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Abstract 
This thesis examines the conception, implementation and outcomes of 
corporate management change strategies through an ethnographic study of a 
commercial vehicle manufacturing plant in Southern India with a history of 
labour-management conflict. Participant observation and interviews were carried 
out mainly within one manufacturing facility between July 2008 and June 2009, 
with a further visit in 2011. Towards the end of my fieldwork I also interviewed 
trade union conveners, activists and a cross-section of workers. 
The change management programme at the case study firm sought to 
implement the precepts of lean manufacturing by removing systemic 
inefficiencies in inventory management and production processes and installing a 
new organisational culture that promoted greater participation and self-initiative 
among workers and managers. Investigating the reasons for this programme’s 
very partial success made it possible to understand better the contradictory 
pressures faced by corporate management, the challenges encountered by senior 
plant managers and the factors shaping the reception of management policies by 
middle managers and workers. 
The thesis furthers our understanding of the limits of managerial agency 
by integrating two largely independent strands of enquiry: the rich ethnographic 
studies of the labour process, by Delbridge [1998], Milkman [1997], Durand and 
Hatzfeld [2003] and others, that consider the implementation and denouement of 
Japanese modes of work organisation such as lean manufacturing, and the 
granular focus on managerial subjectivities that shape managerial activity and 
condition managerial agency, represented by the work of Watson [1994], Jackall 
[1988] and Dalton [1950]. In addition, it documents the importance of broader 
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political-economic contexts in determining the outcomes of management 
initiatives. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.0 Introduction 
This thesis is a case study of the challenges faced by and experiences of senior 
and middle management involved in implementing change management in a 
brownfield commercial vehicle manufacturing plant located in southern India (to 
which I assign the pseudonym EWS). Lean manufacturing lay at the heart of the 
change strategy of corporate management of CompCo (pseudonym for my case study 
firm, owner of EWS), which was intended to increase the efficiency of human 
resources and machinery and protect or enhance profitability. The term ‘change 
management’ from the purview of this thesis implies the intention of corporate 
management, from its headquarters in a town whose pseudonym I assign as Nellore, 
to optimise the use of machinery and workers to attain cost advantages and ‘add 
value’ at every stage of the production process. The senior corporate management of 
CompCo argued that attaining ‘process efficiency’ in its plant had to be combined 
with changing existing ways through which the firm managed human resources, by 
aspiring to create greater involvement and participation at senior plant management, 
middle management, and operator levels. 
EWS, my case study site, is an engine manufacturing and medium duty vehicle 
assembly plant, located in a town in southern India to which I assign the pseudonym 
Hubli. This was the primary case study site for my fieldwork from August 2008 to June 
2009, with a further visit in 2011, and my discussion and findings are excogitated 
primarily on the basis of this research. EWS is one among other manufacturing units of 
CompCo, a large automotive firm located in southern India. It is an old plant amongst 
CompCo’s other plants, established in the early 1980s, and it possessed a traditional  
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hierarchical organisational structure of management. However, CompCo was trying to 
align itself to a changing Indian automotive market, so corporate management was 
attempting to institute lean manufacturing within an older organisational structure in 
EWS where management had worked on the basis of expediency, contingency and 
immediate practicability. These themes will be evident throughout the thesis, as they 
form the managerial undercurrents that guided the implementation of change 
management within EWS and therefore influenced its outcome. 
I now turn my attention to summarising the research questions of this thesis. 
First, I seek to investigate the context within which change management takes place. 
This raises the question of what impels senior management to strategise in this way, to 
respond to changing external factors and/or the internal organisational expectations 
from its employees. I will attempt to answer the question of what strategies the senior 
management of CompCo adopts and why they do so. Second I will investigate the 
processes and outcomes involved in implementing key aspects of corporate 
management’s strategy. In this regard conceiving and implementing these strategies in 
practice are two different things. Through this thesis, I hope to demonstrate underlying 
tensions between the grand narrative of corporate management, the aspirations of the 
change management team that was tasked with implementing change management, 
and the practical exigencies under which plant management had to implement these 
plans. In doing this I will consider the manner in which senior and middle managers in 
EWS responded to corporate management’s change agenda. This defines my third 
important research question, which considers how change management was received 
by different categories of middle managers, what constraints limited their decisions, 
and how this affected how change was implemented. Finally I turn my attention 
towards workers and enquire whether they embraced, inhibited or resisted corporate 
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management’s change management policies, especially with regard to job routines 
and with regard to accepting new vocabularies of participation and self-initiative. 
The remainder of this introductory chapter is divided into four sections. The 
first section, 1.1, lays out the scope of the analytical agenda of the thesis and explains 
the features that distinguish it from similar ethnographic studies in the field. It also 
lays out the study’s delimiting boundaries. The second section, 1.2, outlines the 
contextual factors that have influenced management policy and employee responses, 
both internationally and within India. The third section, 1.3, explains the rationale and 
contemporary relevance of my study. It briefly charts the evolution of my research 
agenda on management policies and industrial relations that led me to this project and 
this research theme. Finally, by way of conclusion, the fourth section, 1.4, explains 
the overall organisational plan of this thesis. 
1.1 The Underlying Analytic Agenda of this Thesis. 
Lean manufacturing is both a process as well as a paradigm. It is a paradigm 
when viewed by much mainstream management literature, because it is seen to 
comprise a set of inherent first principles that delineate it in contrast with older 
paradigms of production such as Fordism. It has a technical component of work 
reorganisation and a social component comprising repercussions on employment 
routines, employee interaction, and industrial relations. I am primarily interested in a 
sociological analysis of the social component of such policies and their 
implementation. The analytic thrust of this thesis will lie in understanding the 
implications of such policies for different categories of middle managers and workers, 
rather than scrutinising the technical pre-requisites required to implement ‘lean’ 
systems of work organisation talked about in the management literature [Womack 
and Jones, 2007; Liker and Convis, 2011]. 
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Overall, then, this thesis will investigate the specific mix and character of lean-
influenced ‘change management’ policies adopted at CompCo. It was very much a 
top, management-driven project, but its implementation by senior plant management 
was also part of a learning process for these managers. It turned out that change 
management was one among other plans it had, such as massive automation, cost 
cutting through head count reduction, outsourcing and also starting afresh in a new 
production setting where lean manufacturing could be implemented from scratch. 
Consequently, I decided to concentrate to a lesser degree on whether CompCo’s 
management adhered to the text book prescriptions of lean manufacturing or whether 
the full repercussions of lean manufacturing on workers (such as tighter coupling of 
work processes or tightly coordinated team efforts, as explained in the labour process 
literature) bore itself out. These ramifications would, however, have been more 
pertinent had the plant gone the full distance in implementing lean manufacturing and 
modular manufacturing. 
I intend to deploy my ‘sociological imagination’ [Mills, 1959] to understand 
the ‘why’ aspect of management policy development and implementation, with 
particular attention to why managers act the way they do in the course of 
implementing change management. My answers to this latter question will focus on 
the social contexts within which managers act as well as their own subjective 
orientations to managerial decision-making. I consider how both economic and 
organisational contexts and managerial subjectivity mould and shape managerial 
decisions. In doing so, I consider how middle managers of EWS experience 
organisational policies designed to motivate and monitor their conduct, how their 
departmental affiliations and career pathways influence their ways of managing and 
how their work links to broader on-going changes in class structure within India. 
Within this thesis, however, I do not intend to focus in particular detail on the 
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negative outcomes that have already been highlighted in the critical literature Ð 
such as work intensification, the fragility of the lean system, or the limits to the 
positive learning effects of lean manufacturing on workers Ð nor do I intend to 
revisit the well-rehearsed criticisms of the IMVP programme [Coffey and 
Thornley, 2008: 85]. Instead I will investigate the implications of the specific 
‘change management’ policies adopted in my case study, while keeping an open 
mind about the strengths and weaknesses of these policies from the vantage points 
of different categories of managers and workers. 
More broadly, wider political and economic casual factors form the overall 
context that influences and conditions managers’ decision making and workers’ 
responses (see section 1.2 below). Studies such as those in Pulignano et al. [2008] 
analyse the forms of governance and control of firms, the shape of supply chains and 
the patterns and forms of trade unionism, and address corresponding worker 
responses and forms of resistance. Inherent in their analysis is a characterisation of 
the macro determinant variables, such as the product strategy of the firm, the choice 
of suppliers in a particular plant, the degree of fragmentation or integration of the 
production process within and across plants and so on, that cumulatively shape the 
character of lean manufacturing production within the plant. Finally, they also 
provide an excellent account of the varied forms which lean manufacturing regimes 
take across plants in many countries. Following the approach of regulation theory 
and arguments about ‘hybridization’, their approach highlights economic and 
political determinants as pivotal for their analysis of evolving patterns of industrial 
relations. In parallel fashion, one of the few extensive fieldwork studies on the 
Indian automotive industry by Becker-Ritterspach [2009], concentrated upon a 
detailed analysis of the elements of management strategy, their links to supplier 
chain integration, and the degree of replicability of production regimes that was 
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possible as they moved from their original exemplars to plants in the developing 
countries. For him an important issue was how the “complex contextual 
embeddedness of subsidiaries impact transfers and adaptations and thereby 
production system hybridization” [Becker-Ritterspach, 2009: 4]. However, as 
Wittgenstein said, “Whereof one cannot speak thereof one must be silent” 
[Wittgenstein: 264, in Morris], and my own case study research is primarily 
focused on internal organisational processes and outcomes, together with the 
immediate organisational context which covers links with suppliers and 
contractors, the state of local labour markets, and local trade union organisations 
and traditions. Thus my claims and findings emanate only from this case study, 
based on empirical data of what I saw and heard, and it is from this starting point 
that I will ground my analysis. This means that the impact of the wider political 
economy on developments in my case-study plant can only be sketched out, and 
also that any extrapolation of projections from my findings to other firms and 
workplaces would commence from my analysis of my case study firm. 
The primary reason for my highlighting this sample of the literature is to 
distinguish my study from this other literature. These studies examine the ‘how’ and 
‘what’ aspects of management policy, the forms of lean manufacturing that result, and 
the end impact it has on workers. I am, on the other hand, interested primarily in the 
‘why’ aspects of managerial policy, the reasons that managers give and have for their 
selection and implementation of policies, and the manner in which competing 
organisational groups interact within EWS to inhibit or further corporate management’s 
agenda. While I utilise the hybridization thesis, the overall degree of replicability or 
failure of lean manufacturing is secondary to me because I view change management 
through the eyes of the specific managers and workers in my case study, and seek to 
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piece together the overall outcome of lean manufacturing in this particular workplace in 
the light of their individual and collective work histories. 
In pursuing this agenda I endeavour to deploy an analytic approach that is 
sensitive to managers concerns and vocabularies and considers the competing 
management constituencies involved. On this basis I seek to provide a more rounded 
approach in examining the process of the transmission and implementation of 
management policy across the organisational hierarchy and understanding the 
competing preoccupations and interpretations of different managers, all of which bear 
on the effectiveness and impact of ‘change management’ policies, rather than simply 
delineating those policies. I am more interested in the character and impact of lean 
manufacturing as a response to immediate corporate management policies within 
EWS, rather than in attributing more general reasons for its success or failure. Hence, 
the objective of studying the implementation of lean manufacturing lay in 
investigating whether and how managerial rhetoric, especially about troubleshooting 
and self-initiative, was translated into working in practice and consequently its day-
to-day implications for middle managers and workers. On the workers front, I wanted 
to understand from the first-hand accounts of trade union leaders and activists, the 
choices they made and the reasons for their doing so as they reacted to a multitude of 
management policies, of which ‘change management’ was only one component. In 
this regard studying EWS’s difficult industrial relations history made me appreciate 
that the sceptical reactions to management policies among trade unions and workers 
were bound and conditioned by the longer historical context of industrial relations 
between management and labour within EWS and CompCo. 
At this point is worth noting that the industrial relations ‘governance 
architecture’ and conventions in India have exhibited continuities with those in 
Britain, partly because of the long-standing links and exchange of ideas, and in the 
 15 
post-war period there was a related cross-fertilisation of the academic industrial 
relations literature in the two countries. More recently, however, much of the 
mainstream management literature and analysis of management strategies and 
industrial relations in India has stemmed from British and American management 
research and theoretical constructs, partly because this management-oriented 
literature has served as the dominant paradigm. Meanwhile a sociological tradition 
of plant level sociology, along the lines of Batstone et al. [1979] and Beynon and 
Nichols [1977], which covered the automotive industry and other parts of British 
manufacturing, has been virtually non-existent within India, but my research seeks 
to draw upon this alternative ethnographic tradition. 
Having laid out my research themes and my analytic agenda, and having 
mentioned that the wider context is an important influence that underlies 
managerial decisions and workers responses, I will now turn my attention to 
explicating the changing macro political economic context that is influencing 
corporate change management policies in India. This will involve a consideration of 
wider developments beyond India in recent years, and also comments on 
developments within India itself, and these are topics addressed in the next section.  
1.2 The Political Economic Context within which Change 
Management is Taking Place 
In this section I will first consider how global economic cycles affect the 
Indian economy and in particular affect the market dynamics of the automotive 
industry. I argue that the interlinked nature of the Indian economy, post-liberalisation 
after 2005, means that it is no longer protected from contagion from external 
economic headwinds. These headwinds influence the Indian economy and affect 
corporate management’s plans and plant management’s production decisions. I 
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will then turn my attention to the immediate Indian context and trace continuities 
and recent developments in the economy and the societal framework that have 
implications for the process and implementation of corporate management plans by 
middle managers and workers. 
1.2.1 The global financial crisis and economic recession of 
2008 and their ramifications for the Indian economy 
The global economic downturn that began in 2008 and continues to this day 
has highlighted the cyclical and yet vulnerable nature of the global economy. The 
fragile nature of the global economy forms the environment within which 
corporations, and thus their managers and workers, operate in order to secure and 
enhance profitability (or extract surplus value) using the best paradigms available, 
such as lean manufacturing and the related reorganisation of the economic value 
chain. Manufacturing firms find themselves operating within an environment of 
uncertainty, indeed within an environment where the fundamental constructs of 
capitalism are being questioned. In this context mainstream management literature 
continues to champion change management programmes such as lean manufacturing 
and to trumpet their success in transforming organisations and empowering 
employees. As we will see shortly, the Indian economy and Indian manufacturing 
firms are now inextricably entwined in these developments. 
I wish to suggest, however, that offering a critique of the purported beneficial 
effects of lean manufacturing on worker knowledge and empowerment is not enough 
as a response to such managerial policies of streamlining the labour process. In 
particular my case study will demonstrate that managers, when they seek to 
implement such projects of organisational change, are buffeted with a basket of 
competing priorities. These competing priorities influence the ways in which 
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managers interpret and respond to the precepts of lean manufacturing, and thus the 
ways in which the theoretical constructs of lean manufacturing are implemented on 
the shop floor. There are different categories of managers who are involved in 
managing the organisation, who bring to bear their distinctive insights and 
interpretations of change management, and this in turn affects the transmission and 
outcomes of management policies through the organisational hierarchy. In this 
regard firms have to do more than minimise their costs and operate in a variety of 
political economic contexts, because they face the uncertain nature of the global 
economy. Indeed, the recent crisis and the recessionary phase of the world economy 
actually suggests that we need to do more than trace cause and effect relationships 
that influence corporate strategy and industrial relations, because we have to address 
the uncertainties and rivalries that beset corporate policy implementation, and in this 
sense the subjective nature of managing and management. 
This thesis operates within a time period from 2008 until the present, and is 
thus located during the changing nature of economic activity in the Indian economy 
after economic liberalisation. The world has not recovered from the aftermath of the 
economic recession of 2008 and India, being inter-linked to the world financial 
system, is now not immune from contagion. During this recessionary period 
dominant international firms have faced challenges, including exemplars of lean 
manufacturing such as Toyota, which has faced both difficulties in recruiting 
workers in Japan and problems in producing for turbulent markets. Thus in my 
view the literature on lean manufacturing could not explain how to manage in a 
recessionary context when manufacturers, hoping for glad tidings produced by the 
continuation of the bubble, were beset with large volumes of unsold vehicles. Thus 
an understanding of the labour process in firms that operate under these conditions 
becomes necessary but not sufficient, because changes in the labour process are 
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driven both by evolving managerial strategies and distinctive industrial relations 
histories. 
The abrupt closure of financial corporations owing to suspect practices has had 
widespread repercussions on the global economy from 2008 and the world has not yet 
recovered from the collapse of the financial services firm Lehman Brothers. The 
collapse of the value of many stocks on Wall Street in the 2008 crisis was triggered by 
a combination of low interest rates and high-risk loans and mortgages in the US 
[Rajan, 2010]. The effects of this crash spilled over across the world because of the 
principle of distributing the risks, and many banks and individuals were left with 
investments whose value had come down to zero. The above developments point to 
the interconnected and interdependent nature of the economy. Furthermore, there were 
pivotal changes in the character of this interconnectedness, as there was a shift from a 
system characterised by assured production, real consumption and active state 
policies, where firms were characterised by a Fordist system of production, to a 
financial system that was based upon stock markets, investor perceptions and volatile 
financial flows. This transformation in the nature of capital mobility has also had major 
consequences for investment and the profitability of manufacturing firms. 
In this context it is possible to regard the renewed interest in Jackall’s [1988] 
book, appropriately titled Moral Mazes, as an indication of the relevance of 
understanding the contradictory but opportunistic nature of corporate management 
conduct and strategy, as management decisions across organisations in recent times 
have led to such deleterious consequences during the recession. Jackall’s work points 
out the subjective and instrumental nature of much managerial activity, as it operates 
across multiple layers and involves multiple interest groups, often intent on 
impression management and organisational rituals that have little to do with the 
overall ends of the organisation. Bearing the above background in mind, any study of 
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those engaged in change management has to seek to understand managers and the 
activity of managing, including the varied and specific motivations and interests of 
those in charge of implementing organisational change and how junior or middle 
managers’ concerns intersect with senior corporate management’s agenda. 
This thesis pursues this agenda by keeping the contradictory, contingent and 
subjective nature of managerial activity at the heart of its enquiry into the implications 
of lean manufacturing for different categories of managers and employees. In this 
regard Indian companies exhibit similar features of management and employment 
relations to those of other capitalist enterprises across the global economy, but they 
are also conditioned by the immediate context they operate under, and this is 
addressed in the next sub-section. 
1.2.2 The immediate Indian context considered 
The present downturn in the Indian economy has its origins in 2008 because 
the world economy has never quite recovered from that crisis. In India, the 2008 
economic slump was driven by declining investment and lower customer demand 
because the commercial vehicle industry was influenced by macroeconomic 
variables, which affected consumer sentiment and deferment of purchases. The 
crisis that commenced in 2008 and continues until this day also reflects other 
internal factors, such as massive political corruption and continuing crony 
capitalism, which alludes to the continuation of the licence permit regime of the 
1970s, albeit in a different form today. 
The modern face of India nevertheless presents an analyst with growing 
consumer demand led by an expanding middle class. Rising middle-class demand 
triggers demand for a variety of goods and services, and engenders complexity in such 
markets as the automotive market, fed by growing demand. Another causal  
 20 
mechanism for the expansion in product portfolios and increasing specialisation in the 
Indian commercial vehicle industry involves the entry of many multinational 
corporations such as Mercedes and Volvo who, though relatively new to the Indian 
automotive market, have long experience of paradigms of work organisation such as 
lean manufacturing or Volvo’s socio-technical experiments. These entrants have 
intensified competition and challenged the established position of old companies such 
as CompCo and TATA, though the latter know the market and its demands inside out. 
For instance, the rules of play in the intercity passenger transportation industry were 
comprehensively overhauled by Volvo’s foray into long-haul, multi-axle buses in 
India in the middle of the 2000 decade which in turn influenced buying decisions of 
intercity bus operators and state transport corporations. Finally, increasing 
specialisation in the cargo and infrastructure industry demanded diversification of the 
product range offered by Indian commercial vehicle firms. 
 Against this background employment relations and wider patterns of social 
relations in India exhibit important continuities in terms of patronage and preferment, 
but also the co-existence of these features with contemporary management practices 
within the government and private sectors. The new vocabularies of participative 
employment and precepts of lean manufacturing began to become popular in India 
even before the crisis, in 2008-2009, spurred by the prescriptions of the global 
management literature (especially the enormous impact of the books of Womack et 
al.), and the manufacturing practices of pioneering multinational and Indian 
automotive firms. Thus lean manufacturing soon became the dominant paradigm that 
was at the heart of corporate strategies for changing existing organisational structures, 
industrial relations practices, and manufacturing processes. Indeed it was such 
changes that forced corporate management at CompCo to implement changes in their 
management policy. 
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Against this background my fieldwork made me interested in the changing job 
and career aspirations of middle managers, that appeared to be triggered by the life-
style changes promised by the burgeoning services sector. The younger middle 
managers I met were, after all, coming into the work force of an old plant, such as 
EWS, that operated in a manufacturing industry that could not measure up to the wage 
levels of the information technology enabled industry. In order to meet global 
competition but also satisfy changing employee expectations, corporate managements 
needed to develop new managerial strategies which yielded productivity gains and 
possibly promised career advancement for managers. 
After the economic liberalisation policies of the Indian state in 1991, the decade 
from 2000 onwards marked a transitional phase for Indian trade unions, who have had 
to face a less sympathetic management supported by provincial governments eager to 
attract investments. However, the new environment under which trade unions have 
operated since 1991, is still within the limits of earlier protective legislation, such as 
the Industrial Disputes Act 1947, which gives protection for established employees 
but little or no protection for contract labour. For trade union leaders within India, as 
in Britain, the era of militant personality-led unionism (epitomised by luminaries such 
as Arthur Scargill and the charismatic communist trade union leader in southern India 
during from the late ‘70s to first half of the 1990s, Comrade Suryanarayana Rao) has 
passed by.1 Instead unions have to satisfy the divergent expectations of different 
groups of workers, and they have to take difficult decisions in responding to 
management policies, some component of which they have little knowledge. Thus 
this marks a period of challenge for Indian trade unions and their leaders. 
From the above discussion, I can summarise the following characteristics that 
define employee relations within contemporary India as: (a) India’s economic  
1 http://pd.cpim.org/2002/july07/07072002 suryanaraya.htm. / 
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ecosystem is no longer an island by itself but is closely entwined with the global 
economy, making work and employment relations more open to market forces; (b) 
there are modern manufacturing and management techniques that co-exist with 
systems of preferment and patronage long characteristic of the Indian social structure; 
(c) there are many social groups among employees in India, such as established 
workers, insecure contract workers and different levels of management, whose 
expectations compete and collide with one another (and therefore require study in 
their own distinctive terms before coming to any overall generalisations); (d) despite 
liberalisation, the state continues to be an important player in arbitrating industrial 
relations disputes and the implications of management policy for employment 
relations. 
1.3 The Rationale and Contemporary Relevance of This Study 
I have an abiding personal intellectual interest in the discipline of industrial 
relations, with which I have been engaging since the beginning of 2000. Here I will 
briefly touch on what interested me in this topic of enquiry and how my interest has 
developed in recent years, against the background macro conditions outlined in the 
previous section. 
My early foray into research on manufacturing industry and trade unionism 
was during the fieldwork for my MPhil study around 2005 [Understanding Trade 
Union Reponses to changing managerial production strategies: A case study of an 
Automotive Component Firm in Bangalore India, 2005], which at that juncture was 
concerned with chronicling competing trade union responses to management policy in 
the Bangalore plant of the German spark-plug manufacturing firm Bosch. Thereupon 
my interest in industrial relations expanded from just chronicling overall trade union 
responses to understanding managerial strategy and the labour process. I became 
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interested in managerial strategies and trade union responses under a diverse range of 
conditions in the automotive sector around the world, where the conventional functions 
of HRM and personnel management appear to have been taken over by manufacturing 
paradigms such as lean manufacturing, six sigma and TQM. These interests culminated 
in the present PhD, which has now widened further in its agenda. 
I was not convinced by the sanguine proclamations of the lean manufacturing 
literature [Womack and Roos, 2007] but instead was led by Wilkinson et al. [1998; 
2010] and Parker and Slaughter [1989] who debunked their claims and instead 
emphasised the themes of management control and work intensification in lean 
manufacturing. Over time, my study of the ethnographic literature demonstrated to me 
that the effects of lean manufacturing, such as work intensification, its fragile nature,  
and the tighter coupling of production processes began to appear similar across 
different plants and companies. However, my own case-study research convinced me 
that I needed to go beyond understanding top management policies and worker 
responses in terms of cause and effect, and instead address those middle managers 
who are trapped in between the competing demands of their superiors and workers 
but are tasked with implementing change management and have to motivate workers 
to deliver on corporate management’s agenda. Furthermore, workers in EWS faced a 
number of other challenges, especially with regard to anxiety over job-security. 
Concomitantly understanding their reactions to management policies, both as 
individuals and via trade unions, becomes important in order to illuminate how both 
middle managers and workers went about receiving, implementing and sometimes 
opposing corporate management policies. 
Thus these are the questions that I have pursued in my ethnographic study of 
management policies and the changing labour process within EWS. As the corporate 
management of CompCo was attempting to implement its project of change 
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management this gave me an opportunity to be a witness and get a first-hand account 
of the challenges and constraints under which these managerial innovations were 
made. In developing this research I was inspired by the writings of the sociologist 
Tony Watson [1994; 2002], who studied the contingent nature of management; Theo 
Nichols and Huw Beynon [1977], whose landmark study of ChemCo considered how 
different types of managers implemented workplace innovations, managed 
contradictory pressures, and controlled and mobilised the workforce, in order to keep 
the plant running profitably, maintain the technical system; Eric Batstone et al.’s 
[1979] classic book on trade union mobilisation and leadership; the ‘hands on’ 
approach to language and meaning developed by the philosopher Wittgenstein [143-
176; Kramer Michael in Crary Alice (eds), 2007e]; and towards the end of my 
research, the work of Robert Jackall [1988] who deals with organisational politics, 
the contradictory nature of managers and the choices they made while deciding 
management policy. All these authors have considerably influenced my train of 
thought and their ideas will form an undercurrent that runs throughout this thesis. 
While my fieldwork in CompCo was done during a period of relative industrial 
quiescence, I also wish to highlight how recent more conflictual events have 
reinforced its relevance. In particular workers recently ‘went on a rampage’ at a 
Maruti-Suzuki plant, causing the death of an HR manager and other employees. I 
glean from reports of these recent developments in Suzuki that the management’s 
patience in regard to labour militancy had thinned, while hostility between regular 
employees (and their unions) and contract workers exacerbated the conflict. 
Such developments highlight the timeliness of sociologically informed 
ethnographic studies of Indian vehicle manufacturing plants of the sort attempted in 
this thesis, which seek to ferret out the underlying causes that might have precipitated 
this unrest. In the Weberian sense of ‘verstehen’, on the activities and understandings 
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of both managers and workers, this thesis offers a timely sociologically informed 
contribution to understanding both the decisions and dilemmas of management 
‘change agents’ and the decisions and dilemmas of trade union leaders under the 
present circumstances, that are increasingly towards management’s advantage. 
This starts from the position that understanding the effectiveness and the 
implications of corporate management policies during recessionary times around the 
world is only possible by getting at the nub of the subjective but contradictory nature 
of managerial activity and combining it with extensive ethnographic data. This 
qualitative approach is timely because it is the best means of understanding both the 
motivations and the structural reasons that underlie such tragic events as the death 
of the HR manager and workers in the Suzuki unrest. Growing labour unrest, such 
as is manifest in the Suzuki example, makes an extensive ethnographic study of the 
implementation and experience of lean manufacturing across automotive plants 
through the eyes of workers and managers paramount, especially as the existing 
labour process literature has not addressed these aspects of management policy and 
labour unrest in any detail in firms operating in India. 
In this regard a first-hand account of how and in what manner both managers 
and trade unionists argue and act during the implementation of corporate ‘change 
management’ programmes is highly relevant. Furthermore, on the trade union side an 
understanding of how competing rivals shape their outlook towards management 
becomes pertinent. My research, influenced by the work of Batstone et al. [1979] helps 
in throwing light on the dilemmas of union organisers and representatives in 
representing, mobilising and servicing the grievances of their members, at a time when 
management is making persistent attempts to alter the terms of engagement with unions 
and implement a new rhetoric of lean manufacturing. Thus a sociologically nuanced 
understanding of trade union responses, emanating from individual accounts of the 
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challenges and experiences of trade union organisers and the collective memory of 
workers, will help in understanding how past experiences and industrial relations 
history mould their responses towards corporate management policies. 
1.4 Conclusion 
By way of a conclusion I will now turn my attention to the sequence of chapters 
in the thesis and indicate their overall contents and aims individually. Chapter 2 is the 
literature review. It reviews salient debates in the labour process and empowerment 
literature, including a set of key ethnographic studies, and then considers several 
important analyses of the perspectives and experiences of managers, the role of trade 
unions in responding to management and representing workers, and the role of contexts 
in influencing the formation and implementation of management policies. Chapter 3 
reviews my methodological choices and the rationale for this qualitative case study. 
Chapter 4 provides an account of the setting of the research. It comments on the wider 
Indian economic and social context of the firm and its factory, lays out the overall layout 
of the plant and registers the key organisational features that can be understood through 
an analysis of the setting. Chapter 5 lays out CompCo’s senior management’s agenda 
for corporate change, discusses the way in which it sought to implement this agenda, 
and some of the challenges it faced. Chapter 6 investigates in detail the implementation 
of change management by CompCo and how CompCo management tried to resolve its 
problems. 
It tries to understand the implications of change management for middle 
management within EWS and the critical role of career pathways, as different cohorts of 
managers respond to and facilitate or inhibit corporate management policy. Chapter 7 
traces the industrial relations history of the firm and identifies workers response to the 
multiple but contradictory strategies pursued by corporate management. It then 
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considers the strategies and the dilemmas of trade union leaders as they seek to deal with 
new developments alongside persisting old continuities.  
Finally, Chapter 8 concludes the thesis and tries to answer the broad questions 
that are listed in Section 1.0 in this chapter about organisational change and employee 
response. 
I hope the works offers some insight for the reader and that it achieves what the 
poet T. S. Eliot (‘Litte Gidding’, The Four Quartets, Section 5) calls the objective 
end of any work of writing- “What we call the beginning is often the end. And to 
make an end is to make a beginning. The end is where we start from.” 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
2.0 Introduction 
In this literature review, I will outline key aspects of change management and proceed 
to suggest the questions they raise for a case study in vehicle manufacturing like mine. The 
literatures I draw on are primarily from the labour process approach and management studies, 
including ethnographic studies in these traditions, which illuminate management policies and 
workers’ responses. The purpose of this literature review chapter is to provide a selective 
review of the sociological and employment relations literature on the efforts of corporate 
managements to reorganise and even transform work processes and practices under the 
banner of ‘change management’. This literature addresses the form, intensity, and 
completeness of such efforts at ‘change management’ and the implications and consequences 
for various categories of managers and operators. I also draw on some critical literature on 
industrial relations, particularly in relation to issues of worker mobilisation and union 
organisation. 
My primary aim in this chapter is to support those commentators who (i) address the 
social positioning of managers, recognise the tensions that they face in developing and 
implementing their policies and register the often partial and unrealised nature of change 
management programmes, and (ii) argue for the need to locate managerial decision making and 
workers’ responses within a subtle appreciation of the specificities of context, including the 
political and economic context of firms. Throughout this chapter, I attempt to address the 
tension between the structures that shape management's decisions and the agency, which they 
can exercise to shape policies and outcomes. Each section of this chapter seeks to explain and 
justify appropriate conceptual tools and research questions relevant to my own research.  Thus, 
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I will lay out the arguments prevalent in the literature that helped me in arriving at my key 
research questions. 
Section 2.1 starts by considering the competing logics of management policies for 
reorganising work and managing workers, by comparing ‘responsible autonomy’ and ‘direct 
control’ approaches. It then pursues the issues raised in these discussions by moving to a more 
specific consideration of debates around management policies that claim to ‘empower’ 
employees, before considering the implications of selected ethnographic studies that have 
examined the impact of both lean manufacturing and associated involvement strategies in 
specific manufacturing workplaces. Having addressed the substantive character and dynamics 
of such change management policies in increasing detail, the chapter then looks particularly at 
some key questions about the character of worker responses to management, before 
considering two issues that are touched on but not addressed in detail in much of this 
literature. The first such issue concerns the varying roles and subjective orientations of 
managers as active agents of change management, while the second concerns the wider 
context within which firms operate and the ways in which such contexts may influence the 
selection and modification of established management policy templates. I will examine the 
question of the means through which managers aim to achieve what they regard as the optimal 
utilisation of the factors of production, which involves seeking to balance the contradictory 
logics of ‘responsible autonomy’ and ‘direct control’ [Andrew Friedman, 1977: 48]. I explore 
the argument that managers should allocate specific tasks to employees whom they view as 
best suited for the role demanded by specific job routines. I contrast this with the argument 
that managers should adopt a participative style, which aspires to some measure of autonomy 
for employees and aims to bring about voluntary commitment and perhaps hasten the 
resolution of production-related problems without having to travel up through the 
organisational hierarchy. 
In Section 2.2 I will then consider the more specific debates about empowerment and 
participation that may overlay changes in the core production process, whether these involve 
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measures that are sometimes conceptualised as forms of soft HRM, or are part of a 
compendium of measures implemented under the title of lean manufacturing, or are part of 
the contrasting model of group working inspired by the Volvo experiment at Uddevala 
[Sandberg, 1995]. This section relates to the previous discussion on the selection and 
implementation of management policies by trying to understand what management policies 
demand from employees, the modes of management exercised in pursuance of those 
demands and the various means through which employees are expected to respond to meet 
these demands. 
These issues are then followed up in more detail in Section 2.3 through an examination 
of examples drawn from ethnographic case studies, which illuminate the key features of lean 
manufacturing and how their implementation has affected different constituents in factories 
where it has been adopted. These ethnographic studies attest to the contextual nature under 
which lean manufacturing regimes operate between the continuum of tight managerial control 
on one end and team-work and participation at the other. 
Section 2.4 builds on the findings of the ethnographic studies and selectively addresses 
the literature on how management policies and indeed change management are received by 
operators and workers, who are the targets for many of these management policy initiatives in 
the manufacturing sector. The literature I draw on here interrogates the question of 
representation and whether this representation speaks with one voice or whether there are 
differing priorities amongst those who represent labour. I address these questions by looking 
particularly at the arguments made by Batstone et al. and earlier debates raised by Richard 
Hyman. I then address some further industrial relations contributions that seek to understand 
worker and union responses to the exercise of management prerogatives, with particular 
attention to the implications of John Kelly’s [1998] discussion of worker grievances and 
mobilisation. In this section, I also return to the ethnographic literature to consider the various 
means by which operators have reacted to management policies. 
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Section 2.5 of my literature review then considers the rationales for managerial agency, 
and in particular the arguments used by managers to justify their actions. It does this by looking 
at two different genres of literature: first, that stemming from Hyman, who emphasises the 
constraints and contradictions besetting management strategies, and second, that represented by 
the work of Tony Watson, who focuses sympathetically on the moral orientations of managers 
as they cope with organisational pressures and dilemmas. It then considers Jackall’s [1988] 
work on the morality of management and how the varying interests of different individuals 
shape managerial policy. In this way, my review of the literature registers the emerging dialectic 
between managers as agents of capital responsible for co-coordinating and realising surplus 
value, and managers as subjective agents within a distinctive moral economy. Both of these 
approaches are treated as aspects of the ways in which change management policies are enacted 
and implemented by those in charge. In particular, I will draw on Watson’s perspective to show 
that, from an individual manager’s vantage point, there are real apprehensions about matters 
such as what superiors think, the fear of punishment and the necessity of adopting policies 
thought to be the best current option for ensuring organisational survival. This section differs 
from the preceding section because the literature here addresses how managers justify and 
implement management policies. 
Finally, Section 2.6 considers in more detail some of those commentators who have 
argued for the importance of context in understanding the evolution of corporate policy. This is 
an important section because this literature demonstrates the role that contextual factors have 
in the conceptualisation and implementation of change management projects by senior 
management, and indeed in the reception of these policies by middle managers and workers.  
This section also considers the processes of selection and interpretation of change 
management paradigms such as those embracing specific modes of work organisation (for 
example ‘lean manufacturing’), and reviews the literature on the hybridization of such 
paradigms. As such, it addresses the effects of both ‘systemic’ and ‘cultural’ influences 
on the implementation of these policies. 
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The above debates serve cumulatively to illuminate a set of research questions that 
address the implementation of change management policies by management, and their 
limitations, implications and outcomes as these are experienced by senior managers, middle 
managers and operators, which I set out to examine in my ethnographic case study of an 
automotive plant in southern India. I have not addressed the methodological literature directly 
in this chapter because I will explain the rationale for the choice of qualitative research 
methods in the methodology chapter. 
2.1 Options for Strategic Change: Responsible Autonomy versus 
Direct Control 
In this section, I consider some of the management strategies that have been 
documented in the literature on the management of change and what the literature suggests 
about the reasons why managers select one strategy or another. Commentators have pointed 
out that managers continually face tensions between a wish to control employees and their 
wish to gain the commitment of employees through various strategies that imply 
empowerment rather than control 
The underlying conflict, between labour and labour power in labour process theory, is 
that there is an inescapable compulsion to produce surplus value and there is a resultant 
antagonism between the functions of capital and labour and the need for managerial 
mechanisms of surveillance and discipline. At the same time, the labour process does not 
represent the whole ‘circuit of capital [Thompson, cited in Spencer, 2000: 232]. It does not 
provide the whole explanation for production, accumulation and realisation of surplus value.  
Furthermore, this rather abstract theorisation of the imperatives characterising the capitalist 
labour process does not in itself provide sufficient tools to understand variations in 
management policy towards labour and broader repertoires of management strategy. 
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I will therefore consider the debate about the relationship between responsible 
autonomy and direct control as a less abstract way of addressing management options, but one 
which retains a concern with the extraction of a surplus from labour. This will allow me to 
elaborate upon the various ways in which employees are perceived at different points of time 
by the organisation, collectively as well as individually, and consider how projects designed to 
empower or control them influence their responses to change management. Within 
mainstream management literature, by writers who hail from the competitive advantage 
perspective like Michael Porter [2011: 4] identify the main features of corporate strategy, the 
adoption of which influences the extant adoption of its responsible autonomy or direct control 
to manage its employees: 
Strategy is the creation of a unique and valuable position, involving a 
different set of activities. Strategy requires you to make trade-offs in 
competing to choose what not to do. Some competitive activities are 
incompatible; thus, gains in one area can be achieved only at the expense of 
another area. Strategy involves creating “fit” among a company’s activities. 
Fit has to do with the ways a company’s activities interact and reinforce one 
another. 
However, it should also be recognised that Hyman uses his broader discussion of the challenges 
management faces in organising the extraction of a surplus to make a crucial point about the 
limitations of neat functional typologies of management strategy such as the above definition, when 
he emphasises that: 
Managerial strategy is best conceptualised as programmatic choice among 
alternatives none of which can prove satisfactory. The internal coherence of 
managerial activity as a collective labour process cannot be taken for 
granted. [Hyman, 1987: 30] 
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Nevertheless, managers manage their workplaces and understand change management in 
different modes, and we first need to understand the ways in which managerial activities are 
perceived in terms of both their consequences and the ways in which managers perceive 
themselves. Dealing with and managing other managers and workers within management is, as 
Thompson and McHugh [2002: 12] point out, a fundamental challenge of management begins 
with an undercurrent running through ‘managerialism’ They write: 
Common to all versions of rational efficiency is that the logical basis of 
action is held to reside with the manager. In contrast, employees who 
restrict or oppose such action are frequently held to be acting irrationally, 
governed by a ‘logic of sentiment’ rather than one of efficiency. 
The challenge for management is to encourage employees to do their best on their own volition 
through a range of employee initiatives that exclude conventional collective bargaining but involve 
representative participation, including joint consultation and Japanese-style company councils; 
downward communications, including team briefing, employee Financial reports, and other 
media; Financial Employee involvement, including Employee Share Ownership Plans and 
profit sharing/ bonus schemes; and upward problem solving, including suggestion schemes, 
quality circles, and Total Quality Management. [Ackers, 2010: 68] 
The panoply of these measures are otherwise also known as Quality of Working Life 
initiatives (QWL)[Katz, 2004: 301] which according to Katz and Kochan [Katz, 2004: 301], are 
“oriented towards improving organisational performance and working lives of employees. They 
operate at the lowest level of industrial relations activity, namely the shop floor through the 
involvement of groups of workers.” The obverse critique of autonomy is that the managerial 
strategy of direct control lays down tightly prescribed procedures, closely integrates production 
processes, monitors employees minutely, and lays down stringent strictures against their violation. 
Andrew Friedman [1977] pioneered the analysis of this strategic dualism, whilst also 
seeking to grasp the tensions and limitations of each end of the spectrum of managerial 
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control and employee discretion and thus the complex mixes of policy that could actually 
result. He started from the observation that management is not a two-tier process where work 
organisation designed by engineers is primary, and the exercise of management counter 
pressure to worker resistance is secondary. Both are managerial problems that are measured 
in terms of profits. If the costs in terms of worker resistance are too great, alternative 
strategies would have to be tried and these will involve changes in the organisation of work 
[Friedman, 1977: 45]. 
As Friedman [2000: 68] in his later writing suggests, “There are systematic, 
predictable influences on the direction management moves along the continuum in response to 
changing product and labour market conditions, changing technological conditions and 
internal interactions.” Friedman [1977: 48] argues that the “responsible autonomy” approach 
entails allowing workers a wide measure of mental and physical agency over the direction of 
their tasks whilst getting them to identify with the competitive aims of the enterprise so that 
they will act ‘responsibly’ with the minimal amount of supervision, thus saving senior plant 
management time and money. This characterisation is given a distinctive twist by a 
perspective from labour economics, which argues that it is cheaper to pay efficiency wages 
where it is costly to monitor the performance of employees and when the overall long-term 
goal is to attain a lower wage-cost equilibrium in an employer’s iso-cost curve [McConnell et 
al., 2007: 254]. The expectation on the part of the employer is that higher wages and the 
feeling of autonomy will offset the tendency of employees not to identify with corporate 
management targets and goals. Empowerment policies can be seen as one form of such a 
strategy of ‘responsible autonomy’, and as such have also been depicted as a requisite 
stepping stone for ‘High Performance Work Organisations’ applying strategic HRM practices. 
[Applebaum and Batt, 1994]. 
Both Friedman and the ‘efficiency wage’ theorists suggest that strategies emphasising 
‘responsible autonomy’ may be more attractive to some managers and firms than to others. 
One influence noted by Friedman is the level of trade union organisation and worker 
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cohesion, which may represent a particular challenge to policies of direct control and 
encourage managers to co-opt or bargain with well-organised workers. Another influence 
noted by economists is the level of complexity and uncertainty of the production process and 
the product market. This suggests, for example, that if the product market for commercial 
vehicles needed polyvalent workers with extended training, it might make sense to adopt 
some variant of a ‘responsible autonomy’ strategy. 
Thus Friedman’s argument about ‘responsible autonomy’ versus ‘direct control’ 
provides a valuable point of departure for the analysis of varied and changing management 
policies, particularly in regard to the organisation of the labour process and the management 
of labour, and especially if Hyman’s point about the tensions and limitations facing all policy 
options is borne in mind. Thus I will shortly draw upon Friedman’s discussion of ‘responsible 
autonomy’ and ‘direct control’ to review the concept of empowerment. Before doing this, 
however, I also wish to note that Edwards [2003: 348] draws on his own work and also that of 
Marsden to develop a more sophisticated version of this typology, and uses it to analyse a 
wide range of issues including skills, labour market structures and the organisation of pay and 
incentives, though he does not choose to evaluate the substantive value of his analysis other 
than using it to organise a wide range of materials. 
 In my opinion, the utility of these approaches is to situate in a broader historical 
context the modes of controlling labour and extracting surplus value from it. Edwards 
suggests that empowered staff were more likely to engage in a beyond contract effort, i.e. 
beyond the normal call of duty, and he also argues that there has tended to be little union 
negotiation concerning the principle of such initiatives (an empowerment paradox) with 
design and planning excluding union involvement. In practice, however, issues arising out of 
the implementation of empowerment often become industrial relations matters. For example, 
job enlargement can threaten traditional demarcation lines as well as raise remuneration 
issues. As the case studies of such researchers as Milkman [1997] and Graham [1995] 
illustrate, employees tend not to question the principles of empowerment but turn the 
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promised discourse of empowerment against itself and ask management why it did not 
deliver on its claims. Edwards [2003: 348] also incorporates the discussion of ‘bleak house’ 
strategies where employers impose poor terms and conditions and exclude unions, a phrase 
first used by Sisson [Sisson, 1993: 1108, cited in Marchington and Grugalis] as well as 
consideration of areas of employee agency and resistance into his model.  
Edwards and Belanger [2006: 306,308] analyse the empirical evidence relating to the 
extent of control and autonomy, which illustrates the need for careful consideration of such 
case-study data before arriving at theoretical generalisations. Their appraisal of case studies of 
workplace ethnographies case studies indicated that “managements applied a top-down and 
unitarist approach, and trust relations were absent or weak. The participation “schemes were 
operated at the discretion of management since there was no commitment by management to 
be bound by discussions”. A valuable insight offered by is the requirement of combining the 
analytic findings and insights of several ethnographic case studies bearing in mind the 
underlying determinants of industrial relations such as market conditions, technology and 
production organisation and managerial strategy in order to explicate the effects of managerial 
policies of control or discretion upon employees I will return to their arguments and analysis 
in Section 5, which considers worker responses to change management initiatives. 
The implications of this discussion of managerial control and autonomy culminate 
in the following research themes that form the subtext of my first two research questions: 
first, ‘What overall strategies for the organisation of production and the management of 
labour have managers in my case-study company developed in recent years?’ and second, 
‘How far do these strategies involve a focus on ‘responsible autonomy’ or how far are they 
characterised by ‘direct control’?’ 
The next section takes its cue from the discussion on responsible autonomy and 
investigates, given an a priori assumption that if employees were granted responsible 
autonomy, what would be the main features of this employee discretion, and in what ways 
would employees be expected to exercise it. The definitions may be as broad and all-inclusive 
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as ‘any form of delegation to or consultation with employees’, or as narrow as a ‘formal, on-
going structure of direct communications’ such as through the mechanism of team briefing. 
Some authors refer to involvement as participation while others use empowerment, voice, or 
communications, often without extracting the conceptual meanings or differences that are 
used in practice [Wilkinson and Dundon, in Wilkinson, Golan Marchington and Levin (eds), 
2010: 168]. The features of direct participation and its effect on employees are broadly termed 
as empowerment, comprised of: 'information sharing' of the companies’ challenges; future 
plans and why and where employees’ active participation beyond their employment contract 
is needed; 'upward problem solving'; 'task autonomy'; and, finally, through 'voice systems', 
which broadly implies various modes of granting voice to employees’ concerns through 
downward communication of management's plans [Wilkinson and Dundon, in Wilkinson, 
Golan Marchington and Levin (eds), 2010: 171-178]. I will now turn my attention to 
understanding empowerment and its main features. 
2.2 The rhetoric of empowerment and changing employees’ attitudes 
It is argued by some authors that empowering employees promotes more egalitarian 
workplaces, where through effective leadership practices and by deploying Total Quality 
Management, managers and the managed go beyond a contractual transactional relationship 
and strive to achieve quality and productivity that could not come out in a more authoritarian 
frame work [Guillen and Gonzalez, 2010: 186]. Wilkinson [1998] identifies some of the key 
elements of the rhetoric associated with empowerment. In this new discourse, managers are 
exhorted to trust and involve employees; different forms of control are demanded from earlier 
supervisory arrangements. Wilkinson [1998: 150] refers to “simultaneous loose-tight 
properties” of the resulting arrangements, with specific reference to control through shared 
values (of ‘customer service’, etc.) so that employees have greater discretion with regard to 
how they carry out their jobs to meet these core corporate values. In this context, he directs 
the reader towards Morton’s [1994] idea that workers have two jobs: one is to carry out 
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designated tasks and the other is to search for improvements. In this view, middle managers 
[Wilkinson, 1998: 43] become facilitators, coaches and motivators, encouraging participation, 
teamwork and the delegation of responsibility and accountability which helps foster pride, job 
satisfaction and better work. At the same time, there are rival justifications of an 
empowerment strategy within the business studies literature, ranging from perceptions of 
employees as resources associated with the ‘Hard’ model of HRM, to regarding them as 
agents that can develop the organisation’s core competencies, to seeking them as sources of 
individual competitive advantage [Legge, 2003: 87].  A related strand of the mainstream 
management literature claims that if line managers are delegated greater power and freedom 
to take quick decisions, they will participate more robustly in realising their immediate senior 
management’s objectives. This is because they will feel a sense of ownership over the tasks 
they perform, feel responsible and find meaning in their work. This implies they will be 
accountable for the tasks that they perform [Bowen and Lawler, 1992: 33]. 
Meanwhile, the practice of continuous improvement is seen as increasing employee 
involvement in decision-making, although there is little discussion as to whether it is 
relatively low grade, task-centred involvement or a more significant form of participation 
and shared decision-making. In practice, there is a basic ambiguity in TQM in that, while 
employers seek the commitment and empowerment of their employees, increased employee 
responsibility for the work process is a cornerstone of the approach [Hill and Wilkinson, 
1995: 14-16]. 
As these comments suggest, there are varied conceptualisations and interpretations of 
‘empowerment’, and the effects of such policies are also strongly contested. Indeed, there is 
no clear agreement in the literature on what the term ‘empowerment’ implies, and 
disagreements cover basic questions around what powers or capacities are granted to the 
empowered, how their power is enhanced, what areas of activity or decision-making they 
cover, and who is included in these processes [Hales, 2000: 502]. For example, 
empowerment of employees may be seen as an independent project of soft HRM [Legge, in 
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Cummings and Wilson (eds), 2003: 87], designed to implement organisational attitudinal 
change, or it may be seen as an aspect of broader changes in work organisation, such as 
TQM, lean manufacturing or even Swedish versions of group working. This also leaves open 
important questions about the ways in which such changes in the responsibilities of 
employees are tied to payment and reward systems, for example through ‘performance-
related pay’ or symbolic rewards and recognition. 
Most crucially, there are major questions about the boundaries of any control that 
workers may be granted. Does management retain a veto over the ways in which workers use 
their enhanced involvement, over the implications for effort or manning levels for example, 
so that worker empowerment is only pursued within these limits? Put another way, is 
‘empowerment’ a zero-sum or a non zero-sum game (Hales, 2000: 502): are managers 
relinquishing power as it is delegated to workers, or can they grant power to workers while 
also retaining or even enhancing their own capabilities? Relatedly, does empowerment mean 
the acquisition of power by workers, or rather its passive receipt simply because someone 
else in the organisation has given up notional charge of organisational functions previously 
held by employees higher up in the organisation? And does this mean loading more 
‘responsibility’ than ‘autonomy’ on to non-managerial jobs, even though employees may not 
necessarily be given adequate means to discharge their new responsibilities? Furthermore, 
Hales [2000: 502] also poses the question of whether empowerment is specifically about 
“more autonomy or choice over how work is done or greater voice in the [wider] decisions of 
the work place or organisation as a whole”. Even the optimistic literature suggests that the 
first option is more likely for ordinary employees, though middle managers may be 
empowered to encourage wider innovation and change. 
Overall, then, it is management that empowers employees, and such initiatives have 
tended to cover direct workforce involvement over only a relatively small number of issues 
usually connected with the production process or service delivery. Furthermore, Wilkinson 
[1997: 47] develops the argument that direct management communication of ‘company 
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challenges’ reduces the room for maneuver of operators and employees, and it is in this 
context that managers allow employees to communicate horizontally so they can collect 
information outside their workgroup and are able to make effective customer-related 
decisions (e.g. replacing defective products). Managers can also influence outcomes by 
their selection and allocation of employees to particular teams. In short, there may be 
some greater autonomy and responsibility at the point of production or service delivery, 
but it is usually tightly circumscribed. 
Empowerment and self-initiative of employees are encouraged through the direct 
participation of employees, which is defined by Wilkinson and Dundon [Wilkinson, Gollan 
and Marchington and Levin (eds), 2010: 168] as, “any form of delegation to or consultation 
with employees”, or as narrow as a “formal, ongoing structure of direct communications 
such as through team briefing”. 
Empowerment and participation of employees is achieved through the language of 
“soft Human Resource Management” practice that communicates “images of care and 
nurturing in order to develop employees as valuable members of the organization who help 
it achieve its goals” [Harley and Hardy, 2004: 379]. Paraphrasing Wilkinson and Dundon 
[Wilkinson, Gollan and Marchington and Levin (eds), 2010: 174-179] who identify the main 
features of Direct Participation of employees: 
i) Information sharing: Information on management plans and challenges is passed downwards  
to employees  to win them over and make them empathise with its business decisions and 
challenges in order to bring out greater employee commitment. 
ii) Upward problem-solving techniques seek to go further than communications by tapping 
into employee ideas for improvements. As with communication methods, problem-solving 
practices have been inspired by Japanese work systems and encourage employees to offer 
ideas for improvement. By leveraging the suggestions of employees management can 
improve its production practices and seek to promote a more co-operative Industrial 
Relations climate ...Workers communicate to managers rather than managers transmitting 
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information to workers.  Upward problem solving begins with workers letting management 
know that there is a problem and allow them to deal with it. 
iii) Voice over: Employees are allowed to air their views and grievances openly and independently 
through a voice system rather than being able to raise just work-related issues. 
iv) Task autonomy: Allowing work groups greater control of its activities. These work 
groups are known as team working or self-managing teams. 
“The work group itself decides details of production and work group norms to a 
much larger extent than the former job restructuring schemes. Such teams can 
have autonomy, concerning task allocation and scheduling, monitoring of 
attendance, health and safety issues, the flow and pace of production, and 
can also be responsible for setting improvement targets.” [Wall and Martin, 
1987 cited in Wilkinson,1997,48] 
v) Self-Management: Work groups manage their production by themselves but 
are constrained by limits set by management. 
Wilkinson and Dundon [2010:177] also point out that the above mentioned features 
of direct participation are overlapping and are by no means discrete entities such as, for 
instance, information sharing, which overlaps all other features as an important pre-
requisite rather than an independent feature in its own right.  
Expressions of direct participation and self-initiative may range from worker 
participation in ‘High Involvement Management’ to varying degrees of Total Quality 
Management regimes. High Involvement Management practices are characterised by team 
working, pro-active suggestion schemes, rapid idea generation, functional flexibility in their 
work, skill acquisition and team work [Bowen and Lawler, in Wood in Wilkinson, Gollan 
and Marchington and Levin (eds), 2010: 410]. The main features of TQM identified by Hill 
and Wilkinson [1995: 9] are as follows:  
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 a) Customer focus: its customer centric approach to satisfy the quality requirements of 
workers who are in the next stage of the line who are termed as internal customers and most 
importantly the customers of the end product. b) Process orientation. The activities performed 
within an organization can be broken down into basic tasks or processes (transformations of 
inputs into outputs). Basic processes are linked in series or “quality chains” to form extended 
processes. The production process, for example, is modeled as an extended chain of interlinked 
basic processes. c) Continuous improvement where employees continually strive to improve 
production processes and quality by identifying and implementing requisite changes. 
However, detractors of employee participation couched in the nurturing and 
empowering vocabularies of soft HRM point out that implications for employees in practice 
might remain unrecognised by advocates who herald participation and empowerment as the 
stepping-stone towards employee commitment and organisational excellence. 
Practices, such as work intensification or downsizing, which may lead to 
‘bad’ experiences and material consequences for employees, can be enacted 
because the convergent, benevolent identity of HRM will conveniently 
construct them as an ideologically ‘good’ thing. This combination of 
convergent meaning and ambiguous practice makes HRM a powerful tool 
for managers. [Harley and Hardy, 2004: 393] 
With these arguments in mind, sceptics about empowerment and indeed many of the detailed 
ethnographic studies [Graham, 1995; Delbridge, 1998; Durand and Hatzfeld, 2003; Rinehart et al., 
1997] point out that the main goal of empowerment is a shift away from joint regulation to forms of 
participation that do not challenge management prerogative. Sometimes ‘empowerment’ is 
specifically framed in terms of eliciting the efforts of individual employees, but more often, where it 
is directed at clusters or ‘teams’ of workers, it is management that generally defines the parameters 
and objectives of such ‘teamwork’, thus undermining any independent collectivity.  Thus, as the 
case study material mentioned above shows, there have remained vast gaps between the 
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articulation of a rhetoric of empowerment and its implementation, which often runs in parallel 
with a reduction in workforce numbers as teams are required to work constantly towards the 
reduction of labour costs, as illustrated particularly in the Graham [1995] and Rinehart et al. 
[1997] studies which are considered more fully below. 
Later sections of this chapter will: review in more detail the implications of the rich 
case-study literature for our understanding of management policies; consider the character of 
worker responses to such policies, with particular attention to the scope and limits of 
collective mobilisation; consider how to conceptualise the wider context in which firms 
operate and pursue change management policies; and address the ways in which firms may 
borrow, adapt or ‘hybridize’ management policies developed by pioneering firms and/or 
promulgated by leading consultancy firms. 
In the above discussion I considered the rhetoric of empowerment, and registered the 
manner in which regimes of employee participation manifested themselves and criticisms 
leveled against them for their distance between what they promise and their actual intentions. 
The research questions that arise from the above discussion are: 
• How far has management at my case-study firm embraced a rhetoric and/or policy of 
empowerment? 
• To what degree has this rhetoric and policy actually evolved in terms of devolved 
powers and responsibilities and for whom? 
• Were there distinctive limits to the extent of empowerment in this firm? 
• What features facilitated and what features undermined worker commitment 
to empowerment? 
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2.3 Principal themes in the ethnographic literature on 
the implementation and effects of lean manufacturing 
The advocates of lean manufacturing such as Womack et al [2007] tend to present 
it as a total package of techniques that need to be adopted as a basis for major 
productivity gains based on a transformation of employment and production relations 
with line managers and production management interloping into what was considered as 
the domain of the HRM department and its assemblage of QWL measures. This package 
includes new forms of team working, just-in-time production, direct worker 
responsibility for quality and kaizen (continuous improvement). Furthermore, they argue 
that such innovations generate new, more harmonious and co-operative relationships 
among workers and between workers and managers, characterised by the practical 
empowerment of workers on the shop floor. It incorporates the main tenets of TQM 
schemes and high involvement models. However, the ethnographic case studies which I 
examine in this section provide a more sceptical view of these changes based on detailed 
workplace research. In particular, they often draw on labour process theory to highlight 
the negative experiences of workers and the gap between the rhetoric and the reality of 
worker empowerment in the workplaces they studied. In addition, case-study research 
can also raise questions about the varying ways in which lean manufacturing ideas are 
actually adopted in different firms, rather than simply conforming to a universal template. 
As such, these ethnographies provide more detailed guidance on key issues that I need to 
investigate in my own research, building on the issues raised already in this chapter but 
giving added focus to my research agenda. 
The rest of this section starts by looking at ethnographic findings about team-
working, because this is often seen as the basis of lean manufacturing. It then considers 
other key innovations that surround team-working and are claimed to give lean 
manufacturing its distinctive character, by considering the critical ethnographic 
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analyses of ‘Just in Time’ (henceforth JIT), detailed monitoring of the production 
process, and continuous improvement. It then provides some brief comments on studies of 
other forms of work organisation as a context for discussing the conditions which have 
influenced the adoption and adaptation of lean manufacturing methods in the ethnographic 
case-study workplaces. 
Team-working has long been recognised as an important feature of Japanese 
corporations in their specific national institutional context [Pudelko in Haak and 
Pudelko, 2005: 189; Sako, 2006: 108-113] but more recently it has also been identified 
as an important feature of management innovation in the West in recent years. Team-
working implies reorganising work tasks: it is a socialisation device aimed at 
overcoming conflicts between employees and especially between management and 
workers. In the context of the manufacturing industry, citing Buchanan, Danford, [1998: 
410] identifies the main features of team work in the context of modes of work 
organisation such as lean manufacturing: 
The key features of Japanese teamworking are drawn from a Toyota 
model which is little different to classic scientific management: 
‘minimum manning, multi-tasking, multi-machine operation, pre-
defined work operations, repetitive short-cycle work, powerful first line 
supervisors, and a conventional managerial hierarchy’. [1994: 219] 
These features of team work differ from the team work of the Swedish socio-technical mode 
of work organisation, where operators manage themselves within their team with a lesser 
degree of managerial intervention as compared to lean manufacturing [Danford, 1998: 410]. 
Workers in the socio-technical mode of work organisation completed a number of complex 
but varied tasks which provide with them avenues to apply their intelligence and discretion 
and do a great variety of operational tasks with long cycle times, unlike lean manufacturing, 
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where the main components of job routines and cycle times are clearly spelt out by 
management. 
In the management literature, developing a cell-base team structure is seen as 
helping communication and acceptance of change, and through peer pressure reduces the 
need for tight supervision and other forms of external control, which in turn facilitates de-
layering. Rubenstein and Kochan [2001: 141] identify the advantages team-working 
brought about in their study of the Saturn plant instituted by a partnership of the UAW 
and General Motors in America, as follows: 
The key contribution that Saturn's teams (and teams of any other 
organisation) make are to enable rapid co-ordination and enhance 
problem solving on a continuous and, as needed, periodic basis. Teams 
can do so if they bring grounded and diverse expertise to bear on a 
problem and can act to implement ideas that have merit [.] 
However, critiques of the rhetoric of team work in lean manufacturing, such as Legge [2003: 
83,84] citing Parker and Slaughter, point out that the nature of job routines within a team 
dictated by those who regulate the pace of work, the job routines of individual members are 
characterised by 'peer-surveillance' and the members adhere to “management by compliance”  
and “the nature and pace of work are prescribed by whoever has the ‘whip-hand’.  
Gall augments to Legge’s portrayal of team work by citing Parker and Slaughter  of  
teamwork being hard, not to say oppressive, and lacking any potential for enjoyment. It also 
suggests that work will be the same, day in, day out, and relieved only by the odd rest day.” 
[(Parker and Slaughter 1985) p365,cited in Gall, 2010] 
According to Cooper [(1973), cited in Wilkinson 1998: 48], such groups can 
have ‘skill discretion’ (solving problems with the knowledge of the group) and also 
‘means discretion’ (choice in organising the means and tools of work), but it should be 
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noted that they are still working within a structure determined by senior management 
and remain focused on operational rather than strategic issues. In broad terms this 
means giving more responsibility and greater autonomy to the work team and 
replacing immediate supervisors with team leaders. At its most basic level this may 
mean removing inspectors from the production line as workers take on wider 
responsibility, or it may involve the more significant restructuring of work units into 
cells (often around product flows) or even the creation of semiautonomous work 
groups now commonly referred to as self-managing teams. The most ambitious 
versions of this differ from job rotation, enlargement and enrichment in that the 
work group itself decides the details of production and work group norms to a much 
larger extent. Wilkinson cites the observation of Wall and Martin [(1987) cited in 
Wilkinson, 1998: 48] that such teams may have task autonomy concerning task 
allocation and scheduling, monitoring of attendance, health and safety issues, and 
the flow and pace of production. They may also be responsible for setting 
improvement targets (see the discussion of Kaizen below) and for the recruitment 
and training of temporary staff, as well as controlling overtime levels. 
In the workplace ethnographies, however, the scope of team autonomy is 
generally much more circumscribed, focusing on guaranteeing work pace and quality, 
fine-tuning the internal allocation of tasks and contributing to continuous improvement. 
On this basis, Graham [1995: 148] argues that the team concept in the firm she studied, a 
non-unionised Japanese green-field auto ‘transplant’ in the early 1990s, obfuscated the 
capitalist worker relationship because it created tensions within the team which had to 
meet defined production targets and monitor each other rather than facing direct 
supervision. Graham shows that worker socialisation takes place informally through the 
team culture and formally through orientation and training, and in her opinion this 
constitutes an invasion of the territory within which workers had maintained control in 
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more conventional manufacturing firms. As a result, Graham argues that social control 
was attained by management through the self-regulation of team members, which 
involved expressions of the team’s displeasure over lagging team members, though she 
also notes some limits to worker consent even in this unorganised factory. In turn this 
control over shop-floor culture, combined with technical control through JIT and 
kaizening, provided the basis for work intensification. Rinehart et al. [1997], in their 
study of the Canadian CAMI plant (a unionised joint-venture between General Motors 
and Suzuki) undertaken through the 1990s, note the top management vision of a social 
system that reinforces production but focus their investigation more specifically on the 
development of a form of vocational identity through training programmes and the 
dynamics of social interaction within the work teams themselves which ‘enabled’ 
employees to become team players. On this basis, Rinehart et al. [1997] argue that 
teamwork, at least in this unionised plant, actually represents a ‘contested terrain’ and 
can have varied forms and outcomes. Particular configurations depend largely on how 
team-working fits into the broader social and organisational context, and the 
predispositions and power resources of economic actors inside and outside the firm. 
JIT “is an important constituent of lean manufacturing where components are 
delivered as they are required rather than being kept at the store.  
“Graham [1995: 77] identifies an important characteristic of JIT 
wherein [..the burden of material shortages is transferred to the line 
workers and material handlers. Each material handler is in charge of 
stocking all the parts for approximately three times along one side of 
the line. This involves hundreds of parts ...With just-in-time-
production, parts are not often not kept in stockpiled storage areas but 
are delivered just in time.” 
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JIT minimises buffer stocks between processes by delivering components as needed and seeks 
to move products continuously along the production line. According to the advocates of lean 
manufacturing, this makes the production process more transparent, leaves problems and faults 
visible for all to see and exposes the ability of workers and managers to ‘hide behind’ surplus 
components. These features are symbolised by the beeping of the andon lights when the line 
has to stop. As a result, the company is able to visualise product flow and inventories, and 
mistakes in the production process can be seen and rectified. In theory this should deliver line 
stability and flexibility at the same time. A consequence of JIT is that operators are on their 
toes all the time and because components are timed to be exhausted and replenished at the 
start and end of a tightly timed job-routine routine respectively and, that workers are under 
substantial pressure to complete a sequence of tightly coupled tasks within their job routine. 
Operators’ job routines are, in turn, carefully timed to measure every bodily movement and 
time taken for each operation. The quote below by Parker and Slaughter [1989: 74] identifies 
the main attractions of JIT for plant managements but point out the deleterious repercussions 
for operators: 
A JIT program can mean big corporate savings: less capital tied up in 
work in process, lower costs of warehousing and material handling, 
scrap, and faster delivery to customers. But the costs of JIT borne by 
workers are speed-up, the loss of buffers and therefore the ability to 
vary the pace of work, enormous pressure on the job, and loss of jobs. 
The CAMI case study [Rinehart et al., 1997] explores how JIT was used to make the entire 
job cycle transparent and to remove opportunities for workers to vary or slow their work-
rate and hide this within the production process. This was accompanied by speeding up the 
line without consulting experienced line operators. As in Graham’s case study, close 
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surveillance and rapid feedback avoided stockpiling of components or faulty production 
and institutionalised standardised tools, components and job routines. 
In her case study, Graham illustrates the contradiction in the philosophy of line 
stop. On the one hand, an operator was empowered to stop the line if she/he found 
difficulties in completing the job cycle or detected a flaw in the product that was moving 
to the next stage. On the other hand, however, in reality the line never stopped unless 
absolutely necessary and vehicles moved on even if parts were missing. This implied that 
the team had to work down the line installing the part after the other parts had been 
attached, which was difficult and time consuming. Operators lagged behind and in order 
to prevent this often ran behind the material handler to warn of the impending material 
shortage. 
My review of this aspect of Graham’s case study leads me to question whether 
lean manufacturing always leads to work intensification and surveillance of the work 
process, which is the conclusion common in other studies of the operation of lean 
manufacturing. The question arises whether a particular configuration of lean 
manufacturing precipitates work intensification or whether it is a case of improper 
implementation leading to an incomplete realisation of the system effects. 
My reading of Rinehart et al. [1997] suggests that lean manufacturing was seen by 
top management as a dynamic and flexible system. It was designed to respond rapidly to 
fluctuating production quotas, equipment breakdowns, part shortages and unbalanced 
workloads through a combination of frequent line speed changes, oscillating overtime 
requirements and almost constant line rebalancing within and across teams. Rinehart et 
al. [1997] argue that it was an attempt to standardise the work process while 
simultaneously aiming for quality and numbers, a feature also reflected in accounts of the 
operation of NUMMI, a US joint venture [Adler, 1992: 8-14]. Thus the core premise of 
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lean manufacturing is to maximise output with minimum cost and minimum labour, but 
as the CAMI study showed, this also amplified worker dissatisfaction. 
Another aspect of lean manufacturing, already implicit in the above discussion, is 
the monitoring process. In the SIA plant studied by Graham [1995: 112-114] employees 
were monitored through a computerised assembly line which set the pace of work and 
also focused everyone’s attention on any lagging team. The process of pulling the cord 
above the line indicated that there was a problem for everyone to see and the playing of 
computerised music unique to each team indicated that everything was normal when the 
cord was pulled again. 
The computer also monitored the number of times the cords were pulled and this 
set in place a continual process of measurement against other teams’ performance, the 
pace of output and the quality of the products. This, together with time study, increased 
the stress on individuals in the team by pointing the spotlight on them. The visibility 
and apparent transparency of the production process was an important measure in 
keeping up the pace and ensuring that operators would not ‘hide’ within the job cycle, 
so they could not ‘take a breather’ while other members covered for them. The 
importance of the monitoring process in lean manufacturing is also pointed out by 
Durand and Hatzfield [2003], in their study of work reorganisation in a long-
established, unionised, Peugeot car factory in France through the late 1990s. They note 
that the coordination of operator skills and the flexibility of the lean manufacturing 
system were regarded as prerequisites for the plant’s survival. The diversity of models 
required a closer and sharper eye on the operators on the part of the supervisors, but 
also better-trained operators who now had to deal with a substantially larger mental task 
list. The training imparted to operators in preparing them for the lean manufacturing 
mode of work organisation sought to specify ‘the exact gestural technique’ [Durand and 
Hatzfield, 2003: 24] to be used in a way quite different from the tacit skills that had 
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traditionally been picked up on the shop floor. This meant that processes of negotiation 
and autonomy among line workers were undermined by lean manufacturing, with its 
emphasis on written codified rules and the visibility of the production process through 
measures such as value stream mapping. 
In terms of kaizen, the core premise is that worker control is limited to the area of 
work methods, and even there it is constrained by the parameters of the production 
process as a whole. SIA, the case study company of Graham [1995], summarised the 
core message of kaizen as that of always searching for a better way. Thus on the one 
hand workers were expected to make suggestions and continuously take part in 
improving their productive efficiency, eliminating waste in their bodily movements and 
reducing the cycle time of their job routine. But on the other hand, management persistently 
intervened in this process, through constant time study [Graham, 1995: 106] and appropriate 
workers’ creative tacit knowledge to ‘use it to its advantage’. On this basis she argues that a 
combination of kaizening, JIT and team work concentrated the work, increased peer pressure 
through team work and accelerated the pace of work. In her view, kaizening led operators to 
feel that their knowledge was being appropriated, and indeed she agrees that it formed a 
means through which management attempted continually to gain control over workers’ 
creative knowledge and use it for its own advantage. It also meant constant disruption as 
changes in the workstation were suddenly introduced, interfering with the learning of work 
routines and undermining the scope for finding some space in the process, or ‘making out’. 
Graham [1995: 106] who draws this term from the sociologist Michael Burawoy [1985], 
uses ‘making out’ to mean “The idea that workers play games to create spare time yet still 
make quotas and, by doing so develop a consensual relationship with production- was 
effectively undermined at SIA”. 
Just when a worker had a station under control with a few seconds to spare, he 
or she ran the risk of being kaizened, as management intensified the job by 
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appropriating that worker’s knowledge of ways of saving time in the job routine. In 
summary, then, Graham argues that kaizening is not only designed to capture workers’ 
secrets to gain spare time, but also when, how and where these ideas are implemented. 
It therefore is an extremely effective procedure. It essentially convolutes the making out 
process which, under other management systems, benefits the workers into a process 
that puts continuous stress on the worker and forces workers’ compliance [Graham, 
1995: 138]. Indeed, as Durand and Hatzfeld [2003: 165-173] document, workers are 
required to follow tightly prescribed job routines, while still being expected to suggest 
improvements to the ways in which they perform each operation to ensure requisite end 
product quality.  
An integral aspect of management policy in the CAMI case study by Rinehart et 
al. [1997] was that, alongside the elimination of production buffers and pressure to 
minimise line stoppages, kaizen was used to eliminate floating workers, despite the 
priority that the union gave to such floaters to allow for rest periods and cover for 
injured workers. Thus in this case, kaizening threatened to reduce the number of workers 
in each team, with visible consequences for work intensity and worker wellbeing, and 
this became a big bone of contention between the workers (and their union) and 
management. The CAMI case study [Rinehart et al., 1997] also points out the 
importance of management-led kaizen teams alongside operator-led kaizening, which 
lead to the implementation of management-designed measures without taking on board 
operators’ opinions. Though worker suggestions could lead to cost saving and 
improvement in the efficiency of operations on the assembly line, such suggestions were 
often not recognised, while rather routine or mundane suggestions were highlighted just 
to give the impression that workers were genuinely involved in the kaizen process. This 
then led to disenchantment among workers and their non-cooperation with management. 
More broadly, kaizening often intensified the pace of work, which made operators 
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sceptical about management’s discourse that it empowered workers. Against this 
background the workers and the union at CAMI were only prepared to accept kaizen if it 
matched a worker’s interest. Thus they characterise the union stance on kaizen in the 
following terms: if these practices jeopardised workers’ rights, degraded working 
conditions, and eroded union independence, they should be contested. 
Rigid standards must be rejected because they inhibit worker discretion. 
Kaizen should be resisted if it intensifies work and makes it more 
stressful. And if lean manufacturing translates into the company’s 
inability to accommodate older or injured workers, it should be 
opposed. [Rinehart et al., 1997: 185-6] 
Shimizu [2000] classified Kaizen into one form that is led by the supervision of senior 
management and the middle managers as a part of their functional roles and another kind of 
kaizen which stems out of suggestions offered by workers through quality circles and a 
suggestion system. Kaizening changes in Japanese firms such as, for instance, redesign of 
production lines in practice and any other far reaching production related changes, came 
through working of integrated teams of managers. Kaizening for workers was viewed “as 
training them to look for problems, searching measures to take and solving problems” 
[Shimizu: 2000:14]. In practice, major production related operational changes are imposed 
from above. These far reaching changes lead to widely known “management by stress” 
[Parker and Slaughter, 2001: 74] and inevitably have to be accepted by workers which, as the 
above quote from Rinehart et al. [1997] points out, gives very little room to maneuver for 
workers. 
I will now discuss ethnographic evidence about the contexts and variations in 
management policies. The ethnographic studies that I have discussed above offer 
detailed accounts of the day-to-day operation of lean manufacturing policies and the 
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shop floor responses to these policies. However, they also show that management 
policies and worker responses vary, and these variations are linked to wider contextual 
differences between the companies and workplaces involved. Here, I simply wish to 
register the relevance of some of these differences in a summary fashion, as a basis for 
later discussion of the particular circumstances surrounding my own case-study 
company and factory. 
First, some of these case studies are of green-field sites, but many involve firms 
and workplaces with a much longer history. In this regard, Durand and Hatzfeld [2003: 
160] make an important point about continuities between Fordist production and lean 
manufacturing. Team work is often imposed over plants that have much older 
supervisory arrangements. In their case-study, standardised work, short job cycles, line 
based work, JIT pull processes, and several layers of production management precluded 
anything other than the most mundane existing team discretion, underlining that in 
such circumstances, management only implements what it prioritises at a given point 
of time even if the results are partial and incomplete. 
Durand and Hatzfeld [2003: 44] suggest that management at Peugeot attempted 
to “rationalise” the line, to halve cycle time and double the speed of the operators, and 
that it was these targets that were crucial to management, rather than imposing 
discipline on workers as an end by itself. However, even within this seemingly 
inflexibly and top-down model, there was negotiation and adjustment between different 
agents [Durand and Hatzfield, 2003: 107]. First, within the quality monitoring process 
there was perpetual ongoing negotiation between different departments. Second, they 
note that the notion of quality in the lean manufacturing process has now become all 
encompassing, and subsumes such issues as negligence and discipline, which were 
traditionally the subject of negotiation between the worker’s representatives and 
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management. As such, the quality control system acts as a source of pressure but also 
forms a (limited) space for negotiations and adjustment between actors. 
Therefore, Durand and Hatzfeld [2003: 172-175] explore a multi-leveled field of 
negotiation between the production control department, the programme controllers, and the 
assembly line managers with their supervisors, and at the two ends the sales department, 
which procures the orders and provides the rigid yardstick within which negotiation occurs. 
On this basis, they suggest that the detailed operating rules in the assembly plant are never 
absolute but are in a perpetual state of redefinition and interpretation, at least by 
management. At the same time they also register the strengths and weaknesses of trade 
union efforts to contest management’s lean manufacturing policies, the strengths being 
linked to a longstanding tradition of militant workplace unionism while the weaknesses 
reflect increasing divisions among workers, especially along educational and generational 
lines. Second, the implementation of lean manufacturing is also influenced by changing 
pressures on the plant, reflecting both changes in product markets and shifting senior 
management agendas. Thus the CAMI study highlights how the optimistic premises of 
lean manufacturing, celebrated by Womack et al [2007] as a return of job enrichment and 
intelligence of the worker, were undermined by the evolving policy priorities of CAMI 
management. The talk of empowerment was very real at the outset and was represented 
by the practices of a few managers, but their departure had real implications for many 
operators’ prospects of empowerment. Furthermore, job rotation and flexibility were 
often ignored when production demands intensified. When market conditions dictated 
production, much of the empowerment rhetoric was abandoned and the aspect of lean 
manufacturing that increased the pace of production replaced the empowerment rhetoric. 
Thus Rinehart et al. [1997: 177] quoted the observation of one manager: 
When you’re not at full production you have the luxury of a lot of 
things – a slower line or downtime. There was time for people to work 
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on suggestions, head over to repair to work on a quality program. Now 
that we’re at full production, we have to run at maximum speed and 
everyone is assigned to their teams, and that’s pretty much it. 
This discussion connects with the earlier observation of Marsden [in Edwards, 
2003:348], that a developmentalist discourse could be fast replaced by a more urgent cost 
reduction discourse leading to direct control. Additionally, many of the specifications in 
the lean manufacturing manual of the company were rendered irrelevant because of rapid 
shifts in market demand and the product mix that was needed for the day. Changing 
conditions, especially in product demand, were so rapid that it was impossible to keep 
lean manufacturing manuals constant, which meant that the lean manufacturing system 
was subject to continuous modification and compromise because the standards and 
baselines kept shifting in response to every crisis of production. 
At the same time the union representing the workers at the plant, the Canadian 
Auto-Workers Union, was endeavouring to develop new policy responses to the 
challenges of lean manufacturing, in a way that was perhaps more sophisticated than the 
Peugeot unions discussed by Durand and Hatzfeld [2003], highlighting the potential 
importance of different labour movement traditions and strategies as well as market 
conditions and management policies. 
Thirdly, Delbridge’s [1998] comparative ethnography of two factories which he 
labels Nippon Co and Valley Co respectively – one characterised by the capacity of 
management to insulate the workplace from many sources of uncertainty, and the other 
characterised by being buffeted by a turbulent environment – underlines the ways in 
which such wider conditions influence the policy options open to plant management and 
the whole character of the ‘negotiated order’ of management-worker relations. 
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In the firm Delbridge calls Nippon Co, the firm had a dominant position in its 
product market and had integrated a compliant trade union into its management process. 
In this context, production was planned in terms of a managerially pre-ordained set of 
shop floor activities. The key features of the lean manufacturing ecosystem in Nippon 
Co entailed tight coupling of internal processes, making individual workers’ pay 
contingent upon group performance, and decreased reliance on informality but increased 
clarity and visibility of responsibilities. These policies had resulted in intensified 
pressure on workers to attend work even while feeling unwell or finding it difficult to 
keep up with the line. 
The system of ‘internal’ or ‘bounded’ JIT, which tied production to the preceding 
assembly line, minimised the number of occasions where workers could negotiate with 
each other or secure better terms in the wage-effort bargain. Overall this process control 
exerted by Nippon Co was experienced as intrusive, restrictive and stressful by the 
work-force, who felt obliged to comply but were also consistent in their refusal to 
participate in any discretionary activity such as problem solving. Consequently the 
dynamic improvements claimed by the lean manufacturing model were missing and in 
many ways management engaged in quite conventional forms of “direct control” 
[Delbridge, 1998: 192] but Delbridge also shows that this company could benefit from 
lean manufacturing techniques even without much operator participation and 
involvement. 
By way of contrast, the management at Delbridge’s [1998] other company, Valley 
Co, could not implement lean manufacturing. It was reliant on personal relationships 
amongst line managers and operators and informal solutions to cope with unanticipated 
developments in the system. Several specific features of the context of the firm 
contributed to this state of affairs. These included relations with suppliers, the 
unpredictable nature of customer demand and the state of the equipment in the plant, all 
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of which compromised the formal management systems established by plant 
management. When these systems did not deliver what they were designed for, then what 
Delbridge [1998: 28] calls ‘directed chaos’ involving a meeting ground between getting 
people to do that little bit extra and turning a blind eye to the breakdown of designed 
rules. In particular management relied upon the cooperation of operators in taking 
responsibility for more than their designated job tasks. 
In this context the management style could be characterised as opportunist, 
habitual, tactical, frenetic, reactive, ad hoc, and fragmented [Delbridge, 1998: 180]. 
Furthermore, the resulting porosity in the formal system opened possibilities for workers 
to exploit, as they sought to wrest control over their work experience from management. 
In some cases such worker resistance could then be a further source of uncertainty for 
management. 
This comparison between Nippon Co and Valley Co raises important questions 
for my own research project, because it emphasises how management policies in regard 
to work organisation, the control of workers and the work process, including patterns of 
pressure and compromise, depend on (changing) technological and market conditions, 
but also the earlier history of management practices and worker/union responses in the 
company. In some ways these observations echo earlier discussions in industrial 
sociology about how different manufacturing processes, such as process production or 
assembly manufacturing, provided distinctive contexts for the evolution of management 
policies [Fox, 1966: 16-17, 26], but they also emphasise the importance of changing 
market environments and the ways in which managers could sometimes reconfigure the 
contexts in which they worked. One specific feature noted by Delbridge [1998], which 
may be a feature which plant managers have to cope with but may also be one that they 
can change, is the role of suppliers. 
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In another extreme case, such as Volkswagen’s Resende work organisation 
experiment, the component suppliers were brought inside the factory as assemblers. Here, 
their role has been transformed to one of “subcontractor and an involvement in the day-
to-day running of their part of the assembly process. In recognition of this, they were 
directly involved in the construction of the new installation and contributed $50 million 
of the initial $300 million investment in the plant. [Ramalho and Santana, 2002: 759] 
By having all suppliers under one roof, while each remains an independent entity, and 
plausibly subcontracting labour even amongst these suppliers, it becomes difficult for such 
workers to find a collective voice. However, though the role of suppliers has recently been 
given some attention, it can be argued that their impact on the labour process and industrial 
relations has not been dealt with in sufficient detail in the literature, especially in regard to 
changes to assembler/supplier linkages within the global supply chain. 
This discussion surveys the debates around the features that lie at the heart of 
modes of work organisation such as lean manufacturing and its implications for workers. 
It reiterates the main analytic focus of this thesis, which is to understand the means 
deployed by managements to achieve organisational objectives and its resultant 
implications for employees. Valuable insights from studying the ethnographic literature 
are: its undercutting of the “one best way” [Danford et al, 2005: 8] status as being the 
only road to corporate success declared by evangelists of lean such as Womack [2007] 
through “working smarter not harder” [Danford et al, 2005: 8]; underline its 
contextual nature and compromises and in reality its role as a means for management to 
exercise control over its employees; and its leading to greater work intensification for 
workers. 
With the above discussion in mind, the questions to the research agenda 
of understanding change management, its experience and implications for 
employees within my project are as follows: 
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• What were the key features of the change management strategy in my case 
study firm? 
• In what ways did they involve JIT, kaizen, monitoring, etc.? 
• What aspects of these policies were successfully implemented? 
• What tensions and limitations arose in the implementation of these policies? 
• How far did lean production gain the consent of the workforce and in what ways 
did it face resistance? 
2.4 Worker and Union Responses to Management Policies and 
Prerogatives 
The workplace ethnographies discussed above suggest that significant elements of 
many workers’ experience of lean production are quite negative, primarily because of 
work intensification and declining job security, and that these features can undermine 
management claims that workers will be empowered in a more positive way by the changes 
they are introducing. At the same time these ethnographies document a wide range of 
worker responses. Some workers, such as those in Delbridge’s [1998] Nippon Co (which 
dominated its market and recruited in an area where employment prospects were 
difficult) largely accommodated management demands, though they resented overtime 
and tried to avoid involvement activities where these were discretionary. In this case 
there was a union at the firm but it was largely quiescent and accepted management 
priorities. Some workers, such as many of those in Graham’s [1995] study, tried to resist 
some management demands, such as acceptance of unscheduled overtime, in more subtle 
ways, through informal understandings whereby they obstructed the work flow. The 
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degree of resistance varied with the position and gender of workers. Women workers 
who had children to care for were forthright and blunt with management and even 
refused when there were calls for overtime, though others participated in management’s 
attempts to ‘manufacture consent’. However, there was no trade union as unions had 
been excluded from Graham’s factory, helping to explain why worker resistance was 
limited and largely covert. 
In other cases, trade unions articulated worker grievances in a more active way, 
as was the case in the firms studied by Rinehart et al. [1997] and Durand and Hatzfeld 
[2003], but even in such cases there were important differences in the coverage, unity 
and efficacy of trade union representation. At Peugeot both the workforce and the unions 
were divided, partly along inter-generational lines, though this did not preclude 
substantial resistance and bargaining by the more militant union. Thus the older 
permanent workers had seen change management programmes come and go they had 
survived and were more likely to participate in resistance, though some were more eager 
to fade into the background. Meanwhile, the younger workers on probation were often 
enthusiastic and eager to embrace change management as they aspired to upward 
mobility and career growth. Furthermore, both the NUMMI [Adler, 1992] and the CAMI 
[Rhinehart, et al,1997] cases illustrate how the trade union of was initially a cooperative 
partner in management’s intensive attempts to implement lean manufacturing and in the 
latter the case the CAMI’s union was initially only lukewarm in its protest against the 
slew of incremental lean innovations rolled by CAMI’s plant management. [Rinehart et 
al., 1997]. It was only later in NUMMI [Adler, 1992: 45-52], with the growth of 
workers’ resentment, that the union was forced out of inaction to protest at 
management’s policies, and in the CAMI case the union was forced to protest more 
robustly and take a proactive stance against lean manufacturing [Rhinehart et 
al,1997,187-188]. Meanwhile, subcontracted workers and temporary labour in some of 
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these factories found themselves fighting a day-to-day battle just to hold on to their jobs 
and had little scope for resistance. Indeed, their responses were determined primarily by 
the character of the supplier relationships, whether or not there was a trade union in the 
plant [Graham, 2006: 343-346]. 
In the rest of this section I will look briefly at some wider discussions of 
industrial relations and trade unionism to locate my ethnographic findings in terms of a 
broader framework that addresses the articulation of workplace grievances and the role 
of trade unions in the collective organisation and representation of workers. In 
particular, existing debates on the manner in which different categories of workers and 
types of unions respond to change management, and when and who might or will resist, 
will be examined here. This will be set in the overall context of the widespread decline 
in trade union coverage, membership [Hyman, 1999: 3] and activity in many countries 
over the last thirty years or more. 
Against this broad background, Kelly [1998] has drawn particularly upon 
‘mobilization theory’ to explore the processes involved in the formulation of shared 
grievances and the pursuit of common interests by workers, especially through union 
organisation and activity. This leads him to focus first on the conditions in which workers 
may develop a sense of grievance and injustice, and then second on the circumstances in 
which such injustice is attributed to the actions of an employer and respond collectively 
to them. A central feature of Kelly’s argument concerns the presence of an effective 
organisation through which worker mobilisation could occur, coupled with confidence 
among those workers that collective action will be efficacious and result in the righting 
of some injustice. In particular he highlights the intervention of leaders who frame 
issues and legitimise collective action in the face of collective opposition. In this respect 
he develops a theme that was emphasised earlier by Eric Batstone and his collaborators 
[Batstone et al, 1979] in their discussion of the role of ‘leader’ stewards in articulating 
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union principles (see below), but gives this argument a more radical form by explicitly 
recognising that the ideological horizons of trade unions may go beyond collective 
bargaining. 
While Kelly’s [1998] discussion focuses particularly on the role of union leaders 
and activists in articulating grievances, it has also been recognised that wider patterns of 
work and community socialisation and processes of intergenerational transfer play 
important roles, while management traditions and ideologies can also become influential 
in forming worker responses. Thus the formulation of grievances and wider conceptions 
of shared interests involve social complexity and can generate ideological ambiguities. In 
this context, rival conceptions of injustices and shared interests may come into play, 
which can lead to mutual recriminations and accusations of, for example, ‘selling out’ or 
‘sectionalism’ [Batstone et al., 1979]. 
This leads to an appreciation of the wide variety of perspectives on employment 
relations and understandings of workers’ interests both within specific unions and across 
different trade unions that may have prior ideological commitments, or represent 
specific interests or espouse wider agendas that go beyond their functional role of 
representing workers. Thus unions may be linked to larger ideologies and may embody 
different degrees 
of pragmatism, and, as a result, differ in their inclinations to challenge the dominant 
structure of industry, whether through strike action or political mobilisation. At the 
factory level, Batstone et al. [1979] emphasise, through their comparison of manual and 
white-collar and also leader and populist stewards, that workplace trade unions are not 
uniform or timeless entities, but differ in their orientations to bargaining with 
management and in their relationships with their memberships. Meanwhile, Hyman, 
writing in the later half of the 1970s [Hyman, 1979b: 42, in Darlington and Upchurch, 
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2011: 89] has emphasised that the process of bureaucratisation could alter the 
relationships between union leaders, activists and members in the manner described: 
Shop stewards too [became] “managers of discontent”: sustaining job 
control within the boundaries of negotiation with management 
authority and capitalist priorities, rather than (apart from the most 
exceptional circumstances) pursuing frontal opposition. 
Hyman termed this phenomenon ‘the bureaucratisation of the rank and file’ [Hyman, in 
Mcllory, 2012: 63] which may mean that the effectiveness of workplace union organisation 
becomes compromised, either by becoming an end in itself or even by unwittingly 
becoming an agent of management. The main characteristics of this trade union 
bureaucracy identified by Hyman [1989a: 181-182, in Darlington and Upchurch, 2011: 79] 
are comprised of three sets of social relations: a separation of representation from 
mobilisation, a hierarchy of control and activism, and the detachment of formal 
mechanisms of policy and decision-making from the experience of members. However, as 
an analytic heuristic, it may be valuable to register a departure between Hyman’s writings in 
the 1970s-80s, and his subsequent later writings, which place less emphasis on these 
tendencies and instead highlight a series of dilemmas that face all unions and which are 
only partially resolved in different ways by different union traditions. 
Against this background, many students of industrial relations have emphasised 
that bargaining between unions and management can create a web of rules that forms a 
basis for accommodation and relative stability, but there has also been recognition of 
the fragility and potential disruption of such agreements. This forms the background to 
the discussion of the role of shop stewards in “the organization of workplace conflict 
and accommodation” by Batstone et al. [1979]. In particular, these authors suggest that 
those they call ‘leader stewards’ were most effective because they were aware of the 
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balance of power and the nature of rules existing in the plant, and by articulating their 
demands at opportune times were able to give legitimacy and plausibility to them. What 
mattered were the gains these stewards could make for their members, on the one hand 
by articulating grievances in a way which generated membership unity and (where 
necessary) mobilisation, and on the other hand by a realistic calculation of the bases for 
a deal with management. This was captured in a quote from a management informant at 
the plant, who commented that: 
“The personal approach is important. You’ve got to be able to talk 
to the stewards without them immediately taking a conflict line. I 
like to keep an open door. The real stewards who lead their men get 
rewards for them; [the men] may have a lot of moans against them 
but you find that they’re very rarely defeated in elections and 
they’re [Leaders] not soft on management. Often they’re very tough 
but you know that if they agree to something the section will follow 
them and they’ll tell the section off if necessary. [Batstone et al., 
1979: 166] 
This emphasises that there were incentives for management to make concessions 
to workers represented by such ‘strong bargainers’, even if the concessions also imposed 
costs on the firm. Similarly, there were incentives for leader stewards to impose discipline 
on their members as well as to articulate their grievances and protect their interests. That is 
why managements sometimes prefer stronger bargaining arrangements with unions and 
leaders who have a steady pair of hands instead of populists and stooges who might lack 
the authority to defend the agreements reached. 
On this basis, managers might refuse concessions or unions might resort to strike 
action, but such decisions would reflect careful assessments of the costs and benefits 
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involved, a feature that has been emphasised in Chamberlain’s analysis of the 
calculations informing the offers made and the sanctions deployed during collective 
bargaining. It should also be recognised, however, that both Batstone et al. [1979] and 
Kelly [1998] emphasise the significance of the active articulation of grievances and 
mobilisation of union power, rather than simply pragmatic calculations of existing power 
relations. At the same time, workers and trade unions face dilemmas about the demands 
they make and the settlements they accept because, apart from exceptional circumstances, 
they still retain an interest in the survival of their workplace and, though more 
equivocally, the profitability of ‘their’ company. 
Thus the existing frameworks of locally agreed rules that guide management and 
labour are widely acknowledged in day-to-day union activity, while challenges to these 
rules are usually specific and piecemeal, operating alongside continual accommodation 
between workers and managers which may take varied forms in different workplaces and 
even parts of a single workplace. This reflects the risks and limitations of more radical or 
revolutionary union action, even if union members wanted it. In recent years, however, it 
has more usually been management that has challenged existing workplace agreements, 
underlining the limitations of traditional forms of union bargaining in hostile conditions. 
After all, Batstone et al. [1979] conducted their study in a period and at a workplace 
where trade unionism was particularly strong and well organised. Contemporary capitalist 
firms beset with intense competition in their search to maximise financial performance 
and to satiate the interests of their shareholders and other stakeholders inevitably 
marginalise trade unions. 
I am of the view, based upon my readings from a wide range of commentators, 
including accounts of managerial strategies by Jackall [1988: 91-95], that with an eye on 
financial expediency and faced with the threat of withdrawal of mobile investor capital 
[Wilkinson and Wood, 2012: 379], managers focus on short-term goals, adopt cost-
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saving strategies, which Jackall terms as “milking”, and optimising their use of existing 
plants rather than investing in new equipment which would dent profits. This runs 
simultaneously alongside the devolution of management decision-making towards line 
management [Davis, 2006: 71; Sisson and Marginson cited in Edwards, 2003: 178] 
which in my view undermines the HR function, “linking of individualised fortunes to 
organisational fortunes” [Wilkinson and Wood, 2012: 379]. Line managers, faced with 
high levels of accountability, then focus on the delivery of the short-term results that will 
protect their own positions to the exclusion of other concerns. All of these trends over 
time have cumulatively influenced managerial avoidance of trade unions and their 
marginalisation. 
In summary, management and labour are in a constant state of realignment of 
rules, for the intensity of worker response and resistance varies in time. In times of crisis, 
workers may face workforce reduction, plant closures, wage curbs, wage cuts, work 
intensification and the replacement of collective bargaining by joint consultation, and 
sometimes an increasingly hostile state response to workers’ interests, a trend that 
continues to hold true in India from the early 1990s until the present [Ramaswamy, 
1983: 976-977]. Another repercussion on workers, common to India as well, as 
Teitelbaum [2011: 38-39] points out, is the trend of managements resorting to increasing 
capital investments as a means of supplanting workers and reducing headcount. Many 
companies have sought to adapt their organisational forms and impose new sets of rules 
that suit their interests, and even creating what some writers theorise as the transitions 
into newer “regimes of accumulation” [Corriat and Dosi, in Boyer, 2002: 308-309]. All 
of these developments have weakened union capacities to resist, though as Kelly [Frege 
and Kelly, 2003: 9-14] emphasises, this has also prompted efforts to renew and 
remobilise the labour movement. 
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Some of these developments and also their contradictory features can be seen 
reflected in the varied and changing patterns of worker response, accommodation and 
resistance documented in the workplace ethnographies discussed at the start of this 
section. There have not been many attempts to draw out the wider implications of the 
findings of such studies, but Edwards, Belanger and Wright [2006] and Edwards and 
Belanger [2007] have made one such attempt, which is useful in helping me to refine my 
research questions. 
These authors are interested in explaining the varied mixes of conflict and 
cooperation that characterise different workplaces, and in particular the rare conditions in 
which participation and involvement schemes offer substantial gains for both 
management and workers. They recognise the conflicting character of employment 
relations, but their starting point is a critique of a simple conflict of interests model 
because it fails to recognise several points. First, the underlying interests of both workers 
and managers may be quite complex and even contradictory (keeping a job but also 
gaining better terms and conditions; controlling workers but also eliciting commitment). 
Second, both parties act upon their own understanding of their ‘concerns’ rather than on 
the basis of imputed underlying interests. This provides the basis for mapping different 
patterns of conflict, accommodation and cooperation in different workplaces, according 
to how employers prioritise and seek to combine detailed control and long term 
productivity gains, and how workers prioritise and seek to combine their control of the 
work process and their longer term influence and security within the enterprise. This 
allows them to locate and compare a range of detailed workplace studies, to explain why 
certain options don’t exist and to explore the specific dynamics of those that do. In this 
regard the authors devise two analytic constructs: developmental concerns and control 
concerns. The firm's developmental concerns address the issue of efficiency as reflected 
in the reorganisation of work, training, and the development of skills, technological 
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change, or organisational innovation more generally. These concerns are linked to the 
firm’s ability to respond to new competitive pressures and the continued improvement of 
the forces of production. On the other hand, control concerns have to do with rights and 
power in day-to-day relations – that is, the regulation of the forces of production as they 
are at a given time, in a given context. Edwards, Balanger and Wright [2006: 131] say 
that they relate to ‘power over’, the ability to control the other group, with the threat of 
sanctions for non-compliance. They concern the wage-effort bargain and the managerial 
prerogative to hire and fire. Labour, they argue, has concerns such as the need for the 
company to continue to be profitable so that they can continue in employment, but have 
other concerns such as the secure working conditions and job security. Edwards, 
Balanger and Wright [2006: 132] develop a nice analytic tabular column model with the 
column spaces delineating scenarios that extend from the situation in which the 
managerial agenda is characterised by ‘developmental concerns’, but with 
marginalisation of labour and where managerial objectives overpower workers and 
collective representation, to a mutual gains enterprise scenario in which workers’ 
concerns and interests reflect long-term developmental concerns, often in post capitalist 
or socialist conditions, and capitalism is at its weakest [workers management of firms for 
instance], to another where the firm’s developmental concerns are under-emphasised and 
the tussle between management and workers is confined to control. Within these analytic 
constructs they fit in the ethnographic case such as studies and analyse the points of 
convergence and departure of capital and labour's concerns, and locate the case studies in 
the columns wherein either management or labour's interests prevail. For instance, 
Rinehart’s [1997] case study plant, where capital's developmental concerns outweighed 
labour's concerns – in spite of it being a highly unionised plant. The obverse was true in 
Volvo, where control of workers was economically unviable because the prevalent wage 
structure was unsustainable. Finally, they link the survival and erosion of different 
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patterns of workplace relations to wider technological, market and (crucially) institutional 
conditions, which facilitate, preclude or erode workplace cooperation. 
As Allan Flanders [1975: 135-137] points out, the workplace is comprised of 
management and organised labour whose interests vary from one another. Hyman [1978] 
points out that these interests are rarely reconcilable. In this section, I have tried to 
excavate how and in what manner workers and trade unions react to managerial 
prerogative and the extent to which they support or inhibit it. The rhetoric of lean 
manufacturing, celebrated by its evangelists [Womack et al, 2007], is undermined by 
ethnographic studies that show the obverse of empowerment and participation that is to 
say, greater managerial control. Batstone et al.'s approach, for me, breathes fresh air into 
the study of trade union strategy, trade union alternatives and the dilemmas and 
circumstances under which trade union policies are formed and the conditions, challenges 
and constraints under which different categories of trade union leaders operate and how 
they respond to workers’ concerns and attempts to impose organisational change upon 
them through lean manufacturing. Finally, the above discussion registers the increasingly 
difficult circumstances under which trade unions operate and, as pointed out by critics, 
identifies the manner in which changing management policies, with their instruments 
such as HRM and lean manufacturing, seek to individualise the employment relationship 
and do away with trade union representation. 
I will now turn my attention to the following research questions the above 
discussion raises herewith: 
• What forms and traditions of trade unionism and collective bargaining are 
found in this workplace? 
• How are grievances articulated within this workplace? 
• How far do workers act collectively to seek redress or bargain on their concerns? 
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• What role do union leaders/representatives and/or union activists play in 
articulating grievances and mobilising workers? 
• What patterns of resistance, accommodation and cooperation characterise the 
different groups of employees in my case study plant? 
• Does management support and/or discourage union representation and 
bargaining in this workplace? 
2.5 Conceptualising Management 
There are varied ways of conceptualising the process of management and the 
choices corporate managements make in guiding their organisations and seeking to bring 
about change. Managements function within the rubric of an organisational hierarchy. 
Hales [1995: 89] defines hierarchy as “a system of delegated power and responsibilities 
and graded rewards and status where the power attaching to a particular position is 
commensurate with responsibilities. Occupants of positions “lower down the chain of 
command are permitted indeed obliged to take certain decisions, but within the 
constraints of rules decided centrally”. 
Broad statements about the modus operandi and objectives of the organisation 
and the rules of the organisation aiming to modify behaviour are the two main functions 
of top managerial activity [Hales, 1995: 92], while the degree of control and the degree 
of delegation of power vary and are partly contingent on market competition and the 
other institutional parameters within which the organisation operates. 
Within an organisational hierarchy, the degree of centralisation and devolution of 
powers may vary considerably and although bureaucracy may be decentralised in the 
nominal sense, it is nevertheless the case that in a substantive sense the key decisions 
which set the axis on which managers operate and define the parameters for detailed 
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operational decision making are made by a relatively small number of senior managers. In 
recent times the focus of managerial literature has shifted from formal information 
systems and strategic planning systems based on hierarchy towards the realisation of 
organisational forms based on interpersonal communication and relationships. Ghoshal 
and Bartlett [cited in McGee, 2003: 147] signal this shift in organisational priorities 
towards a learning organisation where, “ideas embodied in organizational learning are 
important for companies that are trying to redraw their mental maps. The move to flatter, 
more informal structures requires a managerial mind-set conducive to information 
sharing and to the diffusion of knowledge and expertise from individual or localized 
domains into the wider corporate resource pool". 
One interesting starting point in addressing these issues is to consider the different 
ways in which senior managers may mobilise and control their firms within their 
organisational structure and I examine this by outlining and discussing the typology of 
different styles of top management. While there are limitations to this typology, it 
succeeds in raising important questions about the mobilisation, motivation and conduct of 
middle managers: the managers who actually have to implement the policies set in train 
by top management. The rest of this section focuses on these questions by considering 
how best to conceptualise managers, especially middle managers, as active agents in the 
co-ordination, control and transformation of enterprises. 
The typology proposed by McGee [in Cummings and Wilson (eds), 2003] 
views top managers as either lion tamers, or mentors, or leaders or trainers, each with 
distinctive priorities, styles of decision-making and impacts upon different categories 
of organisational employee. 
According to McGee [2003: 154] the lion tamer mode of management focuses 
on “operational efficiency, employs systems that provide financial data about business 
and evaluates industrial output against present internal targets using financial reward 
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mechanisms to reinforce ‘appropriate’ business behaviour. The communication 
infrastructure is characterized by formal protocols for linear communication through 
formal hierarchies”.  
The ‘leader mode of management’ is subtly different in according less weight 
to financial data and more to productivity measures.  
Thus it focuses on economic performance through process-efficiency, employs 
systems that provide performance figures about the business and evaluates individual 
business performance against external benchmarks using ‘best practice’ transfer 
mechanisms to implement appropriate business behaviour. The communication 
structure that follows from this approach is predominantly formal in style and 
characterised by vertical control channels with transverse integration linkages (or 
networks) between businesses for the purpose of tactical and operational co-
ordination. [McGee, 2003: 153-44] 
The ‘trainer mode of management’ moves further away from financial measures, 
to link performance measures with the longer-term development of organisational 
competencies. Thus it focuses on internal effectiveness based on business competencies, 
employ[s] discrete function-/task related measures to monitor business performance 
using formal standards and protocols to orchestrate the development of specific 
competencies in individual businesses so that these map on to the ‘headquarters’ 
blueprint for a corporate competence matrix in a complementary fashion along with 
other businesses in the portfolio. The communication structure tends to reflect the matrix 
structure with formal function/ process integration. [McGee, 2003:154] 
 Finally the mentor mode of management gives even greater weight to the 
development of competencies oriented to handling change and uncertainty. Thus it focuses 
on developing capabilities that can both generate and survive discontinuities in the 
competitive and strategic contexts, and will employ progress and positioning indicators 
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to assess the nature and value of competencies being developed by the individual 
businesses and to learn about the mode in which these capabilities are leveraged by the 
businesses. The mentor is concerned with aspects of effective organisational learning 
and perceives the headquarters-business relationship as one within which the learning 
partnership exists. Accordingly it reinforces appropriate business behaviour through 
continuous empowerment of the business through the relationship context. The 
communication is organic, characterised by a fusion of formal and informal 
communications (and relationship networks) linking individual businesses to each other 
and to headquarters. [McGee, 2003: 154] 
First this typology devised by McGee [2003: 153-4] recognises the importance of 
financial and bureaucratic control in many businesses. The inherent logic of bureaucracy 
and its features and the manner in which its rationality and inherent logic conditions the 
behaviour of its practitioners has been an object of enquiry from writers such as Weber 
[in Blokland, 2006: 34, 38-40, 44], Mannheim Karl [in Blokland, 2006: 112] to Henry 
Fayol [in Pugh (ed.) 2007: 1916]. 
As Weber [in Mintzberg, Ahlstrand and Lampel, 1988: 194] points out that 
managerial activity needs to take place within a framework he termed as an “iron cage of 
rationality” and was marked by an endless march of technical and managerial rationality. 
A bureaucracy in its various formulations is therefore viewed as a basis for exploring the 
social word within which managers function. 
 Bureaucracy is defined by Bendix [cited in Styhre: 108-9] as one that “refers to 
the universal tendency of men who are employed in hierarchical organizations to obey 
directives and to identify their own interest and ideas with the organization and with all 
those persons in it who shares this identification”. I characterise this bureaucratic 
governance structure as broadly having the following attributes: comprising an 
employment relationship; an elaborate division of labour; a centralised yet delegated 
 77 
2  “A matrix is an organizational structure in which employees report to multiple managers, such as a 
functional manager and a project manager (Sy and Cote, 2004). The ultimate goal of the evaluation exercise 
is to improve the employee’s future performance (Schweiger and Sumners, 1994)” [in Applebaum, Nadeau 
and  Cyr, 2008: 236]. 
 
 
decision-making system; a vertical coordination and control system; and the 
proliferation of rules and a focus on predictability and control. All of these attributes 
remain central towards an understanding of the functioning of contemporary corporate 
management and how within it varied modes that modes of work organisation are 
envisaged. 
Second this typology devised by McGee [2003: 153-4] also provides a valuable 
reminder that top level managements may have different organisational priorities and 
that the implications of these priorities can ramify through the organisation in terms of 
rather different patterns of co-ordination and control and distinctive ways of defining, 
developing and rewarding middle managers, both as heads of specific businesses, and 
as implementers of policies within those businesses. Third, it highlights the ways in 
which middle managers are not merely constrained by organisational structures, but 
come to be active agents within a matrix of objectives and control mechanisms set from 
above. 
At the same time, however, the trainer and mentor types within this typology appear to 
offer an over-optimistic vision of the scope for the non-bureaucratic mobilisation of 
unified and co-operative management within a ‘matrix’ or ‘organic’ form of 
organisation.2 Instead, investigators such as Burns and Stalker [1994] and Jackall [1988] 
suggest that efforts to move away from classic financial and bureaucratic controls involve 
tensions between rival middle management groupings, leading top managers to seek to 
reimpose traditional forms of bureaucratic authority and financial control. For example 
Burns and Stalker highlight the ways in which top managers may cultivate micro-
political rivalry between different management ‘cliques and cabals’, but at the same time  
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seek to contain and channel such rivalry through the control of promotion, demotion and 
financial rewards. On this basis, it can be argued that, however much we may be 
attracted by the apparently flat organisations, learning campuses and informal structures 
that have been pioneered by information technology companies such as Apple, Google 
and Microsoft [see e.g. Gates, 1995], corporate management is predominantly 
characterised by some form of bureaucratic control. 
Nevertheless, such attempts to develop typologies of styles of senior management 
and their implications for middle managers suggest that, in analysing the formation and 
implementation of corporate policy, we need to consider both the frameworks within 
which middle managers act and the ways in which they conduct themselves as active 
management agents in relation to those frameworks. Most analyses of the character and 
impact of change management policies, including the ethnographies discussed earlier 
which map the implementation of lean manufacturing, focus primarily on the substance of 
such management policies and the ways they are experienced by workers, and therefore 
provide little insight into the detailed character of managers as active agents of change. 
However, Nichols and Beynon [1977] provide an early exception to this rule, while 
classic discussions of the moral framing of management conduct have been developed by 
Jackall [1988] and Watson [2002], and these authors provide important conceptual 
resources for undertaking such an analysis. Accordingly, the rest of this section will 
examine managers and management as a human activity involving managers trying to 
account for and rationalise their actions within a moral economy of management action. 
Nichols and Beynon [1977] emphasise how the orientations and activities of the middle 
managers they studied were nested within an overall logic of capitalist enterprise, 
involving control over the production process in pursuit of profitability. On the one hand 
they show that some managers, especially younger men with expectations of rapid 
promotion, embraced and celebrated management policies that cut costs, placed tighter 
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constraints on operators and diminished job security, though in so doing they could 
provoke crises that might ultimately damage their career prospects. But on the other they 
also document the agonising and the uncertainties that beset many conscientious middle 
managers who tried to reconcile policies of corporate rationalisation and corporate 
responsibility. Thus one such manager, reflecting on how workers might judge who was 
responsible for making redundancies, remarked: 
“The thing is I don’t think they think it’s me. I don’t think they think it’s 
my boss. They think it’s “them”. But we’re “them”. But it’s not us. It’s 
something above us. Something up there. “[Nichols and Beynon, 1977: 41] 
For Nichols and Beynon]1977] such managers were living through the complex 
and contradictory character of contemporary capitalist management, primarily committed 
to making the firm successful but sometimes also bemused about the consequences. While 
Nichols and Beynon emphasise the ramifications of profitability and surplus extraction for 
the conduct and the subjective experiences of managers, Jackall and Watson make rather 
different contributions to an understanding of managers as active agents. 
Underlying two conflicting managerial discourses of facilitating participative 
regimes of troubleshooting and empowerment versus that of cost-cutting is the 
interpretation individual managers bring into their implementation and the degree of power 
they possess within their sphere of influence, either to thwart or go ahead with these 
decisions. I will now dwell upon the indeterminate nature of managing and management, 
the dilemmas of managers tiptoeing through the organisational hierarchy, organisational 
interest groups and corporate rituals. I will return to this concept of strategic exchange in 
Chapter 6, and indeed I will keep revisiting the writings of Watson’s and Jackall’s study 
of managers in an American corporation to illuminate the analytic arguments of my case 
study. 
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Watson [1995; 2002; 2008] provides a direct engagement with the subjective 
orientations, managerial self-identity and moral conduct of managers. He emphasises that 
such managers have distinctive material, emotional and psychological aspirations because 
of their personal life conditions. From my review of Watson, I argue that managers and 
their immediate colleagues constitute a distinctive habitus, in which they create meanings 
and react to orders, strive for targets and aim for their own career goals by interpreting 
and reinterpreting their situation and exchanging rewards that are not only material but 
also symbolic and cultural. 
As Watson [1996: 337-338] observes: 
Managers, like all other human beings, constantly shape and reshape their 
self-identities throughout their lives. A key component of a concept of 
self is a set of values, and this is seen as expressing itself among the 
managers studied here in the variations which were heard on the theme of 
'the sort of person I am'. This notion is worked out through processes of 
'internal conversations' which are always informed by the external 
dialogues which people have with others – directly and indirectly through 
the cultures within which they live and through which they find available 
to them sets of discursive resources to use in making sense of their 
situations. 
Managerial identities are imbued within their workplace and they locate their identity 
fused with their work place in terms of what the German philosopher Heidegger calls as 
“daisen or being” or thrown projection [1998: 685-6] which manifests within the organisation 
through taken-for-granted managerial self-awareness, an individual self-understanding and 
deeply ingrained acquaintance of their workplace, its people and manufacturing processes 
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upon which evaluations of themselves and of others are made. Using the accomplished 
familiarity managers have acquired within their work place, they deploy discursive 
resources depending upon their position in the hierarchy to deflect blame, justify actions 
to themselves and others and avoid the opprobrium of their superiors. 
This exchange of organisational vocabularies by managers enables them to 
categorise and create meanings which become dominant, allows them to legitimise and 
reiterate their positions of authority, and thus to manage the organisation and create a 
hierarchy within and across the organisation. In this regard, Watston highlights and 
even celebrates the commitment and capacity of senior managers to orchestrate a broad, 
system wide, conception of organisational priorities and policies. Thus, summerising 
Watson’s overall narrative of managerial strategic exchange [Watson, 2002: 202-6]: 
‘Managerial activity is all about a process of strategic exchange: those 
directing the organization [which are sets of patterned understandings, 
relationships and practices] and entails balancing meanings and resources 
all across those constituencies are made whose support is needed for the 
continued existence of the organization, whether it is junior employees, key 
customers, senior managers, shareholders, state agencies or pressure groups. 
For example, within an organisation there are different groups of individuals 
who are compensated differently.’ 
Some individuals are high-value managers, while others are individuals upon whom 
management have directed considerable resources to train them. As Watson observes: “Within 
these constituencies of the organisation managers prioritise areas of exchange activity where 
there is greatest uncertainty with regard to supply of resources necessary for future viability.” 
[Watson, 2002: 205] Hence managers are always transacting cultural and social capital and 
meanings within the work place in which they operate. Even as managers within the 
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organisation continually reassess their identities and relationships with colleagues and 
superiors, and engage in this process of exchange, the degree to which they can varies 
depending upon their position in the organisational hierarchy. Managers seek to make 
what Jackall [1988: 30] terms as cognitive maps of other managers consisting of “old 
loyalties alliances and associations” which alerts them to the requirement of making new 
alliances and being on the winning side if they or their areas get targeted for 
‘restructuring’. 
Thus, one theme in Watson concerns the ways in which the construction of 
meanings by effective managers seeks to transcend the more specific sectional-
management priorities of the competing coalitions of managers and departments 
highlighted by many commentators on middle management [e.g. Hyman, 1987: 30]. At 
the same time Watson’s own empirical research in his case study firm ZTC Ryland 
highlights the ways in which such ambitions can fail. His study of the fate of a top 
management programme of strategic organisational transformation, designed to forge a 
‘winning culture’ with a ‘commitment to excellence’, shows that a combination of 
financial constraints, existing organisational traditions, saturated markets and employee 
redundancies undermined the credibility of the change programme. As a result different 
discourses of management remained in play, on the one hand highlighting empowerment, 
skills and growth as a part of a culture change within the organisation that was being put 
into place at Watson's case study firm ZTC Ryland and on the other a discourse that 
emphasised control, job redundancies and cost-cutting measures. The currently dominant 
figures in ZTC Ryland were increasingly applying short-term financial controls and 
regular cost-cutting measures which repeatedly involved employee redundancies and the 
Finance Head's cost cutting anxieties became the butt of employees’ jokes. 
The manager was said to epitomise an old-timer manager hero who did not 
sugar-coat his words and was said to be “unthinking and absolutely, uncaring 
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about the people aspects of management” [Watson, 1994: 175]. Thus within an 
organisation there were different generations of managers, each having her or his 
distinctive world-view and perspective towards management. 
Instead Watson [1994: 196-7; 2006] notes that middle managers may be 
disappointed that they are not in control because their well-meaning objectives have 
been blocked by superiors, and hence they may feel they are doing only a part of a task 
which if done fully would have satisfied them. Thus such managers across the 
organisation may express disappointment with their inability to realise what, seen in 
moral terms, they thought would be good for the organization as a whole. 
“Managers widely disapproved of the short-termist cost-cutting approach 
which had arisen within ZTC regime as much as they resented the 
behaviour of senior managers effecting such policies and practices. Yet the 
stories and jokes about foolish, self-cancelling cost cutting practices and 
about the bullying behaviour of Ted Meadows were as current in areas of 
the plant where he rarely directly intervened in the manufacturing area 
where he held particular functional responsibilities he provided the focus 
for the development of a cynical and defensive unofficial culture.” 
Thus Watson recognises that there are contradictions in management policy, but he 
also emphasises the role of competing management discourses, because the ways in which 
managers interpret their conduct as individuals has consequences for the conceptualisation, 
realisation, and implementation of specific policies such as those associated with the idea of 
change management. In the literature [Cunningham, 1999: 198, 205], this has been 
illustrated by the tension between managers who prioritised immediate objectives as they 
faced the pressures of the line and senior corporate management which wanted to 
disseminate a new discourse of empowerment. For instance, Milkman [1997] discusses 
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production managers who have to meet immediate production targets by resorting to 
measures, such as tweaking up the speed of the line or compromising on quality by asking 
the team to carry on production with defective parts in plants in which top level 
corporate management wanted to apply lean manufacturing’s emphasis on the team 
being accountable for the quality of the component it produced. 
By discourse Watson implies “a connected set of statements, concepts, terms 
and expressions which constitutes a way of talking or writing about an issue, thus 
framing the way people understand and act with respect to that issue" [Watson, 
1994: 113]. 
More broadly, Watson argues that the rhetorical tools needed to manage and the 
linguistic choices employed by managers need careful consideration by researchers. 
This is important for understanding and analysing the tensions between groups of 
managers (and individual managers) but is also crucial for understanding the importance 
of strategic systemwide thinking for successful management, both at the top and in the 
ranks of middle management. Thus Watson argues that there are business goals for the 
longer term which are obscured by focusing on the attainment of immediate targets. The 
latter often add to the contradictory, fragmented nature of management policy which 
prevents managers from viewing the organisation’s survival in terms of its overall 
requirements, instead of merely conceptualising ‘strategy as numbers’ [Smith: 358-73, 
in Cummings and Wilson (eds), 2003]. 
From this vantage point, notions of management control and resistance cannot 
simply counter-pose strategic top managers and resistant middle managers, but need 
more careful examination and qualification. Corporate management devising strategy 
can sometimes face sectional middle management parochialism. This suggests that 
strategic management requires specialist middle managers – also known as staff 
specialists – to identify specific problem areas and solutions and then the organisational 
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ability to integrate such expertise within an overall strategy. They thus face major 
challenges of co-ordination and control since such specialist middle managers may be 
expected to possess interests and perspectives that do not match top management’s 
strategic priorities. This argument is important in realising that there are different 
layers of the organisational structure that may pull in different directions, with 
different career goals and definitions of their tasks. There are multiple interest groups 
and managerial agendas within the same organisation. 
Different managers tend to prioritise a wide array of dominant values learnt 
during their socialisation through mentors and their career in the work place. While 
some managers are dependent on their mentors for their onward ascent in their career 
pathways, others depend on what Jackall [1988: 45] denotes as the “fealty and alliance 
structure” in congruence with being conversant with the organisational ethos and style 
of the organisation, being in the good books of those who matter and being there at the 
right place and time. However, these prevalent values could be threatened by a new 
incumbent to senior managerial level given a free hand in formulating strategy who, at 
the point of assuming office, brings her or his own style of management and a new 
ethos and who wants a clean slate to start from. These corporate trailblazers bring a 
formidable reputation of turning things around in their previous employment and the 
latter’s managerial traditions. This is illustrated by Watson [1994: 103]. 
Whilst in the field, Watson was asked about his notes regarding a new 
managerial incumbent taking over the reins of a senior managerial position at ZTC 
Ryland, and about his previous stint in another firm: 
“He had claimed to be producing an organisation “focused on customer 
satisfaction”. This meant producing a “not just a new technical strategy” but a 
“total rebirth” of the company. The Financial Times had referred to his 
“contempt for the old regime” at BTC and has suggested that he was attempting 
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to introduce the “informal and dynamic style” of the computer industry, from 
which he came into telecommunications. Another report said he was going to 
end the idea of BTC standing for “bugger the customer”. [Watson, 1994: 103] 
Illustrating the potency of mimetic behaviour within organisations, Jackall points out 
that, “not only does the CEO bring in what the CEO thinks, changes in the way things are done 
but also in the process of the shake-up” rearranges the fealty structure of the corporation, 
placing in power those barons whose style and public image mesh closely with that of the CEO 
and whose principal loyalties belong to him” [Jackall, 1988: 25]. These organisational rituals 
become increasingly important within organisations particularly in line with the managerial 
agenda set by the CEO and have a tenuous correlation with the attainment of corporate 
objectives. However, they indicate the significant measure of power wielded by a few 
individuals within the organisation and how managers adopt isomorphic behaviour with the 
intention of making a good impression on senior management and avoiding their displeasure. 
Jackall demonstrates this isomorphic behaviour of subordinates who began to arrive to work at 
0630 hours and compulsorily partake in organisational rituals. 
Between middle management and senior management lie lateral entrants into the 
organisational hierarchy who have the ear of senior management, are highly qualified but 
are often resented by careerist middle management. They are well versed with techniques 
such as lean manufacturing and more often than not occupy a senior managerial position 
in the change management team overtaking many middle managers in occupational rank. 
They are central to the implementation of corporate management's agenda. I think 
Melville Dalton's [1950: 349] analysis of the tension between careerist line managers 
who wear the grime of the manufacturing area on their sleeve against the well-dressed 
technocratic and ambitious staff specialists intending to impose their managerial agenda 
on the former group sums up the prevalent mood of insecurity among line managers: Line 
officers fear staff innovations for a number of reasons. In view of their longer experience, 
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presumably intimate knowledge of the work, and their greater remuneration, they fear 
being “shown up” before their line superiors for not having thought of the processual 
refinements themselves. They fear that changes in methods may bring personnel changes 
which will threaten the break-up of cliques and existing informal arrangements and quite 
possibly reduce their area of authority. Finally, changes in techniques may expose 
forbidden practices and departmental inefficiency. In some cases these fears have 
stimulated line officers to compromise staff men to the point where the latter will agree to 
postpone the initiation of new practices for specific periods. 
In the rivalries between middle management specialists and departments there will 
be winners and losers. For example the HR department may find itself scapegoated for its 
long-term plans which conflict with the short-term plans made by production line managers. 
The latter may resent the HR staff who, at the same time, must carry forward the decisions 
taken by specialists and bear the brunt of other peoples’ displeasure. Furthermore such 
managers might begin with exceptional optimism but face unavoidable problems because of 
a lack of co-ordination with policies pursued by other managers. On the one hand they may 
then look to senior management for simple solutions, or on the other hand they may believe 
that they themselves are benchmark-setting innovators who can ignore other opinions 
because they possess the ‘silver bullet’ by way of knowledge of the best change 
management tools. 
Management is therefore comprised of multiple interest coteries and status 
groups, woven together by an intricate web of relationships of individuals across the 
organisational hierarchy with changing assessments of loyalty towards each other and 
networks of influence and power. Managers work within an organisational institutional 
logic which according to Jackall [1988: 35] implies that “the socially constructed 
shared understanding of how their world works”. For example, there may be important 
differences between managers aiming primarily to get products made and dispatched 
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and managers focused on organising processes, such as lean manufacturing, with 
longer-term objectives. 
Indeed different types of managers often have different career goals and Watson 
argues that this influences the implicit contract that they are prepared to work under, 
which influenced their motivation and the way they aim to deliver work. While the 
labour process literature is rich in ethnographic data on how employees make meaning 
and negotiate their positions in the work place, Watson suggests that they tend to treat 
organisations as being composed of homogeneous managerial interests. Yet, such 
managements are comprised of different functional departments, specialisms and 
individuals, each with their own interests, priorities and management styles, who may 
be at loggerheads with each other. 
However, this discussion should not lead to the conclusion that middle managers 
are simply self-seeking agents always pursuing advantage and career advancement, 
though Jackall seems to argue something close to this summation. He does so, when he 
argues that managers’ ethical choices are expedient and if need be on certain occasions 
managers in his case studies are seen to adhere to the moral option of what is considered 
either ethically right as against, what is considered as repugnant. Jackall argues that 
‘Morality in the corporate world does not emerge from internally held 
convictions or principles but some person, some clique some coterie. 
Since these relationships are always multiple, contingent and dynamic, 
and in a flux, managerial moralities are always situational and completely 
relative.’ [1988: 609] 
Jackall [1988] looks at how managerial activity takes place within the 
organisational structure, analyses its subjective nature and illuminates how multiple 
interests groups connive and scheme to survive and climb up in a zero-sum game of rising 
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up in the organisation. The unfolding nature of managerial activity and the different 
position of individuals within the organisational dynamic are a pathway Jackall [1988] 
uses to understand the ways in which ways individuals strategise their decisions and in the 
process adjudge complex ethical dimensions of right or wrong, using people and betraying 
trust. 
Watson’s [1994] managers are concerned about the ethical choices they make but 
are on occasions unable to do anything but sit back and watch as a colleague loses his job as 
a part of a cost-cutting drive by management. However, the ethical dimension of 
managerial action and decision-making is antedated by his primary concern which centres 
on the use of discourses and how managers created meaning in their work places, 
negotiated their self-identities in, and engage with, organisational challenges as they arose 
in an organisation that comprised of multiple cultures and multiple repertoires of 
management discourses. However, both these writers challenge the assumptions of linear, 
top down strategy formulation or contingency theory of organisation, and instead view an 
organisation as an intersection of multiple meanings, priorities and aspirations, as a starting 
point from which managerial activity is carried out in responding to the external context 
such as market competition. 
This leads me to conclude within an organisation there are multiple interest 
groups, organisational rituals, unsaid but obvious organisational power structures and 
always hongoing conversations within and between different groups of employees. Each 
of these employees brings their perspectives on management to the conversation they 
have in the workplace.  
Given this context, this part of my review of the literature attests to the complex 
nature of organisational behaviour. It suggests that I need to investigate and analyse the 
processes of change management carefully in relation to such different departments and 
different managers, both in terms of the rhetorical devices they adopt and the pragmatic 
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tensions that characterise the policies they pursue. These subjective dynamics at the 
workplace and the policies pursued have implications for their work and their 
relationships with their colleagues. I also need to consider the constraints and incentives 
that lead managers in my case study plant to act in the way they did. 
  I will hereupon cite Richard Hyman, who sums up the problematic of 
managerial strategy and its coherence an aspect accepted implicitly by change 
evangelists such as Tom Peters [1997]. The internal validity and coherence of the 
transmission of various paradigms of corporate strategy, within even in the framework of 
organised managerial dissonance suggested by Tom Peters [1987], is assumed and 
ingrained in the prescriptive measures to be adopted by senior level management. The 
measures of corporate restructuring and reorganisation suggested by these mainstream 
management authors have a considerable traction on senior level management across 
many firms in the world; however, as Hyman [Hyman and Streek, 1988: 51] point 
antithetically, 
“More fundamentally, strategic coherence may be obstructed not merely by 
the inadequacies and idiosyncrasies of managers as human actors, and by 
the recalcitrance of informal organisational relations, but also by structural 
contradictions within the managerial process itself. Conflict and division 
within capitalist management reflect not merely the diverse ideologies and 
sectional interests of say, marketing, production and personnel staff: 
different elements in the production and realisation of surplus value may be 
in principle incompatible. 'For individual capitals- as for capital in general 
there is no “one best way” of managing these contradictions only different 
routes to partial failure. It is on this basis managerial strategy can best be 
conceptualised: as the programmatic choice among alternatives none of 
which can be satisfactory.” 
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Managers have to realise surplus value from the resources of production and, 
therefore, deploying the “sociological imagination” in order to understand how multiple 
managerial interpretations of managerial strategy of change or the status quo intersect at 
the site of manufacturing, and inform the labour process all of which constitute an 
important sociological project of enquiry for me in this thesis. 
I return, to the question that has constituted the undertone of the discussion of the 
above sections. How do managers manage and exercise control? What are their 
understandings of the activity of management and how do they go about managing and 
implementing regimes of organisational change such as lean manufacturing? Managers 
operate within an organisational ecosystem that could mirror many metaphors as a 
family, including paternalism or outright control. Quoting from Hyman [1988: 51] 
again: 
“Within specialisms too, inconsistency and fluctuation of policy may 
derive from contradictory pressures. The function of labour control, for 
example involved both the direction, surveillance and the discipline of 
subordinates whose enthusiastic commitment to the corporate objectives 
cannot be taken for granted: and the mobilisation of the discretion, 
initiative and diligence which coercive supervision, far from guaranteeing, 
is likely to destroy. As Burawoy put it [1979: 30], the capitalist labour 
process “must be understood in terms of specific combinations of force 
and consent that elicit co-operation in the pursuit of profit”. It is of course 
a familiar argument that discretion is most likely to be permitted and 
encouraged among certain types of employees and in certain types of 
work context.” 
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I will now enunciate my research questions arising out of the above discussion. What visions 
and priorities are being pursued by the top management of my case study firm? Do the 
actions of specific individuals at senior level managerial positions shape or change 
management outcomes? What are the constraints and incentives that influence management 
actions at the workplace I studied? Overall, how should we characterise the role of middle 
managers in this case study firm? 
 2.6 The Wider Context and Its Influence on Management Policy 
Options 
This section considers why context is such a crucial question when considering 
change management. Several of the previous sections have noted the importance of the 
wider context surrounding the firm and the workplace. For example, my review of the 
ethnographic literature highlighted the importance of product markets and 
technologies while the discussion of workers’ responses registered the significance 
of different trade union and industrial relations traditions. In much of the mainstream 
management literature about lean manufacturing, however, it is treated as a universal 
recipe for executing large scale changes in the production process regardless of 
context. Womack [2007] and Florida and Kenny [1993], for example, have equated 
lean manufacturing with Japanisation, but do not regard this approach as permanently 
conditioned by the Japanese context. Instead they see its elements as being installed as 
a package globally in the same shape and form, provided that first principles are 
adhered to. 
Subsequent commentators have challenged this over generalised picture and have 
emphasised the crucial role played by the wider political economy within which firms 
operate, while also seeing this political economy as characterised by significant sectoral, 
regional and national variations. Commentators, such as Aglietta [2005], Freyssenet [2009] 
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and Boyer [2002] have developed an ambitious ‘regulation school’ analysis of the 
adoption, adaptation and hybridization of production models on this basis. Meanwhile , 
Elger and Smith working in the labour process tradition, have offered a more modest 
heuristic device which also treats context as a crucial dimension of the introduction of 
changes in work organisation and employee involvement. Both of these approaches have 
challenged the view that change management takes place in accordance with the linear 
process envisaged originally by Womack and his collaborators [Womack et al., 2007] and 
have tended to see policy selection and implementation as more selective and even 
piecemeal. At the same time they have tried to specify the kinds of dimensions of context 
which shape different change management policies and determine whether they succeed 
or fail. 
Drawing on the above discussion on the quality, intensity, causality and 
completeness of change, we can see that that in much of the literature including that of 
the regulationist school [Aglietta, 2005; Boyer, 1998; Freyssenet, 2009]  there is a 
tendency to treat lean manufacturing as a distinct and complete production system, 
though Boyer and Freyssenet are also at pains to emphasise the contextual and 
contingent nature of the functioning of such ‘production systems’. This means that they 
tend to identify the modification of such systems as a product of the failure to implement 
the key features of the model because of the impact of macro-structural contingencies, 
instead of addressing the contested micro-political nature of the workplace that underlies 
the implementation of managerial policy. 
 The remainder of this discussion tries to understand the varied and shifting nature 
of modes of work organisation in relation to the contextual conditions under which they 
operate. It starts by considering the claims of the GERPISA school of thought in this 
regard represented by some of its primary exponents Boyer [1998; 1996], Durand [2007] 
and Freysennet [2009]. They suggest that the adoption and adaptation of modes of work 
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organisation, such as lean manufacturing, are contingent, often piecemeal and are 
conditioned by the context and institutional framework they operate under. We will 
review this argument to understand how they and others have attempted to explain 
changes in work organisation by reference to changes in political, economic and 
institutional arrangements. Thus the regulationist literature attempts to characterise 
changing modes of work organisation and their impact on the labour process and on 
relationships between the various constituents of the plant (the main area of enquiry of my 
thesis) and contextualise these in relation to political and economic transformations. The 
three components of changing regimes of work organisation which they identify are: 
changing paradigms of production and consumption; changes brought about in relation to 
suppliers; and the consequences for corporate decision-making, all of which are related 
to fluctuating world automobile markets and globalisation. 
As a prelude to considering the arguments of Freyssenet and Boyer and also 
Elger and Smith[2006], it is helpful to register some important distinctions in terms of 
the scale, completeness and intensity of the processes of change that are being 
considered here. In this sense we need to unpack the word ‘change’ in the way that 
Erickson and Kuruvilla [1998] do when they survey the literature on how the extant, 
intensity and degree of change within industrial relations systems are affected by points 
of departure. These fundamental punctuations in industrial relations systems are 
characterised by changes in underlying understandings on managerial policy, collective 
bargaining arrangements and employment policies. Changes may be either gradual, 
discontinuous or ritual.  
Changes in the industrial relations system may be evolutionary or incremental 
in nature rather than discontinuous [ Erickson and Kuruvilla, 1998: 9]. The authors 
inspired by Darwinian theory venture to identify that important external and internal 
developments over time affect the contiguity of the industrial relations model being 
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followed within various countries. These points of rupture in the industrial relations 
system are marked by periods of equilibrium, discontinuity and transformation. 
They describe a process of discontinuous change, where the structures and functions of 
the industrial relations system undergo modification after remaining under extended 
periods of punctuated equilibrium, wherein the industrial relations system undergoes 
experimenting in policy and practice, finally doing away with the prevalent system as 
whole. These points of departure in the industrial relations system could arrive after a 
relative period of equilibrium or relative system stability and quiescence marked 
economic upheavals and changes in the industrial relations system. These intervals of 
non-transformative industrial relations and discontinuous change are termed by them as 
punctuated equilibrium. 
 They argue that industrial relations systems are dynamic, and continuously 
evolve and change, at key historical junctures or moments of transition they undergo 
rapid change, “deep structure” is seriously altered, and there is a great deal of 
experimentation in industrial relations policy and practice. Between such critical 
junctures, the systems typically undergo relatively minor modifications (or, in other 
terms, they evolve). The key historical junctures represent punctuations or 
“discontinuous transformations” [Erickson and Kuruvilla, 1998: 12]. 
Erickson and Kuruvilla (1998) identify the manner in which changes in the deep 
structure of the industrial relations system within which workers and employers interacted at 
times of economic crisis and tumult whereby the internal validity and coherence of the 
assumptions informing the industrial relations system were under deep interrogation by the 
state, the public and employees. For instance, the post-war era in the USA brought about 
fundamental questioning of the elements that comprised the industrial relations superstructure 
that operated under the rubric of democratic capitalism, which, as they illustrate, precipitated a 
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change in the industrial relations system. They [1998: 16] cite Priore and Sabel who comment 
on the far-reaching changes the great depression of the 1930s-40s brought about. 
 During the 1930s and 1940s, arguably, the network of fundamental social choices 
(or “deep structure”) underlying the U.S. industrial relations system was brought under 
serious reconsideration with questions that challenged the institutional Industrial Relations 
arrangement of the state, firms and workers: would unions be socially accepted and 
formally sanctioned by law? What would the basic mechanisms be for certifying a union 
and for conducting labour-management relations? Even more crucial, how, exactly, would 
a union be defined, and how would the workplace be governed? These changes in deep 
structure under periods of revolutionary change as suggested by Hannan, Freeman and 
Gersick [cited in Erickson and Kuruvilla 1998: 11] are comprised of: 
• The network of fundamental assumptions and principles underlying the 
system seriously comes under question. In other words, there is a 
reconsideration (and, ultimately, change) of what Gersick calls the “deep 
structure”. 
• Change is rapid, by comparison with change during the longer periods of 
relative stability. 
• There is great experimentation and increases in speciation and 
diversity, as various new forms are tried out before one dominant 
form takes root. 
Erickson and Kuruvilla [1998] also describe another form of change as one 
where changes made earlier on during the founding stages of the system, but unrelated 
towards its “working integrity”, later push it towards evolving new pathways, which 
may thus be owing to historical decisions taken in the distant past [Erickson and 
Kuruvilla, 1998: 9]. The deep structure comprises of intricately linked choices to which 
actors have access, and if the constituent elements of this deep structure have undergone 
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far-reaching change, then the industrial relations system has indeed undergone 
transformation [Erickson and Kuruvilla, 1998: 12]. 
Over time, “socioeconomic conditions driven by globalisation and intense 
competition” drive through instability in the deep structure of the system by affecting 
coherence and internal validity of constituents of the system through ‘wear and tear’. 
These events overtake the system which was designed for another time, and therefore 
render it redundant and incapable of taking on new developments leading to its 
changes in the workplace practices. 
As evident below continuing on the theme identifying defining moments of 
rupture and continuity of change in the industrial relations system industrial relations 
scholars have tried to pick out specific political economic contextual developments over 
a long period of time. These developments may have either favoured or inhibited 
managerial prerogatives to organise production, on the level at which managerial 
decisions are taken and where there is impact on trade union mobilisation power. Even 
as they disagree, they identify specific causal mechanisms that have triggered changes in 
the industrial relations system and have had repercussions for workers. 
Some commentators such as Kochan et al [Erickson and Kuruvilla, 1998: 17] to 
say that the industrial relations order on which much of the discipline’s literature was 
founded is no longer relevant. Others like Hyman [Hyman cited in Erickson and 
Kuruvilla, 1998: 6] beg to disagree, arguing that industrial relations was not 
transformed by such events to the extent that old tensions were abandoned and that 
continuities did not recur in the movement towards a new regime of industrial relations. 
The move towards the features such as “an enterprise focus (as the locus of human 
resources and industrial relations decision-making and strategy), increased flexibility (in 
how work is organised and labour is deployed), the growing importance of skill 
development, and union membership declines” characterised the main causative 
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features indicating changes in the industrial relations system in the 1990s [Kuruvilla, 
1998: 4]. 
Furthermore, decentralisation in bargaining, management’s increased autonomy, 
and the switch to a bundle of workplace practices that included teams, contingent pay, 
employee participation, training, and employment security amounted to a transformation 
in the United States of the industrial relations system towards post-Fordism, all of which 
challenged the foundational arrangements on which the industrial relations system is 
premised. 
For instance, using their model, I argue that the regime of industrial relations 
brought about by lean manufacturing may imply some rupture in this equilibrium but it 
nevertheless contains essential ingredients that represent continuities with Fordism, and 
therefore mirrors many of the elements that comprise the deep structure of Fordism. The 
analytic payoff of Erickson and Kuruvilla [1998] is the importance they grant towards 
the political economic context in their attempt to freeze specific macro epochal trends 
over a finite period of time, that have in turn gone on to alter the internal elements of the 
industrial relations system under which managers, workers and the state operate. At the 
micro level a case study enables singling out of the definitive epochs of rupture that have 
caused far-reaching transformation in a firm’s industrial relations history and 
understanding the causes in the long term that triggered that rupture. Studying how 
significant events in reaction to the evolution of managerial policy provides me an 
impetus to consider the big picture of viewing present developments against the 
continuum of changes occurring in the industrial relations system over a finite time 
period. 
This attempt to identify the macro context of varieties of change is relevant to my 
research project because it seeks to illuminate distinctive macro-economic variables 
including globalisation, competition and institutional class compromises in specific 
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locations and the ways in which these are related to the changing trajectories of work 
organisation and industrial relations. Durand [2007], for example, considers the 
implications of these factors for a cross-section of actors including operators, middle 
managers and senior plant managers. On this basis, Boyer [1995; 1998], Freyssenet [2009] 
and Durand (2007: 3-19) and other writers – though not from this school, such as 
Korczynski and Ott [2004: 590] – identify a fundamental shift in the compromise over time 
between the company, government (especially through legislation), productive value chains 
and trade unions, and related changes in the distribution of the welfare state. This shift 
becomes possible because the state shifts its role from being a guarantor of jobs and 
regulator of the economy (by means of legislation/encouragement of collective laissez 
faire and superintendent of industrial relations institutions), to becoming the sponsor of a 
cluster of apparently efficacious decentralised or outsourced services to its ‘customers’, 
with only limited regard to protecting levels of employment and working conditions, both 
of which are left to the market to determine. 
Unpacking further the issue discussed earlier regarding linear causality, it is 
important to register the arguments made by Freyssenet et al. [2009]. Though these 
arguments remain contentious, they provide a foundation and starting point for further 
unpacking of the literature to illuminate my research questions. They characterise an 
older regime of production and accumulation in both Europe and America, in which, 
particularly after the war, the welfare state [Drache,1998: 23] and growth driven by 
internal consumption with a reasonably clear consensus between state, industry and 
workers produced a moderately hierarchised income distribution which underpinned 
moderately hierarchised social and professional category and satisfactory social 
protection [Freyssenet, 2009: 8]. An important highlight of this regime of accumulation 
was that mass production was well synchronised with mass consumption [Drache, 1998: 
1916] for a consumer who had a finite sense choices of mass produced automotive 
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products to make in the course of his purchase. The welfare state sought to be achieved 
through “high productivity, stable international order and strong workers movement” 
[Drache, 1998: 3]. Freyssenet then argues that the oil crisis of the early 1970s upset this 
'punctuated equilibrium' mode of mass consumption of standardised automobile models 
within a product-led industry, in which companies driven by the need for economies of 
scale alone decided what consumers would be offered. After the oil crisis, the tastes of 
more assertive, price-conscious consumers forced companies to become more market 
sensitive in their models, catering to different segments, and this affected their production 
strategies and product platforms. 
Against this background Freysennet [2009: 11] emphasises first the ambivalent 
nature of the assimilation of a new production paradigm in terms of their transferability, 
as he questions the ‘technicist’ strand of thought embodying a recipe-book approach 
where individual paradigms if implemented in accordance with tried and tested 
principles of their individual proponents would synchronise perfectly without losing any 
of their individual features. Thus the implementation of new modes of work organisation 
intended to bring about changes in production is often selective and piecemeal because 
management actors had to interpret the relevance of varying ‘production models’ during 
the process of their application in different production environments, and under different 
pressures. This is illustrated by Freyssenet [2009: 10] in the following terms: 
For example, some people assimilated Toyota’s lean flows with Honda’s 
responsiveness, yet the former implied rigorous production planning 
whereas the latter was based on innovation rents derived from innovative 
models being launched before competitors could copy them. What 
followed was the construction of a number of systems that were cut off 
from their original objectives and even contradicted them on occasion, 
leading to some disappointing results. The sum total of best practices can 
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only be transformed into profits for a firm if they are compatible with one 
another. 
 Second, he also argues that any given ‘functional’ paradigm of lean manufacturing in 
any specific plant was based on a specific company-governance compromise between the 
company, state and operators. On this basis the analytical payoff of describing the post 1980s 
counter oil shock was to highlight the important role of the local governance apparatuses of 
particular firms, including the relationship between state and trade unions, as industrial relation 
arrangements influenced the production strategies of companies and their choices of 
product platforms and modes of work organisation. One response to this was what the 
regulationists term the ‘volume and diversity’ strategy for profitability: 
Many carmakers continued to follow a ‘volume and diversity’ strategy 
based on increased sales volumes and a commonalisation of invisible 
components, on the one hand, and on a diversity of bodies and visible 
equipment on the other. [Boyer and Freyssenet, 2002: 10] 
 Freyssenet [2009: 20] argues that the rapidity of capital flows associated with 
financial opportunism, and an unequal distribution of national income based on merit and 
good fortune, commenced the process of globalisation. This phase was marked by a wave of 
consolidation across various segments of the automotive industry, including the takeover of 
Nissan by Renault, even as demand across various segments stagnated. In post-recessionary 
Japan after the bubble of the 1980s such processes of consolidation also had to deal with the 
demographic aspect of an aging labour force, especially as, according to Ohle [2009], 
younger workers appeared to have a declining interest in taking up production jobs and 
looked to other sectors for employment. This implied that Toyota had to turn to European 
repertoires of work organisation based on the Scandinavian experience to offset the shortfall 
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in the availability of employable young operators, who previously provided the dexterity to 
meet the requirements of tight lean manufacturing job routines. 
 Returning to Freyssenet’s [2009: 15] overall attempt to map the trajectory of 
changing market conditions and consumption patterns and their impact on the mode of 
work organisation in auto firms, the mid-1990s marked the emergence of the new 
economy and a rapid upswing in the fortunes of one section of the populace in America 
and elsewhere, coupled with the stagnation of the old economy where income inequalities 
widened and job security could no longer be assumed. Freyssenet characterises this as a 
case of differing social trajectories and heterogeneous expectations. Against this 
background it was gradual economic revival throughout the 1990s and careful attention to 
specific model ranges such as pickup trucks – rather than attention to Japanese modes of 
work organisation – that allowed automakers in the US to balance the books. However, 
there was no guarantee that particular attention to specific models, in response to the 
changing consumer income distribution and demand, would produce profitability in the 
bottom-line of the company. 
Third, then, Freyssenet [2009: 14] points out the diversity of strategies, 
product mixes, bases of cost-reduction, and changes in ownership patterns that were 
adopted by companies in response to such changing market conditions. The changing 
distribution of national incomes in different countries affected the purchasing power 
of consumers. Those who were able to find better employment prospects at the end of 
the economic depression cycle were still buffeted by changed rules of employment 
which favoured merit-based remuneration and hire and fire policies which carried 
through the 1990s. 
Thus Freyssenet shows how larger institutional structures, consumption 
patterns and market demand affected ownership patterns, modes of work 
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organisation in global automotive companies, thereby underlining the importance 
of the context in which the plant and its parent company operated. 
 The nature and character of each economic crisis was different, ranging from the 
East Asian crisis of the 1990s to the more recent events precipitated by the failure of 
Lehman Brothers and the sub-prime crisis [Brown, 2010: 27] that affected the global 
economy and whose after effects continue to this day. However, the difference between 
these two crises was that global linkages between national economies, now including China 
and India to a greater degree, only became stronger in the intervening time period, which 
led to uncertainty for manufacturing plants. This uncertainty affected corporate and plant 
management’s production decisions on inventory management, work organisation, the 
size of workforces to be deployed and the models used to scale down production. 
A trend that has accelerated through the 1990s, and through the recent economic crisis, 
saw the larger automotive makers set up plants in countries such as China with a hope that 
the large internally-driven consumption economies will make up for fluctuating demand 
back home while being confronted not only with the demand heterogeneity, but also 
differing state regulatory regimes and varying customer expectations in each of these 
countries. Freyssenet [2009: 2] argues that an important sequel to lean manufacturing was 
an accelerated emphasis on modularisation where companies outsourced production to the 
suppliers at the top of the value chain, with an aim of spreading the financial risks; this 
was quite different in intents and purpose from the Japanese sub-contractor sub-ownership 
model. Through this action they hoped to concentrate on what they felt were their primary 
technological core-competencies in addition to having time and effort to branch out 
because of modularisation into areas such as targeted marketing and financial services to 
complete the production and consumption cycle. This was because the market, irrespective 
of whether it is the passenger vehicle or commercial vehicle segment, is segmented with 
different customers having differing requirements. Since 2000, environmental concerns 
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and fuel prices have forced manufacturers to move towards innovative, alternative fuel 
vehicles. It could be argued that the world may be waiting for the emergence of the next 
big idea in work organisation through modularization [Boyer, 1998: 288-91] which is 
illustrated through Volkswagen’s modularisation experiment in the Resende case 
mentioned above. In recent times modularisation has come to be a much sought after 
production paradigm amongst corporate management, of conceptualising work 
organisation in their plants. Perhaps this will punctuate or disrupt the present equilibrium 
in the ‘deep structure’ of lean manufacturing, on the basis of JIT, kaizen and tighter 
relationships down a chain of hierarchised suppliers who are always pushed by 
manufacturers to reduce costs. 
Finally, against this background Freyssenet [2009: 31] lists six ways in which 
companies can achieve profitability: economies of scale; productive efficiency with 
reduction of costs with constant volumes; innovation in quality assurance; product 
diversity; product quality; and product innovation. Each of these must be possible and 
viable in the specific conditions in the countries in which these companies operate. 
Freyssenet also argues that decisions on products, productive organisation and 
employment relationship must be congruous with the strategy being pursued, compatible 
with one another and acceptable temporarily to the main actors in the company. 
Thus he argues: 
Insofar as these are appropriate ways to envisage general conditions of 
profitability, thinking about the future must be rooted in two types of 
studies: one category that: updates possible profit strategies depending on 
differential evolution of national and regional growth models; the other that 
outlines possible government compromises between main actors in a firm 
(shareholders, banks, executives, employees, trade unionists, suppliers state 
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authorities etc.) as well as the means used to implement whatever of the 
chosen profit strategies is viable. [Freyssenet, 2009: 31] 
 This also sets the scene for considering the range of possibilities open to top managers 
as they seek to adopt and adapt influential models of management strategy and modes of work 
organisation propounded by dominant exemplar firms and especially by consultants. In this 
context a key concept in ‘regulation school’ analyses is that of ‘hybridization’, highlighting the 
scope for specific modifications and combinations of policies, but also noting that only some of 
these represent viable hybrids. Boyer makes the point that no mode of manufacturing 
technology is exclusively coterminous with any single organisational form and that neither is 
there in any society a particular organizational model that is so strong that specific societal 
effects become irrelevant. On this basis Boyer [1998: 38] maps out many different scenarios to 
illustrate how modes of work organisation, such as lean manufacturing, may work in adapted 
form in different countries and organisational settings. A few of these are touched on briefly 
below, even though the extent of hybridization may vary in completeness and degree with each 
configuration, which I list hereafter. 
In the first configuration Boyer [1998: 33, 38] considers the scenario 
where the transplant might utilise 
the heterogeneity of economic agents to select individuals, in a sense 
deviants, who are willing to accept the rules of the game associated with the 
new model of production which it intends to transplant. In this case there 
may be a coexistence of a dominant form with a number of enclaves 
organized according to different principles through a simple transposition of 
modes of technological diffusion. 
The second configuration of hybridization is characterised by: 
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In this model specific production arrangements are identified as core best 
practices which must be pursued by the subsidiary. The latter are seen as 
a replacement by alternative arrangements which are similarly supportive 
but are tailored to the circumstance of the local subsidiaries. [Boyer in 
Fernar, Quintetanilla and Runde (eds), 2006: 58] 
The third intermediate configuration cited in Boyer is that the implementing company might 
transcend the production paradigm it is trying to imitate and come out with something far 
superior because of the learning process involved in adoption. Boyer outlines a special type 
case where neither the transplant nor the local production model is in a position to eclipse the 
other. For instance, in the FASA Renault study [Boyer, 1998: 47-9], prevalent contextual 
conditions of local training institutions producing skilled labour, corporatist paternalism in its 
treatment of workers and “workers who made clear demands in response to corporate 
strategy”, were juxtaposed with Fordism. The latter comprised of a system in which 
management were required to turn out large volumes whilst at the same time maintaining 
diversity and running into an industrial relations system marked by periods of 
management/labour conflict.  
‘Given these circumstances, he contends that the encounter between the 
initial profit strategy of the parent company and the local conditions 
faced by transplants there arises a logical conflict which appears to lead 
to failure or poor performance. This process may lead to failure or 
stagnation but it may also lead to the exploitation of a management 
model which resembles neither the parent company or the indigenous 
firms.’ [Boyer, 1998: 47] 
Management and labour could arrive at a compromise which mirrored a compromise 
that resembled neither Toyota or a Fordist-Sloanist corporation [1998: 47]. In Rubinstein and 
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Kochan's case study, the local UAW Union was willing to “play in accordance with the new 
rules” which promoted competitiveness and quality that met corporate concerns of 
competition and a flexible strategy, both seemingly incompatible with each other. Boyer 
[1998: 48] calls the Saturn case a relatively short-lived experiment in management union co-
operation as representative of hybridization without a transplant. Others like Rubinstein and 
Kochan [2001], who systematically traced the evolution and limitations of the experiment, 
attributed the following underlying assumptions that formed the basis of the experiment state: 
“Within the American Car Industry, managers wished to measure up to Japanese efficiency, 
workers sought employment stability with a say in management decisions.” 
The main point to reiterate again is that local contexts, whether trade union 
configurations, market conditions or state policy, have crucial bearings on the 
development and functioning of management repertoires. Therefore in the view of 
Boyer, lean manufacturing has progressively detached itself from its local surroundings 
as it has developed in different contexts, but this has also meant a variety of forms of 
selection, adaptation and hybridization. If the model had remained static it would have 
been incapable of influencing the global history of firms and production methods. Lean 
manufacturing within the Boyer framework therefore cannot be regarded as a singular 
model, but should be seen as a grouping of traits belonging to two or three evolving 
models. 
The regulationist literature recognises that when managers propose changes in 
modes of work organisation, there are questions of choice, especially in regard to the 
application and adaptation of particular models of product design and development, 
marketing, and work organisation and employment relations. To address these issues they 
have developed a sophisticated analysis of transplantation and more especially 
hybridization, but they also make strong claims or assumptions about functional fit and 
economic viability when they map the emergence of a limited number of successful 
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variants of emergent production regimes. By comparison Elger and Smith [2005; 2006] 
offer a much more modest heuristic device for thinking about the ways in which the 
adoption, adaptation and implementation of well publicised production models by senior 
managers are influenced by the cross-cutting and interacting features of dominant 
production paradigms, underlying production relations, and specific societal institutional 
arrangements. 
Elger and Smith [2005; 2006] draw upon the labour process strand of argument to 
explore the implications of different contexts in these terms. In particular they analyse the 
tensions in the applicability of different aspects of popular management repertoires and the 
ways in which these are addressed by managers located in different types of establishments 
within international firms, with particular supply-chain linkages and corporate competitors, 
and operating in specific localities characterised by distinctive state policies, labour markets 
and industrial relations traditions. The arguments of Elger and Smith [2005; 2006] can be 
summarised in terms of three parameters that they delineate, namely societal effects, 
dominance effects and system effects. They argue that each of these has been the focus of 
a distinctive set of arguments about influences on management policies, on employment 
relations and on work organisation, but that all are actually in play in the selection, 
adaptation and implementation of such management policies. 
First, dominance effects have been the focus of much of the prescriptive 
management literature on lean manufacturing. This recognises that key practices of 
management, and especially regimes for organising production in manufacturing, were 
developed in response to local conditions in leading national economies, sectors and 
firms. But such innovations within dominant economies and enterprises are then seen to 
have a generalised relevance across a wide range of businesses spanning various 
sectors, as in the application of variants of lean manufacturing beyond Toyota and even 
the automotive industry, into other sectors such as the call centre industry, and across a 
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range of local and host settings. However, the lean manufacturing paradigm gave rise to 
a cottage industry of consultants offering recipe books for corporate change (epitomised 
by Womack et al., 2007), whilst the tensions and contradictions inherent in this 
approach were glossed over and long standing structural tensions within leading 
exemplars were overlooked and the success of dominence effects were taken for 
granted. One example of this perspective is exemplified by Abo who identifies the main 
features of this enterprise union perspective, which discounts the fact that even within 
the paternalistic system traits of loyalty and life-long employment that purportedly gave 
lean manufacturing a distinctive edge over their western counterparts. In his view the 
Japanese industrial relations system where workers are trained and groomed within the 
firm is opposed to a job-centred market which comprises a formalised education system 
through which an individual is required to go in order to find employment within the 
firm.  
Quoting Abo [cited in Boyer and Drache (eds), 2008: 112] to substantiate the 
above observation: 
In terms of industrial relations, the critical problem is the extent to which 
a ’them and us’ consciousness exists in the workplace. For Western kinds 
of industrial trade unions principally organized in ‘job-centred’ labour 
markets, it is more essential to keep a horizontal relationship with their 
rank-and-file members and this tends to create an ‘us’ feeling. On the 
other hand, for Japanese-type company unions, the more important issue 
is the vertical relationship between the union and the company where a 
‘them and us’ consciousness is blurred. Trust building is another area 
where institutional arrangements matter a great deal. It is difficult to say 
which comes first - the industrial relations system which creates a high 
level of trust between workers and employers, or the process of trust 
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building through workplace participation which leads to an industrial 
relations system reinforcing this goal. In Japan, the so-called ‘my 
company’ consciousness supports an ‘us’ sentiment among all employees 
in a company. This sharing of a common concern is an important basis for 
developing multi-skill training programmes which need a broad 
perspective and flexible framework of industrial relations. 
 However, there are detractors of this totalising perspective such as Ohle [2009] 
who brings out in detail the changing pattern of employment relationships in Japan 
across different firms in various sectors. Another ethnographic study of Roberson 
[Roberson, 1998: 122] carefully maps out different categories of permanent and 
temporary workers within the firm and maps out the tenuous commitment of some to 
their jobs in Shintani metals which repaired watch cases and jewellery items [Roberson, 
1998: 127], a medium scale company employing about fifty-five employees [Roberson, 
1998: 1]. He, instead, points to a state of flux and rapid change in the employment 
contract that was influenced all the time by economic crisis. First they failed to explore 
the problematical features of Japanese industrial relations associated with the 
limitations of enterprise unionism and the existence of many small, subordinate supplier 
firms, which facilitated the development of lean manufacturing in Japan. Second, they 
failed to register sectorial and even company contrasts in management strategies 
regarding employment and production, even among Japanese companies themselves. 
Boyer [1998: 40] notes that even while broadly adhering to lean manufacturing percepts 
Toyota and Honda adopted significantly different production regimes.  
Finally, Elger and Smith [2005; 2006] emphasise that wherever other firms in other 
countries pursued such dominant models, their adoption and implementation nevertheless 
involved processes of selection, modification and even negotiation of elements from the 
overall repertoire of lean policies. 
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Second, the notion of societal effects not only recognises the origins of a given set 
of innovations in particular social settings, and the degree to which those settings have a 
bearing upon the conduct of managers and workers within the firm, but also emphasises 
the persistent importance of distinctive national configurations of work, employment and 
industrial relations. This suggests that particular regimes of production developed within a 
particular country, such as the Toyota Production system from which the variants of lean 
manufacturing originate, might indeed be affected considerably by conflict, differentiation 
and reconstruction, as they are adopted and implemented in somewhat different national 
settings. At the same time Elger and Smith [2005] also highlight the importance of 
tensions and conflicts within specific ‘national employment systems’, which may mean 
that there is some space for the sponsorship of internationally dominant models even when 
they conflict with established national practices. Thus, the impact of societal effects should 
not be overstated or taken for granted. While institutional conditions are important in 
understanding the context within which specific management decisions are taken at a 
given point of time, their consequences need to be unpacked through empirical evidence. 
As Rubery and Wilkinson [2005: 45] observe: 
Employment policies and practices may need to be regarded as having 
emerged out of a range of influences, including production and 
marketing requirements, labour market pressures and contradictions and 
the interplay of management policy and labour organisation and 
bargaining strategies. 
Finally Elger and Smith [2006: 53] identify System effects, and for them this notion: 
identifies fundamental social relations and processes that underpin and 
condition specific institutional patterns and organizational practices that 
characterise the evolution of competing capitalism and competing firms. 
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Despite national variations between competing capitalist countries, they 
share certain fundamental systemic commonalities that are sometimes 
overlooked in the discussion of societal effects. When certain 
management practices, such as quality control, become generalized as 
shared standards of performance they may thus become ‘systemic’. 
 However Elger and Smith also argue that the systemic status of such management 
approaches remains provisional because of the inherent tensions and contradictions that beset 
the employment relationship and thus colour the development of those practices, a phrase that 
itself is at the crux of the discussion on work organisation. 
 Having made these distinctions, Elger and Smith draw out the implications in 
terms of a research orientation by developing the notion of the varied repertoires of 
practices available to corporate managers in a way that links to my earlier discussion of 
the agency of management. This notion of varied managerial repertoires suggests that 
enterprise managers may draw upon home- or host-country models, internal corporate, or 
wider sectorial or network recipes, and or exemplars drawn from dominant countries or 
leading firms. We need to be sensitive to the ways in which these elements are brought 
together within specific firms and workplaces, as managers and employees address and 
mediate the effects of globalising capitalist forces, national institutional rules and ‘world-
best practices’ of work and employment standards within distinctive local contexts. It is 
only through micro-political processes of argument, interpretation, conflict and 
compromises that groups and individuals negotiate how these different (often competing) 
ways of working, standards of quality, authority relations, and forms of employment will 
actually shape particular work situations [Elger and Smith, 2006: 54]. 
This highlights the scope for different management coalitions sponsoring 
particular repertoires, in terms of competing managerial practices and production 
arrangements. It recognises the possibility of active management choices at various levels 
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of the corporate hierarchy in responses to specific forms of corporate competition, 
economic conditions (including crises), state regulation, industrial relations traditions, 
and local institutional arrangements. These responses by managers have been varied and 
selective: they may sometimes generate new forms of work organisation but they can also 
involve piecemeal ‘bolt-on’ changes that leave much of the existing production system 
intact. At the same time, corporate management decisions may also alter the wider 
institutional contexts in which they operate, for example, by pressurising the state to 
change policies or by recasting the relationship of the company with its suppliers, in order 
that causal influences do not simply run from context to management decisions to forms 
of work organisation. 
 Overall, the literature reviewed in this section highlights the importance of placing 
my specific analysis of change management in one company and vehicle plant in its 
wider context, both in terms of developments in the wider Indian political economy and 
in terms of the specific sector and locality. Furthermore, it also suggests that the 
development and implementation of management policy options can usefully be 
conceptualised in terms of, first, processes of transplantation or hybridization of 
production models, and/or second, the contested and selective recombination of elements 
from a varied repertoire of management models and recipes. More specifically it suggests 
the following agenda of research questions, which I list below. 
What market, regulatory and institutional conditions influenced the formulation 
of top management strategies for work organisation and employee involvement at my 
firm? How far did these policies reflect the simple adoption of existing models of lean 
production, and in what ways did the managerial policy hybrids that drew on varied 
exemplars, combine them in distinctive ways? What role did dominant models of 
international best practice play in the formulation and implementation of management 
policies? To what extent did national and local market and institutional conditions have a 
 114 
bearing on the development and implementation of management policies? What tensions 
and limitations characterised the formulation and implementation of these change 
management policies? 
2.7 Conclusion 
 This literature review identifies a continuum with control of workers on one end, 
and autonomy on the other, and tries to understand the means managers deploy to gain the 
acquiescence of their subordinates. Managerial vocabularies of technological innovation 
coupled with empowerment and individual employee growth project an idealised summit of 
organisational excellence and corporate success. High performance and high commitment 
were promised by adherence to the recipes of management 'gurus', such as writers like Tom 
Peters. However, managers operate within an organisational chain of command and their 
managerial agency is constrained, facilitated, censured or rewarded. Moreover, managers – 
particularly middle managers – have to confront market competition and pressure from 
their superiors which encourages them to manage through expediency and cut cost control, 
even short circuiting procedure so well laid out in the recipes suggested by corporate 
management, and engaging in “organised chaos”. Cost control ranges from “milking 
production facilities”, to reducing head count. The literature points out the criticisms of 
participative QWL measures of direct communication and TQM; for instance Wilkinson 
[1998] contends that it is a means to secure managerial control through subtle means by 
building adequate institutional mechanisms emphasising aspects of benevolent 
paternalistic concern. The latent objective is to ease out trade union dissent, and possibly 
facilitate soft HRM objectives to morph into hard HRM when warranted. 
The main agenda of writers such as Jackall [1988] is the existence of multiple 
interests, priorities and attempts to justify managerial actions and problematise the 
objectivity of managerial strategy and the bureaucratic rationality under which various 
 115 
conceptualisations of managerial strategy function. Managers act in many ways that 
mimic their superiors who wield power, and these actions have nothing to do with 
rational means alluded to by organisational efficiency. Managers have their careers and 
jobs to worry about, and they with varying degrees of power are on the chess board with 
other colleagues and must keep an eye on others’ moves and accommodate organisational 
objectives with their future plans. Watson takes a sympathetic stance and tends to view 
managers as passive subjects reacting to competing discourses and having to justify their 
actions, while Jackall tends to be condescending towards managerial morality. 
 Literature informed by the Foucauldian perspective of discourses and power, in my 
view, is not very helpful to this project because I share the concerns of critics like Spencer 
who point towards the preoccupation of Foucualdians (represented by the likes of Knights 
and McCabe [2002: 582-6], for instance) who, in their various writings, while being 
fundamentally concerned with the interconnection between ‘subjectivity and capital’, do 
not identify “the sources of capitalist (class) domination” [Spencer, 2000: 236]. This source 
of domination occurs at the site of extraction of surplus value, and is comprised of real 
individuals who create, resist and obliterate vocabularies of change management and 
status quo. Wittgenstein’s conceptualisation [Kramer in Crary (eds), 2007: 159-63; 
Wittgenstein, 1998: 34-9] of language sheds light on how particular vocabularies have 
contextual implications and can be understood by the community of actors who belong to 
that organizational context which is continually in transition. Understanding how people 
react, their lives and their compulsions under which they pursue a particular course of 
action is a strength of Jackall’s and Watson’s approaches and, if I may say, builds on an 
earlier sociological mould of understanding, social interaction and action by Goffman 
[[cited in Brannaman, xiv, 2005]. Their focus lies on identifying how managers act the 
way they do, and the underlying reasons for managers acting and pursuing a course of 
action the way they do, rather than just viewing the effects of policies within an abstract 
 116 
panopticon of control and resistance that are conditioned by regimes of discursive 
practices under which actors are constituted. 
 Within this overall organisational framework, managerial paradigms of change 
management are implemented and have embedded within lean manufacturing the rhetoric 
of participation and empowerment on one hand, and the lion tamer model of management 
on the other. These two competing managerial rhetorics characterise the tension within 
lean manufacturing. The ethnographic literature debunks the sanguine claims of Womack 
et al.’s [2003] lean manufacturing and, as Parker and Slaughter [1989] summarise it 
pithily, a means of “management by stress”, leading to work intensification and eventual 
reduction in head count. Furthermore, studies such as Ohle [2009] point out that even 
within the idealised environment of enterprise unionism, there exist different categories of 
workers and enormous complexity in the employment relationship with varying degrees 
of commitment. These counter narratives posed a challenge to an idealised 
conceptualisation of Japanese employee commitment, and further highlighted the tensions 
of the employment contract within Japanese organisational structures. This implied that 
constructs such as team-work and the perfect system like status lean manufacturing 
model was untenable. As writers such as Shimizu point out these idealised first 
principles such as JIT for instance were themselves, in a process of transition within 
Japanese automotive firms in response to changing worker profile and to the crests and 
troughs of the Japanese economy. All these changes in first principles would have a 
bearing on industrial relations, supplier chains and the network of social relations 
prevalent within the firm. If lean manufacturing is undergoing transition within Japan 
there is no reason to believe that it can be selectively implemented elsewhere which calls 
into attention the importance of context under which managerial templates of change 
management are implemented. 
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Context therefore assumes importance because it is the site of extraction of value 
of firms who adopt varied repertoires of work organisation to efficiently organise the 
interaction of human and machine capital [Brown, 1992: 191-2]. The immediate political 
economic context and history of Industrial Relations around the firm influences the 
selection and adoption and diffusion of modes of work organisation. As Elger and Smith 
[2005] and the hybridization literature points out, there are no linear pathways and a 
particular production paradigm such as lean manufacturing can adapt in many ways, 
conditioned by system and dominance effects of the immediate context under which 
these paradigms are sought to be implemented under. My review of the literature 
suggests that there is a need to merge an understanding of managerial agency and 
rhetoric with the selection and implementation of production paradigms, which the 
regulation theorists seem to suggest are independent of subjective nature of managerial 
decision-making. 
 Having laid out the managerial aspect of implementation of policies and the 
context under which they are selected and implemented I will turn my attention towards 
workers. As this literature review suggests, trade unions and workers are beset within an 
environment that is increasingly difficult for them in recent times. However, the 
industrial relations of a particular firm and industrial relations over time are shaped by 
definitive events whose causal mechanisms need to be singled out. Performing this task 
becomes important in order to analyse trade union response to changing managerial 
strategies which is the main pay off of the Erickson and Kuruvilla [1998] paper and 
builds on the earlier discussion that stemmed from regulation theory which highlighted 
the importance of context under which influence the manner in which firms, workers and 
managers function. In this challenging environment the question that follows is: how do 
trade union leaders mobilise workers and how do workers react. Aforementioned 
critiques of the trend towards excessive bureaucratisation of trade unions, such as the 
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earlier writings of Hyman, which worry about its repercussions for the rank and file 
members and others like John Kelly [1998], which identify how and under what 
circumstances trade union mobilisation takes place. But the analytic nuts and bolts of 
delineating the manner in which trade union leaders function, their compulsions, the 
manner in which they go about mobilising workers and manage their expectations is 
only provided by Batsone et al.[1979]. This provides a valuable analytic payoff of 
picking out specific features of trade union organisation, mobilisation and leadership 
patterns over time, keeping in mind a firm’s industrial relations history. My reading of 
Batstone et al. on individual first person accounts, patterns of leadership and 
mobilisation styles will help me to understand how and the manner in which workers, 
trade unions and their leaders respond to managerial strategies, some of which they 
perceive as inimical to their livelihoods. 
 I have inductively derived my research questions and the concepts enunciated in 
the literature review to form the analytic spinal cord upon which the later chapters of this 
thesis rest. But first I discuss my methodological decisions and their justification in the 
following chapter.  
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Chapter 3 Methodology 
3.0 Introduction 
This chapter outlines my methodological decisions and discusses the ways these 
shaped the data output and interpretation. In particular, I seek to explain and justify my 
belief that qualitative research methods, and in particular conducting an ethnographic 
study of a single firm, would be the most appropriate method for answering the 
questions I outlined in Chapter 2. 
 My original research interest was in the relationship between management and 
workers as it was affected by the reorganisation of the labour process under repertoires of 
‘lean manufacturing’ in the automotive industry, where, owing to cost sensitivity 
throughout its extensive supplier chains, lean manufacturing is seen as the dominant 
paradigm to maximise efficiency and minimise costs. For reasons discussed below, 
however, I came to focus on the particular change management strategy adopted by my 
case study firm, seeking to identify its appeal to senior management, how they sought to 
implement it, and the responses of middle managers and workers. I hoped in that way to 
produce a textured picture of the bricolage of social relations that were prevalent in the 
plant. Moreover, I hoped to build on the industrial relations and sociologically literatures 
outlined in Chapter 2 to challenge further the lingering mainstream managerial literature’s 
naïve, linear understanding of the implementation of managerial strategy. While the 
question of change management may seem narrow, I see the study of the dynamics of 
corporate level change programmes, such as my own thesis, as contributing to the 
recognition of the irreconcilable nature of management-labour relation and to research 
which provides, as Tony Elger [2009: 10] puts it, “ a critical analysis of power relations 
and social inequalities that characterise employment relations, and encourages the 
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contextualization of research on contemporary changes in work and employment within a 
broader, inclusive conception of the evolving political economy.” 
This chapter is divided into eight sections. Section 3.1 will lay out my primary 
methodological considerations by exploring the extensive literature on ethnography and 
case studies and their justification. I also want to explain the influence of Wittgenstein and 
Critical Realism in the way I think about research. Section 3.2 then explains how and why 
I chose my case study firm and how I gained access to it. Section 3.3 summarises the 
main types of data collection, namely, participant observation, interviews and primary and 
secondary documentary evidence. Section 3.4 provides a reflexive account of the ways 
my fieldwork evolved over time and pulls out the main roles, dilemmas and challenges I 
had to face as an inexperienced fieldworker. Section 3.5 explains the hindrances to 
recording data on the spot and how I dealt with that. Section 3.6 explains how I analysed 
my data. Section 3.7 considers the ethical decisions that I had to take as a fieldworker. 
Section 3.8 concludes the chapter. 
3.1 Methodological Choices 
 In research on the labour process, employment contract and managerial decision-
making qualitative research has played a major role. Influential qualitative research has 
included the early work of Flanders [1964] on the Fawley productivity agreements at 
‘Standard Oil’ Great Britain, which gave rise to the Blue Book; Crozier’s[1969] studies of 
organizational power and authority by studying the nature and distribution of power of 
managers and workers in a bureaucratised French tobacco monopoly firm; Batstone et al.’s 
[1979] construction of archetypes of trade union mobilisation in response to management 
policies on the shop floor and Burawoy’s [p129,1985] understanding of the making of 
worker consent working as an operator in of south Chicago shop floor. In the Indian context, 
the legacy of qualitative research into HRM, organized labour and trade union leadership 
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has been provided by E. A. Ramaswamy [1977; 1995] over the past three decades, and, 
more recently, by Teilttelbaum [2009] and others. 
Within qualitative research overall, ethnographers undertaking case study research 
have played a pivotal role in developing an understanding of the implications of changes 
sought by management, based on detailed workplace research. As shown in Chapter 2, 
vivid descriptions of field settings has always been central to understanding the labour 
process and explaining the wage effort bargain emanating out of the interaction between 
human and productive capital. These are enumerated in Nichols and Beynon [1977] on 
the labour process and how it was shaped by managers and workers in ChemCo England, 
in Watson [1994] in understanding the roles, motivations and accommodations of 
managers and the work of Delbridge [1998], Elger and Smith [2005] and Milkman [1997] 
in understanding the repercussions of Japanisation. 
It was logical therefore for me to consider the merits of plant-level ethnography 
and case study research and their components, participant observation and the analysis of 
primary and secondary documents, in relation to my research agenda. This would enable 
me to look at “how work gets done” in the workplace [Edwards and Belanger, 2001: 
291] as well as the relationships between individuals and groups. 
3.1.1 The ethnographic method 
There are numerous accounts of ethnography and its epistemological foundations. 
Drawing on Hammersly and Atkinson’s definition of [in Strausss, 1998: 144-5] 
ethnography as the ethnographer participating, overtly or covertly, in people’s lives for 
extended periods of time. Hammersly and Atkinson believe that by observing and talking 
to people at first hand, in the immediate context of their everyday environments, 
ethnography can allow us to describe and understand much better what happens in the 
contexts we are studying and appreciate how the people concerned view their actions, 
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interactions and circumstances. Ethnographic studies are able to bring out the “special 
languages, unique and particular problems and more generally, distinct patterns of 
thought and action” [Van Mannen in Strauss, 1998: 115]. However, this does not mean 
that ethnography is limited to understanding micro-processes. What happens within the 
worlds that ethnographers observe is not independent of the cumulative effects of the 
multiple forces acting upon and influencing people’s actions and ethnography can 
illustrate the interconnections of these forces and the ways in which they affect people’s 
lives. As Fetterman [in Strauss and Anselm 1998: 115] points out, it is in this way that 
ethnographic studies can help us build a rich understanding of cultures and their 
importance in determining how organisations and societies work. 
The actual process of conducting an ethnographic study involves a continual 
process of data generation, interpretation and analysis (Frake in Emerson, 1983: 64]. 
Through compiling a ‘record of events’ over the period of fieldwork, the ethnographer 
arrives at an ethnographic statement which is added to continually as new 
understandings emerge. The main objective of ethnography is to discover in the words 
of John Brewer, “social meanings and understand social behaviour from people’s own 
perspectives” [Brewer, 2002: 58]. I feel therefore that the ethnographic method 
requires insight, intuition, guesswork, and an openness of thought, warranting a 
reconstruction and framing of events beyond what is set down in the field notes in 
order to better illuminate the framework within which events portrayed fit together. 
3.1.2 The role of language in ethnography and ethnographical 
writing 
My understanding of ethnographic research and writing gives a lot of importance 
to the role of language: as the social anthropologist Clifford Geertz [1983: 50] observes, 
the ethnographer “inscribes social discourse: he writes it down” in the process of 
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writing field notes, for instance, as well as in the final account. However, my interest in 
the centrality of language has been more influenced by the legacy of Wittgenstein, with 
its view of the role of language and its representation of reality, which I see as having 
provided an important legacy for the sociology of work and workplace ethnographies in 
particular. Following Wittgenstein, an important objective of ethnographic research is to 
understand and make sense of different vocabularies used by managers and workers, 
within the specific spatial and temporal context in which they are created and used. 
Utilising Wittgenstein’s insights on language and meaning I see the ethnographer 
as seeking to become a part of the ‘linguistic community’ of managers and workers in 
the plant, whose language and representations of reality emanate from the social context 
of the plant, their personal experiences, and their work histories. The understandings of 
language and meaning that managers and workers share are specific to the field setting 
[Hill, 1997: 565]. Context is critical because words have meaning in the stream of life 
they are being used to project reality [Reed, 1999: 292]. This conceptual space is 
challenged and contested by rival vocabularies, some more powerful than others (such as 
the more sophisticated participative tone wherein my case study firm often spoke of 
engineering the customer’s tomorrows).  
This idea of the shared community of meanings by actors, is captured by 
commentators such as David Stern [1995: 125, 137, 128, 201] who, while citing and 
paraphrasing the thoughts of the later Wittgenstein, notes that: 
“Our explicit beliefs and interpretations are only meaningful against a 
background of shared practices, which include the skills and customs we have 
learned – ways of acting that were not acquired as beliefs, even though we 
may express them in beliefs. It is this “way of grasping a rule which is not an 
interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we call ‘obeying the rule’ and 
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‘going against it’” that ultimately ends the regress of interpretations. In other 
words, “it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game”. 
These often irreconcilable, multi-textured and multidimensional vocabularies, such as 
those of workers and managers, arise out of accomplished phenomenological familiarity with 
their institutionalised roles. These roles are the mediators of specific sectors of the common 
stock of knowledge of work and departmental routines shared, for instance, by middle 
managers and which are both implicit and explicit. Therefore, by virtue of the roles an 
individual plays, she or he “is inducted into specific areas of socially objectivated knowledge 
not only in a narrow sense, but also in the sense of ‘knowledge’ of norms, values and even 
emotions” [Berger and Luckmann, 1991: 94]. Roles and linguistic vocabularies are managed 
and perpetuated by actors in their ‘front stage’ interactions [Goffman, in Branaman, 2005: xlii] 
and therefore we have access to, for instance, determined rhetorics of empowerment, and 
responses to it. 
This requires becoming part of a linguistic community of meaning by observing 
and listening to participants unobtrusively; gradually developing trust and friendship 
with key informants; and observing attempts at what Goffman termed “impression 
management” [Morean, 2006: 59]. Vocabularies may start out as performative, bringing 
into being that which they name, an idea usually associated with the philosopher J. L. 
Austin [cited in Butler, 1995: 197]. Over time these vocabularies may come to be taken 
for granted by subordinates in the organisation and are transformed into action in order 
to push corporate management’s rhetoric of its change story forward. Understanding 
these vocabularies allowed me to participate in conversations at the later stages of 
fieldwork, and this was in turn necessary to understand the vocabularies fully. 
My approach to learning the linguistic vocabularies of informants is different from 
that of authors who adopt a Foucauldian perspective, who, like Knight [2002], see 
discursive practices as constituting subjects, who may not even recognise the extent to 
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which discourses are disciplinary and attached to power. According to critical readings 
of Foucault, actors unintentionally reproduce discourses and become “disciplinary 
subjects” [McKinley, in Clegg 2010: 113]. 
This to me appears a very top down theoretical pathway to guide an 
ethnographic study, and also philosophically problematic. It does not illuminate how 
agents resist or inhibit attempts to discipline them and, also does not capture the 
effects of political economy on the construction of power and narratives in 
organisations. Hence, the Focauldian strand of explanation of power and analysis-of 
how discursive practices are created and consequently reproduced – lacks the dense 
empirical variety and analytic depth of data brought to studies such as that of Elger 
and Smith [2008]. Theirs and other ethnographic studies [Huxley et al., 1997] bring 
together in their analysis an array of political economic factors which in turn have a 
bearing on the employees’ experience of power, the operational consequences of the 
implementation of modes of work organisation, such as lean manufacturing on 
employees which finally considers employees’ varied perspectives on power, 
resistance and their experience of work 
Moreover sociologically, I follow Margaret Archer [2007] and other Critical 
Realists in seeing subjects not as the puppets of discourse, but rather as thinking, 
deliberative individuals who affect and modify their social worlds – for instance 
management policies – and reflect upon them themselves. By deliberative I draw on 
Archer’s view of people’s ‘internal conversation’ which for her is “is a continuous 
process of people evaluating their situations in light of their concerns and evaluating 
their projects in light of their circumstances” [Archer, 2007: 34]. In the empirical 
chapters I will try to allow everyone to speak with their own representations of 
management and industrial relations that, “by saying clearly all that can be said clearly” 
[Kramer, in Crary, 2007: 149]. 
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 3.1.3 Case study research 
The case study method is a common means of enquiry adopted by researchers, 
and, while not coterminous with ethnography, highly compatible with it. Case studies aim 
to reconstruct “the intricate complexities of specific sites or processes and their origins, 
interrelations and dynamics” [Kuper and Kuper, 1996: 129]. The extended period of stay 
and engagement case study required [Burawoy, 2009] makes ethnographic 
reconstructions of the case study possible. 
A case study is defined “as an approach that uses in-depth investigation of 
one or more examples of a current social phenomenon, utilizing a variety of sources 
of data. A ‘case’ can be an individual person, an event, or a social activity, group, 
organization or institution” [Keddie in Jupp (ed.), 2006: 20-1]. 
Single case studies will focus on one setting, while multiple case studies study 
two or more settings with the aim of comparing them and allowing the researcher to 
verify the research’s results internally and externally. As Yin [2003] cited by Ridder 
[2009: 142] explains, in that way researchers may be able to generate fuller 
understandings of local phenomena than may be possible in single case studies or 
develop hypotheses on which further research can be based. 
However, for an individual student researcher, only conducting a single case 
study is practicable. It still allows the researcher to look at more than one set of 
circumstances within the setting, for instance those of specific constituencies of 
managers or worker as sub-cases in their own right. In my case study of EWS, as 
discussed below, these sub-cases demanded individual attention and their study was 
essential to my overall understanding of what was taking place in the plant and my 
appreciation of the various interests, interactions, accommodations and conflicts. 
The methodologies used in case studies can be further categorised as descriptive, 
exploratory, or explanatory, depending upon their intended objectives. Yin [2003] cited 
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by Ridder [2009: 142] says that a descriptive case study seeks to paint a complete picture 
of a phenomenon within the setting, whilst an exploratory case study will be less 
structured and will be aimed instead at identifying questions for future research. An 
explanatory case study will seek to identify and analyse the causes and effects of 
phenomena. My case study of the implications of change management in CompCo is an 
explanatory case study category. An ethnographic case study, which involve the 
exploration of a case as it presents itself in front of researchers in the field and by the 
researchers’ direct involvement and participation in them, seems particularly suitable for 
identifying the causes and effects of phenomenon that an explanatory case study requires. 
3.1.4 The validity of case study and ethnographic methods 
Because case studies are inevitably bound by space, time and the practical 
constraints faced by the researcher, the choice of case study research raises questions of 
how far data can be generalised and thus how valuable and valid the findings of case 
study research can be. Problems also arise regarding the soundness of the conclusions 
reached by ethnographers and the extent to which they are generalisable. 
A single case study is bound, first because the researcher is tightly bound by the 
field site and even as the researcher leaves the field setting she or he needs, out of 
necessity, to endure a continual iterative process of constantly thinking about the field as 
though still living inside it, imagining that setting and its relationships constantly. 
 Second, the fieldworker is continually beset with choices of strategies that need to 
be made and the selection of the optimal techniques to be adapted for the particular 
setting, which means they must establish methodological boundaries. Fieldwork is 
therefore limiting, context bound, and the context of fieldwork decide the choices the 
researcher makes. Third, the case study research process can be limiting as a method for 
an individual researcher. As I found out in the course of my fieldwork at EWS, the 
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inability of solitary researchers to be in two places at once may therefore mean that they 
miss out on opportunities to collect interesting data. Thus, whilst one interview is being 
carried out, important events may be taking place elsewhere of which we become aware 
only later. At the end of the fieldwork the researcher must question whether she or he is 
satisfied by fulfilling the limited scope of the initial research question, conceived before 
entering the field or whether the questions have evolved and diversified the scope of 
enquiry needed. In this way the case study is bound by space, time, and practical 
constraints and cannot for instance even attempt to offer universal explanations of 
changing industrial relations in the whole of the Indian auto industry at different times 
and places. 
Finally, case studies are bound because they may lose their relevance after a 
particular date and events may overtake the researcher and challenge her or his 
conclusions. This cannot be avoided by the student researcher who cannot overstay her 
or his invitation and has to complete their thesis. 
Yet, in spite of all the above limitations of boundedness, case studies do not 
necessarily impede depth of analysis, possibly because a robust framework of theory and 
method supported by qualitative data may emerge out of comparison with and detailed 
study of other cases addressing similar themes. I am of the view that the valuable 
contribution that can be made by individual case studies stems from their potential to 
provide answers to complex questions regarding the changes in the labour process and 
managerial strategies and can confirm the internal fit and validity of the emergent data 
through triangulation [Given, 2008: 892] and extensive analysis. 
 The question of the generalisability of ethnography is often seen in terms of 
whether other researchers would come to the same conclusions. This question is closely 
connected with the debate about the rejection of positivist research, which seeks findings 
which are replicable, uncontaminated by reinterpretations or revisiting of the data 
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[Blackburn, 2005: 162]. As identified by Denzin and Lincoln [2005: 148] the non-
contextual non-situational model assumes that “a morally neutral, objective, observer will 
get the facts right” but this ignores the ‘situatedness’ of the observer, associated with 
class, race, gender, sexual orientation, ethnicity and rationality. 
In contrast, ethnography sees this situatedness as inevitable, and therefore 
different researchers are unlikely to produce the same analysis. Acts of perception are 
fraught with interpretation because although both researcher and the researched are a 
part of the same world, there is no certainty that any researcher will achieve a 
completely accurate interpretation of the circumstances being researched, and even less 
likelihood that any two researchers will produce the same analyses. This inescapability 
of differences in perception and interpretation was recognised by the phenomenologist 
philosopher Merleau-Ponty, who underlines the evanescent nature of our reflections and 
emphasises that however much we try, interpretation is inevitably part and parcel of the 
object of our enquiry. Commentators quote Merleau-Ponty [1962: xiii], who said that 
“we are through and through compounded of relationships with the world”. 
Further interpretations are conditioned by our beliefs, which are socially 
structured, and therefore require “parentage” [Blackburn, 2005: 170]. We are intimately 
bound to the world by “intentional threads”, as Merleau-Ponty puts it (in Mohanty, 2006: 
76] (which can only be loosened by our withdrawal from the world and reflecting about 
the world but is never obliterated). In Merleau-Ponty’s [2005: xv] own words 
Reflection does not withdraw from the world towards the unity of 
consciousness as the world’s basis; it steps back to watch the forms of 
transcendence fly up like sparks from a fire; it slackens the intentional 
threads which attach us to the world and thus brings them to our notice; it 
alone is consciousness of the world because it reveals that world as strange 
and paradoxical. 
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 Wittgenstein, in coming from the analytic tradition of philosophy, also agrees on the 
foundations of our certainty without evidence which lie in our contextual embedded link to 
our world we inhabit: “The existence of external objects was certain, but it was not something 
that could be proved, or that was an object of knowledge. Its location in our world-picture 
(Weltbild) was far deeper than that.” [Kenny, 2007: 166] 
As the pragmatists would argue, at any given point of time these implicit beliefs 
condition our ensuing truth claims [Rorty, 1995: 96] and consequently have a role in 
deciding the final form of our findings in ethnographic case studies. We cannot escape 
these beliefs and, furthermore, they may vary between researchers examining the same 
case. This subjective nature of human belief, which may also be transient, undermines 
positivist claims to validity and theoretical generalisability. 
Ethnographers seek to recover situational knowledge, representations and 
understandings of actors and reflect the position of different actors within the social 
situation of ethnographic sites, and this understanding of the social relations therein 
cannot be achieved without being reflexive and being aware of one’s limitations as an 
intruder who invades the social space occupied by actors [Burawoy, 2009]. This is an 
interactive process in which the researcher is an active participant. 
 Yet many ethnographers insist that there should be some yardstick for discerning 
the validity of research results; otherwise, the researcher simply lapses into an unending 
cycle of “relativism” [Huberman and Miles, 2002]. Critical Realism in particular tries to 
find a middle path between positivism and the eschewal of objectivity by postmodernism, 
by continuing to seek a reliable picture of what actually exists in the real world while 
acknowledging the fallibility of research, and recognising its limitations in terms of time, 
space; it recognises that the researcher is also located in the world he or she studies. 
Critical Realism retains the sense of the “objectiveness” of reality, since the 
retention of “an unbiased interest in things as they actually present themselves to the 
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perceiving subject is the foundation of realism in fieldwork” [Hammersley, 2002: 7]. 
According to Hammersley 
the aim of social research is to represent reality, but this is not to say that its 
function is to reproduce it (that is to say represent it in its own terms). 
Rather representation must always be from some point of view which makes 
some features of the phenomena represented relevant and others irrelevant. 
There can be multiple, non-contradictory and valid descriptions and 
explanations of the same phenomenon. 
 However, as Cerwonka and Malkki [2007: 30] point out, this ethnographic dialogue, 
though rich, is limited in its validity by time and space and the ethnographer makes 
evaluative decisions in the field that affect how she or he interprets data. The solitary 
researcher can ‘freeze’ a particular element of the social relations observed in the field but 
cannot provide a timeless explanation because the researcher herself or himself and the social 
relationships within the field are in a state of constant flux. To quote from Cerwonka and 
Malkki [2007: 30]: 
“Ethnographic fieldwork is a rich and demanding activity where questions 
about the relationships among experience, self, and the alterity of the 
research object are more readily explored than in other research practices.” 
Of course, this applies as much in research in the sociology of work or organisation as 
anywhere else. The researcher may try to explain the data in the best way she or he can but in 
the process may miss out important data that other researchers might identify. Or the 
explanation may be valid in itself at the point in time it was reached, but market conditions 
and the individuals and hierarchal arrangements within an organisation may change, with 
newer repertoires of managerial activity, which mean that a study loses its validity. This 
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temporality of time and space as pointed out in the discussion on the bounded nature of 
case study research does not discount the validity of outcome of the study because as 
Hammersley [2007: 189] says of ethnographers, “We develop analyses by making 
connections among the conceptual categories of our local data and also by relating them 
explicitly to generic ideas that transcend them.” 
3.2 My Case Study 
In this section I explain the choice of my case study company, and 
how I gained access to it. 
3.2.1 My Rationale For My Choice Of The Case Study Firm 
Fieldwork for this explanatory single-case study was conducted in the EWS 
plant of CompCo in Southern India from August 2008 until the first week of June 2009. 
EWS and CompCo are pseudonyms of the case study plant and company respectively. 
CompCo is a leading commercial vehicle manufacturing firm in India, which, during 
the fieldwork period, was in the process of implementing major changes within its 
plants which seemed to me to be likely to be of significant interest. 
 At that juncture, I wanted to understand how commercial vehicle manufacturing 
companies in India were reacting to the dominant paradigm of change management in 
the automotive industry, which was lean manufacturing. I also wanted to examine the 
challenges corporate and plant management encountered and to explore the 
understandings and outcomes for workers and managers in a company that had a 
difficult industrial relations history. Studying change management in the initial stages of 
its implementation and institutionalisation had an advantage over studying the effects in 
companies that had already institutionalised lean manufacturing to an advanced degree 
and where those effects are well documented in the literature [Rinehart et al., 1997]. The 
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choice of CompCo was advantageous because I was able to observe an evolving 
corporate strategy, the outlooks and interactions of workers and managers, and the 
measures they accepted or rejected, the changes in their work routines and the labour 
processes being imposed upon them. I hoped that extrapolation of the findings from this 
firm, which has been a dominant player in the commercial vehicle sector in India, would 
illuminate the challenges of implementing managerial strategies of change management 
in the changing commercial vehicle manufacturing sector in India. 
My other reasons for choosing CompCo as a case study firm were entirely 
pragmatic. One of its main production sites is in Hubli, a town an hour and half away by 
bus from my family’s home, and where I could live during fieldwork. Recording and 
storing my data at home meant I could be sure of maintaining its security and 
confidentiality. Moreover, I had spent the best part of my childhood in Bangalore, India 
so I knew the area fairly well. As important, I had a connection to the company through 
my uncle, who had worked at CompCo and still had acquaintances there. 
3.2.2 Gaining access 
The difficulties of getting management’s agreement to pursue fieldwork have been 
well documented in the literature. As Morell et al. [1997] observe, the start of any 
ethnographic study begins with a search for gatekeepers and the simple question, “Whose 
approval do we need to obtain in order to conduct our research in this organisation?” 
Identifying gatekeepers is also useful in providing pointers to the structure of an 
organisation and may help to clarify differences and similarities in the agendas of the 
researcher and the gatekeepers [Morell et al., 1999: 58]. Moreover, since gaining access is 
a continuing process, it involves continually explaining the research agenda to 
participants as the research progresses. 
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 The preparations for my fieldwork commenced with a letter from my academic 
supervisor to the HR Director at CompCo corporate headquarters in April 2008. Initially, 
the Director was reluctant to grant permission to allow me to study one of CompCo’s 
plants. At that stage, there was some discussion as to whether a study of a plant in Hubli 
manufacturing motor cycles, TVS, might be more productive than a study of the 
commercial vehicle plant. TVS had a long standing collaboration with the Warwick 
Manufacturing Group. A Professor there introduced me to the HR manager of TVS. 
However, in the TVS plant was at an advanced stage of impelementing the process of 
lean manufacturing and also had a waning trade union voice. This made TVS less 
attractive as a case study site because I wanted to study how trade unions receive lean 
manufacturing from the beginning and in any case, I was unsure whether I would get 
sufficient access to pursue participants over an extended period or be able to plumb the 
managerial networks at TVS, 
However, a relative of mine who had worked in a senior position as GM in 
CompCo and who had retired recently succeeded in convincing Mr. N, who was 
heading the company’s change management programme, to allow me to carry out my 
fieldwork study in the company. Mr. N believed that my research could provide 
valuable insights into the effectiveness of CompCo’s change management programme, 
which could help him in managing the process and deciding on what he described as 
“course corrections”. Mr. N’s views convinced corporate management to grant me 
permission to start my fieldwork initially at WAP4, although eventually I ended up 
spending almost all of my time at EWS, which became my field site. 
The kinds of data available to researchers are dependent on the access they obtain 
and the position they adopt in carrying out their research. Initially, it was clear to me that 
I needed to establish my credibility with management, who were sensitive to any 
potential criticism, so I could both gain the insights only they could provide and access to 
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the data I needed. Nevertheless, as my research progressed I found that as management 
began to treat me more as an established part of the social fabric of the plant I was able to 
use the freedom of movement I had gained to establish a network of contacts and interact 
with workers. As I discuss further below, much depends on obtaining a role in the case 
study setting that allows one to meet and talk with people in the setting on a regular basis. 
However, any particular role will also have drawbacks, insofar as it limits the scope of 
where the researcher can go and whom he or she can talk to. A particularly good example 
here is Milkman’s [1997] study of the impact of technology on workers and workers’ 
rights in the US car industry. She was able to obtain access to an automobile plant only 
because at the time, the United Automobile Workers union wanted to study the impact of 
new technology on the job security of its members and approached Milkman asking for 
her help [Milkman, 1997: 192]. Although the two had different agendas, there was a 
confluence of interests and using its relationship with the employer, the UAW was able to 
secure access to the company. Milkman was therefore able to gain the access that she 
needed for her research in return for providing a study of how the union’s recently 
negotiated job security programme functioned; something at that point that the 
implementation of new technologies had triggered. 
As identified by Milkman [1997: 197], the researcher’s agenda will usually not 
be in exact congruence with what the company would expect or hope would be 
delivered and this was true in my case study. I wanted to interpret and understand what 
change management would mean to operators and middle managers, whereas the 
company wanted me to help them assess first their change management programme and 
later their inventory reduction project. For me to gain the access and trust needed to 
obtain a deep understanding of the effects of lean manufacturing driven change, I had to 
show a coalescence between my research agenda and the interests of plant management 
and its perception of what a student’s research project ought to contain. As I discuss 
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further below the role given me by management, while providing access to managers 
limited my access to and possibly credibility with workers. 
3.3 Types of Data Collection 
Before proceeding to elaborate upon the particulars of my fieldwork and its 
dilemmas I will describe the three sources of data for this project in brief. I agree with 
Burgess [1995: 3] that whilst in the field and during the process of fieldwork the 
ethnographer’s attention should focus on the way in which different people experience, 
interpret, and structure their lives. My ethnographic experience informs me of that for an 
ethnographer to experience Burgess’s prescriptions requires forbearance, a friendly 
disposition, and empathy, with the aim of creating friendships that abide within an 
extended conversation rather than just finding respondents and fitting them into an 
interview format. Whilst being methodical and systematic with data collection is 
necessary, flexibility needs to be factored into data documentation to make it flexible to 
accommodate new developments in the field. This, in turn, illuminates aspects of the 
phenomena that did not occur to the fieldworker’s commencement of fieldwork. 
Accordingly, Burgess suggests that the methods of investigation that are used be 
developed in relation to the theoretical perspectives or theoretical orientations, that 
themselves are structured to provide a better insight into the social world that is 
structured by the participants. 
Burgess describes the usual means by which the ethnographic method gains an 
insight into the social worlds of the actors it seeks to study as: participant observation; in-
depth or unstructured interviews; and documentary evidence so that during the course of 
their work researchers can discern the meaning of social situations [Burgess, 1995: 3]. I 
will elaborate on participant observation, interview, and sources of primary and 
secondary data  
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3.3.1 Participant observation 
Among the many definitions of participant observation in methodology texts 
Tony Watson [Watson, 2010: 207-8] captures the meaning well in saying that 
participant observation 
“is a research practice in which the investigator joins the group, 
community, or organization being studied, as both a full or partial 
member, and both participates in and observes activities, asks questions, 
takes part in conversations, and reads relevant documents. It is a practice 
in which the researcher engages with the people being studied, shares 
their life as far as possible, and converses with them on their own terms.” 
My fieldwork adhered to all the parameters delineated by Watson, including that “the 
observation has to occur over a period of time which is sufficient for the researcher to appreciate 
the range of norms, practices, and values, official and unofficial alike, which characterise that 
research setting”. 
My participant observation included pure observation – for instance, walking for 
extending periods of time around my case study plant to observe workers within the 
shops, memorising the plant’s layout, and trying understand its labour process – as well 
as frequenting the places where managers had lunch, such as the canteen and the eateries 
where workers drank their tea. I also undertook extensive walks around the town, which 
was known for its industrial manufacturing firms, and walking around the residential 
colonies in which CompCo workers and managers lived. Other forms of observation 
consisted of taking long bus rides after the shift to get a sense of the town when the day 
was ‘quiet’. On many an occasion I would encounter a group of workers from CompCo 
and would endeavour to get an idea what workers were talking about, and also in hope of 
finding potential new informants, I would interject and ask open-ended questions and use 
 138 
the technique of snowballing. This was in addition to the intense interaction I engaged in 
within the plant, especially with managers. 
As a fieldworker, I used to used to spend at least five days a week lasting for an 
average of about seven hours or even more in the premises of plant as a part of the 
GEMBA team, and later on some occasions at Mr. AB’s residence, which was not far 
away from where I lived. Regular participant observation carried out at the EWS plant 
premises was also backed up by additional opportunities. I was always ready to rush to 
Hubli, if a manager or worker was willing to talk to me at his residence, which used to 
happen every now and then on Sunday afternoons. 
3.3.2 Interview data 
 My ethnographic fieldwork included many informal interviews with senior and 
middle managers, as well as detailed unstructured interviewing of senior and middle 
managers and workers. In the course of my participant-observation I interacted frequently 
with over twenty-three managers, and was often able to ask them questions for at least 
half an hour, in most cases on several occasions. The senior managers amongst them 
included the Change Management Head, the Head of Production and staff specialists, 
such as the Deputy Head of the Change Management Project. Amongst middle 
management, my informants ranged from senior middle managers, comprising shop floor 
heads, to intermediary middle management and line management. Additionally, shortly 
before leaving the field I had interviews that ranged from one hour to two-and-a-half 
hours with twelve people out of these twenty-three, I also interviewed six graduate 
engineering trainees and interacted with two out of the six frequently during my stay in 
the change management nerve centre of EWS, where I also met a cross section of 
managers from other plants of CompCo in the training centre. In addition I had three 
interviews with the General Manager (GM) of EWS, whom I met in person only towards 
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the end of my fieldwork. I interviewed him three times, once during the main fieldwork 
period, and twice, for two-and-a-half hours at a time, when I visited on a follow-up trip in 
2011. I also visited the home for destitute children run by a middle manager who was of 
intermediate rank, and had six interviews with him at weekends. I was also invited for 
dinner to the house of one line manager in the last week of January 2011 and spoke with 
him for about an hour-and-a-half. 
My interactions with workers were less intensive, and my discussions with them 
started as my exit from the field drew closer. Most of the interviews with workers were 
arranged either through a particular trade union convener of EWS, Mr. VDVN, or a 
manager, Mr. RGPN, who had very good rapport with workers because he interacted 
with them on a daily basis. Mr. SMGN, now a quality inspector who had “crossed over” 
to the other side of the fence from being a worker himself, also introduced me to 
workers to interview. Altogether, I carried out detailed unstructured interviews with 
sixteen permanent operators, who comprised two union conveners and fourteen 
operators who were involved in production, manufacturing and stores-related activities 
within EWS. These were semiformal interviews with an informal, conversational 
character, “shaped partly by the interviewer’s pre-existing topic guide and partly by 
concerns that are emergent in the interview” [Bloor and Wood, 2006: 104]. I would also 
try to create opportunities for further interaction during the course of my interviews. In 
addition to these sixteen permanent workers employed in EWS, I interacted with two 
temporary workers, in the Medium Duty Vehicle Assembly area, who were not yet 
regularised, one outsourced employee who whose salary for his work within the engine 
dressing section of EWS was paid by another firm, and one temporary worker from the 
machine shop. I also interacted with six semi-skilled workers who did peripheral jobs 
such as cleaning industrial waste such as iron fillings, janitors and those who 
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maintained CompCo’s facilities. I also spoke with two suspended workers, one of 
whom I met at Mr. VDVN’s trade union office. 
 In addition to interviewing managers and workers within CompCo I was able to 
meet with individuals outside it. This included in particular my uncle, who had retired as 
a GM at CompCo, whom I spoke to for two hours at weekends in his home in 
Bangalore. I also had detailed discussion lasting for over two hours in the Pune plant of 
a firm called Cummins with one ex-CompCo employee who now worked in Cummins 
and the Head and Deputy Head of the Cummins Pune plant. The three of them helped in 
giving me an industry-wide perspective and some insights into CompCo’s 
organisational culture. Whenever there was an opportunity I also tried reaching out to 
management consultants who were particularly well versed with industrial relations 
aspects of the Indian automotive industry. I had four detailed interactions with 
management consultants over the weekends for about two hours each in Bangalore, 
after seeking an appointment with them with a hope of excavating further data garnered 
from experience and from their contacts with retired and serving managers in EWS and 
other plants of CompCo. I also visited a trade union leader, Mr. VDVN, at his office 
outside the plant several times. I also met him again for about an hour-and-a-half on two 
occasions during my visit to the plant in January 2011. 
3.3.4 Primary and secondary documents 
I was also able to obtain primary data supplied to me through the inventory 
change management project in which I became directly involved. This included 
company magazines directed towards conveying the gospel of change to workers, and 
enabled me to acquire written versions of the new vocabularies adopted by senior 
management to represent what it saw as the new changed reality of the firm’s capacity to 
“Engineer Tomorrows Together”, graphs and trend charts, regularly published brochures 
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describing the changes made in production processes, company documents describing 
present limitations and future states to be attained and photographs portraying 
enthusiastic workers and line managers participating in implementing lean innovations. 
With regard to workers, pamphlets issued by the trade unions, their notice boards 
and material given to me by union activists were extremely useful, although their 
collection was fraught with danger as I risked antagonising management by undermining 
its change ‘story’. These were published in the local language, Tamil, and later translated 
for me by a native Tamil speaker. 
Other documentary evidence included publications from automotive industry 
consultants and exhaustive weekly updates delineating an array of indicators and 
challenges for automotive firms in the commercial vehicle industry in India. I also 
made a habit of exhaustive perusal of the Indian financial press and the Financial 
Times. 
3.4 The Fieldwork Process 
An understanding of the plant’s social relations cannot be achieved without being 
reflexive and being aware of one’s limitations as an intruder who taps into situational 
knowledge and invades the social space occupied by actors. Burawoy [2009] characterises 
this as a montage of the actors’ contextual experiences and knowledge, an interactive 
process in which the researcher plays a role, too. Ethnographers are obliged to relate their 
experiences of fieldwork in some depth, since their data are produced through their 
interactions with informants in their fieldwork setting. Hence the author’s account of the 
data production process must acknowledge the reflexive role of his or her own social 
positioning in the construction of their relations with informants. My identity as a male 
from an upper caste habitus, and as middle-class south Indian was crucial to gaining access 
to my case study firm, but afterwards relatively unmarked in my interactions with 
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managers, partly because some of them came from a similar background. Making contact 
with trade union leaders relied to a small degree on previous contacts I had made as an 
MPhil student. Inherent in the process of ethnographic research is a continuous process of 
identity management [Coffey, 1999: 26], which in my case involved deference to the older 
managers I met and fellow feeling with those closer to my own age. My social background 
was no doubt more of an issue in my relations with operators, but hardly ever commented 
upon. But more important to my experience of fieldwork, and in the account I now 
provide, was the roles that my informants assigned me, and my awareness of the gains 
and costs of the ways they were positioned. 
In retrospect it seems that my fieldwork fell into three distinct phases, each 
revolving around different sites, particular informants and strategic dilemmas. The first 
phase lasted between my arrival on 28 June 2008 and 10 September 2008. In this period 
Mr. N, the Head of the Change Management took me under his wing and located me in 
WAP4, the smaller CompCo plant in Hubli. I also got to know Mr.NNK, a Head of 
Purchasing in one of the CompCo plants, who was essential in guiding me in the early 
days. I also attended internal training classes on lean manufacturing and related manager 
strategies. This was invaluable, not in terms of acquiring knowledge about lean 
manufacturing and the company’s approach to change management, but because it 
allowed me to absorb the organisational culture of the company. 
The second phase of fieldwork lasted from 11 September 2008 to 10 February 
2009, during which I was based mainly in EWS working as an analyst on the inventory 
programme. This phase saw me becoming further entrenched into the field and building 
rapport and establishing relationships, particularly with middle managers. Significantly, I 
also became a part of the change management project myself. My key informants 
became Mr. AB, Mr. N’s deputy who was in charge of implementing GEMBA in the 
inventory management process; Mr. RGPN, a senior manager of stores; Mr. AK, Mr. 
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SMU and Mr. ISC, line managers in the Production Control department; Mr. SVM who 
was a Production Engineer who oversaw the industrial engineering aspect of GEMBA; 
and Mr. TJN who managed the GEMBA reward system. This phase was dominated by 
the advent of the recession period that lasted from November 2008 to mid -May 2009. 
The third phase, from 11 February 2009 to 12 June 2009, marked an intensification of 
my efforts in fieldwork and my attempts to capture the views, attitudes and motivations 
of the GM, Mr. AB and middle managers through longer and more systematic, although 
semi-structured, interviews. I also carried out a programme of intensive and detailed 
interviews with workers. I also undertook an interview with the GM of the factory, and 
repeated that on my return for ten days in 2011. 
3.4.1 My introduction to the field 
Like Delbridge [1998: 18], I believe that the fieldworker’s initial foray into the 
field is important for the reader to know about. It shows how the fieldwork has to cope 
with unfamiliarity, uncertainty and dependence on gatekeepers who have their own 
schedules that do not make much time for the researcher. But this can also help him or 
her to grasp some of the tensions present in the setting. 
Although my first day felt momentous, I got off to a slow start. On 28 June 2008 
I found myself at a busy road junction waiting for the bus that would take me to EWS. 
An hour’s waiting was filled with nervousness about the research project and quite how 
I would get to my research setting in an unfamiliar town. Two hours and a change of 
bus later saw me getting off the bus at the town’s makeshift bus station. I remember 
haggling with the driver of the auto rickshaw (called a “tuk-tuk” because of the noise its 
small engine makes) over the fare and his justification for it, which was that he would 
have to return empty from there back to the town centre. He took me to the plant where 
I was told to report first and stopped in front of the main entrance. I was dressed in a 
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collar and tie and more formally than would have been usual. I waited in the queue, in 
the security enclosure, along with company representatives and other people waiting for 
their appointments with the managers of relevant departments. 
The security staff asked questions about my academic work and when I said that I 
was visiting Mr. N they became even more apprehensive, and I had to call Mr. N, to 
whom a security guard talked with respectful reverence. Once satisfied, the security 
guard called Mr. K, the person designated to meet me that day. I thanked Mr. N soon 
afterwards and he told me to call him if I ever had a problem entering the plant and said 
that he could always be reached by telephone, except when he was flying. He then told 
me that he would be available to meet in three days’ time and invited me to come to see 
him then. After having got an initial overview of the atmosphere, and since Mr. N was 
away, I returned back home. 
On the second day, at around 11.30 a.m., I went to the administrative building and 
searched out the comfortable GEMBA discussion room, where the running air-
conditioning numbed the perspiration, and I glanced through an array of graphs and 
charts and photographs. I had to wait there for about an hour, first establishing a rapport 
with the caretaker of the conference room, who told me he would be busy when the 
London based proprietors came and that it was his responsibility to see that lunch reached 
the GM’s “cabin” (suite) on time. I made some friendly talk with him as I glanced though 
the company magazines and the GEMBA Empower Prize distribution photographs and 
literature, which emphasised again and again the value of teamwork. Later, in the 
GEMBA discussion room, I was introduced to Mr. NNK, who managed relationships 
with prospective parts suppliers in the WAP4 plant. He continued my tour of the 
administrative building explaining the trend charts, and showing photographs of 
employees who had won prizes for kaizening; he hoped to construct an impression of a 
company that cared about its employees and wanted to adapt to future challenges. On day 
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three, Mr. N told me that he was not able to meet me as we had planned, because he had 
to go to corporate headquarters at Nellore. I therefore decided not to attend the plant that 
day. 
Day four saw the arrival of Mr. N, one among the key gatekeepers of my project, 
who was all pomp and circumstance with his busy Blackberry phone trying to represent 
the energy, dynamism, renewal and all that GEMBA may be seen to represent. If I 
recollect correctly, he tried to show urgency and immediacy of purpose. He spent time 
discussing my academic background, my uncle who had been instrumental in arranging 
my access and how I could assist the company in the GEMBA project. Days five and six 
saw me finalising paperwork and getting an identity card prepared for entry to the plant, 
which at that stage was WAP4, and I could not do much other than seeing Mr. NNK 
operate in his cabin. He told me to take leave because Mr. N was pre-occupied with work 
and could not provide me with what he termed a "focussed agenda" to follow. 
3.4.2 My changing roles 
I had to play a variety of roles in order to gain the trust of respondents and senior 
managers, on whose acquiescence my access to the field was premised and who would be 
important in my initiating contact with other informants. Already in the first few days of 
fieldwork I could see that a key issue would be adopting an appropriate role, one which 
would make me acceptable to my gatekeepers but which was not entirely under my own 
control. 
My position as a student stood me in good stead, and I did not have to dissimulate 
to play this role. I adopted the role of the innocent inexperienced in the ways of the world 
and new to industry, which to a certain degree was true, as I was making my way through 
unfamiliar surroundings in a large manufacturing setting. It was a role of passive 
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observer, but it also meant that I had to be shown round the factory, and have the role of 
the different departments and important managers explained to me. 
In fact, the role assigned me by Mr. N, as a ‘trainee’, was ideal in so far as it 
meant that he had to explain things to me. My academic background did seem to be a 
positive factor in my favour, but he was also clearly convinced that for a student to 
succeed in his research he needed to be guided in the ‘proper’ manner. To accomplish 
that he needed to explain and make sure I understood how GEMBA was working and 
point out the need for ‘course correction’. He told me that was the precise reason for 
supporting me was so I could strengthen the on-going project which he was heading. 
In order to put him at ease I requested to be “guided” and my career be shaped by 
his valued inputs brought by many years in the industry. I adapted to the role of a willing 
'project trainee' who needed to be provided in his words as a senior manager with the 
'right perspective'. He was my primary gatekeeper until I met Mr. AB, his second in 
command on the GEMBA project. All this meant both he and others had to explain things 
to me explicitly that they might not have done otherwise. Moreover, he and others had a 
model for this role in the trainees from management institutes who worked on the 
programme. 
So although I did make the move from a rank outsider to being a member of the 
community, it was largely by being deferent and respectful, friendly but not ingratiating, 
and attentive to others, as Yin [2011:119] suggests. Conscious that I should not 
emphasise my other role as an independent researcher I restricted my queries to asking 
apparently innocuous questions and trying to ‘stay around’, completing a 10:00a.m. to 
17:00p.m. routine in the plant, reading GEMBA tracker charts in the first half of the day 
and later attending meetings and talking walks around the assembly areas. I was very 
occasionally taken to lunch in the executive canteen by Mr. NNK and could see who 
showed respect to whom, who the important visitors were, and so on. Managers and 
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operators ate separately and managers enjoyed a much better overall environment than 
that of operators. I also observed that special guests such as senior managers from other 
companies, including important suppliers, were served special lunch menus that were 
different from the main menu. Japanese visitors seemed particularly well treated. 
It also meant I could watch Mr. N perform his role. I was able to see how Mr. N 
managed his subordinates in subtle but powerful ways and came to appreciate the 
‘performativity’ of his change programme phrases by seeing how his subordinates sought 
to adopt them. I watched him conduct long distance teleconferences with a series of 
vendors and the Head of the Corporate Purchase department in Nellore apparently 
seeking its advice before asking for approval for the purchase of new computer 
peripherals. Mr. N was careful to keep people of influence ‘in the loop’, a phrase that 
would become repeated many times until it became ingrained in the minds of subordinate 
managers who dared not to use Mr. N’s favourite vocabularies 
Sometimes, Mr. N would give me a lift back to my home in his car and he would 
talk nostalgically about himself, my uncle and other erstwhile colleagues. But I realised 
that along with trying to induct me into the company, the senior managers were also 
seeking to ‘chaperon’ me, as [Yin, 2011: 127] says, in order to monitor me and to see 
what I was learning. 
The host may have two different motives. One is to monitor the site 
visitor. The other is to see or hear what the site visitor appears to be 
learning. For instance, when organizations are the setting for field 
research, the site visitor may have access to a higher official who might 
not normally give such access to the host. 
Luckily, however, I had opportunities to meet other people in CompCo. For a month 
from September 2008, at Mr. N’s suggestion, I attended training programmes at the training 
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institute located midway between WAP4 and EWS at Hubli. This was meant to give me a 
deeper understanding of the implementation of lean manufacturing at CompCo and gave me an 
opportunity to witness first-hand the hierarchical pathways in which graduate engineering 
trainees were being groomed for future managerial positions, to discern their educational 
background, and the challenges these young recruits mostly male faced in their training course, 
and whether they would continue to rise up through the CompCo hierarchy and become 
company men or conversely leave at the first opportunity to a better job in the less physically 
taxing IT industry. During these training classes I started building up a small cohort of friends 
who were younger than me and worked with Mr. N’s deputy Mr. AB. The training classes also 
provided me with another opportunity to examine how functional roles in different specialisms 
were apportioned, understand different middle managers’ work histories and how they got to 
their present occupational position, how they addressed superiors such as Mr. N, and the extent 
to which they embraced these training programmes. 
I date the second phase of my fieldwork to beginning the inventory project for Mr. 
N. I was now able to develop a ‘hands-on’ understanding of the company’s lean 
manufacturing innovations with regard to its inventory management system. I got to 
know a number of middle managers and an important actor, Mr. AB, whom I will discuss 
further below. 
Later, before my exit from the field, and with the increased acceptance of my 
presence and the trust of many managers, I became more confident and independent in 
my demeanour and was able to ask for meetings and interviews I felt the research 
required. In this role I was able to pursue more detailed unstructured interviews, asking 
questions that previously would have been impossible. 
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3.4.3 Building relationships with key informants 
From the time I joined the GEMBA team in EWS I was able to build another set 
of relationships. EWS became my field, “the site of my personal engagements between 
the researched and me” and I began to be able to enact “the social roles and relationships 
which places the self at the heart of ethnographic enterprise” [Coffey, 1999: 23]. 
As mentioned earlier, in November 2008 Mr. N asked Mr. AB to work with me on 
the inventory project and then report back to him. He was waiting for Mr. AB to come back 
after his absence owing to the death of a close relative in his family. I still remember the 
day both of us met. Mr. AB was an easy-going young man from north India who was 
perhaps still trying to come to grips with the well set ways of the southern Tamil, Telugu 
and Kannada speaking plant. Mr. AB’s office was like a data analysis room full of young 
graduate engineering trainees immersed in graphs and pie charts and statistical 
calculations. This was where the real action of GEMBA took place and provided many 
invaluable insights into peoples’ real attitudes to GEMBA. It was here also that inventory 
meetings would take place. 
At that point, Mr. AB designated me as the point of contact to move the reporting 
aspects of the change programme forward and I had to alter my role to behave more 
assertively in order to ascertain whether quantitative targets were being met. The middle 
managers were under the impression that if they failed to cooperate they would have to 
face a flustered Mr. N, and therefore co-operated, believing that my participation was 
intended to help Mr. N and Mr. AB. With Mr. AB’s authority I was able to spend long 
periods talking to managers ostensibly to get them to go through each and every anomaly 
in the inventory accounting process and identify the faults. But at the same time, I was 
given much wider access to the plant and was better able to fulfill my own research 
agenda. I would later realise that if it had not been for Mr. AB and the inventory project I 
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would not be writing this thesis. Both of us have left the field he is no longer Mr. N’s 
‘Man Friday’, and I am no longer mapping his career trajectory. 
In addition, I was able gradually to spend more time with Mr. AB who would 
sometimes accompany me on the way back home, and in those evenings I learned more 
about the unstated structures and organisation politics within EWS and reduced my 
dependence on Mr. N. Mr. AB would open up to me about the problems of managing a 
company such as CompCo and his difficulties as a young manager from north India. He 
seemed to appreciate the need for my developing an understanding of employee relations 
and work histories at a more interpretative level. 
I was also able to observe Mr. AB during his telephone conversations with 
colleagues who rang him. Whilst I could not always discern the precise subject of the 
calls, they did enable me to observe the enactment of power relationships within the 
company and the problems faced by Mr. AB in dealing with the organisation. I was able 
to ask Mr. AB questions, and sometimes made statements about the organisation to draw 
out his personal opinions about the state of the organisation. 
At the outset I was very uncertain how long the inventory project would last and I 
was apprehensive that I would find that my usefulness to Mr. N would cease and I would 
lose my access to the plant. With time and the advent of the recession it became evident 
that the project of change management was going badly, because there were other 
priorities to attend to, and as a result I was able gradually to enter into friendships with 
other individuals who in turn introduced me to other managers. Moreover, although 
during the recession many managers were not at work, in another respect this was 
serendipitous for me because between November 2008 and April-May 2009, Mr. N was 
so preoccupied with dealing with the recession that he was hardly able to meet with me. 
Therefore I did not have to fear his getting to know how much time I spent talking to 
people on matters that were not strictly devoted to promoting his change project. 
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Some middle managers were very formal and were unwilling to give much insight 
into their work or what they felt about change management. However, interesting 
operational details would emerge in the course of discussions about the completion of the 
statistical returns. Yet by the middle of December, participant observation in the 
Production Control office enabled me to understand middle managers’ world-view, and by 
discussing with them a wider array of general topics, their attitudes towards loyalty to the 
company and how changing management policy affected them. I also was able to explore 
how the department as a whole coped with pressure. These were people who had spent the 
best part of their lives and perhaps waking hours in the plant, and however much they 
criticized other departments and their higher-ups, they were generally loyal to the 
company when there was a crisis. But when they were subject to pressure they would 
often pour out their hearts to me and complain about the stresses they were under and 
protest the unfairness of the treatment meted out to them by their superiors. Being 
conscientious in implementing corporate management’s lean manufacturing agenda, 
being involved and sympathetic with their concerns but at the same time not appearing to 
bat for their grievances passionately, was a difficult balancing act for me as a fieldworker 
with regard to line managers. 
By late December 2008 three managers in Production Control, Mr. AK, Mr. SMU 
and Mr. ISC and I became great friends and before my exit shared their grievances and 
their feelings towards the company and would also introduce me to their colleagues who 
dropped by, and allow me to have informal interviews with them. During this process of 
colleagues dropping in, casual conversations would begin with Mr. AK assuming the role 
of another key informant. This would lead to interesting group discussions between them, 
their colleagues, and operators who dropped by for a chat. Towards the end of phase three 
of the fieldwork, I was in a position to undertake extended tours of the plant, taking longer 
routes compared to regular direct ones to reach particular departments. By making these 
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extended walks I could pick up news of industrial accidents, overhear gossip, observe foul 
language used against selected adversaries (usually managers), shadow some operators and 
get a grasp of the main issues, whilst at the same time maintaining my position as a 
management analyst. 
Similarly, I was able to build a relationship with the change management 
coordinator in the engine stores, Mr. RGPN, who was the driving force behind a local 
orphanage. Initially our discussions were confined to change management, but eventually I 
managed to extract an invitation to visit his orphanage. I remember being there on a Sunday 
evening with a box of chocolates and sweets for the children. I had eight separate 
conversations with Mr. RGPN, including visiting his home, although his willingness to 
speak to me was lubricated in part by my asking my uncle to speak to him. But our 
dialogue was interrupted by the recession which caused prolonged shut downs in the plant 
and therefore denied me the reason to be present in the plant. This was the lowest point in 
my fieldwork because people remained at home, which meant that I had to work hard and 
persuasively to be invited to their houses if I wanted to converse. Nevertheless, Mr. 
RGPN and myself became friends and he introduced me to other colleagues. 
In the final stage of my research I was able to gain invitations to the homes of Mr. 
AB and Mr. AK, and Mr. AB visited my own family. At this stage we were on very good 
terms with one another and they could speak to me without inhibition. I also persuaded 
my relative to talk to the GM of the plant, Mr. SDM, whom I had previously deliberately 
avoided. His friendship as a long-standing colleague of my relative, who started his 
working life three decades back, helped a great deal in breaking the ice. I had three long 
conversations with him, with the last one being the most memorable just before I left the 
field. The instinctive judgment of mine of not meeting the GM until the very end proved 
to be invaluable because doing so at the earlier stages would have alienated Mr. N and I 
might have lost the confidence of Mr. AB. A further visit in January 2011 proved to be an 
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unexpectedly rich interaction with the GM who spoke extensively about the company and 
its problems and he became my sixth critical informant. 
3.4.4 Accessing the operators on the ‘other side of the fence’ 
During roughly the seventh month of my research, from January 2009, I began to 
take greater chances and secretively started collecting pamphlets dropped by the union, 
grabbing them before anyone could see and shoving them into my research bag. Earlier I 
noticed in our car rides that my innocuous question regarding these would incur Mr. N’s 
opprobrium and bring out his inherent antagonism against workers. He tried very hard to 
‘protect’ me from the views of workers, preferring instead that I should concentrate on his 
core themes of achieving mind-set change amongst a critical mass of middle managers 
and proffer suggestions of course correction of their implementation of lean 
manufacturing. I was therefore in fear of being seen by the security staff as someone who 
would have sympathy with workers and their problems. 
A visit to Nellore in December 2008 and a contact’s lead took me to a Union 
officer who gave me the contact number of Mr. VDVN, the leader of a left-leaning trade 
union confederation with members in CompCo. My trip to Madras also introduced me to 
a disgruntled operator and I took this opportunity quietly to take a look at CompCo’s 
Nellore plant WDP4 and read the union’s publications at the notice board outside the 
plant. It took a while to build rapport and to help do so I met the operator not in the 
factory but in a variety of other settings, including the union office, a small, run-down 
building in the back streets of the town, and a local restaurant in which he and other 
operators he introduced to me would speak freely. This was the most difficult and 
delicate parts of fieldwork for me because I had to make sure this was done casually and 
discreetly without offending managers such as Mr. N and letting down Mr. AB. 
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Pursuing fieldwork with both ends of the spectrum of opinion proved to be a 
tightrope walk. I will explain my methodological strategies and elaborate upon the 
reasons for measures I undertook for maintaining the balance below. During the course 
of weekends, in addition to meeting Mr. RGPN, I would fix up to meet with Mr. VDVN 
in the left aligned party union office. Operators were disgruntled at that juncture and he 
would answer my questions posed as an student eager to know, punctuated by satire of 
management generally drawing from my reading of labour process literature and books 
by Elger and Smith [2008] and Durand and Hatzfield [2003], whom I would read just 
before catching the bus to pick up ideas for leading questions and to recollect the 
grievances of operators cited in the labour process literature. Mr. VDVN felt that I was 
having a go at CompCo and would launch a a whole hog attack at CompCo. He later 
introduced me to other operators, and with extreme difficulty I managed to get them out 
of the plant and meet them in a restaurant on the affluent side which I had earmarked in 
advance. 
The last day of my fieldwork, a day before catching the flight to England, proved to 
be very valuable because the long-awaited settlement had finally been signed. Quite a few 
operators in EWS felt that the uncertainty over getting a settlement with new terms and 
conditions for the next two years was over, even though management exerted its prerogative 
to raise the number of hours worked to reach the earlier threshold of incremental pay 
marginally, even though the increase implied that the workers had to work for 480 minutes. 
3.4.5 Exit from the field 
I exited from the field after phase three by early July 2009 when I felt that 
respondents and myself were getting weary of each other and there were no further data 
that were emerging that challenged what I had already learned. Overstaying there would 
lead to potentially destroying the goodwill I had built up so painfully over time. In 
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grounded theory this is called ‘theoretical saturation’ – the point at which “researchers 
are comfortable that the properties and dimensions of the concepts and conceptual 
relationships selected to render the target event are fully described and that they have 
captured its complexity and variation” [Given, 2008: 875]. However, I was luckily able 
to revisit the field briefly in January 2011. 
3.5 Data Recording 
My situation in the plant limited my ability to make on-the-spot notes. The use of 
recording devices was not permitted because it was against company rules to have 
cameras or Dictophones, and since I, like everyone, had to declare my belongings at the 
gatehouse, I could not take them into the plant. During participant observation, including 
long walks around the plant, I never felt I could comfortably even take out my notebooks 
to write in. Although aware that it would be better to avoid misrepresentation through 
faulty memory, I felt that I was limited to recording my observations after conversations 
with informants had taken place. 
Even during interviews, to take out a notebook or Dictaphone was seen as pushing 
it in their face. If I tried to do so most managers, especially middle managers, became 
self-conscious and very reserved in expressing their opinions, and I could sense that my 
taking out a notebook from my bag disrupted the otherwise spontaneous flow of 
conversation. For instance, I would notice that informants would divert their attention 
away from me by turning back to their work or excuse themselves from me a few minutes 
after I took out the notebook. I did manage to write down notes at the later stage of 
fieldwork while having detailed conversations with a few managers such as Mr. RGPN 
and the GM Mr. SDN. However, then too their attention to my writing would transform a 
conversation into a dictation, which is something I wanted to avoid. 
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Hence my field data were mainly written down after interviews and interactions, in 
a set of notebooks which I treated as ethnographic field notes – that is, my record of “in-
depth descriptive details of people (including themselves), places, things, and events, as 
well as reflections on data, patterns, and the process of research findings” [Given, 2008: 
348]. 
This also included interview data, which I usually managed to write down as soon 
as possible afterwards. Usually I would wait for my respondents to become occupied in 
other matters and then quietly write down what they had said in shorthand. Or I would use 
the lunch break, excusing myself from Mr. AB or Mr. N and finding a quiet place in EWS 
sitting on parapet walls to make notes. Then, after dinner at home, I would recollect and 
write down all the significant events of the day, planning whom else to ask to confirm 
information, trying to make linkages, draw out categories and think of further questions 
and themes to ask about. I also tried to expand my shorthand notes by recording them in 
another notebook in more detail. I also typed out draft notes on computer files, which 
eventually become the basis for the vignettes I describe later. 
Even the notes I had with me once landed me in an awkward situation. On one 
occasion while I was away using the toilet I saw Mr. AB picking up the notes. But 
fortunately they were far too cryptic and my bad handwriting saved me from him reading 
my observations about people, GEMBA and managerial strategy. 
I adopted the same tactics of data recording for workers that I followed for 
managers and my primary objective was to go the extra mile in making them comfortable 
with my presence. I was very careful not to take out my notebook which would mean 
termination of all contact with them and they were at first suspicious about whether I was 
sent by management. People like Mr. VDVN were very conscious of these things and 
losing their hard -earned trust was deleterious for fieldwork. Instead, I would return home 
or run to the Hubli railway station benches to transcribe the notes about the workers ‘. 
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I divided my nine field notebooks thematically and allocated each theme 
separately. I allocated separate notebooks for workers, a notebook for scenario 
management and another for middle management. Within the notebooks I tried to divide 
its pages into technical factual data, management ideas and strategies and allocated 
spaces for individuals such as Mr. AB, Mr. N, Mr. AK and so on. Whenever I found 
information that needed to be probed or an aspect of data that I found important, it would 
be circled and written in larger text with red pen. Important themes within the notebooks 
would also be underlined and marked with a box and connecting arrows made. Any other 
observations about people, or passing thoughts, would be noted down without fail in the 
notebooks. 
3.6 Data Analysis 
I will divide the discussion into two parts. The first part will reflect the multiplicity 
of qualitative methods I deployed in analysing data, and the second will describe the 
ontological framework that that underpinned the eventual writing up of the analysis and 
conclude that these analyses aimed at triangulation of data. 
I commenced detailed analysis of my field-notes upon my return to England in 
July 2009 where I began scrutiny of the data with my magnifying glass and wrote them 
out as coherent sentences. I began to type down data from my notebooks and highlight 
themes of significance under the following headings: elements of the change 
programme; labour processes; management strategies; senior plant management; senior 
management career pathways; senior managers on managing; middle management 
grievances; middle management career pathways; industrial relations history; and 
workers. I would then look for repetitive assertions and important items which I had 
earlier marked with a star in my notebooks. Once I started analysing my data I returned 
to them over and over again and they were in addition to the pamphlets which formed 
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another repository of data. I followed a similar stratagem for analysing the pamphlets. I 
also set out to analyse other primary documents, such as the inventory data which 
comprised graphs, numerical figures and other statistical calculations, company data 
such as its fortnightly change management bulletin to its employees, delineating its 
overall market position, competitive challenges, the glad tidings that adoption of lean 
manufacturing and kaizening would bring, progress made and course correction 
required. Secondary documents comprised generic material from the financial press 
pertaining to the firm and the industry in general. 
Upon suggestion of my supervisors I began constructing vignettes under each of the 
above themes. I was also in occasional touch with middle managers and would seek 
clarifications over any factual inaccuracy that I felt needed to be addressed. From these 
vignettes emerged early chapters and I started dispatching the first of what has now become 
uncountable manuscripts to my supervisors for suggestions on how to improve, who would 
always come back with comments and suggestions. Thus in due course, a narrative began 
to tell itself and my early descriptive chapters began to burgeon. 
I had another opportunity to clarify and revisit and build upon emergent themes by 
an intensive bout of fieldwork during my visit in January 2011 where I interacted with line 
managers, Mr.RGPN, the GM Mr. SDN and Mr. VDVN. My attempt at this juncture had 
always been to verify my data from multiple sources and repeat the same theme queries 
over multiple respondents. After my return to the university on 15 of February 2011 from 
my visit in January 2011 I built analytic constructs upon these drafts which were primarily 
descriptive. I compared them and extracted a set of analytic argument claims that revealed 
themselves as the analysis continued, and the writing began to take shape and a more 
rounded perspective emerged towards the end of the writing. I could then juxtapose this 
overall rounded perspective with the literature, changing trends in the automotive industry 
and try to pin down my research questions specifically and how they address, support or 
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challenge the literature on change management, managerial rhetoric and industrial 
relations. My friend who works as a financial economics analyst in the insurance industry 
would periodically send me graphs and status reports which helped complement my 
analysis at that stage of managerial strategy. I continued to take the help of consultants in 
the automotive industry such as a professor of industrial engineering at the WMG and 
labour process researchers, to understand the full implications of these emergent themes, 
whenever required. 
Another strategy to supplement my data analysis - in addition to the tangible 
methods of analysing data - is to freeze moments of events, recollect them vividly and 
relive moments of fieldwork emotionally, interpret them carefully in order to ensure that 
those impressions, the richness of experience and data is not lost. This meditative process 
of closing one’s eyes, reflecting deeply to go back in time was helpful. It comprised 
performing ‘the epoche’ like operation which consisted of bracketing myself 
phenomenologically, and being in profound contemplation in the state of a passive 
meditative witness. This was in order to resurrect and view, mentally, moving frames of 
interviews and conversations, and experientially live down every moment of my 
fieldwork to capture their vividness and full intensity and to discern new analytic 
insights. These insights and new impressions I would immediately put on record to 
supplement the insights offered by notebooks. Consequently, my impressions of the plant 
and its dramatis personae are always embedded in my thoughts and, as with all industrial 
relations ethnographic researchers, the prospect of continually having to live and 
reconstruct as accurately as possible that sociological space of ‘action and agency’ has 
inevitably left an emotional burden on me. My intention to deploy the phrase ‘emotional 
burden’ is to underline the depth of involvement of the data and its analysis with me. 
This process of recording data yielded a definite set of findings which resulted in 
the construction of the final drafts of my empirical chapters. My analysis yielded a set 
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orelationships which I will list in the empirical chapter and the conclusions. Towards the 
final stages of writing up, a clear set of analytic constructs emerged through which I 
could generalise my findings by the emergence of a coherent narrative that links the 
chapters together. My methodology, as illustrated in the empirical chapters through the 
headings of the sub-sections, agrees with the qualitative technique of triangulation to 
allow the data to speak for itself, and allow for the emergence of an overall coherent 
narrative. 
Once a coherent narrative emerges the ethnographer researcher must seek 
interpretative validity [Maxwell, 2002: 48]. Central to the aim of achieving interpretative 
validity is the recognition that the analyst of the data cannot explain or arrive at a 
working hypothesis without ensuring that she or he has excavated all the connections and 
relationships between all variables in her or his case study. 
The attainment of interpretative validity to the best of my ability is an important aim 
of my study. Inherent in this attitude is the concentration on the explanatory power of data 
in an attempt to advance findings that corroborate or refute prevailing currents of 
hypothesis. Research questions emerge from the intersection between theory and the field 
and there is a continual, iterative conversation between research questions, which 
themselves are evolving and are continually informed by emergent themes from the data. 
3.7 Ethical Concerns 
Conducting social science research requires recurrent questions of judgment and 
discretion in the ethical realm. As Laine [2000: 29] observes, 
“The overlapping of roles and relationships presents researchers and other 
professionals with a range of complex ethical and moral dilemmas for 
which there is no satisfactory solution. Multiple roles (friend / therapist / 
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researcher) and dual relationships (friend/researcher) have a propensity to 
create “conflicts of interests.” 
I see as the most important of the ethical guidelines put forward by the British 
Sociological Association [2004] the requirements to obtain informants’ informed consent 
and to avoid causing harm. I attempt below to recollect honestly the ethical dilemmas and 
decisions that I as a relatively junior researcher faced, especially because I was always 
reminded that to continue in the field I required the continuing support of senior 
managers. As Van Mannen [in Emerson (ed.), 1983: 277] says, what could seem quite 
abstract decisions are in practice “immediate, personal and excruciating decisions”. 
Embedded in fieldwork are reciprocal expectations of the researcher and the researched 
that operate within asymmetric relationships of power. The researcher has to negotiate 
power relations in terms of access with managers who possess economic resources and 
have an important say in creating and reproducing authority in the plant. 
Even once I had received formal informed consent from management to conduct 
my study, I needed the informed consent of managers and workers. Informed consent is 
constantly negotiated at multiple levels to maintain trust and take the dialogue to a 
deeper level. As Coffey [1999: 26] says, this requires a continuous process of identity 
management. The maintenance of my carefully constructed identity (no less carefully 
constructed for being true) as a friendly research student was crucial to getting the 
consent of middle managers and workers. Coming from an overseas university also gave 
me a veneer of prestige, but I also had to reassure them that I would not reveal what they 
said. I also was careful to avoid empathising with workers when I spoke to managers 
like Mr. N, who I knew was hostile to them, which inevitably would have made him 
think I shared his views. I see this as an example of what Burgess [1995: 202] describes 
as the “white lies” fieldworkers must occasionally tell. 
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The researcher must also be careful that no harm comes to people as a result of 
participating in the study. Some commentators on “ethical situationalism” [Hammersley, 
2007: 238) suggest that one should concentrate on protecting from harm those people 
who are vulnerable rather than everyone, such as Mr. N, for instance, since “the 
likelihood of offence to someone cannot be avoided”. 
I was therefore particularly careful not to betray the trust of middle managers and 
workers. Indeed, middle managers often asked what I was going to do with their opinions 
and perspectives, and could not think how the minutiae of events, conversations and 
impressions would be relevant. Consequently, I had to be careful that I did not share 
middle managers’ points of view to their superiors, especially when asked directly by Mr. 
AB or the GM, Mr. SDN. Since they had given me a role in troubleshooting on GEMBA 
and finding out the hold-ups in its implementation, they did ask me questions about 
others’ attitudes. But I would skirt their questions, or tell them nothing I thought 
consequential. Workers were even more nervous, and as noted above I tended to meet 
them off-site as a result, where our conversations could not be overheard. 
In these circumstances the researcher is always nervous about performing his or 
her identity appropriately. As Laine [2000: 6] says in the immediate situation there may 
be little the researcher can do “to ameliorate the anxiety that could impede progress 
towards establishing rapport and trust”. One of my most anxious moments was when Mr. 
AB tried to read my notebook, but luckily my handwriting and cryptic notes meant that 
he was unable to understand my notes. Even now, however, the emotional burden of 
carrying the plant and its individuals in my mind has been very difficult to me, although I 
follow Burawoy as seeing this as a key aspect of analysis. 
As the thesis neared completion, I became more concerned about whether the 
written version of the thesis, especially if it were published, would reveal the identity of 
either the case study firm or individuals within it. Access to the firm was granted in the 
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first place under the proviso that I would take adequate precautions to protect the identity 
of corporate policies and individuals, although the firm was less worried about being 
named. However, disguising the identity of the firm may be difficult, since individuals in 
the industry and academic practitioners who know the sector might deduce it. The 
automotive industry is so capital-intensive that there are only a finite number of big 
players. Protecting the identity of individuals may also be a problem, although I have 
used pseudonyms for them as well as the firm. Clearly before anything from the thesis is 
published more care will have to be taken to disguise their identities. However, so much 
time has elapsed since the main body of the fieldwork that people may not be so 
identifiable as they might have been, even to insiders. 
3.8 Conclusions 
Hence, like other ethnographers, I have tried to spell out my decisions and 
experiences in detail. Providing this kind of account of the circumstances under which 
my data was produced and analysed is essential to the readers’ valuation of it. 
Although there are limitations to the generalisability of both case studies and 
ethnography, I think this case study does help to explain how automotive firms operating 
under similar contextual conditions in India and organisations elsewhere in the world 
with similar organisational structures might seek to implement lean manufacturing and 
organisational change. The findings of the case study help in furthering a sociological 
understanding of how these managerial innovations would be received by various 
categories of employees including senior management, middle management and 
workers. In doing so, the study explores the situational context in which management 
encountered significant challenges and adapted both its approach and its expectations. 
My case study also seeks generalising findings that can contribute to attempts in the 
literature to understand trade union leadership patterns, attempts to defend the 
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ideological, financial and structural integrity of trade unions, and their attempts to 
mobilise their members, under conditions similar to those within CompCo.
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Chapter 4 The Fieldwork Setting: the Changing Indian 
Political Economic Context, CompCo’s Local Environment, 
and the Plant Layout 
4.0 Introduction 
This chapter provides an account of the fieldwork setting of the plant in my case 
study firm, CompCo’s, in which I studied the evolution of its GEMBA change 
management programme. I begin by looking at its wider context, the changing political 
and economic environment within which automotive firms like CompCo, and their 
trades unions, now operate. I identify changes in the “deep structure” [Erickson and 
Kuruvilla, 1998] of macro political economic context that surround the economic 
liberalisation policies of 1990. I then look at the more immediate environment of 
‘Hubli’ town, before concentrating on the plant itself. 
In Section 4.1, my first objective, will be to begin with an account of the 
changing political economic context the changing dynamics of the economic and social 
structure especially after 1990s is important so as to understand the contextual 
conditions that influence Indian automotive firms managerial policy and worker's 
responses. I begin, by surveying the economics literature on the economic environment 
of the Indian economy before 1990 and then specifying far-reaching changes in 
economic policy which in turn altered the manner in which the Indian economy operates 
after economic liberalisation of the 1990's. I then register, the implications it has for 
new economic opportunities for the middle class, who are the main beneficiaries of 
liberalisation. This class in turn drives consumer demand as consumers and meeting. 
The aspirations of this class poses a challenge for Indian manufacturing firms in India 
whose recruitment of manages has to compete with the services sector in terms of 
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potential recruits’ expectations of pay and rising economic status. Workers in turn share 
the upwards-leaning aspirations of the middle class, which they take as a reference 
point. The increase in compensation to employees, especially the variable component of 
performance pay, has been pointed out by studies by analysts [Chakrabarti et al. 2012] 
consultant firms and the business press [Economic Times, June, 2012]. 
I then turn to the fundamental shift in the character of the state and its regime of 
accumulation brought about by the economic reforms. Given this changed context, I 
examine the nature of the Indian automotive industry under these new circumstances and 
argue that automotive manufacturers have little choice other than to embrace newer 
modes of work organisation and managerial strategies. The changes favour management 
and mark a changed role of the state, but co-exist with continuities in the legislative 
framework governing employment security and trade union collective bargaining. The 
legislative framework governs the relationship between the firm, the state, the worker 
and the trade union. Companies get around its limitations by hiring contract labour who 
are caught in between different employers and have no trade union representation. 
My second objective in this chapter is to provide the reader with an outline of 
the main company sites to which I will be referring in the thesis, and to provide a picture 
of its organisational structure. In Sections 4.2 and 4.3 I provide some background 
necessary to understand the implementation, consequence, and outcomes of change 
through GEMBA: CompCo’s product profile and the geographic locations of the main 
CompCo manufacturing units and their roles in the company’s overall product portfolio. 
In sections 4.4 and 4.5, I focus on my main fieldwork site, EWS, and its local 
environment. Section 4.4 provides a small amount of background to the plant’s local 
context in the town of ‘Hubli’ and some characteristics of the workforce. The long 
Section 4.5 takes the reader through a walk around the main areas of EWS, including 
both administration and production. It begins, in Sections 4.5.1 and 4.5.2, with the 
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gateway to the plant, including the manner in which managers and workers enter the 
plant, and then moves on the main administrative building (Section 4.4.3). My initial 
observations of the gatehouse and administrative areas focused on the visibility and 
pervasiveness of forms of status hierarchy, so I emphasise these. The next sections 
introduce the main production functions and areas in the plant, first the areas of 
production control, including the GEMBA office (Section 4.4.4) and then the main 
production areas (Section 4.4.5), including especially the machining and assembly areas, 
and significant informants who went on to play an important part in my fieldwork. This 
description of the spatial layout of the plant and its components provides a first 
impression of the difficulties the firm faces in coordinating production in an ageing 
facility. The Appendices to the thesis include a series of diagrams and maps that show 
hierarchical structures of the company, the plant layout, including the administrative 
offices and the machine shops. 
4.1 The Wider Political and Economic Environment 
4.1.1 The Indian economic context before 1991 
It is hard to understand the importance of the changes that economic liberalisation 
in the 1990s brought without first recognising the perceived problems that liberalisation 
was meant to deal with. The main feature of the protected economic system that 
characterised pre1991 India was that the state had an absolute monopoly in determining 
how the economy functioned. Immediately after independence in 1947, the state invested 
heavily in the public sector, particularly in heavy industry, such as iron, steel and 
infrastructural in power projects, dams. The state also protected domestic industry from 
overseas competition by placing stringent import controls. The deployment of fiscal and 
monetary policy instruments sought to mobilize private financial savings for public 
investment, aiming to get the private sector to conform to five year plan priorities through 
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quantitative restrictions on private investment, capital issues and foreign collaboration, as 
well as restricting imports of technology, capital goods and intermediate inputs 
(Srinivasan and Tendulkar (2003:12), " The drive for import-substitution industrialisation 
(ISI) was underlain by a socialistic model of accumulation which sought to build up the 
‘capital goods capabilities’ of the newly independent post-colonial nation.” [Corbridge, 
2011]. 
However, as Srinivasan and Tendulkar [2003: 13] argue, the import substitution 
industrialisation distorted market price signals, politicised decisions and corruption. This 
was because the criteria for evaluating applications were broadly drawn, and the discretion 
on the part of licensing authorities opened up bureaucrats to ‘constant pressure from 
politicians and license seekers’. Second, while successful in denying licenses the 
authorities had no way to induce potential licensees, and, thirdly the authorities did not 
keep track of the implementation of licenses. 
For manufacturers, the unpalatable result of the licensing system [Srinivasan and 
Tendulkar, 2003: 12] was to create a labyrinthine bureaucratic maze of approvals and 
strictures which manufacturers, especially smaller manufacturers, had to wade through. 
They had to reach a ‘tacit understanding’ with various levels of the bureaucracy and 
resort to underhand dealing. This scuttled their production capacity through production 
limits and caps through plan targets, and stymied competition by preventing new firms 
from entering the market. All of these factors cumulatively created a web of 
protectionism and led to limited product portfolios for the consumer. 
The economic crisis of the 1990s made things worse. It was caused by a balance 
of payments crisis, coupled with political instability on the domestic front, the collapse of 
the Soviet bloc, leading to an end in barter trade, and, after the Gulf War, both spiralling 
oil prices and the loss of remittances from migrant labour who had been working in war 
affected parts of the Middle East [Srinivasan and Tendulkar, 2003: 27]. The resulting 
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reduction of foreign exchange reserves forced the government of India to pledge its gold 
reserves in return for financial assistance and to accept and implement International 
Monetary Fund policy recommendations. 
4.1.2 Economic liberalisation 
The immediate consequence of the economic crisis was reforms [Mathew, 
2006: 19] directly affecting the operations and market structure of Indian 
manufacturing firms and the financial market under which they operated. 1) Removal of Tariff Barriers: Previously Indian firms had to take permission 
from the government and bureaucracy before importing items leading, for instance, to 
what Maira (2004: 42) calls crippling capacity constraints because firms like Tata were 
unable to import efficient machine tools, having instead to depend on the indigenously 
produced equipment by the state owned public sector firm HMT, which would not 
measure up to Tata’s specific requirements.. With the new industrial policy there were no 
barriers to the entry and exit of firms and the government would now facilitate rather 
than interfere in investment decisions. Also the limits on the assets of large business 
firms were removed, as were the need for “prior approval from the government for 
capacity expansion, capacity creation, amalgamation, and mergers or takeovers” 
[Mathew, 2006: 18]. 2) Trade policy reform: All restrictions and quotas on exports and imports and 
subsidies for exporters were done away with, exchange rates were allowed to fall, and 
up to nearly half of the government stake in public units was sold, in order to get money 
into the government treasury and reduce the deficit and allow the private sector to grow 
[Mathew, 2006: 18]. 
These and other economic reforms of the Indian economy in the 1990’s, 
including the deregulation of financial markets, were successful in achieving a relatively 
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high rate of growth of 6.5% annually [Basu and Maertens, 2007: 149], caused mainly by 
the pro-business policies of central and provincial governments. Import liberalisation 
sustained economic expansion. Moreover, according to Jha [2000: 21] a young 
population of working age would lead to further expansion of consumption and what 
economists call the ‘demographic dividend’. 
The costs of these changes in the “deep structure” [Erickson and Kuruvilla, 1998] 
of the Indian economic system subsequent to economic liberalisation has been greater 
dependence on capital markets and the global economy, a characteristic feature of 
industrial economies dependent upon general equilibrium premised on the Arrow-
Debreau model [Rajan, 2009: 34] to a degree hitherto unseen in the years when the Indian 
economy was protected and regulated by the state. Evidence of this vulnerability can be 
seen in the declining profit margins of most of the commercial vehicle majors in the 
economic crisis of 2008. 
However, this economic increase reflected the improvement of the performance of 
the individual sectors [Basu and Maertens, 2007: 150], without resulting in a large-scale 
transformation of a largely agrarian economy to a modern industrial economy [Pangariya, 
2009: 3]. Despite high growth in the period 1991–2007, led by urban middle-class demand 
and helped by unsustainable expansionary fiscal policies, growth has been concentrated in 
the services sector; agricultural and industrial growth has been sluggish, The result is that 
the period of economic growth and expansion has been relatively jobless [Basu and 
Maertens,2007: 154]. Where employment increased, it mainly consisted of casual, informal 
jobs [Pangariya, 2009: 5] and a rapid expansion of the service sector and offered a wide 
array of job opportunities only for a still statistically small fraction of the total Indian 
population. Even so, people’s chances of losing employment is further exacerbated by 
Indian firms’ use of labour- saving technology and automation, [Richter and Banerjee (eds), 
2003]. Hence, there are still large challenges to be overcome in terms of infrastructure 
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development, poverty alleviation, health and primary education. Taken together “the 
external and internal liberalization policies pursued during the 1990s have neither improved 
social opportunities nor expanded the area of choice for vast numbers of people who live a 
constrained existence, but have put India on a path of unequalising growth led by urban 
middle class consumption” [Storm and Nastepaad, 2007: 1184]. 
4.1.3 Implications of economic opportunities for political and 
social l i fe  
Economic liberalisation is associated with the greater purchasing power and 
political sway of the middle classes An entrepreneurial middle class has emerged with 
greater wealth as a result of the economic growth process and finds itself with greater 
purchasing power, partly through the increase in sophisticated credit facilities. The middle 
class benefits from the demographic dividend identified above and a section of it has 
gained employment in the new economic context, especially in growing sectors like the 
Indian Information Technology and Services Enabled industry CITES) [Singh 2003]. The 
middle classes were in a good position to take advantage of the new liberalized economic 
regime by having a ready pool of technically trained managerial and technical staff in its 
engineering, management and polytechnics [D’Costa 2010b: 12]. According to Fernandes 
[2006: xv], the 'newness' of this middle class lies in its ability to be an active participant in 
consumption and avail greater consumer choices the India of the 1980's did not enjoy: "... 
the rise of the new Indian middle class represents the political construction of a social 
group that operates as a proponent of economic liberalization." This middle class is not 
"new" in terms of its structural or social basis. Its "newness" “does not refer to upwardly 
mobile segments of the population entering the middle class" but rather “to a process of 
production of a distinctive social and political identity that represents and lays claim to 
the benefits of liberalization." [Fernandes, 2006: xv]. 
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Part of this new identity, [according to Jaffrelot: 2008: 45], is "an integrated 
synthesis” of the values of caste and individualism which now shapes political life. For 
instance middle class individuals linked by caste help each other form new businesses 
ventures and negotiate with the state [Damodaran, 2008]. These social identities are also 
argued to provide “important source of symbolic resources that help to manage the 
uncertainties associated with policies of economic liberalization and the broader 
processes of globalization that such policies invoke” Fernandes [2006: 61]. 
4.1.4 Changing nature of accumulation of the Indian state 
Economic liberalisation and shifts in the class structure mean shifts in the role of 
the state in accumulation in India, driven by the twin processes of reregulation and 
marketisation (Reed, 2001: 13). The primary role of the private sector as a driver of the 
economic growth has been accompanied by the development of independent regulators to 
monitor activities in each sector such as, the Securities and Exchange Board of India to 
monitor the stock market for instance. Partha Chatterjee [2011] links the changed 
functional role of the state to the new role of the middle class whereby the dismantling of 
the licence regime has actuated competition between provincial state governments to woo 
capitalist investment from domestic and foreign investors, He argues that these 
developments have led to a clash of state---level political parties and leaders with the 
interests of national and international capital in a prodigious manner. The state still 
continues to be an important intermediary in negotiating conflicting class interests, but 
the state has undergone a fundamental transformation. The “bureaucratic-managerial” 
middle class that had earlier played an active role in leading and executing ideological 
and autonomous activities of a state that had favoured developmentalism has been 
considerably weakened. 
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The new benchmark for the middle class is a professional ethos of managerial 
efficiency and deliverables while promoting what it labels as economic reforms by 
facilitating investment of MNC and Indian companies. In the new context it has become 
imperative for the state to create the right atmosphere for investment and facilitate 
corporate growth for firms which might otherwise move elsewhere. 
The consequence of the above development of the state, both at the national and 
provincial level, is its pre-eminent role as a facilitator of capital investment. The 
provincial states within India, now try to outbid each other to allow firms, especially 
global MNC's, to set up production facilities of goods and services within their territorial 
boundaries. There exist modern managerial practices and world-class infrastructure 
required for the functioning of JIT supply chains and firms along with poverty and with 
teething infrastructural problems which Corbridge [2011] identifies as the less visible 
"trenches of the federal state". This implies that though new economic circumstances 
have come into being, the nature of accommodation and collusion between the state, 
domestic and now multinational corporations and its bureaucrats in the exchange, 
allocation and appropriation of contracts and resources continues. As Gulyani [2001: 
167] observes, the Indian state is changing towards being an effective service provider to 
industry, “ceding their role as providers and investors to specialized private firms and 
taking on the role of regulators of infrastructure markets.” 
However, some argue that the continued existence of laws, some of which go 
before 1947, even in their new forms impede and defeat the overriding concern for 
market efficiency, facilitating corruption in interaction of firms with the state [Reed 
2001: 134]. The state also continues as an actor in industrial relations disputes. 
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4.1.5 Changing Indian automotive industry automotive 
portfolio and managerial repertoires 
The effects of these changes for the automotive industry are marked, but 
nonetheless have not brought about wholesale change to prevalent managerial practices in 
India. Indian managerial practices are challenged by market competition, operational 
constraints such as inadequate power and supply bottlenecks and changing technology, 
forcing companies to adopt meritocratic strategic management in conjunction with 
implementing the latest modes of work organisation such as lean manufacturing. There is 
enormous scope and room for expansion, but implementing new systems of work 
organisation within the Indian automotive industry not only entails questions of whether 
it is a brownfield plant or a new start up, a company’s industrial relations history and the 
role of the provincial state as facilitator of investment, but also teething supply side 
constraints that inhibit the full play of JIT in India. These constraints may force 
management to be selective in their adoption of managerial innovations. Guyani provides 
a good example in terms of persistent supply chain constraints in India: 
For example, a shipment traveling 2500 km between Delhi and Chennai is 
in-transit for seven days, about 4.5 times longer than it takes for a similar 
distance between Valencia, Spain, and Ford’s plant at Dagenham, outside 
London. Not only is the travel time long, it is also unpredictable, which 
forces firms all along the supply chain to hold higher levels of buffer 
inventories to prevent a stock-out. For example, although the average 
travel time between Delhi and Chennai is seven days, it can take 
anywhere between six to nine days; this forces Maruti (Maruti Suzuki) to 
hold buffer inventories of two to three days. Together, the in-transit and 
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buffer inventories translate into significant financial costs. [Gulyani, 
2001: 153] 
Management repertories in India are in transition. Managerial practices have 
historically been characterised by hierarchical social relations. However, managerial 
practices have not been authoritarian but rather, have been framed by an underlying 
authoritative leadership style in superordinate-subordinate relationships, characterised by 
paternalistic care for subordinates, including showing affection, taking personal interest 
in the well-being of employees and commitment to their growth. Organisationally 
prevalent, is a tendency to centralise power, and is characterized by status consciousness. 
[Kakkar et al., 2006: 106] With regard to organisational mobility the literature points to 
an important feature, the importance of internal promotions and advertisements through 
emphasising loyalty and dependability rather than efficiency [Gopalan and Stahl, 2006]. 
There is also a strong reliance on social contacts and the accommodation of family 
members, relatives or friends in their HRM strategies [Pio, 2007: 326], because of the 
belief that the group is more important than the individual [Gopalan and Stahl, 2006]. 
According to Rai [2012: 26] these hierarchical characteristics continue to co-exist in 
Indian Human Resources practices, even in the present, with high power distance in 
working relationships; centralisation, resulting in minimal downward decision making in 
organisations; and paternalism, resulting in difficulties in adhering to stringent and 
objective performance systems within modern HR systems, and leading to ad hocism and 
subjective relationships. 
However, according to Pio [2007: 325], Indian firms are now quite resolute in 
acquiring a strategic HRM thrust, with features of hard HRM and soft HRM co-existing. 
The adoption of latest managerial innovations is corroborated by Iyer [Iyer et al., 2012: 
18] who demonstrate that the liberalization policies of 1991, which facilitated the entry of 
multinational enterprises, further encouraged the auto component firms to upgrade their 
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quality programs by adopting JIT, Total Quality Management and Total Productivity 
Management and Six Sigma etc. Evidence of successful adaptation of these programs is 
gleaned by these firms winning the automotive industry’s quality benchmarking awards 
such as the Deming prize and quality certification and attainting the ISO standards. “By 
scaling up the end quality they delivered, these firms gained both in terms of cost and 
also a substantial increase in productivity.” 
Pio [2007: 325] describes the increasing priority Indian firms give to talent 
acquisition, effective resource allocation, talent improvement, cost reduction and a shift 
towards greater organizational efficiency and competitiveness. Most significantly there 
is also a trend to include the head of the HR function in top management teams and merit 
based recruitment and apply globally recognised standards in HRM practice. The 
movement towards globally recognised values of managerial practice are also attested by 
Kakkar et al (2006: 109]. Hence whatever the pervasiveness and dominance of ‘core’ 
Indian values is in the rest of society (or the older types of relationships summarise by 
Rai, above) a recent study of a large sample of senior level managers suggests that such 
traditional values as close interpersonal relations at work are increasingly receding in 
importance and that ‘there is an emergence of global value paradigms”. 
There is also a continuing trend to modernization and increasing product 
portfolio complexity in the Indian automotive industry. The earliest pioneers in the auto 
industry of Japanese manufacturing practices was Suzuki's joint venture with Maruti. 
The firm, adopted a governance system that introduced production flexibility as 
practiced by the Japanese and adapted to Indian conditions, illustrating the flexible 
organizational capabilities and ability to ramp up production quickly. D’Costa [2010: 
21] also notes that 
‘Suzuki introduced Japanese industry practices to secure quality 
components and ensure uninterrupted flow of production. This consisted 
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of both inter-firm and intra-firm relations (D’Costa 2005: 109). Joint-
ventures between MUL and its suppliers were one such relationship. 
Several components producers created joint-ventures with Japanese 
suppliers, who were also supplier to Suzuki in Japan.’ 
These practices continue to manifest themselves through the strategies of 
automotive manufacturers, including in the commercial vehicle industry, to gain or 
sustain the competitive edge they have in the automotive market. The Indian commercial 
vehicle (CV) industry caters to a variety of customer transportation demands. It produces 
buses for the passenger transportation market comprising intermediate and long-range 
passenger transport ,and whose customers are individual fleet owners, provincial state 
transport corporations and private bus operating firms. It provides a choice for bus fleet 
owners whose businesses are increasingly becoming more demanding following greater 
expectations from customers for better amenities, such as for instance internet facilities, 
greater passenger amenities in buses, faster turn-around times with less maintenance and 
better fuel efficiency, all of which add to operating costs. The CV manufacturers offer to 
customise and build customers’ own chassis (which has in recent times seen intensified 
competition with the arrival of firms such as Irizer). Or the commercial manufacturers 
build it for them at additional cost. 
Customers for trucks span the following range: individual operators or firms 
seeking light commercial vehicles for carrying parcels and perishables; firms and fleets 
specialising in freight shipping who buy medium duty vehicles; and transporters of 
boilers and industrial turbines who seek heavy duty trucks with very high horse power, 
also known as tractor trailers in the industry’s parlance, that cater to the demands of 
heavy industry. The industry also makes custom made vehicles. Most of the commercial 
vehicle manufacturers manufacture chassis which are converted into heavy commercial 
vehicles depending on the individual customer’s requirement of public transport or 
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goods transportation. Pick-up trucks are more often than not manufactured in the 
assembly plant of the vehicle manufacturer and are ready to use upon delivery. 
The vehicle manufacturing segment, like the passenger vehicle segment, has been a 
recipient of substantial FDI and increased competition which has changed management 
practices and led to increased emphasis on operational efficiency on the part of 
management. There has also been widespread diversification of the product portfolio of 
commercial vehicle manufacturers who now build a greater number of ready to operate 
products rather than leave the task of completion to the chassis builder. This is due to 
changing requirements on the part of centre and provincial government-led infrastructure 
projects and bus operations to meet various segments of public transport, coupled with 
large scale institutional support backed by the world bank such as the Jawarharlal Nehru 
National Urban Renewal Mission [JNNURM] programme [Vaidya, 2009: 7]. This all 
means increasing complexity of industrial requirements, private owners who now want 
better technology and mileage and increasing passenger demand, long haulage with 
minimal turnaround and finally increasing complexity in the passenger segment. 
The entry into the automotive industry in India of players such as MAN, 
Navistar, Volvo and joint ventures has challenged firms to deliver end product quality 
while at the same time maintaining cost efficiency and cutting production costs. For 
instance, the German commercial vehicle giant Mercedes-Benz, the world’s number 2 
truck maker, has already made its foray into the Indian automotive industry which may 
threaten my case study firm’s product range and its long-term survival.. An automotive 
industry analysis report [IIFL, 2012,p 5] claims that Mercedes has crystallised its plans 
of making a foray into the Indian CV market through its ‘Bharat Benz’ range trucks, 
customising production to suit the Indian market. It also reports that truck production has 
already started in a green field site with two thirds of the initial capital investment of 
Rs.44 billion and a capacity to produce 36000 trucks that could be scaled up to 70000 
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trucks if required. Additionally it plans to expand its distribution network and diversify 
its product range. 
4.1.6 Continuity in industrial relations regulation in a 
changing political economic context 
Workers and trades unions enjoy state protection in many respects. But the 
trends that have led to the emergence of new middle class patterns of consumption from 
the 1990’s have also raised the expectations of skilled workers [Iyer et al., 2011] who 
want their families to be better off than they are. I will outline the legislative apparatus 
of the state under which industrial relations disputes resolution is governed, identify 
challenges they face individually and through organised representation after the 1990s. 
The state is the pre-eminent regulator of industrial relations in India. 
Permanently employed workers in India are governed by the Industrial Disputes Act 
(IDA) 1947, which also makes provision for trades unions as workers’ bargaining 
agents. The protective aspect of the IDA Act requires that the state's approval is 
mandatory in the event a firm employing more than 100 people decides to fire a regular 
worker. However, the government approval to fire workers required by this act has 
never been granted [D'Costa, 2011a: 124], and the state has not yet made up its mind 
whether to change the act. Over time provincial amendments have strengthened the act 
by expanding the jurisdiction of courts to hear certain types of cases, enhance 
governmental authority to enforce certain types of awards on tribunals and labour courts 
or enhance governmental power to compel attendance at conciliation proceedings 
[Teteilbaum, 2010: 277]. Hence the state enjoys enormous power [Sen Gupta and Sett, 
2006: 206]. For instance, ‘under the IDA act the government enjoys full discretionary 
power whether or not, when, and how to intervene in an industrial dispute-actual or 
threatened. It may or may not decide to conciliate, it may refuse to send a dispute for 
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adjudication or it may even decide not to implement the award of a Labour Court or 
Industrial Tribunal.’ It may prohibit strikes or lock-outs, or it may refuse permission for 
a lay-off, retrenchment or closure. In total, in India, the government plays a vital role in 
shaping the industrial relations climate. Also, the adjudication system is so structured 
and manned that the state apparatus exercises substantial influence over its 
functioning." 
Despite the strong protection and strictures against the dismissal of permanent 
directly recruited workers offered by the Industrial Disputes [IDA] Act [1947], which 
continues even in a context that is in favour of investment capital and management, 
Indian workers are now under threat from a panoply of policies designed to get round 
the legal protection permanent workers enjoy. These range from voluntary retirement 
schemes, threats to industrial relations/HR legislation [Kuruvilla, 2006: 193] and 
flexible management practices that might prioritise automation over labour intensive 
job-routines. Trade Unions are forced to accept these flexible practices in their 
restructuring agreements or face eventual retrenchment. According to Venkataratnam 
[1996, cited by Bhatacharjee, 1999: 24] “these restructuring agreements now include, 
among other things: ban on recruitment, job transfers to non-bargainable category, 
introduction of parallel production, automation and flexibility, transfer of production to 
subcontracted units, introduction of voluntary retirement schemes, transfer of 
permanent jobs to contract/temporary workers, merger of units, and a host of other shop 
floor restructuring provisions.” 
These developments pose significant challenges to Indian Trade Unions who are 
affiliated with political parties whose interests may contradict that of permanent workers 
[Kuruvilla, 2006: 194]. In the Indian theatre the principal left unions are the Centre of 
Indian Trade Unions (CITU), affiliated to the Communist Part of India (Marxist), and the 
All India Trade Union Congress (AITUC), affiliated to the Communist Party of India. 
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The other two unions affiliated to national political parties are the Indian National Trade 
Union Congress (INTUC), affiliated to the Congress Party of India, and the Bharatiya 
Mazdoor Sangh, affiliated to the Bharatiya Janata Party. There are also several other 
regional amalgams that work on members’ caste, kinship or linguistic identities to win 
representational rights through union elections [Ramaswamy, 1973: 921] or expand their 
membership base. 
The relationship between trade unions and political parties is symbiotic. This 
political affiliation of Indian trade unions is a result of the era predating 1947. There are 
overlapping leadership structuring in which enable union representatives to have a seat in 
legislatures and in parliament. The party-affiliated unions represent a number of firms 
and therefore possess an awareness of the local labour market and more extensive 
organisational skills than firm-level unions, which, according to Teitelbaum [2010: 59], 
encourages firm based unions to affiliate with the party based confederations. 
Ramaswamy [1983] has long identified ‘economism’ as a defining 
characteristic of the Indian worker- trade union relationship. An effect of this 
economism is the divided landscape of Indian trade unions and the shifting loyalties of 
workers. By ‘economism’ he means that workers are opportunist, only instrumentally 
attached to their union (or their employment) and readily transfer their loyalty to 
whichever union promises higher wages. The role of the trade union is to help them get 
more money out of their present employment. 
Conversely, this ‘economism’ negates the advantages outlined by Teitalbaum 
brought through affiliation of the firm’s union to a political party-based union, whose 
leaders are answerable to a specific political party and represent many firms in the area. 
Party-affiliated trade unions need workers’ support base to further their political fortunes 
and to poach members from their rivals [Ramaswamy, 1983: 979] However, the weakness 
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of political affiliation, as D'Costa [2011: 124] notes, means that Indian Trade unions ‘are 
heterogeneous and politically fragmented and thus unable to speak with one voice’. 
Managements in India undermine workers’ demands by exploiting intra-union 
rivalries: “Employers can play one union against another, if there are multiple unions, 
although in the automotive industry the general practice has been to foster a company 
union...A characteristic trait of Indian Trade Unions is to present multiple demands together 
in contrast to the reality where unions end up bargaining on very narrow resume of issues” 
[Teitalbaum, 2010: 54]. Management also exploit workers’ economism by planting 
‘leaders’ whom it thinks are ‘safe’ and can guarantee industrial peace [Ramaswamy, 
1983, 1989]. 
Wage levels are largely dictated by the manufacturing industry wage pattern in a 
particular region or state. Teteilbaum [2010: 54] suggests that trades unions set demands 
that they know the firm many not have the resources to meet. The underlying motive of 
arbitrarily raising expectations is to impress their constituents, exaggerate their power 
and, reassure them that the union means well for them. They also try to stretch the 
employer’s financial capability in the “hope that the employer will overshoot and meet 
all of provide a larger settlement’ than if ‘the leadership had presented a complete and 
perfect information about the Union’s expectations. Unions present multiple demands to 
generate bargaining leverage so that they can secure their actual demands” [Teitelbaum, 
2010: 54]. 
In an atmosphere favouring investment and management the state is hesitant to 
change existing laws without consulting management and labour, resulting in uncertainty 
and ambiguity in Indian labour law. This puts management in a quandary especially when 
a dispute arises with its permanent workers. To avoid the protracted litigation and 
circumvent the cumbersome litigation employment law imposes upon them, employers in 
both manufacturing and services opt for contract labour. Moreover, besides the wish to 
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evade state employment protection, there are also cost saving benefits for employers who 
hire contract labour because contract workers are paid less in comparison to directly 
employed workers, usually 25-50% less. Hence in some firms contract workers represent 
nearly fifty per cent of the total workers, with little chance of becoming permanent 
workers [Bhattacharjee, 2009: 15-18]. 
However, contract employees are governed by the Indian Contract Labour Act 
1976, so they are promised some protection. A license from the state was mandatory for a 
contractor to start selling the services of labour. However, in actual practice there is an 
enormous lacuna with regard to implementing the provisions of the Contract Labour Act 
1976, which is meant to guarantee decent employee working conditions and minimum 
wages. To get round it employers hired labour through the intermediary of contractors, 
who undertook to supply labour in the guise of ‘job contracts’ or ‘contracts for 
services’. These were sham contracts, used merely to camouflage the real employment 
relationship within the firm and skirt coverage of the law. [Sen Gupta and Sett, 2006: 
211]. Furthermore, the possibility of government inspectors being bought off by powerful 
managements cannot be ruled out thereupon, making contract labour who do not have 
representational rights very vulnerable. 
Contract workers are caught between two employment systems, making them 
especially vulnerable to problems in the implementation of the law [Meenakshi, 2009: 9, 
13]. Even if the act provides social security such as provident fund, the employee 
struggles to get the money once he leaves the contractor because of her or his current 
ambivalent status as neither an employee of the contractor or the employer who has to 
pay the provident fund. The anomalies in implementation therefore make it very 
convenient for management to take recourse to contract labour to cut down operating 
costs and wage bills. 
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I will now turn my attention to describing the immediate setting of my case study 
firm after having laid out the political economic superstructure of the state, the 
employees, consumers and trade unions and the manner in which its changes influence 
Indian automotive firms. 
4.2 CompCo: its history and Product Profile 
My case study site was an engine and medium duty vehicle assembly plant I call 
‘EWS’, located in the industrial town of ‘Hubli’ (a pseudonym, but a not uncommon 
town name in India). EWS is important in the thesis because it was where I spent most of 
my time as a fieldworker and because at that point of time it served as the main centre for 
CompCo’s GEMBA strategy, most of the main actors being based there. I commenced 
my fieldwork in CompCo’s main vehicle assembly plant, to which I have given the 
pseudonym WAP4, also located in Hubli, but later moved my attention to EWS. In 
between the two plants there was a press shop, WDM3, which I visited with Mr. N, the 
DGM who headed the GEMBA programme, where body panels were produced, such as 
those for the front driving cabs of commercial vehicles. My fieldwork also included a 
number of visits to CompCo's management development centre in Hubli. 
CompCo has been a leading manufacturer in different segments of the commercial 
vehicle industry in India in the era before and after economic liberalisation. Before 
economic liberalisation, the Indian commercial vehicle industry market was limited to a 
few major players but this monopoly has now been challenged because of market 
competition and the advent of new players, although this has not yet undermined the 
dominant positions of companies such as CompCo. 
CompCo was founded in 1948 by Indian promoters and transformed into an Indian 
joint venture of a British vehicle manufacturer in 1950 with a significant presence near 
Preston Lancashire, which dominated the British market for long until its demise. 
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CompCo was taken over in the mid 1980’s by a large Indian conglomerate operating both 
from London and from India, with diverse business interests in sectors such as 
manufacturing, heavy machinery, and banking. CompCo being one of the early entrants 
into the commercial vehicle industry had a preeminent position in the Indian automotive 
market and was successful in adapting to the regulatory mechanisms of Indian government 
policy during the license permit regime, which lasted up to the 1990s. CompCo has tried 
to adapt its operations to the new industry ecosystem and the policies prevalent at central 
and provincial state government levels and continued to prosper, albeit in a much tighter 
market. 
CompCo’s product portfolio comprises both fully assembled vehicles sold under 
its own brand, including trucks, buses, smaller size vehicles used in transporting articles 
such as parcels, as well as defence vehicles, such as infantry carriers, and lower volume 
or custom built products such as heavy-duty high horse-power vehicles including tractor 
trailers used for transporting gigantic machinery such as boilers and turbines, marine 
engines, and heavy duty industrial diesel-run generators. Some production of buses is 
carried out in partnership with CompCo’s bus body building partner, the European firm 
Irizer, but in CompCo’s own vehicle manufacturing plants. In addition, the firm produces 
engines and chassis for other, smaller vehicle manufacturers who carry out the necessary 
production and assembly work to make their own branded vehicles. 
4.3 CompCo’s Plants 
EWS, in Hubli, my main fieldwork site, is part of a larger company apparatus 
employing about 8000 people across India. Production is spread across a number of 
plants, not all of which are located in Hubli, and I have assigned them the pseudonyms 
WDP4, WAM4, WDG3. There is also a foundry unit, which I have called WDP1, 
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supplying EWS and WDP4, which is situated on the outskirts of Nellore, the pseudonym 
of a large city in this region. 
EWS’s main role is to assemble engines using the engine blocks from engine 
foundry unit WDP1, which supplies them to EWS as precast blocks. EWS came into being 
in the early 1980’s, since when it has manufactured engines not just for its own use but for 
other CompCo plants in Nellore and Northern India too. Although the manufacture of 
vehicle engines is the main focus of EWS, a part of the plant, the Medium Duty Vehicle, 
produces the fully functional chassis for medium duty vehicles completed by other plants 
or by either small body building firms or external coach builders such as Irizer. The axle 
assembly shop produces axles for WAP4 and other plants of CompCo depending on their 
requirement, and shop 7 produces connecting rods for some models every now and then, 
while other ranges are	  supplied	  to	  it	  by	  Bharat	  Forge	  and	  other	  primary	  components	  for	  use	  in	  EWS. 
EWS has a state-of-the-art Engine R&D Centre, a two-floor building, that tests new 
prototypes before they go into commercial production. This R&D Product prototype 
development centre serves as the Engine R&D for the whole of CompCo. The R&D head 
of this functional unit sits on the first floor and reports to the head of production. There is 
also a GM [R&D] [see Appendix 3] who comes in much earlier in the drawing board 
stage, co-ordinates with other plants and overseas technological exemplar firms, 
collaborates with them, in planning and bringing the engines from the drawing board 
stage to the next stage. The GM [R&D] also reports directly to the head of production at 
corporate headquarters, whereas the head of R&D centre only reports to the production 
head. 
In the R&D the designs acquire concrete form by assembling them and 
subsequently they are tested extensively for many months which includes running them 
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continuously. The R&D head reports to the production head conceives the engine and 
then works in tandem with the R&D prototype development centre. 
Another section of CompCo plant WAP4, down the road, specialises in the 
manufacture of commercial vehicles and light defense application vehicles and also 
manufactures medium and heavy range manufacturing vehicles. I will have much more to 
say about EWS below. 
CompCo has four other pivotal plants. Plant WDP4 is over four decades old and has 
been through a substantial cycle of renovation and technological upgrading in the last 
decade. WDP4 is located in the large metropolis Nellore, in the same state as EWS, known 
for the presence of companies such as Ford and Hyundai around its suburbs. This production 
unit plant specialises in special purpose engines of very high horsepower used for ships and 
other applications such as diesel generators. WDP4 contributes to the overall commercial 
vehicle product range of CompCo by manufacturing heavy and medium duty commercial 
vehicle chassis and fully built commercial vehicles with particular specialisation in very 
heavy multi-axle tractor trailers used in transporting boilers gas turbines and other very 
heavy industrial machinery. There is also a state-of-the-art Research and Development 
Centre in Nellore which designs, approves design, sets mandatory specifications for a 
wide range of components required for production, releases prototypes of several 
components processes, from the drawing board and finally periodically suggests 
manufacturing process improvements for CompCo’s entire manufacturing setup. 
Plants WAM4, located near Nagpur in Central India, and WDG3, near Jaipur in 
North India, assemble medium and heavy commercial vehicles and cater to the eastern 
and northern markets of the country. A new plant, to which I will assign the pseudonym 
YDM4, in the northern Indian province of Uttarakhand, is now complete. CompCo hopes 
it will transcend the limitations of the other plants by embodying the latest technology, in 
addition to expanding CompCo’s reach over the northern markets, which was hitherto 
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limited by the truncated productive capacity of WDG3. The existence of new plants like 
this one affects management thinking about the future and specific role of an older plant 
like EWS, which commenced its manufacturing operations from January 1980. 
Each of the CompCo's manufacturing plants has a distinctive role in CompCo’s 
product portfolio and each makes a mutual contribution to each other’s product portfolio. 
In the era prior to liberalisation of the Indian economy and the increased competitive 
pressures faced by CompCo, it was possible for each plant to specialise in a particular 
product range and offer distinctive contributions to the overall portfolio. However, in 
recent times the emergence of tightly integrated supplier chains and the requirement of 
being closer to product markets have considerably diluted the earlier prominence given to 
product specialisation of each plant. 
The engine room of CompCo’s overall corporate and business strategy-making 
apparatus, comprising of senior managers such as the Chief Operating Officer, the heads 
of finance and engineering and marketing and purchase, operate from corporate 
headquarters located at Nellore (my pseudonym for a large metropolis in the province of 
Tamil Nadu). All the GMs who head each of the above plants report to corporate 
headquarters at Nellore. 
The organisational chains of command for CompCo as a whole, EWS and the 
managerial and production strata at EWS are depicted in the Organisational Charts in 
Appendices 1-4. Also included in the Appendices are maps of EWS as a whole, its’ 
manufacturing area and its constituent parts. There is a list of the names and titles of 
individuals mentioned in the thesis in the Glossary. 
4.4 EWS: an overview of the environs and workforce 
Hubli, the site of CompCo’s EWS plant, is a thriving location for companies such 
as CompCo (see Appendix 5). The town has grown in strength with regard to the size of 
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its resident and mobile population, the latter running in several thousands in conjunction 
with the growth of the vehicle industry and more recently the ancillary industry that is 
dependent upon it. Hubli’s proximity to Bangalore is advantageous in providing a labour 
force and customer market for CompCo vehicles. Historically Bangalore was a 
manufacturing hub, and continues to be home to large transnational supplier firms such as 
the German spark plug and automotive component manufacturer Robert Bosch. Bangalore 
has also emerged as a centre of the IT and IT enabled services. The large pool of potential 
human resources at the managerial and operator levels in Bangalore and its vicinity have 
contributed symbiotically in substantial measure to Hubli’s industrial growth in recent 
times. Not only is Hubli home to a large ancillary industry that supports companies such 
as CompCo, it is reasonably well connected to other critical accessory and component 
makers in southern India.  
The employment prospects offered by Hubli’s industries make it a melting pot of 
people belonging to different class, caste, and religious identities. The majority linguistic 
group is Tamil speakers, including native Tamil speakers originating from Hubli and its 
neighbouring districts as well as long-time residents from distant parts of Tamil Nadu 
who have made Hubli their home. Hubli residents also include Telugu speakers who 
incorporate the influence of Kannada and Tamil in their dialect. They originate from 
Hubli and its neighbouring districts or migrated from nearby border areas more than 
twenty years ago because of job opportunities in the automotive and engineering industry 
in Hubli. The Hubli manufacturing work force also includes Telugu and Kannada 
speakers who commute from nearby areas surrounding Hubli. 
CompCo’s EWS plant in Hubli employs about 2000 people, comprising 
permanent cadres of operators, both manufacturing and in administration, senior 
managers, middle managers who comprise the executive cadre, management trainees on 
probation, contractual operative staff, cleaners and other categories of casual workers. It 
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is one of the biggest contributors to the economy in Hubli, especially if employees who 
work for its suppliers as well as for the firm were incorporated into the net composition 
of the labour force. It employs direct and indirect labour and contractual labour across a 
spectrum of vocational trades and skills and helps in sustaining consumption patterns of a 
wide array of products and services in the town. Additionally, competitive pro-investment 
polices of successive administrations of state governments by way of tax concessions 
have also had a bearing in the expansion of ancillary industries that support the vehicle 
manufacturers ranging from two wheelers to commercial vehicles in the town. 
The linguistic profile of EWS is not much different from Hubli as a whole, but in 
the plant the main languages spoken include English as well as Tamil. People hail from 
different castes and religious backgrounds, but I am unable to give any further details 
about the social background of the workforce. In my interactions with a wide array of 
managers and operators caste or religion was almost never mentioned, nor used as an 
overt tool of discrimination in day to day employment relations, at least as far as I could 
observe, and I was reluctant to risk alienating my informants by asking explicitly about 
caste or religious identities or attitudes. However, quite a few senior managers of the 
plant EWS appeared to harbour pre-set notions about people of other castes or religions 
even though they would mostly keep it to themselves. For example, the senior managerial 
head of team tasked with implementing change management within CompCo could not 
on some occasions camouflage his beliefs about those of other religious persuasions or 
those who had used affirmative reservation to access places in educational institutions 
and secure jobs. These beliefs were interspaced with their class prejudices regarding 
workers, as will be noted in many places in the thesis, and an example of manifestation of 
this attitude towards workers is provided below in the description of the immediate 
setting of my primary fieldwork site EWS. 
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English is the written and oral language of communication amongst most 
managers in EWS, including production executives. However, English in EWS tends to 
get mixed with Tamil when line managers interact with operators, a significant majority 
of whom also understand and converse English. The recourse to Tamil swear words gets 
amplified either when line managers are anxious about the line targets or when they 
express their displeasure with operators with whom they enjoy a love-hate relationship. 
Middle managers become colloquial with a mixture of English and Tamil when they find 
themselves away from formal environments, such as meetings. I will sociologically turn 
my attention to their profile and career trajectories in Chapter 6. 
While many middle managers reside in Hubli, a substantial section of managers 
commute by the company bus from Bangalore on a daily basis. Senior managers such as 
the GM, the head of the change management programme were chauffeured from their 
residence to CompCo in coupe class cars. I observed that while it was true that while quite 
a few middle managers owned four wheelers, many of them preferred to commute two 
wheelers. These middle managers would often pool cars together if they lived close-by in 
the evening when they returned home from work. This was practical considering that 
since many junior and senior middle managers in terms of organisational position, lived 
near each other in residential colonies in EWS. 
4.4 A Walkthrough of the EWS plant 
The best way to present the ‘feel’ of the CompCo social environment and its 
productive capacity is to take the reader on a ‘walkthrough’ of the EWS plant 
(Apppendix 6). I begin with a description of the entrance to the plant, where we are 
immediately introduced to visibility of the status hierarchies that prevail in the plant. I 
then move on to describing the offices of managerial cadre, where status distinctions are 
also made very evident, before looking at the production units. 
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4.4.1 Entering EWS 
Entering EWS requires managers, workers, suppliers and visitors to pass through 
two sets of security procedures, and the ways they and their vehicles are handled, 
including where they are able to park, tells us much about the status of these categories. 
The entry into the EWS plant requires passing through a security gatehouse, divided 
between two gates on either side of a security office, which operates as a preliminary 
check post and identity verification point (see the sketch of the EWS entrance area, 
Appendix 7). This building comprises a waiting hall and is staffed by security personnel 
who were outsourced employees from another agency. Security both here and later is 
tight and discriminatory. 
The threshold to making one’s way through the plant provides an interesting 
introduction to the social divisions within the EWS plant. Suppliers’ vehicles enter through 
the gate to the left of the gatehouse, and need to prove their identity to obtain clearance and 
undergo a process of inspection of particulars by material planning and detailed verification 
of the supplier vehicle and entry by the security. Security personnel ring the concerned 
purchase manager and ask him whether he is available. The manager would then authorise 
the supplier in. The left-hand gate provides access to a wide road that is meant for the 
suppliers’ vehicles and one can see trucks parked awaiting further, more detailed inventory 
inspection and recording before entering into the plant. Along this road is a second, larger 
building, where security is managed by the security officer, an ex-serviceman who was in 
charge of the whole security set up and had the right to deny entrance to anyone. Suppliers 
could be harassed by security guards on a wide array of grounds for instance ostensibly not 
carrying proper emission control papers. 
The suppliers’ gate (Appendix 7) is also used by senior managers’ chauffeured 
vehicles. After saluting the manager (but not checking his identity), the guards allow 
managers’ cars to drive past the parking area for executives and operators and park in a 
 193 
special area much closer to the administrative block where senior managers work. Other 
managers and operators who enter by vehicles used the same gate, but had to leave their 
two wheelers (and, for those managers who possessed one, their car) at the parking space 
provided near the gatehouse. To the right of the first security office is the field where the 
buses that transport middle management level executives are parked, quite unlike many 
operators who have to make their own arrangements for transport. 
Operators, both permanent and contract, and other workers enter through the gate 
to the right of the gatehouse, and then must prove their identities at a second post that lies 
ahead of the main entrance. ID cards for either one day or longer time visitors or suppliers 
are given here. All operators and workers were subject to stringent security checks by the 
staff of the security officer both when entering the plant at starting time, and when they 
finished, to foreclose the possibility of theft of components such as spark plugs. 
However, daily wagers, who were contractual labour, at the bottommost rung of the 
CompCo hierarchy, were subjected to even more scrutiny and tended to be frisked 
thoroughly. They were engaged in cleaning and loading machinery, earning about Rs.100 
which when converted to UK currency is only just under a pound day. From what I saw 
during my stay in EWS they were often talked to in a very harsh manner by the security 
who in turn would be monitored by their security head. These security guards risked 
losing their job if they did not appear to be firm in their demeanour against factory 
workers and non-technical workers who included janitors and daily waged labourers. 
Managers, however, were not subject to any such checking by the security staff. 
With the exception of the most senior managers they enter through the right hand gate 
and their ID cards are/ are not checked. They all expected to clock in and out at the 
machines either in the administrative block or in their shop floors at the beginning and 
end of their shift. As mentioned in the methodology chapter in order to make sure that 
nothing bad was said about me to senior management I always felt the need to be in 
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impeccable corporate attire at least in the initial stages of fieldwork to be allowed in with 
or without too much small talk. 
The plant would morph into frenetic tension upon the occasional prospect of the 
CompCo owners from either London or Bombay or other senior luminaries visiting the 
plant. When they arrived security guards showed their veneration by means of a salute at 
the gatehouse, at the second entrance and at the forefront of the main administrative 
building of EWS. Their cars would be parked to a space that lay diagonally to the entrance 
to the Works Office, discussed below, near a plaque engraved with the CompCo motto 
'Together We Can' that lay adjacent to the parapet wall separating the administrative 
buildings from the production areas. The drivers would open the door for his boss to leave 
the vehicle. This parking area is also used by visiting management consultants, Mr. N, 
who was in charge of the change management programme, and other senior managers, 
such as the GM and visitors from corporate headquarters in Nellore such as the COO. 
These managers were chauffeured daily, over 80km up and down from Bangalore in, 
coupe class large sized cars. 
In addition to managing security at the gates, security guards maintain a presence 
outside the administrative block, known as the Works Office (see Appendix 8), and at the 
machine and assembly shops, mainly to monitor contracted and sub-contracted labour. 
The outsourced security guards in the plant did not appear to show any extraordinary 
commitment to their jobs in CompCo. The guards were young men from villages and 
small towns in the north-eastern parts of India, such as Assam and Manipur, who told me 
they had been forced to stop education owing to pressing commitments at home or due to 
financial difficulty. The local workmen of EWS, drawing from my periodic observations 
at the gatehouse, did not particularly relish the company of the guards, who more often 
than not falter or struggled to speak the local language and were overbearing to the 
workmen. However, my observations cannot tell me whether the use of non-local security 
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staff is a coincidence or, as I suspect, a deliberate ploy on the part of management to limit 
their communication or potential friendship with the local workers and guards had to be 
firm with workers or face the consequences from their security head who in-turn was 
likely to be rebuked by senior management for not keeping the factory's organisational 
routine running securely. 
4.4.2 Daily routines in EWS 
At the gatehouse one could observe prior to the commencement of each shift, 
several workers arriving in their two wheelers and managers entering the plant in cars as 
another batch left at the end of their shift. The first shift at EWS, according to Mr. MRL, 
the affable Human Resources Development (HRD) manager, begins at 8.00 AM sharp and 
ends at 1600, with lunch between 1300 and 1330. The evening shift begins at 16.00hours 
and ends at 0100 in the morning. The midnight shift begins at 0100 and ends at 0800. At 
the beginning of the morning shift the security guard control the road traffic on the main 
road, where there is a massive influx of operators crossing the road, entering the plant 
and riding into the plant using their two wheelers and some scampering in just to be in 
time for the siren. Both managers and operators have to clock in. Late arrival on the part 
of operators is usually not tolerated by line managers and after two warnings incurs a 
direct pay cut at the end of the month. Managers were not subject to pay cuts for 
lateness, but their timekeeping is covered in their appraisals by their superiors and 
actions such as turning up late for work affected them in the long run. Line managers 
and junior managers were petrified of arriving late and the rebuke for delay in senior 
management ranks is more subtle and for both late arrival carries deleterious 
consequences for their promotion because of letting other production managers down 
and cementing a reputation of not being punctual. 
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The workers’ canteen is separate from the managers’ canteen and is far more 
modest and managers and workmen seldom enter in the other's canteen. Like the 
differences in security regimes, this contradicts the claim that, after the introduction of 
the change management programme, operators are “associates” and equal stakeholders in 
the future of the company. 
Designated spaces for workers’ union meetings or social relaxation within the 
plant EWS are limited. About two yards from the gatehouse there is a flag of the CompCo 
Employees Union, one of the three groupings of operators. This was a persistent eyesore 
for Mr.N, the head of the change management programme. To the right of the flag is a 
small courtyard, near the cycle stand, where many a fiery speech was given and union 
pamphlets distributed. These Tamil-language pamphlets (a sample is reproduced in 
Appendix 13) are one of the main modes of communication between the unions and the 
operators. 
In order to gain interaction with trade union activists I therefore had to go 
outside the plant. The main conduit for me to gain access to familiarise myself and 
interact with a cross section of workers was the communist trade union leader and 
organiser, Mr.VDVN, and his associates. The communist trade union, representing not 
only CompCo but also workers in other manufacturing firms, have an office not very far 
from Hubli’s railway station. 
One operator cadre engaged in administration work confirmed to me that while 
there are plant based Union leaders in EWS the union leadership is external to the plant. An 
illustration of this was my hearing the phrase mischievously inverted by some older 
operators whilst they would have a smoke after their lunch; their cryptic spoof on 
management, “Together Can We?” means the exactly the contrary of the official company 
slogan “Together We Can”. Operators like Mr.VDVN informed me that there was 
absolutely no love lost between the unions that dominated trade union discourse in 
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CompCo, namely the communists, and the other two unions, a Dravidian party aligned 
union and an external leader led union who guided his union matters from Bangalore. I will 
turn my attention to the role of trade unions in Chapter 7. 
Across the road from the main plant is a line of small shops selling tea and fried 
edible items. These shops from my observation provided valuable avenues for workmen 
to unwind and give vent to their day-to-day experiences. As I would buy a cola or water, I 
would overhear and watch some operators sit in these shops outside the company, smoke 
locally made rolled tobacco [known in India as bidi], go through the Tamil newspapers, 
complain of being treated unfairly by their managers. 
4.4.3 The Works Office 
The main administrative centre of EWS, the Works Office [see Appendix 8], the 
HRD centre and the GEMBA office illustrate the hierarchical demarcation of roles and 
status in CompCo. The hierarchy was evident in the layout of offices, and I could observe 
it in the ways people addressed and talked to each other. The administrative offices were 
sometimes full of tension and rapid movement for some people but others seemed to pass 
the day tediously without doing very much. 
The Works Office is the main administrative nodal centre of the entire plant 
EWS. The ground floor houses the more senior managers, along with a large meeting 
room. Most of the senior managers, such as the heads of purchase, material planning and 
supplier billing, work in cubicles which lack privacy, the size of which tended to be 
directly proportional to the occupational rank of the manager. When off-the-cuff 
meetings and reviews were required these managers would have to go to other areas of 
the plant or meet with others from WDM3. The ground floor also houses the larger, air-
conditioned cubicles of the plant head and other significant luminaries in the EWS 
hierarchy, such as the head of the ongoing ultra-modern engine development project. His 
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administrative staff were at pains to describe him to me as a six sigma black belt, though 
this individual was rarely seen by me at his cubicle. 
To the extreme left of the ground floor was the GM’s comfortable, private air-
conditioned office with his secretary arranging appointments and routing phone calls. Mr. 
SDN is the plant director and was positioned right at the top of the plant hierarchy. I 
came across Mr. Sdn as a courteous and unassuming person to interact with, based on my 
conversations with him towards the later part of my fieldwork and during my visit in 
January 2011. When heavyweights in the company, such as the COO, visit the plant his 
office is their first port of call. 
Lower-level managers and clerks in the Works Office do not have separate cubicles, 
and are separated from each other only by a worn wooden scaffold above their desk and 
computer. They address senior managers, such as the head of purchase or materials, in a 
reverential manner, as ‘Sir’. Office clerical workers and their managers, the latter including 
former senior operators who had moved into administrative work in purchase and 
material planning, were busy with their computers or appearing to be busy to escape the 
tedium of the 9.00-17.00 hours administrative routine. Their work hours could prolong by 
about two hours in the evening if work got frenetic during peak production times, to meet 
demand for turnaround of work assigned by superiors or because they were forced to 
emulate some superiors who wanted to prove a point at how hard they worked through 
the keeping of long work hours and keeping long hours was a subtle means of impressing 
their superiors. Managers such as the GM would interact with these staff only if 
necessary and leave day-to-day management of administrative and clerical staff to the 
heads of such departments as materials and purchase. 
The ground floor of the Works Office also had a corner dedicated to an external 
company that handled the transport logistics of the company. This logistics staff was 
responsible for liaising with the transport company entrusted with bringing in the finished 
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components for EWS from other plants, components needed for manufacturing from the 
supplier's warehouse and carrying finished engines and other items such as gear boxes to 
other plants. 
The direct span of control and command exerted over CompCo middle managers 
and operators could not be exercised over these employees, who were sub-contracted 
employees belonging to the logistics company. Nothing much could be done with these 
employees other than constantly being reminded by staff in the purchase and material-
planning department of their responsibilities. CompCo middle managers as I will 
illuminate in Chapter 6 have observed that lean logistics or JIT delivery did not seem to 
fervently appeal to these logistics staff. 
The cash office was located on the second floor of the Works Office. Mr. VDVN 
and other operators sometimes evoked byzantine images of corruption and implied 
misappropriation of funds, as was alleged by Mr. VDVN, a trade union leader, in our 
conversation in late March 2009. The cash office has two functions, to dispense wages 
and salaries into the bank accounts of operators and managers and to pay suppliers. 
Suppliers are seen hovering around and have to go upstairs to the cash office to get their 
drafts. (Bigger suppliers get theirs online.) Sometimes managers would come down and 
meet the supplier and they would talk as if they knew each other, akin to close friends. 
When I waited in the guest sofa that lay next to the main entrance in the Works Office, I 
would sit with suppliers (especially the smaller suppliers whose livelihood depended on 
Compo) who were hopeful that it was their lucky day to get payment, and I would 
overhear workers cursing a manager. Towards the right of the Works Office is the 
building housing the HRD centre. It comprises a dust-filled older office with computers 
and old HRM manuals and industrial engineering books. Adjacent to it, within the same 
building, is a modern air conditioned training centre for training associates and middle 
managers, an executive strategy room with up-to-date media for presentation and 
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discussion amongst senior managers. A space behind the training room is used for 
serving lunches to managers while they are attending training programs. The friendly 
HRD manager, Mr. MRL, reports to the HRM head, who also has an office by the right 
side of the training centre. Across a lawn from Works Office are the first aid centre and 
ambulance shed and some small production units, including the heat treatment plant. 
4.4.4 Production control 
Production control at EWS is separated, spatially from the administrative 
functions, which are the responsibility of the GM and the other staff in the Works Office. 
The main centre responsible for control of production is the Production Control Office, 
which is attached to the Medium Duty Vehicle (MDV) assembly shop, the only unit that 
actually assembles vehicle chassis in EWS (see map of EWS, Appendix 6). The 
Production Planning and Control office (Appendix 9) is responsible for setting out targets 
of production plan, given to them by the production head and breaking the target into 
daily and weekly levels and managing the supply of materials to the production line. The 
production control department is under the overall control of the Section Head I 
nicknamed ‘Mercury’. Besides him, the line managers who work in the Production 
Control Office include Mr. AK and Mr. SMU, who also have additional responsibilities 
in managing CompCo’s only assembly line Medium Duty Vehicle shop. Other 
production managers with the same status have offices within the shop units or, along 
with more junior production executives, work in glassed-in cabins within production 
units. 
Mr. N, who is the DGM of EWS, leads the flagship GEMBA change programme, 
which became my focus. His office is located in the old Quality Control Office, 
perpendicularly opposite the Production Control Office and adjacent to the IT department 
(see map). This end-product quality control department, with its own head, Mr.RGN, who 
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operates from his work area in the ground floor of the administrative building, continues to 
be in existence, to ensure product quality, even after the establishment of GEMBA, and 
continues to play some of the same functions. Below him with regard to the organizational 
hierarchy are the senior level middle managers of engine machining, tooling quality and 
subassembly and MDV quality, who also report to the Deputy Head of Machining and the 
Deputy Head of Assembly respectively (refer to Appendix 3). Managers such as Mr. TJN, 
who monitored production manufacturing process quality norms (refer to Appendix 9) 
worked in the industrial engineering department and worked in tandem with Mr. RGN’s 
department. 
Behind Mr. N’s chamber is the office of the head of engine sub-assemblies and 
MDV quality verification, a senior level middle manager who I will call Mr.Ar who 
reported to Mr.RGN. 
I sometimes saw Mr. Ar end up irritating Mr. N (who always took pains to never 
express his anger) when lecturing to some junior employee with his loud voice or talking 
with some other colleague or trying to get his point across the phone animatedly as he 
reprimanded smaller supplier firms whose existence was critically dependent upon 
CompCo’s continued patronage. During these phone calls, he would attempt to trace the 
source of the defect to the components supplied by a supplier in either Hubli or Bangalore 
and work with them to rectify to prevent future recurrence of the identified defect during 
production. He would also have a number of visitors such as quality inspecting middle 
managers who checked quality after each stage in the line and suppliers from smaller and 
mid-sized firms who would come to meet him regarding quality issues both potential and 
identified and their redressing. It may be worth noting that larger transnational and Indian 
critical component suppliers would liaise directly with the Corporate R&D centre at 
Nellore which was the start to end-product conception and realisation, and the much 
smaller engine design and testing centre EWS or work with the production head for 
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correcting fundamental design changes and identifying performance errors. Moreover 
since, they were careful in monitoring quality they would not find the need to see nor did 
they find favour in being summoned at short notice unless it was an unavoidable 
contingency. Their punctuated presence in EWS, contrasted with Mr. Ar, who exercised 
his managerial authority by frequently summoning smaller and mid-range ancillary 
suppliers to his chamber, as and whenever he deemed fit. I overheard them being berated 
by Mr. Ar as I waited in Mr. N’s office, for their carelessness, in the quality defects in the 
components that they had delivered. 
Within the GEMBA and Mr. Ar’s office space are also various administrative 
clerical subordinates, who move like revolving doors around both Mr. Ar and Mr. N, and 
answer to their summons, but pay particular respect to Mr. N, trying to show that they 
hang on every word. Mr. N hectored them with instructions. They include Mr. N’s trusted 
private secretary who co-ordinated his travel plans across CompCo’s plants and kept 
track of his next ‘to do’ aspect of his lean agenda. 
The rest of the GEMBA team, led by Mr. AB (refer to Appendix 4), who became a 
key informant, work in the first floor office in Shop 6, adjacent to the Engine and Fly 
wheel Machining Area (refer to Appendix 10) and close to the office of the DGM in 
charge of assembly and quality control. When Mr. AB (whom I came to call by his first 
name) wants to meet with Mr. N or other senior administrators, he has to go to Mr. N’s 
office or on occasions when there were GEMBA meetings Mr. N would come over to see 
him. Mr. AB and Mr. N were in frequent telephone contact. 
Security personnel endeavour to watch this assembly and testing area and Mr. N’s 
and the GEMBA office carefully. There are an array of computers and desks with people 
appearing to be very busy. The office has an impressive array of lean manufacturing 
books and GEMBA posters, including Womack and Woos’ Lean Thinking [2003] a 
particular favourite of Mr. N’s, and Gladwell’s (2000) The Tipping Point, with both 
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being strongly recommended to me by Mr. N. Covering the office were drawing boards 
with present and future-state process flow plans and fishbone diagrams, aimed at cutting 
waste and cost, eliminating extra stages and speeding the supply chain and production 
processes, densely scribbled notes of figures, statistical parameters and engineering 
efficiency calculations and marker board illustrations similar to those used in the software 
industry. (A sample of a GIRAP record of targets and shortcomings is presented in 
Appendix 12.) Whenever Mr. N visited Mr. AB’s office one heard a lot of talk about 
dynamism, work ethic, Japanese manufacturing, kaizening deliverables, transparency in 
manufacturing processes, and mind-set change. 
Because Mr. N assigned me a role in inventory change, the team office also 
became my base as a fieldworker. I was therefore able to observe Mr. AB completing pie 
charts and assessing graphs and targeted dates of completion amidst phone calls to 
WAM4 in Nagpur and WDG3 in Jaipur (October 2008-November 2009). Mr. AB's office 
is also inhabited by graduate engineering trainees, hired from premier engineering 
institutes, who analyse an enormous quantum of statistical data and are subject to 
deadlines (called ‘deliverables’ by Mr. AB, a word routinized in accordance with Mr. N’s 
wish. These trainees had to complete their GEMBA projects under Mr. AB’s supervision. 
They were also subject to questioning by Mr. N and their training supervisor, who was 
also brought in from the engineering institutes. 
4.4.5 Production areas 
The production units of EWS are spread across an area the size of three Lords 
cricket grounds, and it took me a long time to understand their different roles and relation 
to the production process. This is indicative of the complexity of the operations, and the 
number of different products and processes involved. What makes it more complex is that 
as an old site, the layout of EWS and accretions of new processes and machinery make 
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coordination under the tightly synchronised production processes mandated by lean 
manufacturing difficult. Understanding how the work force is organised is made even 
more complex by the existence of contract workers who do not work for CompCo but for 
their suppliers or other companies, sometimes in the same units as CompCo’s permanent 
or temporary workers and sometimes in their own units. Moreover, some units of EWS 
are dependent on supplies from, or send components to, another CompCo plant down the 
road. Finally, components sent by outside suppliers, half-completed units and units 
awaiting delivery also have to be stored and fit in wherever they can be on the site. 
There are eight shops or assembly, machining and production units, including the 
Medium Duty Vehicle assembly area and the Axle Assembly Area, the most important of 
which are numbered 3, 2, 6 and 5, 7 (Appendices 9 and 10). The remaining machining 
shops labelled shop 1 in EWS and another shop that lies behind the production control 
office is under locked up are, are in a moth-balled state and are rarely used. Keeping the 
machinery running in these plants, as well as designing the manning arrangements related 
to each machine, is the responsibility of the industrial engineering department in the 
plant. It has to take into consideration the striking combination of old and new 
machinery, which presents short-term difficulties in managing the production of a variety 
of products as well as long-term questions regarding how CompCo investment will 
proceed in future. 
Shop 4 is one of two engine machining areas where engine block tooling, boring, 
ginning operations, dressing and assembly are done. The engine machining areas in Shop 
4 3’s op mainly entail a single group of permanent experienced CompCo operators, 
standing in a line. Each working alone and operating machines that perform operations 
such as rough milling, drilling, washing boring, brushing of holes of the engine etc. It is 
feared it will become redundant because of new emission norms, thereby questioning the 
very legitimacy of plant EWS’s existence. 
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Shop 4 also contains a cylinder engine block calibration area, staffed by workers 
who are contract employees loaned out from WDP1 in Nellore. They carry out an array 
of parameter tests on the engine block before it goes to the assembly areas and certify 
that the engine block cylinder is ready for the next stage of assembly. According to Mr. 
Svm (August 2009) this used to be done by tooling experts from the operator cadre, who 
are now becoming (an extinct tribe in CompCo). In addition, most of the engine 
machining process has been contracted out to a foundry company, thereby rendering a 
number of operators dysfunctional in a plant whose main role is to manufacture and 
assemble engines. Once an engine block is out from shop 4, in accordance with varying 
model requirements, it is ready for assembly processes (called ‘dressing’ and ‘housing’ 
in EWS) in Shop 3 and Shop 6 respectively. Shop 3 was an old assembly shop which 
assembled CompCo’s staple product, the Hino engine, which, owing to changes in 
emission norms from Euro 2 to Euro 4, was nearing obsolescence. The Shop relied on 
the tacit knowledge of its experienced and highly skilled operators. As part of the 
implicit contract between management and these operators, they were given some 
leeway to manipulate their job cycle to their and the company’s mutual advantage. 
However, by the time of my visit in January 2011 part of Shop 3 was being remodeled to 
enable the construction of a new Nissan conveyor line which, as part of a joint venture 
with Nissan, would use Nissan’s implementation of lean manufacturing to build the 
replacement for the CompCo’s ageing Hino line. Implicit in the use of the Nissan 
production system would be the use of more detailed and tightly timed multi-tasked 
operations. 
Shop 5 comprises a big industrial shed. It stores manufactured Hino engines prior 
to dispatch and another part of it stores manual tools such as wrenches, pliers, various 
categories of nuts and bolts and all the small components that are required for 
manufacturing engines. But its main purpose is to house machines that carry out a variety 
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of lathe stamping and multiple operations that prepare the critical components which 
eventually go to the dressing of raw engine blocks such as the camshaft and rocker bolt. 
These are rugged machines, of old design and advanced in age, but were capable of doing 
similar sequential processes that were performed together. The layout of these machines as 
a cell or a line fixed a definite manufacturing route for operations to be done in turn, such 
as machining the rocker arm or gear component of the engine. There is a piling up of 
inventory at the end if there is excess capacity owing to fall in demand and fewer 
components being made. The inability to change machine design and therefore make use 
of excess capacity for machining more urgently required components when required was 
perceived as big obstacle in CompCo, according to Mr. SVM, a member of the GEMBA 
team who showed me around the plant. These older arrangements include both the 
machines performing stage production in this shop and in fragments in other machining 
areas. These older machines co-existed with and competed in their functional utility with 
newer, multi-spindle, multi-task CNC machines procured from international firms such as 
Gildemeister which were placed both in Shop 5 and other machining areas such as Shop 
4. CompCo therefore contained areas which were already automated, and capable of 
further automation, in contrast to its older machines which not only were labour intensive 
but also had limited multi-tasking and multiple process integration capacities. According 
to Mr. SVM [22 October 2008] the older machines were expensive to maintain, could not 
accommodate stringent lean manufacturing standards and in his opinion had limited 
scope for improvement. 
Shop 6 (refer to Appendix 10) comprises an assembly line that assembles engine 
models required by other plants of EWS, including special application marine engines 
and engines of enormous horsepower. Shop 6 has incorporated many of the latest 
principles of lean manufacturing such as continuous flow. The operators on this assembly 
line were permanent employees of CompCo, highly skilled and dexterous and, in the 
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view of Mr. AB [February 2009], capable of matching any plant in India embodying the 
best principles of lean manufacturing. Shop 6 also functions as an office, as the first floor 
houses the head of production, Mr. TRN, responsible for overall engine production, 
including manufacture, assembly and quality, along with the GEMBA team. In addition 
he also monitors axle assembly (refer to Appendix 3), Mr. TRN the vastly experienced 
production head thus has a big say in almost all the assembly and machining operations 
of EWS apart from the decisions of the quality control sections responsible for end 
product, engine manufacturing process and end sub-assemblies product quality, headed 
by Mr. T and Mr. Ar respectively (see Appendix 3). After the GM and the GEMBA head 
he is the manager who has most functional power within the organisation. 
In contrast to the mix of ageing and newer-design machinery typical of EWS, the 
newer WAP4 further down the road handled a diverse portfolio, manufacturing light 
commercial vehicles and medium duty vehicles, and was perceived as more 
contemporary than EWS. It was critical to CompCo’s manufacturing strategy. This plant 
was spread out over a large area. I visited this plant at the start of fieldwork and 
sporadically when granted access during the course of my fieldwork. It concentrated on 
assembly, but also had machining shops needed for machining components such as the 
front cabs and treated metal to be turned around catering to the entire life cycle of 
manufacturing the vehicle chassis and ready to drive vehicle. It also had modern 
convention/conferencing centres, better amenities for employees and operators and a 
building dedicated to change management and also housed the CompCo change 
management team member responsible for ensuring that Japanese principles were applied 
to overall product procurement. Crucial meetings considered important to the overall 
change management strategy were held here. 
Shop 7, which made critical components such as certain specifications of 
connecting rod and engine fly wheel, was a focal point of senior management’s project of 
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automating a substantial part of its machining process. Besides, these production shops 
there are other areas that liaison with production areas and play animportant role in 
getting the chassis out of the plant. 
EWS also has to allocate space for its output to be stored, prior to delivery to the 
customer, and it usually undergoes various quality control inspections during this period. 
Inspection and pre-delivery posed particular problems for managers such as Mr. AK who 
had to do last minute quality checks to cover up for the lapses in production during the 
assembly state in the MDV area. 
The main pre-delivery inspection area (Appendix 10) is isolated from the main 
production site and does not have a GEMBA group. Mr. SGM, who oversaw this area of 
the plant, has worked in EWS for twenty---five years and was an important repository of 
information about changes in CompCo over time. 
Many truck chassis lie waiting on the vacant field outside near its main building, a 
shed with a metaled roof. The building contains a pit, and a way of lowering and raising the 
trucks to enable repairs to the paint finish, and washing and examination of the 
undersides to take place. Operators also weld and fix external parts and fitting, such as 
headlights and brake-lights, on to the chassis. Other operators were seen moving about 
with frame side members, and clamps to attach to some vehicle. The vehicle engine is 
also revved up for testing, creating exhaust fumes that fill the shed with smoke for a few 
minutes. Mr. SGM was a popular superior, the men working there enjoyed themselves, 
but he was always cursing and pushing the contract employees who comprised the 
majority of his workers. 
One of the middle managers frequently to be found in this unit was Mr. AK from 
production control was additionally, responsible for checking whether all the fitments 
were appropriate in the chassis before it went for the road test stage. He worked in 
production control department rather than under Mr. SGM. I managed to develop a very 
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good rapport with Mr. AK and had many extended conversations whenever I would visit 
on GEMBA business. Mr. AK was always welcomed in the area, which he visited often, 
bringing with him a lamp or frame side member from the stores of the MDV assembly 
area and then tracking down the truck missing that fitting from amongst those lying 
around in this area. 
Vehicles in EWS often seemed to hang around waiting for delivery even once 
their fittings and inspections were complete. There is a vacant area beside the heat 
treatment plant, for instance, and when I started my fieldwork there were a couple of 
medium duty vehicles there ready to dispatch. The number of trucks swelled so much in 
the course of the recession, from late August 2008 through May 2009, that there was no 
room to park them. There was thus a highly visible sign of a decline in market demand 
for all to see. 
Disposal of wastes, including scrap disposal area, is another function the plant 
must allow for (see Appendix 9). There is a massive storage area of various items of 
inventory including unwanted items. It is manned by the lowest rung of the contract 
workers, some earning as little as Rs. 100 per day, who move away the unwanted items 
into the industrial waste disposal bins there by seeing them in the evening at the bus stop. 
With their drooping shoulders they looked as if they did not have the agency or the 
representation to voice out their protest as vociferously as do the permanent or contract 
operators involved in production. These industrial labourers are longtime residents of 
Hubli, ready to work in any of its industrial outlets for a daily wage, but are forgotten by 
unions whose constituency is EWS employees. These casual workers were subject to 
their own line managers, who reported changes in labour requirements to their shop 
heads. Their employment was seasonal and they tried very hard to cling on with EWS 
and WAP4 in the hope of eventually accessing the internal labour market. These workers 
were not considered as industrial workers but menial workers, those who do physically 
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taxing and manual work, such as carrying rejected scrap around in trolleys and waste 
metal by hand, seemingly with little heed to their personal safety. These areas were full of 
industrial grime, grease, sheet metal, iron fillings and did not exactly represent Japanese 
principles of lean manufacturing embedded in CompCo’s change management 
programme. 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the political and economic context that conditions 
CompCo’s decision making, especially after the economic reforms of the 1990’s, the 
changing regime of accumulation of the Indian state over time and its interaction with the 
market and workers. Next I registered the emergence of the middle class after the 1990’s. 
It forms the main consumer base for the automobile industry, and the base from which 
companies draw their managers, and is also a reference point for workers’ aspirations 
(Heuer, 2006: 36]. This middle class may well continue to harbour old deeply 
institutionalised prejudices such as caste that might for instance come into play in their 
relationships in less than obvious manner while at work. For instance Heuer [2006: 36] 
cites the example of recruitment based on subjective criteria based on caste, which is 
premised on the idea of mutual support amongst one’s caste compatriots. Therefore, 
within changed middle class values there exists a tendency of continuity and resilience of 
old prejudices as well. 
Section 4.1 then examined the changing contours of the Indian automotive 
industry and argued that Indian automotive firms have no other choice but to adopt new 
manufacturing and managerial innovations but at the same time being aware of 
constraints such as that of infrastructure. Considering the aforementioned changed 
scenario, it becomes very difficult for trade unions in India to function against the 
onslaught of managerial attempts to cut costs while at the same time face a state that sides 
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with investors. However, management’s workers and trade unions interact with one 
another in a regulatory framework that largely predates liberalisation. 
I then detailed the social milieu and local context which comprise the background 
against which the well-established but old firm CompCo operates. CompCo has been a 
major player in the vehicle industry in India, catering to a wide spectrum of requirements 
and the changing context and structure of market demand in India, and this has had a 
bearing of the policy of its corporate management at headquarters in Nellore. 
The chapter has also introduced themes to which I will return, such as the 
prevalence of status hierarchy, overlapping managerial responsibilities, the spread out 
nature of the plant, the varied age of plant machinery, and the pyramidal nature of the 
organisation (but one cut by cross-cutting lines of command, especially for contract 
staff). Other issues, such as CompCo’s relation to suppliers, concern relations with firms 
located mainly outside the EWS complex, so will be introduced later. 
I have given most attention to the production areas, since I will be referring to 
these in explaining the GEMBA change programme and opposition to it. I have introduced 
the important senior and middle managers who I encountered in my fieldwork especially 
those who became key informants. 
I have also sought to identify the connections between EWS and CompCo’s other 
plants and their dependence upon each other. This chapter suggests that CompCo’s 
corporate management has positioned each of its plants differently with regard to its 
corporate management strategy, employee composition and product profile. Some plants 
have been identified as critical for its future growth, while others, like the ageing EWS, 
are a source of concern for corporate headquarters. Hence CompCo’s change 
management project, called GEMBA, was seen by corporate management as more critical 
to plants like EWS than its others.
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Chapter 5 Senior Managers and Change Management Policies 
in CompCo (with particular reference to EWS) 
5.0 Introduction 
This chapter examines the character, interpretation and outcome of the change management 
programme conceived by CompCo’s corporate management operating out of Nellore. Nellore was 
CompCo’s corporate headquarters, and included the perspectives of the senior plant management of 
EWS, my primary fieldwork site. The change management programme in CompCo was called 
GEMBA, which is a Japanese word that implies being at the heart of the workplace. It has been 
defined by one of its practitioners in the following way: 
GEMBA: A Japanese word meaning “real place” – now adopted in 
management terminology to mean the “work place” or that place where 
value is added. In manufacturing, it usually refers to the shop floor. Going to 
the GEMBA, a principle of what is called GEMBA Kaizen, is a reminder 
that whenever an abnormality occurs, or whenever a manager wishes to 
know the current state of operations, he or she must go to the GEMBA right 
away since GEMBA is the source of information. [Imai, 1997: xxiv] 
However, at CompCo, GEMBA was defined by advocates of the change 
management project, such as the Executive Director for manufacturing, Mr. N, who was the 
Head of Change Management, and the GM of EWS, Mr. SDN, in the following way: 
GEMBA is the shop floor; in a service business, the place where the 
customer and the service come together. It is also the quality of human 
interactions in the workplace between co-workers, with customers and 
business partners. [CompCo employees’ fortnightly magazine, 2006] 
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This chapter will begin by trying to understand the underlying motives of corporate 
strategy in implementing GEMBA. The next section will identify the dominant actors spear-
heading the GEMBA initiative and how GEMBA intervened to recast organisational roles 
within EWS. It will also explore how particular managers interpret change management and 
how subordinates have no other option but to follow that linguistic vocabulary to justify their 
activity of management. I will build on the foundation of the preceding sections and turn my 
attention to how GEMBA intervened to review and monitor employee performance. Finally, in 
the penultimate section I will consider other concurrent managerial policies that ran in parallel 
and even contradicted the premises of GEMBA, and delve into senior and corporate 
management's rationale for implementing these policies. I will then conclude by broadly 
analysing the outcomes and repercussions of GEMBA. 
5.1 Corporate Management of CompCo’s Commitment to Change and 
Adoption of the GEMBA Framework 
In the new highly competitive Indian automotive market in which the firm’s position 
was beginning to be challenged by new entrants such as Volvo and, in recent times, Navistar, 
CompCo corporate management were clear that they needed to introduce a climactic shift in 
the way the company worked, so as to drive up its competitiveness by improving quality and 
reducing costs; they decided to use the lean manufacturing model as the focal point of their 
work. 
CompCo’s direct Indian competitors, as well as other businesses supplying the 
automotive industry and other appendages of the automotive industry such as the two-wheeler 
industry had been more sensitive to changing customer demands and were accelerating their 
implementation of practices that senior managers of EWS had identified as embodying the 
integral precepts of lean manufacturing. Lean manufacturing continued to gain eminence as the 
dominant paradigm in the automotive sector, and senior management in CompCo did not want 
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to find itself falling behind the rest of the industry. However, the company had no previous 
history of a coordinated move towards lean manufacturing or any other change on a 
transformative scale. Other automotive companies in India and in the immediate vicinity of 
EWS had pioneered lean manufacturing on a scale much greater than CompCo’s modest 
attempts at introducing quality circles in 2006. Corporate management recognised the scale of 
the undertaking they were about to embark upon and saw that the successful introduction of lean 
would depend upon the choice of a vehicle that would both gain employee acceptance and 
provide an efficient means of managing very large-scale change. 
CompCo decided to focus its implementation of organisational change around the 
concept of GEMBA and called its initiative ‘Mission GEMBA’. The emphasis on the 
necessity for ‘change management’ also stemmed from corporate management’s view of the 
inadequacies of their existing labour force and machinery, and the difficulties that it believed 
its efforts to ‘optimise’ its use of resources would meet. Change would need to be carefully 
structured and driven through decisively if it was to succeed and the friction that would 
inevitably surround the introduction of lean had to be minimised as far as possible. The 
friction and damage CompCo feared it was likely to encounter could be likened to the 
cavitation around a ship’s propeller, which would damage it unless protective measures were 
put in place, and the measures CompCo decided upon were encapsulated in change 
management manifested in the GEMBA programme. 
For the Head of Mission GEMBA, Mr. N, adopting lean manufacturing practices 
was essential to becoming more efficient. For the GM it meant weeding out obsolete and 
inefficient manufacturing and human resource practices whilst also catering for the 
changing aspirations of executives and younger operators. For the Chief Operating Officer 
[COO] of CompCo, Mr. VDS, it meant bringing the company up-to-speed with the 
working practices of the best in the industry, whilst for other Production Heads the 
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introduction of lean manufacturing was and would always be less important than the 
attaining of production targets. 
But whatever their individual perspectives, senior management was unanimous and 
emphatic in its intention to secure large-scale change. In November 2008 in a meeting at his 
home, the retired GM in charge of exports at CompCo Nellore(Mr. RC) told me that: 
“The old days of having only two pre-eminent players are long gone and 
the elephant has to learn to adapt. Senior management is not naive and 
realises the need to become efficient and tell the workers to shape up or 
else the company will not survive the competition. The lumbering 
elephant has marched on, even as it has managed to wade through many a 
crisis in the past. CompCo might have been slow, but would eventually 
catch up because it had no other choice. The market today is changing 
rapidly and in the very near future would have changed considerably 
beyond recognition.” 
At the time GEMBA was initiated, in the middle of 2008, senior management believed that 
CompCo’s existing production platforms would prevent it rising to meet the competition in several 
different segments of the commercial vehicle industry. The ages of plant and equipment in 
CompCo’s manufacturing locations varied greatly within and across manufacturing facilities, which 
would make the introduction of change more difficult (a point that I amplified in Chapter 2), and 
there were numerous productive inefficiencies. 
Faced with this challenge, important members of corporate management, including 
Mr. VDS, the COO, and Mr. D, the Executive Director [ED], at manufacturing corporate 
headquarters in Nellore identified two key operational needs (see Appendix 1 for the 
CompCo organizational hierarchy) . The first measure was to replace outdated items of plant 
with new, automated machinery capable of performing more tasks per production cycle. 
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This in turn would facilitate large reductions in employee numbers and would allow 
CompCo to reduce its operating costs. Japanese texts such as Ohno’s Toyota Production 
System [1988] and the consultants hired by CompCo counselled ‘total preventive 
maintenance’ in order to get the best performance from ageing machinery, and that became a 
cornerstone of GEMBA. 
However, in addition to changes in machinery, there was a critical need for a second 
measure, to ‘leverage efficiencies to the maximum extent possible’ in the company’s working 
systems and use of labour. It sought to do this by adopting the measures advocated by books 
such as The Toyota Way [Liker, 2004], and self-help manuals, such as Lean Thinking 
[Womack and Jones, 2003. I noticed that these books, and particularly Womack’s, had a 
profound impact on some senior managers such as Mr. N, who were spear-heading the 
GEMBA project; they became evangelists for lean manufacturing, quoting frequently and 
liberally from the books they had read. A ‘groupthink’ culture developed in which an 
enthusiasm for the literature on lean was mandatory and one in which managers began to 
compete with each other in reading the latest utterances from management theorists in order 
to make a good impression on Mr. N. 
However, the implementation of change was soon recognised as being anything other 
than a black-and-white exercise. For example, some older machines could not be replaced for 
reasons of cost, as I explain later, and management was forced repeatedly to manage change 
on a contingency basis. Change was further complicated by other preoccupations on the part 
of middle managers who bore no direct connection with GEMBA, who would also compete 
with each other to arrive earliest and thereby demonstrate their commitment to GEMBA. 
Such managerial attitudes and preoccupations considerably influenced the direction of the 
GEMBA project and hence will constitute a recurrent theme throughout the ensuing chapters. 
At the same time as wanting to modernise CompCo’s plants, equipment and working 
systems, corporate management wanted to align their production more closely with market 
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trends for particular product lines and clarify the role that individual plants should play in 
meeting the overall production targets of the company. Viewed from this perspective, the 
EWS plant at Hubli was a source of worry for CompCo’s corporate management, and 
consequently much of the effort to introduce GEMBA was concentrated there. This urgency 
to modernise found CompCo’s management trying to overcome production and design 
deficiencies in such older plants, including WDP4 as well as EWS. It also decided to set up 
a modern production facility from scratch in Uttarakhand, where it could introduce GEMBA 
de novo instead of having to change attitudes and confront people who had become heavily 
entrenched in their occupational roles, work identities and relationships with their 
colleagues. 
Thus there was an attitudinal aspect to the implantation of change management in 
CompCo, as senior level management at corporate headquarters had set views on operators, 
middle managers and human resources in general. Their judgment was that there was a need 
for far-reaching changes in the working practices of operators, whom they perceived as 
lethargic, unionised and having a mind-set that was opposed to “progressive management 
initiatives”. Middle managers and operators needed to be led to the new world of lean, 
irrespective of whether they were enthusiastic. 
These changes were seen as essential to ensure CompCo’s survival and preserve its 
market lead, mainly in Southern India, in the years to come. What undergirded this belief 
was the history of difficult industrial relations at plant level and the perception that workers 
were interested only in their pay packets, irrespective of the financial health of the company. 
This was the dominant attitude of senior managers throughout my stay in EWS, being 
expressed to me by many managers past and present, including Mr. RC, Mr. SDN and Mr. 
N, all of whom stated that CompCo operators needed to adopt ‘a different mind-set’ and 
‘team working approaches’. 
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For conceptualising and implementing change management, the company relied on 
managers who had a proven track record of turning things around and brought with them 
experience from working in the leading manufacturing firms around the world. The Board had 
identified the need for change, but the elements of a lean manufacturing programme, founded 
upon a ‘hands on’ approach such as GEMBA, were first identified as potentially useful to 
CompCo by the COO, Mr. VDS. Prior to assuming his role as COO of CompCo, Mr. VDS had 
occupied a senior managerial position in the Central Indian engine manufacturing subsidiary of the 
leading American aircraft engine manufacturer, Pratt and Whitney, after which he was head-
hunted to run the Pune (an industrial city situated in Western India) operation of an American 
automotive engine manufacturer. This engine manufacturing firm, Cummins PLC, was a leading 
player in engine manufacturing and is also a dominant player in the UK engineering industry, and 
was considered a competitive threat to CompCo. Under Mr. VDS’s suzerainty, a project similar to 
GEMBA was implemented between 2005-2007. Mr. VDS’s stint at Pune had been widely viewed 
as a success, and his arrival as COO at CompCo signalled the intention of the proprietors to pursue 
a more dynamic and robust style of management. 
Mr. VDS had a proven track record of delivering corporate objectives in whatever 
posts he occupied, and he had demonstrated his ability to do this in the Indian context by 
drawing upon a wide range of lean manufacturing and quality control models. These included 
techniques such as Six-Sigma, which in the airliner and jet engine industry from which he 
had come, had to meet far more exacting standards than in the automotive industry. The then 
head of the Cummins engine manufacturing Pune plant, Mr.SRV, which Mr.VDS had 
managed, eventually went on to become one of the leading exponents of lean manufacturing 
practices in India [Mr.SRV, Pune, India, 23 February 2009]. The CompCo board wanted 
CompCo to adopt the best practices and absorb the inner know-how of the workings of the Pune-
based firm which senior managers like him possessed. 
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Upon his arrival at CompCo in early 2008, he was instrumental in persuading other 
directors at corporate headquarters to hire McKinsey, the international management consulting 
company. After their extensive study and recommendation, Mission GEMBA was launched in 
the middle of 2008 under Mr. VDS’s aegis, but with the support of the corporate heads of 
Manufacturing, Finance, Purchasing and Marketing. The COO also took care to secure the 
backing of the next tier plant heads and the heads of key specialisms such as production, 
purchase and marketing in each plant. CompCo also drew inspiration in part from the 
motorcycle company TVS in Hubli, a winner of a Deming Award, which had adopted lean 
manufacturing production principles very successfully in conjunction with Suzuki. In the 
opinion of senior managers, such as the head of the GEMBA team, these companies had 
evolved as exemplars of the effective utilisation of lean manufacturing and were worthy 
examples for CompCo to follow. Thus the scene was set for the design and implementation of 
GEMBA and in the next section I will show how corporate management set about changing the 
organisational structure to facilitate GEMBA’s introduction. 
5.2 GEMBA and the reorganisation of management. 
In my discussion of the GEMBA initiatives I wish to highlight the way in which 
senior plant managers tried to embed GEMBA as both a vocabulary in everyday activities 
and as a technical innovation to optimise manufacturing within the EWS plant. They sought 
to superimpose the structure required by GEMBA over the existing organisational matrix of 
senior plant managers, Section Heads, middle managers and operators. In this regard 
GEMBA can be seen as having four distinctly identifiable aspects: two associated primarily 
with changes in organisational structure, and two intended to reorient the motivation and 
conduct of both managers and operators. The first structural feature involved alterations to 
the company’s organisational and management structure, and the second involved the 
creation of a new organisational management unit to push GEMBA through. Alongside and 
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interacting with these initiatives there were measures to increase the motivation of managers 
and operators, especially to reward initiatives and rapid problem solving, and finally there 
were measures to increase the scope for monitoring production and workers. Unless 
otherwise mentioned, my study of GEMBA and its implementation will focus upon EWS, 
my case study plant. 
5.2.1 GEMBA and the recasting of organisational structures 
This section will lay out how senior management envisaged the GEMBA project 
structure as sitting on top of the existing organisational hierarchy at middle management 
and operator levels. They believed that the existing structure would be at odds with the 
principles of GEMBA, but instead of seeking fundamental change in what was there 
already, they sought to overlay the old hierarchy with the new. The section will explain the 
architecture of GEMBA in CompCo and describe the new management unit that was set up 
specifically to push through the changes senior management required. 
I will now elaborate on how senior management used GEMBA as a classificatory 
mechanism to impose a GEMBA organisational structure that was quite different from what 
was implied in the textual definition of GEMBA dominant in the literature. EWS as a whole 
was divided into GEMBA units comprising of operators and middle managers, based on the 
functions they performed, so that each GEMBA shop unit, comprising of about twenty to 
fifty operators and two or more middle managers, was an internal customer to the other 
GEMBA units in the same assembly or manufacturing process. The term ‘internal customer’ 
followed the principles of lean manufacturing, especially as illustrated in the book Lean 
Thinking by Womack and Jones [2003]. 
Within each GEMBA work area, with its constituent group of operators and middle 
managers, workers were both individually and collectively responsible for adhering to 
quality targets and agreed cycle times – the latter based on ‘takt’ times. The attainment of 
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both quality and ‘takt’ time parameters by the preceding operator affected the outcome of 
the next operator’s job-cycle, and he was hence the ‘internal customer’ of the preceding 
operator. Thus the efficiency of each operator depended on the efficient performance of his 
predecessor in the line. Within GEMBA each shop became a profit centre and competed 
with other shops to achieve the greatest improvements in efficiency. Another objective of 
reordering the organisational structure was to divide the workplace into groups of operators, 
in a way that (in the vocabulary of senior management) would promote teamwork and 
facilitate troubleshooting by the operators themselves without management intervention. 
A multi-disciplinary team of senior middle managers from across all departments was 
established in December 2006 and identified nearly sixty-five functional units initially 8 
September 2008. Each functional assembly or machining unit would represent a GEMBA and 
each GEMBA would be an internal customer to the next GEMBA in the production sequence. 
The elimination of waiting time and wasteful activity through the use of standardising job 
routines was the underlying basis for the tight linkage between different stages of production 
and of individual job cycles which were now very much dependent upon each other. The 
internal customer concept was used to help enforce compliance with these standards by 
making each operator in a line, and hence the whole shop, dependent upon the previous 
operator’s job cycle. Management recognised that one benefit of this way of working was 
that it had the potential to lead operators to ‘manage’ one another and thus enforce internal 
discipline and the resolution of problems without the intervention of managers. 
Also, because these individual business units had to deliver value in terms of cost 
saving, management hoped that operators, motivated by the Empower reward scheme, 
would themselves seek improvements in efficiency through the efficient utilisation of 
machinery, through innovation in working practices, such as embracing multi-tasking, and 
through continuous improvement of the production process. All of these mechanisms were 
intended to create a state of tension, such that operators would no longer need to be managed 
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to optimise performance, with all the attendant industrial relations considerations that might 
entail; instead, under the pressures created through GEMBA and Empower, they would 
manage and discipline themselves and each other. 
The performance of the individual shops was to be analysed through various matrices, 
covering factors such as the cost of materials, the cost of processing and efficiency ratios, 
through which each unit would be moved to compete to better its performance, both in its 
own terms and in terms of other shops. GEMBA inspired ‘new seven initiatives’ Ð known in 
company parlance as the ‘N7i’ with broad functional aims that were concerned primarily, but 
not exclusively, with GEMBA. These seven areas of activity, which formed the framework 
through which GEMBA was communicated to Section Heads, middle managers and 
operators, aimed to: 
1. Increase the number of GEMBAS; 
2. Achieve Effort & Ergonomics improvements (EEI);  
3. Pursue Waste Reduction and 5S improvements; 
4. Promote The Cost Management Initiative (CMI); 
5. Seek improvements in operational efficiency through Identification of Critical 
Machines [ICM] and Total Employee Involvement (TEI); 
6. Produce product quality interventions at critical points and on time as advised; 
7. Reduce Inventory [CompCo website, 2006]. 
Later on, ‘Safety’ was also incorporated into the N7i list as an additional initiative. 
This development was designed in part to help portray the GEMBA gospel in a positive 
light, since it could be represented as benefitting operators primarily, but it was also 
intended to reduce the cost of promoting a safe working environment by embedding safety 
into GEMBA. Implicit in the design of GEMBA was that workers would then assume more 
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of the responsibility for their own and their colleagues’ safety, reducing the burden on 
management. 
Having broadly delineated how the GEMBA project intended to reorder the 
manufacturing areas, I will now turn my attention to Corporate management’s 
reconfiguration of managerial authority within CompCo. 
5.2.2 The GEMBA project Team and the GEMBA management 
hierarchy 
As I have mentioned above, each production line was divided into individual GEMBA 
groups comprising of twenty to fifty operators depending upon the job cycle and the number 
of stages of production involved. Within each GEMBA unit, one middle manager was entrusted 
with managing and monitoring the performance of operators and ensuring that the targets of each 
production/assembly unit were met. These middle managers were designated as GEMBA Unit 
Leaders or GULs and, as there was a GUL for each unit, they were drawn from each line in each 
of the manufacturing, assembly, and operational areas of the plant. In turn, these GULs reported to 
the Section Heads or senior managers responsible for the overall supervision of the programmes of 
individual production lines. The Section Heads were given the title of GEMBA Initiative Leaders, 
or GILs. The GILs were senior managers with considerable experience in the production areas. 
They also occupied positions higher up the company hierarchy than the GULs, who were largely 
middle managers overseeing workers directly. Subject to approval by the finance department and 
more senior management, the GILs recommended the size of the rewards to be given for 
improvement suggestions, which depended upon the perceived value of the suggestion or Kaizen 
improvement. 
The managers designated as GULs and GILs therefore represented a direct line of 
management responsibility for GEMBA activities within the GEMBA work units. Above the 
GILs, however, was a nodal agency led by a GEMBA Head at DGM level. The GEMBA Head 
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oversaw the overall ‘Mission GEMBA’ project, assisted by four ‘Core Team Verticals’ 
responsible for inventory, critical machines, ergonomics, and quality. In company parlance, 
these GEMBA Core Team Verticals became known as CTVs. These four CTVs not only 
sought to ensure the realisation of one of the N7i initiatives each, but together they also covered 
the three initiatives not assigned to anyone specifically. Indeed, some of the seven initiatives 
overlapped and, in retrospect, I think that it was for administrative convenience that there were 
four CTVs to overlook these seven initiatives. 
The GILs who would supervise and monitor the N7i on a day-to-day basis in each of 
the plants would have to report to the CTVs in addition to monitoring the GULs in their 
assembly and manufacturing shops. It should be noted that the strict textual definition of 
GEMBA is quite narrow as it captures the idea of a focus on the actual work place. However, at 
CompCo the term GEMBA came to encompass and be used in conjunction with a broad group 
of themes to address the many N7i undertaken by plant management. Indeed, it was sometimes 
used interchangeably as an alternative term to lean manufacturing. The main vehicles for 
translating the aims of N7i and GEMBA initiatives were the middle managers, especially those 
who were line managers and who now became the focus of greater managerial scrutiny from 
senior management. 
5.2.3 Change in promotion prospects of middle managers 
The promotion of managers, hitherto based on seniority plus the recommendation of the 
Section Head, had now come to hinge upon successful management of the GEMBA targets. In the 
recent past, consideration for promotion had depended primarily on whether someone was due for 
promotion almost as a matter of rote, although a favourable outcome was very much dependent on 
a positive recommendation from a Section Head. Now, however, in the case of line managers, 
appraisal for promotion focused on several criteria: their management of production tasks; their 
achievement of targets decided in conjunction with GEMBA parameters; their diligence and 
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commitment in supervising GEMBA improvement projects; and their interaction with operators to 
implement GEMBA. Furthermore, such appraisal took account of their achievements against 
specific targets that had been entrusted within each of the N7i areas. 
As we have seen, production-related changes were central to the realisation of GEMBA 
objectives. Corporate management never ceased to emphasise the important role that middle 
managers would play in implementing these and other measures to achieve a lean manufacturing 
environment. Now the phrase Key Result Area (KRA) became a crucial part of GEMBA 
parlance and attempts were made to appraise managers on the basis of their achievements in 
relation to an array of KRA parameters. These targets were set periodically in GEMBA review 
meetings attended by Mr. N, managers from other relevant departments, and the appropriate 
CTVs. In designing these KRAs, Mr. N drew upon reports from the CTVs, sought the active 
participation of Production Heads, and also addressed problems identified by middle managers 
in related departments. These targets were then revised and reviewed when corporate 
management in Nellore called in the GM, and Mr. N and his deputy Mr. AB. As a result Mr. N 
and other senior managers not only emphasised the responsibility of middle managers to meet 
these KRA targets, but also claimed that these managers had been consulted during the ‘process’ 
of their preparation. In January 2009 a key participant in these processes told me that, from then 
on, the participation and performance parameters of the middle manager GULs would be 
revisited and from that time period assessed against their attainment of GEMBA targets and that 
this would drive their Key Result Areas appraisal process by their Section Heads. This stance 
clearly contrasted sharply with the previous practice of promotion depending upon length of 
service and periodic Section Head’s confidential performance appraisal reports. 
 
 
 226 
5.2.4 Changes in job rotation and introduction of lateral 
functional mobility among middle managers 
In addition to changing the terms of appraisal to focus on their adherence to 
GEMBA, senior management thought that moving middle managers around on a regular 
basis would motivate them by presenting fresh troubleshooting challenges. More 
importantly, this would render tenuous any loyalties they might tend to form with particular 
groups of workers with whom they shared the daily grind of engine production. In this way, 
undue sympathy towards their colleagues would first be neutralised and then, later, would be 
replaced by an overriding commitment to the company’s aims and interests. 
For instance, the GM, Mr. SDN [26 January 2011] told me that one of the outcomes 
for him from my study would be to highlight the “old man of the sea” syndrome. Here, the 
metaphor from Ernest Hemingway's caricature of the old fisherman in his novel described 
middle managers who had become set in the ways of their departments, doing what was 
expected by their Section Heads and meeting productivity targets but not thinking more 
laterally. As an illustration of his ideas being implemented, subsequent to my exit from the 
field, I learned that the GM had directed the HR Department to adopt a pro-active attitude 
towards job rotation. They were instructed to move around operators in EWS and well-
entrenched veteran middle managers from one shop to another within EWS and from EWS 
to WAP4, or quite plausibly to other plants. This policy of job rotation was implemented and 
was primarily intended to unsettle any sense of accomplished familiarity that managers or 
workers could develop over time with their colleagues or machines in the same area and 
instead develop cross-functionality among them. This was despite the likelihood that such 
moves would disturb continuity and teamwork between middle managers and the operators 
they oversaw. 
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The N7i and the related GEMBA measures, which sought to improve employee 
communication, motivation and reward, were all intended to unsettle that state of habitual 
adjustment between Section Heads and the middle managers. It did so by attempting to 
make middle managers liaise with other, different, operators with the intention of not simply 
extracting production from them, but instead working with them as team members through 
kaizening. In this way, the company hoped to push operators and middle managers 
voluntarily to arrive at ‘outside the box’ solutions. 
5.2.5 Regular feedback mechanisms from middle managers and 
close scrutiny of their activities 
The management hierarchies established by the GEMBA project team played an 
important role in monitoring the N7i goals and employee performance, but in so doing they 
also provided scope for senior managers to monitor the performance of middle managers. Each 
CTV liaised with other GILs and interacted with the GULs of other plants as well as the mother 
plant in which they were stationed. The CTVs convened meetings to review and assess the 
progress made on each of the N7i and heard reasons why the required progress had not been 
made. Minutes were produced and detailed reports, comprising PowerPoint presentations, 
spreadsheets and other documents that encapsulated a wide array of performance parameters, 
were prepared by the CTV using data drawn from the middle managers. These were shown to 
the Head of Mission GEMBA, Mr. N, who would, from time to time, make suggestions for the 
actions he thought necessary. 
The preparation of PowerPoint slides and parameter trackers, which might be compared 
with an array of aspects being tracked on an oscilloscope, eventually occupied much of the time 
and commitment of middle managers, though they also had their Section Heads to satisfy. 
Reports of daily meetings discussing these trackers would be taken back to review meetings 
convened by Mr. N, which also involved the GM in charge of the whole plant and, if necessary, 
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the relevant CTV, and this meeting then sent a report to corporate headquarters; this explains the 
chain of command in decision-making on these reports. The soft copies of the trackers were 
translated into data sheets, and middle managers had to tally the data properly to ensure clarity 
and factual accuracy, since errors would incur the displeasure of both Mr. N and Mr. AB. 
In the above section I have discussed the structural organisational changes associated 
with GEMBA without any detailed discussion of the themes of motivation and monitoring 
operators’ work that I also noted were key components of this process of change management. 
The people spearheading the programme, like Mr. N, believed that GEMBA would succeed if 
(with the cooperation of their middle managers and using these tools) management could 
sufficiently influence a ‘critical mass’ of workers to create momentum or reach a ‘tipping point’ 
(a phrase Mr. N borrowed from his favourite book The Tipping Point [Gladwell, 2007]). The 
leading change managers were convinced that the younger operators formed a distinct 
constituency and could, and should, be made to take an active interest in their work and be kept 
actively engaged and rewarded for participation. It was felt that this would help to provide 
momentum within the workforce as a whole and bring closer the tipping point. 
Thus, GEMBA operated in two domains: the human, and the technical. At the human 
level, it endeavoured to modify employee behaviour. The message from above indeed, one of 
Mr. N’s favourite slogans was that the future of CompCo could not be secured without the 
active participation of the operators who were portrayed as stakeholders who had to be brought 
‘into the loop’ in order to give substance to the company’s corporate slogan, “engineering your 
tomorrows”. However, since senior managers did not expect the language of GEMBA to be 
embraced by workers without considerable management input, they sought to monitor and 
reward participation by, for example, using employee appraisal systems. In this way, GEMBA 
was directed at both middle managers and operators, with the former influencing the latter. 
Senior management in CompCo was hopeful that the younger operators would embrace 
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GEMBA wholeheartedly. The degree to which GEMBA was accepted or rejected by workers 
will be discussed at length in Chapter Seven. 
5.3 GEMBA and Employee Performance 
I will now discuss the range of key GEMBA initiatives and, in each case, review their 
implications for operator motivation, monitoring and performance. I will begin with the 
broadest initiative to involve workers in problem solving, termed GEMBA Empower, which 
was also linked to competitions and rewards for successful suggestions. I will then consider 
some of the specific communication devices that were used to manage and record performance 
and, hence, mobilise management and worker effort. I shall then look at several of the specific 
ways in which working procedures were reorganised under the GEMBA banner before finally 
looking at the 8a.m. meetings which were crucial for monitoring and controlling GEMBA 
activities within each GEMBA unit. 
5.3.1 The GEMBA empower project 
GEMBA Empower was the earliest component of GEMBA communicated to me by 
Mr. N during my initial meeting with him in the first week of September 2008 as I 
commenced my fieldwork. It emphasised a puzzle-solving approach and ran in parallel with 
other day-to-day working-system improvements discussed below. As such, it was an 
important device intended to communicate the necessity for change, and link change to 
financial reward in the minds of managers and operators alike. Mr. N was unremitting in 
urging the GULs and GILs to spread the message of active participation in the GEMBA 
Empower competitions amongst operators in something of an evangelical campaign. 
Thus, GEMBA Empower was designed to allow employees to participate actively in 
improving company performance and, at the same time, accrue financial gains. They could do 
this, first, if their suggestions helped to achieve substantial cost reductions and, second, by 
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pitting their suggestions against those of other GEMBAs across CompCo’s plants in 
‘empowerment competitions’. Periodic continuous improvement activities (kaizening), known 
in CompCo parlance as ‘GEMBA Empower Festivals’, were held at both inter-plant and 
company levels, with the best suggestions winning prizes ranging from outright cash payments 
to overseas trips. This helped management present production issues as puzzles needing to be 
solved, which, in turn, helped to generate employee interest. 
Occasionally, the company would also venture to collaborate with managers and 
industrial engineers of competing firms in benchmarking exercises designed to identify hidden 
inefficiences in production operations,and to identify how to reduce throughput times and make 
machining and assembly operations more efficient. This aimed to intensify the puzzle-solving 
ecosystem by holding a grand finale for operators. Operators from other firms were invited to 
compete with CompCo operators who were winners of the internal company Empower contests. 
CompCo employees who emerged as winners of these grand contests would be hailed and feted as 
joyous victors and Mr. N and senior managers would go to great lengths to be pleasant and 
friendly towards them. Photographs of cheerful employees and managers in pursuit of the 
corporate slogan "Together we can" would appear in the company's weekly bulletin and on the 
communication board discussed below. Such winners, depending upon managerial 
discretion, could be granted occasional overseas trips to nearby eastern countries such as 
Thailand and Singapore. 
As an example, one of the suggestions involved in these ‘GEMBA Empower 
Festivals’ was the standardisation of tools and consumables and production operations. Such 
standardisation involved using a common set of components in the operation of machinery and 
manufacturing of sub-assemblies and vehicles that could enable the company to cut costs in 
the procurement of different components for different product lines. Operators were 
encouraged to communicate suggestions about such standardisation to middle management. 
They were also encouraged to pay attention to tool-changing and cutting out inefficiencies in 
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varied machining processes as means of raising throughput or reducing processing time and 
delays. Hence, the goals of engineers collaborating with one another, and operators competing 
with one another in these festivals, both involved developing efficient production routines, 
cutting costs and getting more out of existing machinery. By observing other operators from 
other shops and other firms, new procedures and standards could be imposed and the 
manufacturing cycle could be continually refined. 
5.3.2 The GEMBA passport scheme 
As I have noted, EWS management, in conjunction with CompCo’s corporate 
management, sought to anchor the involvement of operators in GEMBA operations by this 
system of financial rewards. One important mechanism intended to motivate operators and 
reward participation was the ‘GEMBA Passport’ scheme, which worked like an airline loyalty 
programme. This meant that ‘associates’ could earn a pre-determined number of points for 
various activities/outcomes. In turn, these points could then be exchanged for non-monetary 
prizes. 
Successful participants would be rewarded by being given passport points, with 
prizes awarded at functions organised specifically for this purpose. My fieldwork 
observations in November 2009 suggest that these were attended by visiting luminaries from 
headquarters, by the Plant Head and GM in overall charge of EWS, Mr.SDN, and by Mr. N. 
the GEMBA Head. Photographs of the reward winners along with Section Heads and Mr. N 
would then be displayed prominently on the GEMBA Communication Boards. 
These schemes for rewarding ‘associates’ financially were interlinked with incentives for 
rewarding middle managers, thus making the two groups mutually dependent in gaining rewards 
by achieving and surpassing GEMBA targets. GULs supporting regular GEMBA and periodic 
Empower projects were rewarded financially, while GILs could improve their promotion 
prospects by sponsoring effective suggestions. Both the ‘everyday’ continuous improvement 
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suggestions produced by GEMBA and the ideas developed specifically for forthcoming GEMBA 
Empower events were supported financially by the GILs, who had the power to release funds if 
they found there to be sufficient merit. Depending upon the number of such winning projects, a 
GIL might even gain a promotion themselves within the senior management category. 
Senior managers believed that the operators would communicate more easily with the 
GULs, who were often from the middle managerial level, and that they, in turn, could take up work-
related problems with the GILs and other relevant managers. In this way, it was believed that 
operators could help troubleshoot their own problems. In the GM’s vocabulary, this was considered 
as ‘empowering the operators’. Thus, through a wide array of communications, literature, 
‘GEMBA Empower’ contests, and prize distribution ceremonies, senior management 
sought to achieve its primary objectives of gaining worker acceptance, or at least 
acquiescence, in change management. This was one of the contexts in which Mr. N invoked 
his argument about reaching a tipping point, from which change was seen as being 
inevitable and irrevocable. This would be more likely if there was a climate in which 
operators perceived a shared interest with management in implementing change because 
they believed that there was no other alternative for the company to survive in a difficult 
market. 
5.3.3 The communication boards 
An important measure to ensure the constant visibility and influence of GEMBA and 
reinforce its importance was the setting up of GEMBA Communication Centres [GCCs], a 
system of white or black notice boards on which managers and employees could write with a 
marker pen. The main objective of this aspect of the GEMBA project was to communicate 
information faster, and the GEMBA Head, Mr. N, often referred to the importance of 
disseminating management’s change story. In his view, the GEMBA communication boards 
would ensure that communication was consistent with lean manufacturing principles. The 
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most important objective of the GCCs was to highlight problem-solving targets by 
highlighting and explaining problems in the production process, together with target dates for 
achieving change, a record of what had been achieved, and, where deadlines had not been met, 
the reasons for failure. 
The GCCs were aimed also at reiterating the GEMBA message to associates and middle 
managers by articulating the need for better company performance and providing information 
that would win their support. Operators could also write down any suggestions that they felt were 
important and line managers could use the boards to point out problems and summarise the inputs 
made at the 8a.m. meetings. A variety of information of a graphical, numerical and descriptive 
nature was put on the right side of the board to keep staff informed on the tough market conditions 
facing the company and the necessity for change. Another section on the left side of the 
communication board sought to convey images of the company as a family by using pictures of 
apparently happy employees receiving prizes while being photographed with senior plant 
management, as noted above, thus reinforcing the role of the rewards for involvement in projects 
and for staff suggestions. 
In addition to the GCCs, the GEMBA initiative also involved other visual displays. 
Adjacent to every critical machine was a display that detailed the main characteristics and 
parameters of the machine. The ‘best standard operating procedure’ diagrams and “don’ts” 
were also displayed for the whole machining area. Additionally, each machine carried a 
prominent taxonomical label with the GEMBA N7i board displayed adjacent to it. 
The automated ‘Surveillance of Production Targets’ system was another of the 
innovations suggested by N7i to help boost operational efficiency. ‘Tennis-court score boards’ 
were placed, adjacent to the engine assembly areas of the plant to display the gap between 
targets and actual performance, and, thus, constantly remind operators and middle managers of 
the distance they had to travel. 
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5.3.4 Value stream mapping and fish-bone diagrams 
Along with the GCCs, it was intended that every machine shop and assembly area 
should have a ‘value stream map chart’ that broke down, pictorially and in detail, every single 
process in the assembly and machine shops and also the inventory flows through and out of 
departments and manufacturing areas. This was in order to promote an adherence to best 
practices. Specifying precise standards for individual items of work and activities encouraged 
both managers and operators to adhere to standard operating procedures, and gave management 
tighter control over working processes and the behaviour of operators. This value stream map 
owed its origins to well-known Japanese manufacturing innovations such as fish-bone 
diagrams, which allowed the visualisation of manufacturing and supply chain processes to 
identify weaknesses so that targets for process improvement and wastage elimination could be 
decided and set. As such, it could be used both to encourage focused problem solving, and to 
facilitate closer employee monitoring as a way of ensuring conformity with the standard 
procedures. 
Such attempts to use mapping to rationalise and speed up production processes, at 
least on paper, faced difficulties at the time of my fieldwork, because to be implemented in 
all production areas, it required changes in standing agreements between the industrial 
engineering departments and unions, especially on the job cycles that had been arrived at in 
the negotiated settlements. Senior management wanted more flexible arrangements to allow 
continuing changes to value stream mapping and other innovations such as ‘takt’ time. They 
believed that these measures could be facilitated if most operators could be attracted by the 
extra incentives paid through the reward systems, but they also hoped that they could draw 
upon feelings of company or plant loyalty, which they tried to evoke through the vocabulary 
of participation and empowerment. 
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5.3.5 Lights and standard operating procedures 
 Another step towards lean manufacturing techniques for regulating employee 
performance was the progressive installation of a ‘traffic light’ system of yellow, green and 
red lights in all the machining areas of EWS. The green light depicts the state of normalcy; if 
a red light comes on, a loud beep follows thereby bringing that operation and operator to 
everyone’s attention. Traditionally, operators could not stop their machines of their own free 
will whenever they wanted to and had first to consult the relevant line manager who, in turn, 
would consult the Section Head and possibly others further up the chain of command. 
GEMBA sought to change this by encouraging the practice of ‘line stop’ when problems 
arose. This was not carte blanche to stop machines whenever operators chose to do so, 
because every stoppage had to be justified to line managers retrospectively. 
In a near contradiction of the dictum of ‘don’t accept errors, don’t pass errors on’, the 
disruption of the line and the day’s targets was frowned on by Section Heads and middle 
managers; where there were failures, the spotlight was turned on to those middle managers 
responsible for that line. Thus operators would both pass on and accept errors. For the 
managers likely to fall victim to interrogation following line stops, it was therefore 
preferable to continue working if the flaw was minor, or defer action if it were possible to 
have a problem remedied later in the shift when production pressures had eased. This could 
depend on how critical the machine was to the production process: if it was a bottleneck 
machine, the problem was difficult to ignore and the warning indicated by the red light had 
to be given respect. Notwithstanding the claims of GEMBA to a ‘democratic’ legitimacy and 
the scope for operators to stop the line without fear of being victimised, finding the person 
or mechanical cause responsible for the problem would come into play eventually and was 
something middle managers and operators tried to avoid. 
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5.3.6 ‘Deep-dives’ as a basis for initiating change 
I will now turn to more specific efforts to reorganise manufacturing and working 
practices under the auspices of GEMBA. The first of these were termed ‘deep-dives’, and these 
were undertaken when there was an urgent impediment to production or when management 
perceived that there was a need to alter radically the design and efficiency of a manufacturing 
line using radical new ideas to cut down operating costs. These ‘deep-dives’ entailed the 
participation of diverse cross-sections of departmental heads and senior managers to achieve 
urgent and far-reaching, if not paradigm-altering, solutions to pressing engineering problems. 
Corporate management at Nellore also gave the go ahead to implement measures such as 
‘deep-dives’ whenever it wanted to launch a major efficiency transformation in manufacturing 
operations linked to its Cost Minimisation Initiative (CMI). CMIs were a key area of N7i and 
usually sought to introduce ‘cross functionality’ through a reorientation of senior plant and 
middle management and, if mandated, the ‘empowerment’ of those operators involved in a 
particular line or congregation of machines. 
 5.3.7 The 5S initiative 
5S was another important lean manufacturing initiative introduced in conjunction 
with other GEMBA innovations, and comprised five measures which were characterised, in 
English and Japanese, as: sort (seiri), set in order (seiton), shine (season), standardise 
(seiketsu) and sustain (shitsuke). The main intent behind introducing this initiative under the 
ambit of GEMBA was to alter and streamline the interaction between the operator, his tools 
and the machinery or assembly line; this would eliminate what the Japanese call muda, 
translated as ‘waste’. This idea of waste covered wasted effort, wasted time, wasted body 
movements as a result of doing anything other than the job cycle, wasted tools and 
components, and wasted production capacity. This notion could be deployed to pare down 
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existing job routines and to attack the practice of rest periods and slowdowns that were seen 
by management as time wasting or, as it is sometimes called, ‘swinging the lead’. Clawing 
back the lost time involved was an important management objective. 
5S played an important role in ensuring that employees kept their assembly and 
manufacturing areas clean and tidy, used components in the correct order, used the same 
standardised procedures for tool use and adopted standardised working procedures. CompCo 
managers also sold this approach as an effective way of organising individual lives, so that 
operators were even encouraged to implement the 5S initiatives in their homes. Indeed, Mr. N 
and other Section Heads inspected the homes of operators in visits, and prizes were awarded to 
employees who volunteered to enter the competition and whose houses best reflected the 5S 
organising principles. The entry into workers’ homes and the contact with their families can be 
seen as a deliberate charm offensive on the part of the company, but one aimed at exerting a 
set of subtle influences on the operators who would then regard lean as a fundamental part of 
normal life. Mr. N told me in one of the car rides that I took with him that if “you could 
persuade the wife the battle was half won”. Mr. N was convinced that once the wives were 
won over to the belief that the company was run by well-intentioned people who had the 
interests of the workers at heart, and that lean would be an essential ingredient of their and 
their husbands’ happiness and future prosperity as manifested in the Empower reward scheme, 
their husbands’ hearts and minds would follow. 
Some managers in CompCo often conjoined 5S with the Five Whys procedure, almost 
equating both as equal in importance to lean manufacturing. Thus during my stay I observed that 
5S housekeeping and 5 Whys practices had acquired a predominant space in the vision of some 
managers who were just below the Section Head in rank. However, this conflation of these 
techniques was mistaken, for 5S was at best an organising and housekeeping protocol, while the 
5 Whys was a set of problem-solving aids, which facilitated troubleshooting by performing root 
cause analysis. Bringing the two together tended to mean that each lost the focus it needed. 
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Along with this, confusion as to their roles was engendered in the minds of middle managers 
and operators. This is a valuable reminder that even within one company and workplace, 
different managers had different understandings of some of the key building blocks of lean 
manufacturing, and this was likely to influence how they implemented senior management 
policies. 
 5.3.8 The critical machine initiative 
Another important step towards tightening the monitoring machinery was the 
implementation of the ‘Critical Machine Initiative’ in machining areas, comprised of a mixture 
of older and newer machines. Again this was an N7i that I was able to observe at EWS, and it 
was closely aligned to other measures discussed in this section because both the active 
promotion of 5S and many deep-dives were directed at the upkeep of these machines. It must 
be remembered that the primary function of the EWS plant was to manufacture and assemble 
engines. Machinery in the plant needed to be run at an optimal state and the aim of the Critical 
Machine N7i was to identify crucial older bottleneck machines, the failure of which could 
seriously impede production, and which were therefore designated ‘Critical Machines’. 
Critical process machines, which were very expensive, were also designated in the same 
way. 
Having identified these machines, it was hoped that active, continuous improvement 
and preventive maintenance by conscientious employees would lead to improved production 
results and other lean manufacturing deliverables, identified from time to time by the 
GEMBA Head and senior managers like the heads of individual production and critical 
functional departments. These heads of production departments in EWS parlance were 
known as GMs [Refer to Appendix 2 and 3] such as the material planning head . A more 
detailed discussion of the organizational hierarchy will be pursued in chapter 6 because it 
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has a direct bearing on the scope and span of managerial control and career trajectories of 
senior and middle level management, both of which affect GEMBA’s implementation. 
Traditionally, however, the plant maintenance department did machine maintenance 
and this meant that, if a machine stalled, the machining process might need to be performed 
elsewhere, or, if that were not possible, production would have to wait until the repairs were 
done. Now, having identified critical machines, some of the responsibility for maintenance 
could be transferred to shop managers and, more specifically, to their operators. Indeed, 
corporate management wanted them to contribute kaizening suggestions proactively to 
troubleshoot the upkeep of machinery before problems could arise, a policy that has similarities 
with the idea of ‘total preventative maintenance’. Furthermore, they reminded operators of the 
potential efficiency levels that such old machines were reputed to have reached elsewhere, 
according to such literature as The Toyota Way [Liker, 2004] and Lean Transformation 
[Henderson and Larco, 1999]. 
5.3.9 The 8 a.m. meetings 
One important innovation, which served to oversee many of these processes, was the 
8a.m. meeting in each production area, which was designed both to monitor and to enforce 
disciplined problem solving. Every morning precisely at 8a.m., prior to the commencement of 
the shift, the senior production manager in each area, other line managers, and, occasionally, 
experienced operators, would meet to assess the day’s targets, consider the problems occurring 
on the line, and decide how best these could be approached. These meetings were limited in 
duration and usually lasted no longer than twenty minutes. Discussions were limited strictly to 
immediate production-related issues arising out of the preceding shifts. The input of these 
meetings and the notes made in them enabled Section and Production Heads to get a quick 
grasp of the production scenario, identify any constraints they faced, and determine whether 
production targets had not been met either by operators or by other managers. 
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These meetings were also a chance for operators to be noticed and ‘identified’ by 
managers, and both positive and negative features could influence the points accrued in the 
passports of operators. They could also influence the appraisal of middle managers in charge of 
particular lines. I was able to observe a few of the 8a.m. meetings and see the frank discussion of 
production-related problems that was involved. On completion of the meeting, the convenor, 
usually the middle manager in charge of the line, would write down the problems on the white 
board of the GCC with accompanying ‘target dates of completion’. He later tidied the relevant 
section of the board if the problem in the production line had been resolved. A lot of ground had 
to be covered at the meeting and the discussion tended to be brief and centred on the key issue, the 
target for the day, and any particular production matters needing urgent consideration. However, I 
observed that on a few occasions, the presence of Mr. N and other senior plant managers seemed 
to affect the free exchange of ideas, as middle managers would be reverential towards them: 
dialogue would be constrained and people like Mr. N would apparently end up imposing 
their ideas on the group. 
The above section reviewed how a combination of policies and initiatives involved 
efforts to increase the flexibility and productivity of the production process, both by 
institutionalising problem-solving practices, generating clear but revisable standard operating 
procedures, and tightening work routines. However, a continued thread in the above section and 
the ensuing sections will be how different managers nevertheless displayed different 
understandings of what these policies involved and sought to reconcile their implementation 
with various other priorities. Nevertheless, these policies could mean tighter surveillance and 
increased work rates for workers as well as efforts to involve workers in problem solving. For 
these reasons, senior managers themselves were unsure about worker responses and thus sought 
to mobilise worker effort and initiative through both positive incentives and tighter monitoring. 
Therefore, these efforts to motivate and monitor involvement in these policies necessarily sought 
to regulate the commitment of middle managers as well as that of workers. 
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Section 5.3 has highlighted the range of initiatives subsumed under the heading of 
GEMBA and the extent to which this change programme was driven through a reorganisation 
of management hierarchies and forms of accountability. Section 4.2 also suggested that the 
GEMBA programme was characterised by internal tensions, especially between a language 
of involvement and empowerment and the tighter specification and monitoring of work tasks 
and performance. However, the implications of GEMBA cannot be fully addressed in 
isolation from other senior management policies and priorities that form an important 
context within which GEMBA was pursued by managers and was experienced by both 
managers and employees. 
5.4 The Wider Agenda of Senior Management Policy and its 
Implications for GEMBA 
This section will consider three other major areas of senior management policy 
initiatives which ran in parallel to GEMBA. It will provide a better understanding of the 
overall pattern and process of change management at EWS, within which GEMBA policies 
and their reception can be understood. These three areas are, first, a broad imperative to cut 
labour costs, which had implications for work reorganisation, redundancies and sub-
contracting; second, the implementation of JIT and Kanban policies as additional features of 
a pursuit of lean manufacturing, with particular implications for sub-contracting work to 
external suppliers; and, third, the relationship between purchasing new equipment with higher 
levels of automation and refurbishing and reorganising the use of older machines. Each of 
these areas of policy will be addressed in turn. 
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5.4.1 Corporate management policies of cutting down labour costs 
Corporate management of CompCo, concomitant with its continuing concern t 
reduce labour costs, wanted a reduction in headcount of operators in each of its 
manufacturing installations. By doing so, it hoped to cut down the variable cash outflow 
incurred by the company. In the opinion of the leading evangelists of GEMBA such as Mr. 
N, it was necessary to ‘cut the flab and become a lean and mean company’. This was both a 
long-term strategy and a short-term plan to meet immediate situational exigencies, and, in 
the opinion of CompCo's senior management, it would provide greater flexibility both to 
step up and to reduce labour when warranted. Management’s moves to save money by 
reducing headcount did not constitute an officially stated policy, but they were no less 
deliberate for that. 
At the same time, however, directly employed EWS operators also felt insecure 
about buying into the GEMBA project’s imagery and vocabulary of participation and team 
spirit. As chapter 7 will show, these moves dampened operators’ enthusiasm for GEMBA by 
creating doubts about job security amongst permanent employees, and they evoked 
scepticism over calls for participation and troubleshooting even as they managed to split 
operators into two camps: regular EWS employees and contractual employees. Thus, the 
reality was that GEMBA was far from the minds of either of these sets of workers, 
highlighting still further the dichotomy between top management’s idealised vision of 
GEMBA and the difficulties in its translation in the lower levels of the hierarchy. 
Meanwhile, middle managers themselves were caught between the demands of GEMBA 
Heads, and demanding senior managers like their Section Heads, to whom they had to 
deliver productivity targets. The repercussions and outcomes of this policy for middle 
managers will be discussed in my next chapter. 
Corporate management went about reducing headcount in three ways. One way was 
to persuade those operators and middle managers identified by senior management as old or 
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non-performing to accept a one-off lump sum as severance pay, together with other benefits 
such as those accrued from the employee provident fund, which could be regarded as a form 
of severance pay. The other cost-cutting measures were to resort to hiring contract labour 
and the outsourcing of production facilities, both of which are registered briefly here. The 
consequences and repercussions for workers of the outsourcing policy will be dealt with at 
greater length in the chapter 7. The longer-term aspect of these strategies, which, tied in with 
the development of JIT supplies to the production line was to give a greater role to suppliers 
to manufacture sub-assemblies and critical components, which involved certifying the 
quality of supplies without CompCo having to attest and approve this. 
It should be noted that within EWS there were different groups of contract employees, 
some skilled, some unskilled and others on probation and uncertain of their future in CompCo, 
and they were viewed through different lenses by Section Heads and middle managers with 
regards to their commitment to the company and, hence, the nature of the jobs they could 
perform. Middle managers felt that they could expect different degrees of commitment towards 
GEMBA goals from these different classes of workers. Some contract employee operators, who 
technically were yet to be confirmed as permanent employees of CompCo, could take up 
sensitive job routines done by experienced operators. There were other short-term contract 
employees, hired via the labour contractor employed in specific stages of engine assembly, 
where no special skills were required, and where operators did not have access to knowledge 
that CompCo wanted to keep confidential to the trained operators of EWS. Meanwhile, skilled 
temporary contract employees who were hired from external labour contractors filled in for 
absentee operators. The view espoused by the GM Mr.SDN [28 May 2009] was that it made 
sense for the company to outsource labour to industrial labour contractors in EWS because it 
provided the company with the requisite flexibility to roll back and step up contract labour 
whenever warranted. It is important to register here that the wages paid to them by the 
contractor were far less than those of directly employed operators, and it was the 
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contractor’s responsibility to look after their wellbeing. The flexibility of scaling 
employment of labour up and down also provided the company with a future mechanism to 
circumvent Indian labour laws pertaining to dismissal and the redress of grievances, because 
dismissal of directly employed operators was a cumbersome procedure. 
However, while it may have made economic sense to outsource and sub-contract 
labour, the disadvantage of having outsourced workers exempt from GEMBA undercut the 
aspirations of GEMBA. The inability of contract workers to contribute anything substantive to 
the GEMBA project morphed into a self-fulfilling prophecy that established itself in the plant 
through the continued scepticism about them among line managers. They believed that these 
outsourced workers could not possibly share the long-term enlightened self-interest of directly 
employed workers in having a concern about the long-term wellbeing of the company. They 
reasoned that these workers were itinerant in their employment, as they worked for a 
contractor who could move them to the production site of another firm. Furthermore, they 
would not have time to imbibe these new innovations, and nor did they have the training or 
experience to understand the changes brought about through lean manufacturing. Accordingly, 
line managers believed that operators’ commitment to GEMBA was ephemeral, and efforts to 
get them to imbibe its constructs were guaranteed to fail. 
Corporate management’s constant pressure upon senior plant management of EWS 
to cut down costs led the latter to implement measures that meant that, within the 
production and assembly areas, there were swathes of employees who were outside the pale 
of GEMBA. Herein, I will draw upon two instances from primary data to highlight the 
deliberation of corporate management with regard to the outsourcing plans. The first 
example was of pervasive but unconfirmed rumours in the recessionary months of 2008 
while I was doing my fieldwork that production within functional process lines, such as the 
connecting rod line and engine fly wheel lines in Shop 7, would be drastically scaled down 
to almost nothing until normal economic conditions returned. It was also rumoured that 
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permanent CompCo employees might be asked to stay at home and that there would be an 
increasing reliance on contract or temporary employees. If, for example, EWS senior 
management found that the cost of procurement of outsourced crankshafts was proving to 
be more expensive than producing them in-house, it would take them only a few days to 
revive a machining shop they had kept in cold storage. The second example was to reduce 
headcount by outsourcing manufacturing processes of sub-assemblies to external firms. For 
instance, within EWS, engine block production was outsourced to another subsidiary of 
CompCo, WDP1, which was located on the periphery of Nellore. These employees could 
not be brought under the ambit of GEMBA because they were not directly on the EWS 
payroll, being on loan from WDP1. However, as I noted in my field notes [8 October 
2008], as long as they measured up to the testing and quality assurance routines required by 
management, their participation as a GEMBA group or their inclusion in GEMBA 
suggestion schemes was immaterial, partly because of the nature of their job but also 
because they were peripheral employees. Certainly, at that juncture of my fieldwork, the 
Section Head or the line managers did not regard these employees as important participants 
in the GEMBA process. 
In summary, this recourse to contract labour and outsourcing of production facilities 
reflected an ongoing deliberation within senior corporate management and plant management 
about how to respond to cost reduction pressures, but also implied that managers faced 
dilemmas as a result. In particular, these policies created an environment of uncertainty 
amongst workers and undermined the vision of management, built around the self-initiative and 
participative vocabularies of kaizening by workers. Second, regular EWS operators felt that 
these measures increased their workload and eroded their tacit skills. Finally, lean 
manufacturing measures were perceived by operators such as Mr. VDVN as being driven 
mainly by short-term exigencies, which he saw as myopic and even incomprehensible to 
workers, even though he also saw much inefficiency around him [Mr. VDVN, 3 January 2009]. 
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The above observations suggest that senior management sought to apply lean manufacturing 
measures in a somewhat selective and piecemeal manner, partly because they were sometimes 
deliberately selective about what they wished to adopt, but also partly because of circumstances 
that lay beyond the control of senior management. It is worth noting at this point that, for 
several reasons, the regular workers at EWS remained rather critical of these lean initiatives. 
Most significantly, to the extent that the lean initiatives gave greater credence to the supplier’s 
role in manufacturing through tighter supplier integration into the production cycle, they were 
perceived as evidence that corporate management wanted to make it clear that production could 
go on with or without the operators’ whole-hearted involvement. 
5.4.2 Implementing JIT and kanban and giving greater autonomy to 
suppliers 
JIT and Kanban were other lean manufacturing measures that were implemented in 
EWS and which ran in parallel with the GEMBA measures, rather than being integrated 
directly into GEMBA. These measures involved tightening both the supply chain and job 
cycles in the internal production process through the introduction of JIT and a Kanban cycle 
wherein greater discretion was given to the suppliers. Together with the identification and 
management of critical machines in pursuit of N7i objectives, these policies represented key 
features of corporate management's overall attempt to streamline production. As such, the JIT 
and Kanban initiatives also need to be considered as important parts of management’s change 
programme. I had an opportunity to observe these and query senior managers about how they 
operated during my research. 
Corporate management primarily envisaged that, through Kanban and JIT, added 
responsibilities would be given to suppliers who could set up their own line-side supply 
chains. This would enable CompCo to concentrate instead on its strengths – which senior 
managers, inspired by the managerial literature of Prahlad and Hammel [1990], term ‘core 
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competencies’ – and safeguard its technologies, which were largely developed in-house. 
Suppliers were encouraged to set up vendor supermarkets that fed into pull-based trigger 
systems that could dictate the pace of production. Let us examine this point further by 
examining the role of the suppliers in the engine assembly process. Throughout the engine 
assembly, small four-wheeled vehicles with a pick-up option and an elongated fork were used 
to pick up empty component bins and replenish them continually. In this way, they did a 
‘milk run’ for a Kanban system, wherein a supplier replenished stocks that were found 
depleted. Thus, these vehicles, driven by contract employees, ferried replenishments from 
relevant supplier-organised supply dumps to the line, rather than going through the process 
of entry, quality check, and supply from the stores. Self-certification of quality was actively 
encouraged here, and the supplier was accountable for delivering components of requisite 
specification. 
The Kanban system involved putting the components utilised for production into the 
bins in order of priority and urgency of usage. The most valuable “A value” items, such as 
crankshafts, were generally excluded from the day-to-day Kanban replenishment. Medium 
value or “B value” and low value or “C value” items, such as nuts and bolts, were included. 
A Kanban re-supply could be triggered when the operator or line manager noticed that the 
need for replenishment would soon arise and the empty bin would then be placed outside the 
immediate assembly area where one of the re-supply vehicles would move it to a supply 
dump and return with a replenishment. However, the vehicles would also arrive in assembly 
areas at pre-set times, so that the suppliers rather than operators apparently drove the pace of 
the replenishment process in substantial measure. In this sense, it was not a pure Kanban 
‘pull’ system. With replenishment at set intervals, the Kanban process would largely drive the 
speed at which operators worked, as operators would feel the pressure if they could see that a 
re-supply visit was about to take place before they had completed a bin, indicating that they 
were behind schedule. Note, however, that this system could not be deployed in all areas 
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because it depended upon both the technical ability of suppliers to work within a JIT System 
and the extent of supplier power; not all suppliers could or would cooperate with the 
company in the ways desired by CompCo. 
The JIT system was theoretically a crucial attendant aspect of delegating more 
power to the suppliers, but the GM, for example, was quite sceptical of its effectiveness in 
EWS for a number of reasons. First, he argued that the same company that supplied him 
would also supply other firms and therefore would not guarantee to meet the company’s 
needs at any particular point in time because it would want to sequence its deliveries to 
achieve the greatest economies of scale in its own operations. There were also large-scale 
players who had considerable market power and could afford to dictate terms to customers. 
In these cases, CompCo could not impose its terms and conditions in the manner in which it 
could do over ancillary component manufacturers. In addition, JIT was made difficult 
because of the poor transport conditions and the distances involved in India. Finally, the 
suppliers’ employees who worked in EWS were reluctant to increase output when 
necessary to meet increased demand. When the responsibility for JIT was bestowed upon 
suppliers, this inevitably entailed some loss of direct control and this did not always mesh 
with EWS management’s intention to eliminate opacity in production and gain greater and 
tighter control over manufacturing. 
In addition, many middle managers were ambivalent about the role of JIT in the 
supply chain, because they were yet to share corporate management’s belief based on their 
reading of extensive lean manufacturing and corporate case-study literature [Henderson and 
Larco, 1999; Liker, 2004] that supply chains played an integral role in the organisation of 
the production process. It was undeniable that key change managers, such as Mr. N, did 
make an effort to read up on material about lean manufacturing. However, middle managers 
operating the assembly line told me that their attention was concentrated on the immediate 
production process; they simply did not have time to concern themselves with what the 
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supplier did because what mattered to them was that the material arrived for them to use. 
Despite the difficulties in implementing JIT and their individual reservations about its 
efficacy, corporate management wanted suppliers to play a greater role in the production 
process by setting up vendor supermarkets, intensifying the reach of Kanban and being more 
answerable in replenishing the line with components. 
5.4.3 Varying policies on the replacement or refurbishment of 
machinery 
As we have seen, senior plant management in EWS wanted to implement total 
preventive maintenance measures drawn from lean manufacturing ‘to do’ manuals, such as 
those of the IMVP project [Womack et al., 2007; Liker, 2004]. This intent to adopt pro-
active maintenance were reflected in several of the N7i measures discussed earlier, such as 
the critical machines initiative, the GEMBA measures such as ‘Andon lights’ (designed to 
rest responsibility upon the operators) and the more generic 5S and 5 Whys techniques. In 
this context, it was notable that senior corporate managers adopted a policy of selective 
automation Ð while in some areas new machines were replacing earlier vintages, in other 
areas older machines were being retained, though sometimes they were also reorganised or 
refurbished. The reason management was apprehensive about going all the way with 
automation was explained to me during an extended period of interactions with several 
members of senior management, including Mr. SVM, one of the middle managers who was 
the Core Team Vertical (CTV) of GEMBA, the DGM of engine manufacturing, and the GM. 
Their argument was that substantial capital investment had to be justified by calculations 
about production costs, manning levels and likely production volumes. 
However, corporate management in Nellore was pro-active in pushing senior 
managers in EWS to close shops as a contribution to eliminating all forms of muda or waste, 
an important principle in lean manufacturing. Indeed CompCo was exhorted to do so by the 
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American MNC consultancy firm it had hired, and this was reinforced by Mr. N’s 
unflinching belief in books such as Lean Thinking [Womack and Jones, 2003]. 
One of the wastes identified was obsolescence, and modern machinery such as CNC 
machines was procured, whilst assembly shops and machining areas in older plants such as 
EWS were redesigned. At the same time, senior plant management in EWS was constrained 
by cost considerations. It had to decide whether it should use older machines with existing 
manpower if that could be done cost-effectively, or, instead, choose the easier option of using 
sophisticated multi-axle, multi-job, labour-saving CNC machines such as those of the German 
precision engineering firm Deckel Maho Gildemeister [GmbH], which would require 
corporate management to invest considerable amount of money to procure and maintain. For 
instance, within EWS certain areas such as the engine fly wheel and connecting rod machining 
line in shop 7 were very amenable to greater automation because of the great degree of 
precision these machining operations demanded. Hence, plant management did not think twice 
in operationalising this multi-functional machinery that could do several operations in one go 
and thereby reduce the headcount of required by job machines that could do sequential single 
operations. While such machines could deliver variety and a substantial reduction in human 
capital, they might not have been able to deliver sufficient economies of scale or sufficient 
output when demand was high. Second senior management did not want to upset the 
existing production arrangements such as those in Shop Four and Shop Five, fearing a loss 
in continuity of production arrangements and in existing worker expertise, both of which 
came in handy whenever management needed to make urgent specification changes. 
Experienced operators who had come to develop symbiotic relationships with their 
respective machines could factor in changes in requirements easily or rework parts if there 
were quality problems that needed remedying. An example pointed out to me by Mr. SVM 
[15 October 2008] was the co-operation from operators in standardising older machines such 
as simple cutting and grinding machines and lathes used for machining components such as 
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the flywheel, so that they could perform a greater range of tasks. To achieve this using these 
older, complex but large machines, which could do only one operation at a time, meant 
combining processes in a way that required an enormous reservoir of tacit knowledge. 
Against this background, GEMBA was necessary as a way of educating operators to 
adopt the 5S and Total Preventive Maintenance practices advocated by lean manufacturing. 
Senior plant management also wanted to draw upon this reservoir of tacit skills in 
maintaining and operating machines, but at the same time put an end to conventional avenues 
of the application of operator knowledge that could provide advantages for workers. For 
operators, such conventional practices might mean working faster to gain time for rest, 
holding back on effort, or blaming the old machine for delays while feigning working hard to 
repair it. For managers, such practices were seen as instances of ‘restrictive practices’ or 
forms of ‘swinging the lead’. 
However, despite management efforts, there was little evidence to suggest that 
workers in some manufacturing areas of the plant had relinquished their earlier objectives 
and committed themselves to continuing increases in output through GEMBA practices. For 
example, there was little sign of the existence of ‘internal customer’- driven pull 
mechanisms, because operators went about their work adroitly, with all the skills acquired 
over the years, so that they dictated the pace of the machine through their mastery over it 
rather than, as mandated by lean production, the other way round. Thus, though machining 
operators were apprehensive that their tacit skill might be appropriated from them, I 
observed that they still managed to reach production targets without the aid of standardised 
lean manufacturing job-cycles. The above point contrasts with the implications of external 
JIT for worker skills, discussed above. It also underlines the implications of the different 
skill repertoires operators had, as well as how differences in the labour process affected the 
implementation of GEMBA on the one hand and automation on the other hand. 
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These aforementioned older machines used finite pre-set tools that needed to be 
carefully looked after, but their job specifications could not be changed once they were set 
up. While these older machines could sometimes be used in series to manufacture urgently 
required components, Mr. SVM told me 19 February 2009] that they were expensive to 
maintain, and using them within a regime of stringent lean manufacturing standards was 
difficult. In his opinion, they offered limited scope for improvement and what he called 
‘incremental GEMBA process value generation’, even though managers had identified those 
that were critical and subjected them to lean manufacturing principles of robust pro-active 
kaizening and maintenance. During my fieldwork I observed, that senior plant management 
of EWS were actively considering scaling down the operations of these old machining 
shops such as for instance Shop 2, which performed, most of the preparatory engine 
machining operations for EWS. These operations encompassed a multitude of tasks that 
began with transforming the basic raw components after their arrival from the EWS 
foundry in Nellore and through the heat treatment shop stage if warranted, into cylinder 
valves, pistons, crank-cases and so on for further machining and assembly in other shops of 
EWS. These proposals met with stiff resistance from the union as, though there was talk of 
redeployment of operators, many of the older workers would be forcibly retired or be 
subject to layoffs depending upon the terms of their employment contracts. My fieldwork 
encompassed a period around December 2008 as the recession was approaching its zenith. 
Many of these ageing single operation machines had been ‘mothballed’ because of poor 
market demand, but it also seemed likely that management arguments for closure were 
likely to intensify once the recession abated. 
On the one hand, then senior management in EWS had apprehensions, expressed by 
Mr. AB, Mr. N’s deputy, and the DGM [Engine Assembly], about getting workers to work 
on their machines with the new insights and perspectives provided by lean manufacturing. 
On the other hand, however, corporate management in Nellore and the GM, Mr. SDN, were 
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proactive in pushing senior managers in EWS to close shops as a way of eliminating muda 
or waste, which was partly regarded as the result of obsolescence. 
Meanwhile, multi-spindle, multi-axle CNC machines and other multi-tasking modern 
machinery were in the process of being procured, even as assembly shops and machining 
areas in an old plant such as EWS were in the process of being redesigned in response to 
pressures exerted by senior management to implement the machining ‘best practices’ 
prevalent in the global automotive industry. 
In India, labour costs could be lower but management was, after all, dealing with 
human beings with emotions in contrast to a machine that worked on command. 
Consequently, the older machines, which were dependent on operator acquaintance and tacit 
skill, competed in their functional utility and cohabited with the newer, multi-spindle, multi-
task CNC machines manufactured by transnational machining firms. The extent to which 
corporate management replaced older machinery with sophisticated automated machinery 
reflected a dilemma on the potential cost savings it could gain over hiring workers on the one 
hand, and the expense of maintaining these machines and keeping them running at full 
capacity in an unpredictable market on the other hand. 
In spite of such difficult decisions that senior management had to take, there was no 
doubt that machinery supply firms such as the German world-leader in specialised 
machinery, Gildemeister GmbH, had considerable sway over senior corporate 
management’s future plans for machining shops such as Shop 7 and other machining areas. 
These suppliers attempted to manage the perceptions of senior management in EWS and 
other CompCo plants by communicating pictorial impressions of how, in the future, superior 
technological practices in accordance with the best practices of the industry would allow the 
company to match its rhetoric of “engineering the customer’s tomorrows’ through 
innovation. This raised the possibility that automation as a basis for efficiency could run 
alongside and augment aspects of lean manufacturing involving kaizen and total preventive 
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maintenance, as these newer machines were likely to respond better to lean techniques than 
aging machines that have limited multitasking capacities. In the case of some of the newer 
multi-operational machines, participation was sought from operators working in groups with 
line managers to make machine use more efficient, improve quality, reduce costs, and, if 
possible, avoid further capital investment on more new machines. 
However, these newer machines needed standardised operational procedures and 
specific training, quite unlike the tacit on-the-job training characteristic of the older 
arrangements. They required operators who had specific skills to attend to these 
computerised machines, to enter the operation into the computer and then wait for the 
machine to complete a wide range of machining operations. Thus, though plant management 
had the same objective of improving operational efficiency through both GEMBA and 
automation, each had distinctive features; while automation was intended to eliminate the 
vagaries of human agency, GEMBA initiatives sought to motivate and concentrate human 
agency to deliver optimal output and reach operational targets. 
Against this background, lean manufacturing benefits were seen to be limited in the 
older, linear machining areas of Shop Two, where the labour process was very intensive and 
centred on the set pace of the process. The individual worker had little leeway for group 
work and there was usually very little leisure time for the operator as his attention had to be 
centred on the job. However, there were assembly areas in EWS that were very suitable for 
GEMBA, and management required operators of these labour processes to imbibe robustly 
teamwork and kaizening. In particular, the assembly areas required greater participation and 
synchronous working than the machining area. It was here that EWS’s management wanted 
to demarcate showpiece areas that it could show to its proprietors from London, and even 
some of its competitors, as examples of the best of lean manufacturing. 
Thus, in some areas, such as those involved in engine assembly in Shop Six, clear-
cut and logical cases for senior plant management to pursue GEMBA were evident from the 
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character of the labour processes involved in production. Senior plant management 
concentrated its efforts in these assembly areas because there the group working and 
process management aspects of GEMBA had the greatest potential for boosting 
productivity. In such areas, inter-group cooperation between ‘cells’ was evidently critical, 
and people worked in self-contained cells as team members, although they were monitored 
by management. Tighter coupling of production processes and continuous flow of sub-
assembly operation within and across cells in these assembly areas was critically dependent 
upon coordinated and synchronised working amongst workers. Concomitantly the 
innovations being tried and tested in shop six were a test bed for management's ongoing 
implementation of lean manufacturing innovations in EWS. 
The assembly process involved a sequence of stages, both on the main line and in the 
side sub-assemblies. Yellow lines demarcated different zones and routes across this assembly 
area in an attempt to embody order and recreate Japanese safety and housekeeping measures. 
The operators worked individually on some repeated operations, such as applying torque to 
the crankcase, or in groups of three or four in other assembling processes. The scope for error 
tolerance in the engine assembly process is limited: for example, in Shops Three and Four, 
engine’s performance was tested in a sterile, dust-free, clean area.  Here, there were a few 
computers and an array of other instruments. The permanent operators, who sat and 
monitored parameters, checked quality, and filled in process sheets, took pride in knowing 
the engine very well. 
As this description implies, this work area housed the best and most experienced 
operators in EWS permanent employees including both the last batch of operators accepted 
into permanent posts, and veterans who have worked on assembly for many years. I 
observed that these operators were treated with care and showered with empowerment 
messages from EWS’s GEMBA team, who were at pains to emphasise the successful 
synergy and team-work evident in this GEMBA compared to that in other areas. 
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Furthermore, in such areas, principles such as 5S were followed more robustly than 
elsewhere in the plant. In this context, stopping the line was proactively encouraged by Mr. 
AB, and this was emphasised to the Section Heads and line managers because this was, until 
recently, unthinkable and many managers would have been taken to task for that eventuality. 
However, despite such an emphasis on worker initiative and expertise, senior management 
was still looking at aggressively reducing the numbers of operators in Shop Six as well. 
5.5 The Varying Extent of Managerial Implementation of GEMBA Across 
Work Areas 
As my analysis in the previous section has underlined, the implementation of 
GEMBA varied significantly across different work areas within the EWS plant. In my 
discussions with Mr. AB in early December 2009, he emphasised that quality control 
managers were paying special attention to the engine assembly area and, in particular, Shop 
Six , which was their flagship test case where GEMBA had been applied. Thus, the engine 
assembly area was one of the most active areas of the GEMBA experiment, and Mr. AB, 
whose office was just above the assembly area block, constantly stressed the vigour with 
which GEMBA was to be implemented and targets delivered. Dedicated line managers were 
always available to monitor engine performance and parameter testing, and a line manager 
with a process sheet was usually to be seen moving around the assembly area checking up. As 
mentioned earlier, adjacent to the engine assembly areas are tennis court scoreboards, which 
constantly remind operators and middle managers of their achieved volumes and required 
targets. 
Thus, the N7i ergonomics measures were actively encouraged in this and other 
similar areas in the factory, partly because managers like Mr. N believed that good 
ergonomics avoided industrial accidents and operator strain. At the same time, the overall 
objective of senior management at EWS was to ensure a gradual reduction in the relevance 
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of the industrial engineering department in arriving at collective agreements with the trade 
union over cycle time. This displacement of industrial engineering was to be accomplished 
by the substitution of continually revised job standards. This involved the continual 
monitoring of employees’ job routines and job cycles in the machine shop and the 
transparent specification of operations and inventory flows in assembly and sub-assembly 
areas. In this way, N7i measures combined process standardisation and continuing 
improvements arising from kaizen activities in a way that was intended to increase 
productivity and control costs in addition to reducing strain and promoting safety. What this 
underlines is that Mr. N and Mr. SDN thought the agreements on job times and routines, 
which had been arrived at by collective bargaining, gave operators far too much slack time.. 
A departure from the erstwhile practice of waiting for the industrial engineering department 
and the trade union having representational rights, to arrive at an agreement over the content 
and timings each job routine in the labour settlement could, instead facilitate flexibility. 
Section Heads and Production Heads could meet periodically to modify and continually 
revise the content of job routines depending on the requirements of the production 
requirement of that shift. The outcome of this change in management policy would be, to 
enlarge or alter the number of tasks performed within a job routine, and thereby reduce or 
vary at short notice an operator’s cycle-time. These measures could inevitably result in 
greater work intensification for the operator, but for management it presented an opportunity 
to reduce opacity in the job sequence and secure tighter monitoring of job routines. 
In contrast, however, there were also areas where GEMBA had yet to make an 
appearance and this failure of GEMBA to percolate to every area of the workplace 
challenged the aspirations of the GEMBA team led by Mr. N. There were several related 
reasons for this uneven pattern of innovation. First, it was quite possible that senior managers 
in EWS did not want to innovate across all areas in one go, especially in those areas that were 
perhaps less urgent with regard to improving the labour process and where the outcomes of 
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change management were less likely to make a substantial difference. Second, however, such 
considerations were difficult to disentangle from the varied priorities of senior managers. On 
the one hand, Mr. N did not want to encroach on the rather different agendas of some senior 
managers. On the other hand, what was central for most managers in core manufacturing 
operations was meeting the day’s production targets, and several of these managers abhorred 
GEMBA. In practice, if there were well-established production routines and production 
targets were met, the manager in charge of the area was perceived as ‘efficient and 
experienced’ by his superiors and senior managers, and GEMBA was seen as, at best, a side 
activity. If these areas were led by charismatic managers who represented authority, and 
who were equal to Mr. N in experience and age, little could be done to convince them of the 
urgency of implementing GEMBA above their established priorities. After all, senior 
managers with substantial experience knew the local conditions of their areas within EWS 
and disliked interference in their work domain. 
For example, in Axle Assembly, which was actually adjacent to the GEMBA Head’s 
office, there had been some marginal 5S initiatives and measures designed to enable a better 
flow of materials but, apart from these, no special commitment to lean manufacturing on a 
physical level was evident to me. There were constant quality improvement projects and 
suggestion schemes but, to the best of my knowledge, their impact was not far reaching 
because workers were very comfortable with existing pacing arrangements and would have 
resisted change. Their working practices were characterised by small groups of two to three 
workers swapping alternating spells of intensive work and rest breaks on a moving conveyor 
line, which allowed them to ‘take a breather’. Thus, work was distributed amongst the group 
with the aim of achieving the targeted overall volume of output, which was perceived by 
operators and managers as being more important than the enforcement of strict discipline. In 
this more relaxed environment, the maintenance of individual workloads was less important 
than, for example, in engine assembly where the efficient working of an operator and his 
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achievement of his cycle times were dependent on the preceding operator in the production 
line. In all my stay in EWS, not once did I see Mr. N visit the Axle Assembly shop. This was 
because another senior manager was in charge of it and what was important was that it was 
meeting its production targets. This further emphasises the divide between the theoretical 
intentions of management and the practicality of life and contingencies on the shop floor; 
within the same plant there existed different experiences, stages of implementation and 
understandings of GEMBA and lean manufacturing. 
5.6 Conclusions 
The priority of top corporate management at CompCo was to modernise in a way 
that allowed them to compete and survive. On the one hand, they faced increasing 
competitive pressures from rivals, and, on the other hand, consultants and newly recruited 
managers offered “industry best practice” recipes for efficiency and profitability. This was 
the context in which senior managers at CompCo adopted lean production – and particularly 
GEMBA – as key features of modernisation. 
However, this chapter has also shown that the adoption of these policies was not 
straightforward. Lean manufacturing was actually implemented in an uneven and piecemeal 
manner within continuing institutional constraints and with limited success. In its original 
context, GEMBA meant something very different from what became GEMBA in CompCo 
and EWS. Furthermore, some of the other major areas of senior management policy 
contradicted the official GEMBA agenda of participation and empowerment, especially when 
change management ran in parallel with reactive short-term measures such as outsourcing of 
labour and production. Thus, there was a complex interaction between JIT, Kanban, workforce 
reduction, investment in automation, and the specific GEMBA initiatives. Furthermore, 
external pressures such as the cyclical nature of the commercial vehicle manufacturing 
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business across the passenger and transportation segments, meant that senior managers had to 
respond in the short-term with what they thought was the best policy for the company. 
Against this scenario, there was considerable diligence in applying the principles of 
GEMBA and lean manufacturing by enthusiastic proponents among senior level 
management such as Mr. N, who seemed to have the ear of the COO. Both were evangelists 
for lean and would not hear one word said against their beloved book, Womack and Jones's 
Lean Thinking [2003]. However, the implementation of GEMBA remained primarily 
dependent upon a few key managers, such as Mr. N, the CompCo board knew that lean 
manufacturing was not a silver bullet that could guarantee efficiency and profitability. 
Senior plant managers like the GM had to ensure that their plant remained relevant 
to the future priorities of CompCo’s corporate management, but this involved other priorities 
that sometimes contradicted those of the GEMBA programme. EWS was an old plant, and 
implementing GEMBA within a long-established organisational culture was always going to 
be challenging. Thus, the GM of EWS had a distinctive view of how to implement lean 
manufacturing and, in particular, was more pragmatic in view of EWS's existing 
organisational culture 17 though he decided to keep these views to himself. 
More generally, GEMBA initiatives were not easily reconciled with the more 
immediate priorities of many management groups within the plant, especially as the upward 
mobility of middle managers depended directly upon the positive approval of their superiors. 
Their first loyalty was towards the expectations of their superiors and, only then, to 
GEMBA. Thus, this chapter has touched upon the existence of sources of resistance to 
senior management’s change programme that involve middle management’s commitment to 
established working arrangements and production priorities; this is a theme that will be 
examined in more detail in the following chapter. 
As we have seen, the configuration of GEMBA policies at EWS failed in some 
respects to meet the rhetorical aspiration to empower workers. Furthermore, there was also 
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a persistent tension between senior management aspirations to generate worker 
commitment and involvement in GEMBA initiatives, and other aspects of their policies, 
especially when these involved increased work pressures or diminished job security. Thus, 
senior managers were aware that workers and trade unions were apprehensive about the 
potential loss of jobs. Furthermore, the worker and union defense of established collective 
agreements on pay rates and working pace also appeared a likely source of opposition to 
senior management’s plans and objectives. This theme will be investigated further in 
Chapter 7. 
Another theme that has emerged from this chapter is that there were important 
variations in the implementation of management programmes across the factory. First, they 
had a differential impact on different categories of workers, especially between permanent 
employees, temporary and sub-contract workers. Second, there were also differences in the 
implementation of these programmes across departments and work areas. These were partly 
influenced by patterns of management and worker resistance, but they were also influenced 
by pragmatic senior management decisions about where to focus particular types of change. 
These were sometimes influenced by calculations about the appropriateness of different 
policy mixes for different types of production processes. Finally, specific efforts at 
implementation could also involve a preoccupation with particular ‘show-case’ areas 
because, for example, senior plant managers wanted to convey to visiting dignitaries that 
they were making progress, or they wanted to manage the impressions of superiors whose 
assessments could in turn have a bearing on their career prospects. Additionally these 
showcase areas continued to attest to the corporate image that CompCo was at the forefront 
of “engineering the customer’s tomorrows” by being sensitive to changes in manufacturing 
innovations. Such variations in patterns of management policy implementation will also be 
borne in mind in the following chapters, especially as they could also have implications for 
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the perceived overall outcomes of the change management agenda pursued by corporate 
management. 
The next chapter will proceed to evaluate how the repercussions of the 
implementation of GEMBA were played out in the ranks of management, especially through 
a case study of innovations in inventory policy and the implications for middle managers. 
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Chapter 6 Middle Management and Organisational 
Change in CompCo: A Case Study of Inventory 
Reorganisation in EWS 
6.0 Introduction 
This chapter considers the position of middle managers in CompCo and what 
it tells us about the competing discourses in an Indian firm like CompCo trying to 
adapt to lean manufacturing. It points out the challenges of implementing lean 
manufacturing and attests that its implementation is piecemeal and pragmatic. It uses 
the example of effecting organisational change through lean measures pertinent to 
inventory management (an integral constituent of lean manufacturing) as a foundation 
upon which to demonstrate the conflicts that take place between middle and lower 
level manager, as well as among such managers, including between departments. It 
will show the various coping mechanisms they deploy to orient their beliefs and their 
perceptions of their work in the plant and also to account for their actions. This 
chapter is divided into eight sections. 
Section 6.1 provides a preliminary insight into the organisational hierarchy of 
EWS and the career pathways of middle managers. I will unpack the themes addressed 
here later. The next four sections, the ethnographic core of the chapter, constitute a 
specific case-study of the role of middle managers in change management, focused on 
problems and attempted reforms of inventory control. Section 6.2 discusses the 
importance of understanding inventory in connection with the overall aims of this 
chapter. It then demonstrates how complications in reconciling inventory data posed 
problems for both senior and middle managers. Section 6.3 then considers how these 
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inventory problems prompted a range of change management initiatives but also led to 
difficulties in implementing change management policies in EWS, and made the life 
of line managers very difficult. Section 6.4 examines the inventory meetings as a 
focal point, where interaction between managers illuminated the strategies of change 
managers seeking to push through the corporate agenda and the competing 
organisational priorities in play. Finally section 6.5 completes the inventory case 
study by assessing the scope and limitations of the GEMBA initiatives in relation to 
competing manager vocabularies and strategies. 
Section 6.6 then addresses how external developments affect organisational 
responses and as a consequence managers’ responses, and thus helps to illuminate the 
contradictions of change management. Section 6.7 uses the foundation provided by 
the study of inventory and the earlier introduction provided by Section 6.2 to broaden 
the discussion on patterns of experience, outlook and career pathways of middle 
managers, to understand their goals and the rationales behind their actions. Finally 
section 6.8 provides a conclusion. 
Overall, middle managers have a contradictory position because they are 
caught between senior managers who give them instructions and lower managers and 
workers who may not listen to what they say. Middle managers have different 
amounts of responsibility and power depending upon their rank and hierarchy. 
Higher-level middle managers in EWS report to senior plant management and 
occasionally accompany senior management to corporate headquarters for review 
meetings. Lower-level managers are responsible for carrying out the instructions of 
middle managers and work face-to-face, day-to-day with workers. Together both 
higher- and lower-level middle management are responsible for implementing 
corporate management programmes. 
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A good explanation of this contradictory position is found in Nichols and 
Beynon [1977] in their study of ChemCo. Nichols and Beynon identify three points 
which typify middle managers - their lack of upward career mobility, their need to be 
vigilant against competitors and workers in order to keep the system running, and their 
own job insecurity. They also address distinctive pathways of management careers and 
hence the different ways in which managers experience the contradictions of the labour 
process. Watson’s [1994] interest in the position of middle managers takes a different 
direction. He is more interested in the discourses which comprise any particular 
management culture. He argues that middle managers imbibe these cultures and 
discourses as part of their recruitment training and are also aware that they shape their 
management careers through promotion and non-promotion. There are problematical 
relationships between different management cultures and resources. Watson also 
argues, however, that middle managers come to acquire distinctive perspectives on 
how their work ought to be done and where they see themselves fitting in their 
organisation over time. He also points out the tendency towards segmentalism, 
wherein managers tend to see tasks in relation to their department and its priorities and 
lose sight of the organic whole. Thus Watson [1994] provides an interesting insight 
into how managers interpret meaning and justify their actions; his work is 
complemented by Beynon and Nichols [1977: 30-68] who point to the contradictions 
of the impersonal capitalistic labour process and the location of managers therein. 
The above works are important for grounding my understanding of CompCo’s 
middle managers and the way in which they seek to situate themselves and their role 
with regard to their career pathways, their sense of intentional being in the plant over 
the years, and the mechanisms they deploy to institute and cope with competing 
organisational discourses and priorities. The main objective of this chapter is to 
understand how different management cultures and discourses have a bearing on 
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middle managers and to highlight the tensions between discourses that emphasise an 
existing shared management culture, those that emphasise the importance of particular 
functions and activities, and those that project a new, transformed corporate culture as 
the basis for the mobilisation of middle managers to serve corporate goals. In 
particular it considers how these features relate to the realisation of a corporate 
strategy that is contingent and responsive to emergent situations. 
In order to develop the above argument I will first outline the organisational 
structure and management career pathways in the next section of this chapter. I will 
then draw upon a case study of inventory in EWS in sections 6.3 and 6.4, to get an 
insight into the practice of management and managers and the contradictions of the 
lean manufacturing framework they operate under. I will then return to a more general 
discussion of these themes in sections 6.5 and 6.6 before offering an overall 
conclusion. 
6.1 Mapping the Organisational Structure and Management Career 
Pathways of EWS 
This section of the chapter will first map out the organisational structure as 
illustrated in the organisational hierarchy pictured in Appendices 1-4. 
Appendix 3 identifies the divisions between different levels of lower and 
middle management involved and the span of managerial control of within the 
production hierarchy of EWS, from the departmental heads to the Section Heads. 
Doing so is important because it underlines that middle managers are managed and 
directed by senior managers, but they also manage and direct subordinates 
themselves. Middle managers have different amounts of responsibility and power and, 
as a corollary, lower line managers are bestowed with less power. It is important to 
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discuss the organisational structure of EWS in order to outline how different 
managers, located in different positions and engaged in their specialisations, brought 
to the fore departmental tensions and therefore impeded GEMBA. I will proceed in a 
chronological order and in order to understand where middle managers were located I 
will first illustrate the corporate hierarchy of CompCo and then outline the hierarchy 
of EWS as shown in Diagram 1. The organisational tree attached illustrates the 
positions of managers and their roles in CompCo and in EWS. Thus this section 
provides an introductory map of managerial roles and indicates how different 
managers influenced the functioning of inventory and GEMBA. 
One other important feature of EWS’s management structure was its use of 
matrix based reporting relationships. So, although the company had a conventional 
management structure, there existed very important dotted lines between managers on 
a number of levels. This becomes very apparent when we look at the links between 
the corporate management structure of the company and the structure within EWS 
itself. [Refer Appendix 2 and 3] . 
Although the GM Mr.SDN who was also known as the plant head, was primus 
inter pares and at the very apex of the organizational hierarchy of EWS heads of 
frontline production and functional departments such as Finance, Material Planning 
and Production Control whose cumulative efforts made EWS function as a plant, were 
colloquially known as GM’s. Their deputies who headed of production overseeing 
numerous shops were known as DGMs. Other Managers who reported to them and to 
their superiors were not given the title DGM [refer to Appendix 3]. 
A twist in the hierarchy was that whilst the Head of GEMBA based in EWS 
might have been expected to report to the EWS GM, in fact he reported directly to the 
COO of the company. Although the GM Mr. SDN was at the summit of the EWS 
organisational hierarchy and Mr. N in theory was lower to him, they had equal 
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organisational powers with Mr. SDN’s span of control extending to the whole plant in 
contrast to Mr. N that was limited to GEMBA. However, this limitation in practice 
was not applicable because Mr. N was armed with the mandate of the COO Mr. VDS, 
of the power to interfere in every operational aspect of EWS and CompCo’s plants 
and see through the implementation and integration of lean manufacturing in every 
aspect of their operations. He was the second most powerful individual in EWS. 
The third most powerful individual in EWS, after Mr.SDN and Mr.N was the 
production head Mr.TRN [Refer Appendix 3] who was just called by that phrase 
‘production head’ as opposed to the organisational appellation GM and the Production 
Heads of assembly and manufacturing who reported to him were known as GMs and 
their deputy DGMs. For example, although the machining tooling and sub-assembly 
quality managers reported to their respective Production Head they were also required 
to consult and keep informed the specific deputy heads at their own level and report to 
their other departmental superior the manager product quality assurance. This matrix 
structure, multiple overlapping centres of organisational authority and power and 
finally the role of departmental priorities both came into opposition to inventory 
management, as the next section will demonstrate. 
Looking at CompCo’s central corporate structure suggests that, although there 
may have been delayering, the company retained apparent duplication in functions 
even in its corporate headquarters. The most senior jobs in the hierarchy tended to be 
filled by company men who had been with the company for considerable periods of 
time. But the newer jobs – such as those in the change management programme in 
GEMBA, those below them in the management structure, as well as senior 
management within EWS – were filled by ‘company men’ who had climbed through 
the ranks over the years. Middle management in EWS began immediately below 
departmental heads, as outlined in the chart. Another rank of senior middle 
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management position was occupied by lateral entrants into the managerial hierarchy 
such as Mr. AB. This position and that of Mr.N’s deputy tended to be filled by 
business school graduates of high-quality, typically from IIT or the Indian Technology 
Institutes in India. As the GM told me [Mr. SDN, 26 January 2011] senior plant 
management in the company knew that these high-flyers were unlikely to stay with the 
company long-term because they saw their future in moving from company to 
company in order to seek rapid progression in their careers. Others, like Mr. N, were 
interested in finishing their long careers well, aspired for a seat in the board, and tried 
to appear energetic and in tune with the latest management idioms and practices. 
Managers such as the GM (Mr. SDN) knew that people like Mr. AB had 
limited long-term interest in the future of the company since they would unlikely be 
around to pick up the pieces of any of their failures. On the other hand, managers such 
as Mr. AB, though ambitious, were more likely to be very diplomatic with regard to 
their disagreement and unlikely to go against the grain of company policies which, 
although very dear to those in the highest echelons of management, might prove to be 
generally unpopular and exceedingly difficult to implement, as my discussion on 
inventory will demonstrate. The jobs of Section Heads could be modified to the extent 
necessary to meet changing production conditions and functional manufacturing areas 
over many months. 
The line managers who had supervisory functions over workers reported to the 
Section Heads as illustrated in Appendix 3. In conjunction with the Section Heads, 
they were responsible for the orderly day-to-day functioning of the plant and ensuring 
that the operators did their work diligently. The upward and outward mobility of 
managers such as Mr. AB contrasted with the experience of the Section Heads who 
managed individual shops and the lower-middle managers who were tied by various 
family obligations in Hubli and were very good at the jobs they performed. It was they 
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who kept the plant functioning and were responsible for preventing any disruption in 
production. The careers and lives of Section Heads and lower-level middle managers 
were tied to EWS. Below them the line managers who they supervised, and who were 
directly responsible for managing the workers, were under constant threat of being 
retrenched. 
Two decades previously, entry-level managers who entered CompCo would 
face a written test and an interview and they learnt their skills on the job in contrast 
with the elongated training that fresh engineering graduate managers underwent in 
CompCo’s training school. They would rise up to Section Heads and some would 
progress further to GMs and finally head the plant and eventually, if presented with an 
opportunity, make it to the board. 
Fresh engineer recruits, called graduate engineering trainees (GETS), were 
under probation and would be assigned a number of tasks before some of them were 
sent to the line and others towards design and administration. The GM Mr.SDN told 
me that it was very difficult to motivate younger GETS to get their hands dirty on the 
line. The young engineer recruits had passed through rigorous entry tests and were 
given theoretical as well as practical training about automotive manufacturing. 
Corporate management in the company hoped that some of them would represent the 
energetic new face of the company, embrace lean manufacturing and help it to 
‘engineer the tomorrows’ of the customer. The middle managers who had arrived 
about ten years previously, fresh from the Industrial Polytechnics, were skilled in their 
job and managed the workers, but resented the superior pay of these GETS because, if 
the plant had to run, it was only they who were on call round the clock, and they felt 
that the GETS did not do the same amount of hard work they did in running EWS. 
Looking at the local structure there was more fluidity than the organisation 
chart suggests. In line with contemporary management thinking, the top management 
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of CompCo had sought to introduce what it believed was a flattened management 
structure through team-work, participation and GEMBA. Its motives for doing so 
were not just financial: the company wanted also to shorten lines of communication 
between managers, speed up decision-making and create strong accountabilities. It 
hoped that delayering of the management cadre would produce these effects. 
However, as the discussion of inventory will demonstrate, immediate departmental 
priorities came in conflict with the transformational goals of GEMBA. 
Why then, was the reorganisation of the organisational structure of 
management within CompCo of importance to GEMBA? First of all the existing 
organisational structure of management contributed to rivalry and distrust amongst 
managers. Dotted line relationships without a strict hierarchy meant that, with 
managers in effect reporting to each other at the same levels, authority was diffused 
and the scene was set for people to criticise each other to gain advantage in the 
promotion stakes or secure their own positions. Middle managers were forced 
therefore to keep their eyes not just on doing their own jobs and achieving optimum 
efficiency but also on rival contenders overtaking them within the hierarchy. As we 
will see, this bedevilled the GEMBA project. Second, the insecurity naturally 
engendered by GEMBA amongst both workers and managers was exacerbated by the 
fact that the GEMBA Head reported to the COO and not to the GM of EWS. Mr. N 
and the GM Mr. SDN had different perspectives on management and it seemed 
apparent to me that the GM was not consulted on many occasions. Third, there were 
problematical relationships between different management discourses and cultures in 
EWS: middle managers had grown accustomed to their established functions and 
activities but this conflicted with efforts to impose a new transformed corporate 
culture as a basis of mobilisation of middle managers to serve corporate goals.  
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6.2 The Case Study of Inventory and Organisational Change 1: The 
Existing Inventory System and its Problems 
This section explains why a case study of inventory management is important 
in understanding how managers cope with their work routines in EWS and also 
highlights their competing aspirations. Most importantly the section tries to 
understand the functioning of inventory in EWS, and the underlying problems in 
reconciling inventory which made the work of line managers difficult and 
undermined the GEMBA discourse. 
6.2.1 The importance of studying inventory 
There are two reasons why examining Inventory management in EWS is 
valuable to illuminate the position of middle managers and their responses to senior 
management’s plants of organisational change. First, an attempted reform of 
inventory was an important constituent in CompCo corporate management's plans to 
implement lean manufacturing. Second, studying inventory allowed me particular 
access to middle managers associated with the process of inventory management. As 
a result it provided me with a valuable and detailed insight into the lives, outlooks and 
activities of middle and lower managers at CompCo. 
First, then, the importance of eliminating waste, reducing inventory and 
organising an effective supply-chain management system is one of the mandatory 
steps stressed in the managerial lean manufacturing literature, by such authors as 
Womack and Jones [1996] and Liker [2004]. The corporate management of CompCo 
at Nellore saw inventory reduction as a fit case for troubleshooting because it would 
require spring-cleaning of the plant, its equipment and the supply process, thereby 
eliminating human lethargy and predefined mind-sets that were not attuned to lean 
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manufacturing’s Kanban and 5S modes of thinking. For corporate management, 
inventory reduction seemed an easily attainable target to work upon, to yield 
immediate reduction in material holding costs and reduce unproductive cash outflow 
from the company. CompCo’s senior corporate management at headquarters believed 
that its GEMBA change management programme, that included inventory reduction 
as one of its main initiatives, could ensure a proactive spirit of participation and 
diligence from middle managers. This was integral to GEMBA measures to reduce 
inventory, streamline inventory management and therefore mitigate inventory tallying 
errors. Corporate management hoped that active and careful monitoring of the 
inventory system could also help to resolve the IT errors that caused a mismatch 
between the amount of inventory indicated by the company’s IT inventory 
management system and the inventory at hand, termed ‘work in process’. However 
Mr.RC, the retired GM for exports at CompCo, told me that EWS was a source of 
concern for CompCo’s corporate management at Nellore because it was an ageing 
installation, they were not satisfied with its current performance and they were 
apprehensive about its future role [Mr.RC, 15 October 2008, Residence]. He also 
pointed out that many operators and managers in CompCo’s plants did not seem to 
share the same commitment as Corporate management to future plans to become lean 
and adopt measures such as cutting down inventory to save the company expenditure. 
Second, the study of inventory provided me with a good measure of access to 
study and observe those who were at the forefront of implementing GEMBA and 
inventory in CompCo, and presented the opportunity and time for me as a fieldworker 
to build friendships and interact with other managers in various organisational 
departments in the plant. Studying inventory gave me the time and space to understand 
how individuals and processes functioned in EWS and gain access to departments that 
otherwise were beyond my remit as an outsider who was not an employee of CompCo. 
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It provided an opportunity to have extended conversations and build friendships with a 
wide array of senior middle managers and other line managers with supervisory 
responsibilities, whom I will introduce later in the chapter. Furthermore, it allowed 
me access to understand the opinions of junior and middle managers as they 
performed their tasks and illuminated their responses (including resistance) to the 
change management project. 
Overall, then, my study of inventory provided an interesting, first hand insight 
into the implementation of the GEMBA directives and the patterns of middle 
management response. The objective of the following sub-sections will be to 
understand how the entry of material and its transformation into sub-assemblies works 
and the record keeping associated with this process in EWS. This allows identification 
of difficulties and faults that created Work In Process (WIP) mismatches, which were 
impediments to introducing tighter inventory control. These difficulties emanated 
from lack of proper co-ordination between departments, the inability of CompCo's 
inventory management system to cope with sudden model changes, and the resultant 
consequences of software glitches and computing errors. Such problems affected the 
work of those middle managers who were the change agents charged with pushing 
through GEMBA and changing working practices. Thus understanding these WIP 
problems, that made it difficult for middle managers who then tended to blame each 
other, will lay the basis for analysing the limitations of CompCo's management's 
GEMBA interventions with regard to inventory. 
6.2.2 The functioning of inventory in EWS 
Before proceeding to illustrate how Corporate management wanted to 
streamline inventory through GEMBA it is important to understand the flow of 
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components and sub-assemblies as they make their way from the gate through to 
individual stores of each production area and onwards to the manufacturing process 
and eventually end up as finished products, such as engines or manufactured 
vehicles. I will then comment on the meaning of terms such as WIP and Bill of 
Materials (BOM). 
The entire manufacturing process has to contend with the inflow and exit of 
components, sub-assemblies and finished products, all of which imply that for its 
functional continuity the whole plant has to manage inventory. However, there are 
certain nodal departments in the EWS plant which are primarily responsible for 
inventory management, and whose description is necessary to understand the flow of 
materials (covering such varied items as sub-assembled fitments and pre-cast engine 
blocks) through the plant to exit as finished goods. Managing the flow of materials, 
calibrating them in their physical form and entering their particulars into the CompCo 
inventory management database system represent day-to-day activities of managers 
concerned with inventory in EWS. The nodal departments concerned with inventory 
management are the Material Planning Department, the Purchase Department, the 
Production Department (especially production planning and control), the Systems 
Department, and finally the more dispersed Research and Development centres. 
The Material Planning department in EWS plays an important role in 
orchestrating the transition of raw data forecast from material planning to a purchase 
order, after identifying suppliers by working with the purchase department. Material 
Planning acts on its prepared forecast, decides the future procurement of material and 
then liaises with suppliers. Material Planning then works with the Purchase 
Department, and gives formal consent to the latter to procure the material. The 
Purchase Department co-ordinates supply with established suppliers, with whom the 
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plant has long-term arrangements, and also negotiates with newer suppliers. It then 
implements the purchase order prepared by material planning which is a formal order 
that sanctions cash outflow from the plant in return for the receipt of material. Finally, 
Material Planning oversees the entry of material into the plant before it moves to the 
quality inspection stage. 
Meanwhile the Production Planning and Control Department in EWS projects 
the outlay of material – including semi-finished components – required for the 
coming months. This is translated into a day-to-day forecast requirement depending 
on the manufacturing plan given to them by specific shops. Senior and officer level 
production planning and control managers co-ordinate with other production line 
managers in charge of ensuring the functioning of the line and the supervision of 
operators. Another important responsibility of the production planning and control 
department is to ensure the timely issue of material to the assembly and machining 
shop areas of the plant. 
I will now outline the flow of material from the gate to the stores, how this is 
tracked by inventory, and the implications for assessments of WIP and BOM. The 
movement of material from gate to stores (known as gate entry receipt and dispatch, 
or GR&D) happens in a series of stages. Components which comprise raw inventory 
arrive by truck from the supplier and enter the main gate. After receipt of goods a part 
number is prepared and a preliminary goods received note is made by the gate entry 
staff. Material planning inspects the goods and it then goes to quality control for 
inspection and review of quality. After quality inspection the items go to the 
appropriate stores (either the engine machining store or the assembly stores). After the 
GR&D process material is issued by the stores as required by the production control 
department, and delivered to the different lines in CompCo. In September 2008 the 
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production control executive told me that the whole process of GR&D took five days. 
Following their lean manufacturing aspirations, corporate management wanted this to 
be reduced to fewer than twenty-four hours by eliminating bureaucratic procedures 
and speeding up material entry and usage on a just in time basis.  
After movement through entry and stores, materials then continue to move 
through the production process, and continue to be tracked by inventory. In this 
context there are two technical terms generally used in the engineering and 
automotive industry, and specifically in EWS, that are crucial to understanding 
materials flow and inventory control. These are BOM, which indicates Bill of 
Materials, and WIP, which constitutes work in process. WIP is important because it 
tracks the process of production and it also represents a cost. One of the main 
objectives of lean manufacturing is to reduce costs by minimising the materials that 
constitute the work in process [WIP] together with the storage space they take up. 
This may involve re-engineering the product and process to eliminate the need for a 
specific component (perhaps by using an available alternative) but it may also mean 
reducing the size of store holdings and buffer stocks. 
Thus accurate measurement of WIP is important for the management of 
inventory in EWS and the scope for errors that ramify through the software inventory 
system makes the work of middle managers difficult. In this context there can be both 
positive and negative WIP, and I will now explain these terms so that I can analyse 
how they operate, as the circumstances that trigger a mismatch between them is a 
central theme that runs throughout this chapter. Positive WIP measures the real 
tangible component or sub-assembly waiting for the next stage in the production 
process, once it starts its journey towards becoming a product but when it is not 
actually in the process of being transformed in the production process. In this regard 
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every production assembly area periodically makes a live count of inventory 
comprising of subassemblies and components lying in the shop, called lay-down 
entry. Negative WIP, on the other hand, is a system error or gap in CompCo’s online 
inventory database management system, between the number of components and their 
details as they are present in the system and the number of components absent or 
present in actual physical stock. It is not simply a reverse of positive WIP which is 
the inventory that is going to be used up at some point of time. Negative WIP 
represents the divergence between virtual and paper records, on the one hand, and the 
actual physical stock on the other; however, negative WIP and positive WIP are 
closely linked to each other. The drive to accrue savings by inventory management 
through a reduction in positive WIP inventory can only be successful if it is guided 
by accurate measurement. Hence the drive to reduce positive WIP would make 
divergence in negative WIP more critical and potentially more costly. This would 
especially be the case when the divergence suggests more stock of inventory than 
really exists, as production may be disrupted as a result, but it would also be the case 
if it showed a lower stock of inventory, as the apparent savings from stock reduction 
would be spurious. 
Keeping track of the flow of material and tallying it against the computerised 
information system covering suppliers, material requirements and detailed 
specifications across a database of many product families was particularly important 
in CompCo. Material Planning handles this task of overseeing the correct labelling 
and entry of components into the CompCo inventory management system as they 
enter the plant. This system helps with preparing the forecast and with material 
planning to execute that forecast on the basis of informed decisions. However, 
without the aid of IT, the task of identifying and corroborating the location of diverse 
components based on requirements given by different departments would be difficult. 
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The next important acronym to consider is the BOM. This allows the company 
to define exactly what and how many parts, components or materials are required to 
complete a production run. It is a manufacturing recipe and instructions about what to 
use, how long it will take, and how much it will cost in order to produce the product, 
and is thus a critical component in the manufacturing process. It is interdependent 
with the materials requirements and forecasting module. The present component 
issue system consists of breaking down the long-term production plan extrapolations 
to a weekly and then a daily production plan to specify component requirements for 
the next day. This is executed by ‘production procurement and control’, who produce 
an ‘issue list’ a day in advance based on which and how many components are 
required on the line according to the next day’s plan; then these components are 
issued to the line by stores. 
Once the material is issued, its BOM provides all the details of cost, quantity 
and part number. Inventory items are classified in order of priority, related to both cost 
and functional importance. ‘A’ value items are very specific to a particular 
manufacturing process, are critical in terms of technological competence and are often 
needed at short notice. They are typically key components of inventory and were the 
cause of much tension and many problems in CompCo’s inventory management 
system (discussed below in this chapter). ‘B’ value items are important but are not so 
urgently required. They may be similar to other components but in reality significantly 
different, though belonging to similar product families such as the rings that go into 
the engine dressing. Finally there are ‘C’ value items which are used by many shops, 
such as nuts, jigs and other fixtures. These ‘C’ value items are lower in priority and 
are not required at immediate notice because there is always an ample stock of these 
items and procurement is done at periodic intervals to take advantage of economies of 
scale. 
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The final stage of the progression of materials and sub-assemblies through the 
plant culminates in the final assembly of the vehicle. The final fitting stage involves 
attaching parts such as headlights and break lamps, identifying any faults and taking 
any necessary corrective action, such as welding repairs. The vehicle then goes to the 
lay down stage where it awaits the road test stage and is still counted as positive WIP. 
After the road test the process sheet for the whole vehicle is now complete and it goes 
for pre-delivery inspection (PDI) after which it goes to the dealer for sale to his 
warehouse. This final process of exhausting vehicle WIP inventory by moving it to 
sales is called ‘Passed to Sales’ (PTS). These stages and terms are important for the 
ensuing discussion. 
There are three complications of the efforts to reduce WIP that should be 
noted here. The first flows from the discussion on A, B and C value items, as A value 
items are much more expensive than others so cost per unit of inventory is crucial, 
whilst some B value items are more bulky than others, encouraging efforts to save on 
space costs. However, such pressures fall less on the cheaper C value items, 
especially for smaller components, a point I will touch on later. The second 
complication that arises is that reductions in WIP have to be balanced against 
competing priorities, such as having a secure and assured supply of A value items that 
may often be scarce. This point will be taken up when I discuss the role played by 
suppliers in CompCo, but I am registering the point here to link the technical account 
of WIP into a wider social context. The final complication is that the reduction of 
WIP between stages of production (buffer stocks) may also be attractive for 
management for another reason, because it leaves less room for operators to deviate 
from defined production times, though this may also make the overall production 
process more vulnerable to disruption. As the workers’ chapter will show, CompCo 
management wanted to change the agreed job times to a more flexible ‘takt’ time 
 281 
based rule, so I will also elaborate upon this vulnerability and how aggressive 
reduction of WIP was envisaged to reduce the time taken to complete a job routine. 
6.2.3 The sources of mismatches between negative and positive 
WIP in record keeping and software errors 
Mismatches between negative and positive WIP were the cause of many of the 
inventory management problems that CompCo faced. Such mismatches arose for 
several related reasons, involving such things as a lack of co-ordination and failures in 
data entry. An important consequence of these WIP mismatches was the pressure it 
exerted on CompCo's inventory management software system. I will now comment 
on the more specific reasons for mismatches, though these are not in any order of 
priority and they often reinforced one another. 
First, model changes that required new parts lists often involved the redundancy 
of old parts with distinctive specifications, but these remained and coexisted in the 
stores and on the system. For example Mr. RGPN [13 January 2009] cited the example 
of marketing telling production that a model change had altered the required quantities 
of specific parts, with some needing to be either partially or wholly discontinued. Thus 
items could become obsolete after engineering design changes, meaning that the store 
stock was no longer current for the manufacture and had been replaced by newer 
designs. However some managers argued that components procured with specifications 
pertaining to an earlier vehicle model could not be allowed to go to waste. Furthermore, 
managers in the material planning department sometimes confused similar components, 
though they were very different in actual practice (for example, when being used in 
different models of sub-assemblies or engines). Such confusion arose because at the 
beginning of the material entry process the material planning department had not 
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deleted the component whose design was obsolete, resulting in both kinds of 
component making their way into the stores. Reconciling components that were not 
required for the newer model and avoiding the possibility of mix up with materials 
required for the different models was a challenge, especially when there was an abrupt 
change of specification. 
Second, a related problem was what was termed ‘dead inventory’ at CompCo, 
and this was mentioned by several managers, including Mr. Ar and Mr. AB. This term 
described those parts not moving for more than a month, or exotic parts of 
components lying idle for even longer (such as those used only occasionally for 
highly specific and rarely built marine engine models). In such cases ‘exception 
reports’ had to be prepared and assessments made, both by executives from purchase, 
material planning and production and by managers in the stores where the material 
was lying dormant. Obsolete items were to be removed to create space (at EWS there 
was a ‘space crunch’ for storing inventory in certain areas). 
A third source of errors arose in the specification and categorisation of less 
urgent or generic parts. In this case there could be various component numbers on the 
system for one component, for generic items having similar functions but used on 
adjacent lines. This resulted in near identical parts such as nuts and bolts, that could be 
used as second best substitutes in the production process, finding their way to different 
lines because of system errors, so that line manager had a difficult time reconciling 
these items. As a result there were also problems with WIP mismatch with regard to 
subassembly counts of numerous smaller machined items that were bound for the next 
stage, which made tracing these smaller machined items a nightmare. 
A fourth source of problems arose from mistakes made in data entry. Middle 
managers in material planning and stores could make errors, both in data entry and in 
material issue at various stages of the flow of inventory. Meanwhile the lowest level 
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middle managers, who managed ‘on their feet’ alongside the actual production 
process, could make a mistake in updating the details of inventory used on their line. 
In all these cases the inventory management system was not accurately updated.  
Furthermore Mr. RGPN the manager of engine stores [13 January 2009] told 
me that an online mismatch (caused in this case by Material planning managers) 
precipitated a chain reaction which carried the wrong estimate on to the stores and 
sometimes it was impossible to trace the correct part. When stores personnel made a 
wrong entry of the part number based on what the system told it, then the production 
planning department also made its forecast on this mistaken basis, triggering an 
escalation of erroneous forecasts and hence causing excess inventory. Thus human 
data entry failures, often resulting from overlapping part specifications, ramified and 
cumulated through the stock control process, as earlier ones contributed to the later 
ones leading to erroneous displays of excess or scarce inventory in the system. 
However, line managers in production control were very resistant to going through the 
laborious process of going to the systems department and manually updating each and 
every part number. Managers such as Mr. AK had to be encouraged to do so, often by 
Mr. AB who would also turn to Mercury for support if he failed to convey what he 
wanted to them to do. 
Finally, software errors magnified such entry and system errors and 
themselves led to the erroneous display of components. Middle managers such as Mr. 
AK and Mr. SMU recognised that the IT systems department argued that it was not to 
blame for the glitches in the software and the counting errors that led to complications 
for middle managers. Some people in systems were very touchy on matters of WIP 
and flaws in the inventory management software. It needed visits by Mr. AB, and on 
some occasions Mr. N, to tell the systems head about mismatches and the need to 
rectify software. However, the systems head would turn the tables on the litigants and 
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cite detailed programme routines and software usage instructions, blaming problems 
on the carelessness of the users. 
Thus together system entry errors and software bugs in the online CompCo 
Inventory Management system created a lot of problems for line managers requiring 
components for production. For example Mr. AR emphasised that laxity and delay in 
data entry by stores personnel had disastrous outcomes for the interconnected 
inventory supply chain and for tracing the journey of the component through 
production. If the production line managers accepted the material from the stores and 
Mr. Ar was emphatic that they too had been casual about it they then had to have 
made sure that its specification, labelling and eventual utility tallied with the model 
and planned production mix of engines or medium duty vehicles for that day. In 
particular he argued that it was no use blaming sub-assembly quality control middle 
managers whose role was testing manufacturing components and accusing them of 
delays in certification, if stores were issuing and production were then using the 
wrong components. As the middle manager overseeing quality of sub-assemblies, he 
was adamant that all departments needed to do more to ensure coordination and 
inform their colleagues of any problems, rather than, figuratively speaking, shoving 
problems under the carpet, which occurred especially when those problems were of 
minor nature. On this basis he reiterated the importance of clearly demarcated and 
labelled inventory, located where it belonged, in clearly designated areas, so as to 
facilitate easy sorting and identification at every stage of the component’s journey 
and its integration into the sub-assembly. The main problem and indeed the source of 
a lot of confusion could, he argued, be avoided if data entry was carried out in a 
timely fashion, rather than being deferred (which meant that inaccuracies could creep 
in or necessary actions be forgotten). 
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Overall, then, the human and IT processes of inventory management in EWS 
were challenged by an array of factors, sometimes pertaining to the conditions facing 
the company, but also relating to the competing priorities of middle managers. 
Increased frequency of model changes or abrupt halts in production because of unsold 
products complicated the measurement of inventory and led to WIP mismatch in EWS.  
Alongside this, however, there were competing priorities among middle 
managers, such as release of time for other tasks versus spending time on physical 
inventory or on inputting data, an activity that requires concentration and care. Middle 
managers required time to supervise production and spending time on such matters as 
identifying or designing more generic components could reduce their time on the line 
and lead to them being blamed for lapses by operators. All this also suggests that the 
virtual inventory management system was often not the valuable aid to middle 
management that it was supposed to be, especially in delivering more in terms of a 
reduction of positive WIP. 
Furthermore, the CompCo inventory management system was likely to come 
under enormous pressure where there were rapid model and component changes and 
when the amount of physical stock was driven down. Thus the mismatch between 
positive and negative WIP had important social consequences for the company and 
for middle managers, on which I will comment further below. 
6.3 The Case Study of Inventory and Organisational Change 2: 
GEMBA Initiatives to Reform Inventory Management in EWS 
In order to overcome some of the recurring problems with WIP, CompCo's 
corporate management hoped that GEMBA would help to streamline inventory 
management. The main area addressed by the following discussion is to understand 
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the manner in which streamlining inventory involves those managers (such as Mr. AB 
and Mr. N) who are the change agents charged with responsibility for pushing 
GEMBA and how this reform is planned to impinge on other middle managers who 
will be required to change their work processes. This section will also address the 
various pressures and/or incentives to be used to streamline inventory management 
and, hence, monitor the activities of middle managers in CompCo and EWS.  
Chapter 5 has already introduced the hierarchy of GULS and GILS and the 
mechanism of trackers, and these were also important in addressing inventory. The 
human resource measures mentioned in that chapter, such as trouble shooting group 
activities leading to empower events and festivals, were also relevant to inventory 
management in CompCo. These events were held to recognise the contribution of 
groups of operators with the best solutions. Examples included making a collective 
effort to standardise parts, tools and/or consumables, and avoidance of ordering new 
parts for another model by using a common pool of parts already at hand. 
Early indications of the plans for inventory reduction in the GEMBA initiatives 
were identified by Mr. AB on a bus ride I took with him from the plant to Bangalore, 
after our first meeting in early November 2008. Mr. AB, who was Mr. N’s deputy, was 
around two decades younger in age than other senior and middle managers in EWS 
and, as part of a new generational cohort of well qualified managers, he was hired with 
a view to facilitating the GEMBA objectives. Our conversations became more detailed 
in due course as I was able to link them with my observations about the company 
during our many meetings both in the plant and during further bus rides. During such 
rides he would also switch on his laptop and follow up e-mails and edit the GEMBA 
trackers relating to inventory. These meetings provided an opportunity for me as a 
field worker to understand the relevance of GEMBA to inventory and also his 
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trepidations regarding the implementation of all the initiatives. Whenever I got an 
opportunity to observe his interactions with other managers I could also sense his 
obsequiousness in relation to top management and his civility when he tried to 
persuade or get his point across to Section Heads and senior managers. 
In our meetings he explained that the broad aims of GEMBA with regard to 
inventory management in all of the automotive plants of CompCo was to “enable 
everyone to speak from the same page in the language of transparency with the 
predictability of inventory” [ Mr. AB, 20 October 2011]. This would involve the 
implementation of GEMBA measures that were both technical and human resource 
based, as envisaged by the Executive Director of manufacturing, and the Executive 
Director of strategic sourcing, operating out of CompCo’s corporate headquarters in 
Nellore. 
In the rest of this section I will outline the organisational initiatives pursued by 
Mr. AB, and in the next section I will focus more directly on his efforts to motivate 
and control other managers to pursue these plans. The first initiative involved target 
setting and monitoring, and made use of both GEMBA trackers and a GEMBA-based 
Inventory Reduction and Analysis report (GIRAP). The second major initiative 
involved developing a ‘Road-Map’ for future Inventory Management, and this 
identified a series of both long-term and short-term measures to bring this to fruition. 
6.3.1 Target setting and monitoring sought through GEMBA 
changes 
With respect to inventory management Mr. AB and Mr. N pursued two 
analytical techniques, termed the GEMBA tracker and GIRAPS. The latter was 
specific to inventory, and was intended to make the inventory process visual, 
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analytical and transparent in line with lean manufacturing principles. It was also 
designed to create a mechanism to appraise and track the successes and failures of 
GEMBA units and their GULS. I will now evaluate what is involved in these two 
techniques, especially in relation to target setting and monitoring, and the difficulties 
encountered by middle managers in implementing them in an active production setup. 
Training classes were held by Mr. AB to explain what he envisaged to be 
represented in the trackers, which he believed was congruent with the visual 
benchmarking measures spelt out in lean manufacturing and GEMBA. The tracker 
was meant not just to monitor inventory management, but to institute a set of defined 
goals in managing inventory and also to ascertain whether these goals were met or 
not. Each column of the tracker document addressed a number of parameters, such as 
cost per unit of inventory and average holding days per component in each shop. The 
tracker graphs needed to meet defined expectations at the inter shop or departmental 
level, the inter-plant level and ultimately at the intra-plant level. These trackers were 
similar to an array of criterion readings in the cockpit of an aircraft, showing various 
indicators that reflected organisational health. For instance, for inventory it showed 
indicators such as inventory holding in days in a particular plant, the cost of holding 
them, time taken for movement of inventory from gate to the plant and so on. This 
helped in drawing comparisons with other plants’ performances. Depending upon the 
variables it intended to capture, a pie chart tracker would also provide a brief 
summary of specific shop level goals attained, exhibiting them in green in the pie 
chart, while red areas indicated failure to meet the target. These trackers, therefore, 
were one of the means of assessment in giving rewards for reaching the benchmarks. 
Discussion of the results of the displayed tracker also illuminated points of 
disagreement and difference between the middle managers and the higher ups in the 
plant. The latter often felt that senior management added to their already 
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overburdened workload and that this reflected an obsessive dalliance with statistical 
parameters, instead of adopting a more hands-on approach to understanding the 
difficulties they faced. Thus the tracker was an important tool through which the 
company sought to control and monitor the performance of line managers, such as 
Mr. AK, Mr. SMU and Mr. ISC. 
The GIRAP (GEMBA based Inventory Reduction and Analysis Report)[Refer 
Appendix 12 for an example of the GIRAP], was designed to provide a visual 
representation of how far a particular GEMBA based shop-floor group of operators 
and managers was able to reduce inventory. It was an ‘Excel Spreadsheet based’ 
representation of an array of production-related parameters, elaborating upon the 
following fields: first the GIRAP described the part number and it’s description, it’s 
value in rupees and the quantity. It also recorded the ideas advanced by the GEMBA 
team-members in the shop to reduce or clear the parts held, in terms of each of the 
particulars described, and the impact of the held inventory on the number of 
inventory holding days in terms of cost, space, and labour. Thus the GIRAP would 
provide a detailed overview of part families and particular items that needed to be 
reduced in terms of quantity held, and the GUL would have to report to regular 
meetings (discussed below) to ascertain the progress made in relation to a target date 
of completion. 
The GIRAP was an important means to ensure that all the statistical figures 
could ‘speak for themselves’ and that the total quantity of inventory could be broken 
down to GEMBA level inventory in order to facilitate detailed analysis. It was 
mandatory for the GIRAP to be made by every GUL or relevant executive in the 
production area and Mr. AB argued that serious intent in doing the GIRAPS properly 
would best be realised by linking their appraisal to key result areas [Mr. AB, 21 
November 2008]. In practice this tight interlinking of career appraisal to their 
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progress in GEMBA targets began to be implemented much later, after my exit from 
the field, and apparently in a half-hearted manner. However, while I was there I was 
assigned the task by Mr. AB to monitor compliance of GIRAPS by following up with 
each GUL whether he was completing the graphs properly. 
Managers prepared GIRAPS reports that analysed the inventory data by going 
to the CompCo inventory management system, downloading values for each 
component specification, ascribing a reason for its WIP mismatch or non-exhaustion 
from that GEMBA work area, and explaining why the targeted date of completion 
(TDC) was not reached. Completing the GIRAP was an activity that took at least two 
hours and most GULS – who were also supervisors in charge of the line and were 
entrusted with the responsibility of overseeing production efficiently so that there 
was no disturbance that would affect other operators and line managers further down 
the line – felt that sitting in front of the shop floor computer could only be done after 
the production has been carried out for the day. 
In this context, however, middle managers were also fearful of rebuke when 
they were not able to meet the deadline set by the TDC, and in due course tended to 
be evasive and vague in their responses in the TDC columns. As a result, Mr. AB told 
me to chase the middle-manager GULS in a relentless manner to remind them that 
they had to be clear and transparent in their GIRAPS. It was, after all, his baby and 
he continued to work hard to make it more effective and ensure its continued 
relevance as the coordinator of the inventory management project for CompCo. As a 
result he became synonymous with the GIRAP and middle managers saw him as 
‘GIRAP AB’, whispering among themselves, ‘Here comes GIRAP AB’. 
Thus the GIRAP brought about key areas of fissure and discontentment 
amongst middle management which I will elaborate in my discussion of the reactions 
of these managers to these policies in the next section. 
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6.3.2 The roadmap 
Building on these techniques, in November 2008 Mr. AB developed a broader 
conceptual plan of action, which he termed a road map for inventory management. 
This was intended to provide an objective framework on a yearly basis with well-
defined rules that were codified, written and made explicitly clear for everyone, with 
everything visually represented to show the road ahead. This roadmap spelled out, in 
detail, expected milestones for MIFA, supplier integration, self-certification and other 
aspects of lean management. Underscoring the roadmap was frequent recourse to 
power-point presentations and an array of key performance indicators (KPIs). As 
proposed by the GEMBA team meetings, the targets in the roadmap were intended to 
have an impact upon the executive’s career prospects. 
As a result, the word roadmap became important in the vocabulary of the 
GEMBA team and much time and effort was spent by Mr. AB in front of the 
computer to prepare it, before it was taken to review at corporate headquarters in 
Nellore. This road map for inventory that he prepared in 2008-09 talked of training 
for both executives and associates, underlining an emphasis on cultural change. 
Among the important aspirations of the road map were to develop a culture of quality 
and this involved the lean manufacturing innovation of allowing operators (now 
called associates) to take the initiative to pull the ’Andon cord’ [Appendix 14] which 
would stop the line, though no associate really does this because their Production 
Heads would come scampering after them, especially when the demand is heavy. 
Similarly Mr. AB’s roadmap urged stores to move to a lean supply management 
system to improve productivity, and this was intended to bring about a displacement 
of the ‘produce at any cost’ mind-set of Production Heads and middle managers. 
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The success of this road map was, however, contingent upon sustaining 
accurate inventory forecasting and the effective co-ordination of inventory 
requirement estimates for about ninety-nine per cent of components, both by 
material planning and production control, and by the line managers handing out 
material for use in the line. In practice, however, such aspirations in the roadmap 
became undermined in a number of ways which will be discussed in the following 
sections of this chapter. However, it is appropriate to comment briefly at this stage 
on both the longer-term measures that were envisaged in the Roadmap documents, 
and the shorter-term measures which accompanied it. These features drew upon 
GEMBA measures that were already on the table, having been excogitated by Mr. 
N, Mr. AB and the Materials planning head Mr. TMS.  
First, it was planned to produce an accurate estimation of base line inventory: 
an estimate of whatever inventory is there in the plant at a given moment providing 
the present health of the plant’s inventory status. This means the removal of 
anomalies in the software and the correct reflection of physical inventory in the 
inventory management system of the plant for everyone to see at a glance. An 
accurate estimation of inventory also means strengthening the management of the 
information systems and invoking standard operating procedures for inventory 
management in the CompCo inventory management software. 
This overall objective in the roadmap was contingent upon strengthening the 
systems department in the company and on a concentrated and conscientious effort 
from middle managers across the entire spectrum of material flow in entering WIP 
data to ascertain the emergence of negative WIP. This also meant that the middle 
manager in charge of the line should report any problems to his Section Head and 
also co-ordinate with the production planning department middle manager in charge 
of that line, to go to the systems room, inspect the IT information and make necessary 
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corrections with assistance from the IT systems team. If a problem was to persist, the 
DGM [Machining or Assembly depending on the shop in question] Mr. AB and Mr. 
N would have to get involved and work with the head of IT in EWS to resolve it. It 
was claimed that the aim of the roadmap was to eliminate management bureaucracy 
and the resulting procrastination about problems until they snowballed because of the 
delay. Instead problems were to be solved at their source by the middle manager in 
accordance with lean manufacturing principles. 
Second, the use of MIFA (Material Information Flow Analysis) to implement 
improvement projects became another important buzzword for Mr. AB, and perhaps 
a way of imposing his individuality by trying to give it more priority, though Mr. N 
also shared this commitment. Again, however, from the perspective of the inventory 
roadmap, the use of MIFA was contingent upon an orderly flow of inventory, the 
correct organisation of materials and sub-assembly, and a correct tally of physical 
and online stock. 
In addition to the roadmap, Mr. AB also championed short-term inventory 
initiatives that were intended to bring rapid improvements between November 2008 
and February 2009. The first of these required the individual departments of Material 
Planning, Production and Purchase to co-ordinate and make a close study of supplier 
relationships to the plant and to review the inbound supply chain management 
process thoroughly. In this regard, Mr. AB emphasised the role of team-work, 
participation, and immediate and frank discussion of problems at the point of their 
emergence, as well as skill mapping of each executive to enable development of a 
personal development plan, mentoring and appraisal. 
Secondly, at a plant level, senior production executives were required to meet 
with production planning and material planning and freeze the base line inventory. 
They would then sign the cut-off point as the maximum limit designated for holding 
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physical inventory in a particular manufacturing area, and this would regulate how 
much material that Material planning could procure on the basis of these norms. This 
laid the basis for MIFA initiatives and for Section Heads and GMs to set norms or 
inventory targets for each GEMBA, which Mr. AB regarded as important milestones. 
Finally, regular cyclic counting was required which eliminated the need of IOH 
(Inventory on Hand), described further below. The GEMBA unit leader had to capture 
the physical level of components and sub-assemblies constituting WIP. The stores 
GUL also had to capture store-level inventory physically and make a separate record of 
what was called ‘decision inventory’, typically A value items where the plant kept 
reserve stock even if there was no immediate need. Furthermore, stores level inventory 
was to be tallied with plant level inventory online, and the plant level inventory 
should be linked in real time with the CompCo inventory system. 
However the previous section has already discussed how and why WIP errors 
ricocheted throughout the CompCo inventory management system and made the work 
of middle managers very difficult. The next section therefore seeks to find answers to 
the question ‘What happened to this GEMBA discourse about inventory?’. Were the 
above goals successful in streamlining and overcoming bottlenecks in inventory 
management? My rather negative answer lies in the different priorities of managers, 
who could not be forced to follow the GEMBA line, as well as the extent to which 
the recession exacerbated these different interests (together with the limits to 
CompCo’s control over suppliers and contracted labour). Thus the next section 
identifies how GEMBA measures affected different departments and unpacks the 
tensions between different constituencies of managers, and more specifically middle 
managers, as the GEMBA management of inventory put different individuals and 
organisational structures at loggerheads. 
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6.4 The Case Study of Inventory and Organisational Change 
3: The Responses of Middle and Lower Managers 
In this section I will discuss the collision between the discourses of GEMBA 
and the discourse of targets because they employed a different set of rules and 
vocabularies even as they had similar ends of ensuring profitability and of keeping 
the line functioning smoothly. In particular they saw the underlying bottlenecks to 
inventory management rather differently, whether their source was external to EWS, 
organisational or based in the ways in which individual managers viewed their 
workplace. I will begin the discussion by trying to understand an important field 
setting for me as a field worker, where competing discourses and claims to be the 
dominant truth which others must follow, played themselves out; namely, the 
inventory meetings. 
6.4.1 The Inventory meetings as an important site of discussion 
and resistance to GEMBA inventory initiatives 
The inventory meetings provide different perspectives and divergences of 
opinion between the senior managers of EWS driving GEMBA on one hand and on 
the other the senior, middle and line managers who (in conjunction with workers) 
were responsible for implementing the GEMBA measures. The interplay between the 
various actors over the management of inventory brought to the forefront important 
tensions between corporate management’s vision of what lean manufacturing could 
achieve and the reality of life in a plant dominated by the need to achieve production 
and income targets in a testing economic climate, thrown up by the economic 
recession. The following discussion of the weekly inventory meetings in EWS seeks 
to illustrate how senior management failed to give due consideration to some 
 296 
significant impediments to implementation that arose from real-world operational 
constraints, posed both by machinery limitations and supply chain constraints. It will 
also demonstrate how corporate managers tasked with implementing GEMBA, such 
as Mr. N, were unable to get the wholehearted cooperation of middle managers and 
line managers, who were charged with implementing GEMBA on the factory floor, 
because of the competing priorities that they faced in their everyday working lives. 
The weekly inventory review meetings were usually held on Fridays between 
1500 hours and 1700 hours, either in the GEMBA room in EWS or in Mr. AB’s office 
located on the first floor of Shop Six. Attendees would include line managers from the 
MDV area, such as Mr. AK, Mr. ISC and Mr. SMU. These were three individuals 
whom I came to know well during the course of my fieldwork in production planning 
and control, and included two of the three managers (Mr. AK, the late Mr. SMU and 
Mr. ISC) who were required by Mr. AB, to account for the progress they had made, 
first in getting to grips with the failures to attain the GIRAP targets identified at the 
previous week’s meeting, and second regarding the extent to which these identified 
faults had been analysed and corrected. Attending inventory meetings was an 
important part of the role of middle managers in production and planning and the 
main task of Mr. AB and Mr. N was to ensure that those middle managers met the 
inventory reduction norms and key performance indicators identified in the previous 
meetings using the GIRAPS. 
Individuals such as Mr. N and Mr. AB, who had invested an enormous amount 
of energy in GEMBA, saw their future careers as inextricably linked to ensuring the 
realisation of corporate management’s new vision for EWS and CompCo. Typically 
an inventory review meeting would begin with each of the statistical pie chart trackers 
being displayed on the screen and the display of each tracker would produce an 
animated discussion between the superiors of the middle managers in the Production 
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Control Department, such as the Head of Purchasing. The discussion would then 
move on to assess the progress or lack of progress in inventory reduction of specific 
components pertinent to an assembly area that were illuminated by the GIRAPS. Line 
managers had to explain the success they had in reducing inventory through 
standardisation suggestions and the modification of machinery to eliminate 
components wherever possible. They would have to account for the work done to 
track inventory pro-actively, categorise components and eliminate WIP mismatches in 
their shops. All these had to be recorded in a GIRAP, a sample of which is provided 
in the Appendix 4. Mr. AB insisted on getting complete clarity from the GULS 
present and would ‘drill down’ to the fine details of what had or had not been done. 
He wanted to know how components had been categorised right from the moment of 
their specification through to the preparation of the baseline inventory (the 
significance of which was noted in the discussion of the roadmap above). Norms 
would be set for the usage levels of components, for their conversion ready for the 
next stage of assembly or machining and right through to their eventual exhaustion. 
Reduction of inventory was a key theme and all the norms set would be given target 
dates for their attainment. The full details were recorded in the trackers and the 
GIRAPS. 
Mr. AB also focused on devising aggressive strategies to target reductions in 
the number of component and sub-assembly families through standardisation and the 
introduction of a proper value-stream based system of material flow. This he believed 
could only be done by establishing a culture of self-initiative and personal 
responsibility in EWS and CompCo, instilling a willingness proactively to reduce 
inventory and to believe in lean working practices to reduce wastage and reduce the 
costs. If attendees in the inventory meetings had failed to achieve the norms or targets 
laid down in the last meeting and the GIRAPS looked vague or lazily done, line 
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managers had a lot of explaining to do. Mr. AB would get irritated even though he 
expressed his irritation in a very diplomatic manner. 
Mr. AB also worked hard towards reducing opacity regarding the flow of 
materials and their eventual exhaustion, realising that opacity often concealed a lack 
of progress. He travelled through the plant armed with various PowerPoint 
presentations and an array of trend diagrams and regression charts which, along with 
the pie charts and the GIRAPS, were intended to capture and monitor inventory. He 
saw no reason why the company should not achieve significant savings if every line 
manager and operator was proactive in kaizening, eliminating wasteful production 
processes and streamlining the inventory management process, including the software 
based inventory management system which (as the previous section illustrated) was 
seen by many as the main cause of WIP mismatches. 
The inventory related GEMBA duties that managers performed included 
tallying WIP, ensuring that the correct specification of materials was sent to the stores 
and other specific activities pertaining to the MDV areas, such as tallying component 
usage and stock records and ensuring a proper and adequate supply of components. 
Periodically Mr. ISC and Mr. AK would be reprimanded by their Section Head, Mr. 
N, and by Mr. AB, for failing to follow up the inventory management and WIP 
mismatch reduction objectives decided upon in the last inventory meeting. Change 
Managers such as Mr. N and Mr. AB wanted to ensure that managers were convinced 
by, and committed to, the newer GEMBA discourse, which had to function in an older 
plant against the backdrop of a managerial style and organisational ethos that were 
more pragmatic and reflected the practical operational impediments and constraints 
that EWS faced in coping with some very immediate supply chain and machinery 
issues. This pragmatic style of management entailed recognising the existing 
limitations of machinery and human resources in EWS. It used a mixture of 
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managerial authority and utilised the long-lasting rapport that line managers and 
Section Heads had with senior workers to get them to do more work than necessary, 
such as overtime and working to meet sudden increases in the day's targets. 
I observed that managers who had spent much of their career and their 
working lives in EWS were sceptical of corporate management’s new troubleshooting 
and innovation discourse as a means of reforming the way EWS managed inventory. 
Corporate management wanted to base management activity upon precepts of lean 
manufacturing which promised not only to make the production process more 
efficient but also concurrently to operationalise a new vocabulary of Kazenning 
embraced and spoken by line managers and workers. The perspective on change 
management of those section managers and line managers I observed in EWS, as well 
as that of the plant GM, Mr. SDN, reminded me of the observation regarding older 
companies by Ackers and Black [1992: 193] who said that: 
“Older companies are richer in cultural constraints that are embedded 
in every level of the organization ... Like ocean liners, they cannot be 
turned around quickly, and except in a situation of extraordinary 
crisis (and not always then some go down like the Titanic), they 
usually prefer to ‘manage change’ by developing tried and tested 
strategies and relationships ‘what works now’ rather than rethinking 
their whole approach in the white heat of abstract capitalist logic.” 
Initiatives to streamline and improve inventory management in EWS were 
predicated on the assumptions that proactive participation and the empowerment of 
employees could be achieved through participation schemes, pro-active troubleshooting 
and self-driven initiatives, and that this would result in cutting down on all forms of waste 
that lean manufacturing identified as muda. 
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However, the organisational structure of EWS was grounded upon a hierarchy 
and a chain of command which resembled a matrix form of organisational structure 
that writers on organisation, such as Mintzberg [2008: 34], have characterised as the 
‘Machine Organisation’. Any measure of delayering of decision-making and active 
participation had to be introduced within the existing organisational structure, for the 
immediate and conceivable future at least. Running through middle managers’ 
perceptions and responses to GEMBA were two tensions that existed at two levels. 
The first level of tension was at the organisational level of EWS, which involved the 
implementation of newer processes of inventory management that managers such as 
Mr. N believed represented the more efficient, flatter production regimes 
characterised by lean manufacturing in the context of the older hierarchy. 
The second level of tension was between corporate management’s vocabulary 
and language games of teamwork and participation, and the existing organisational 
linguistic community and meanings understood by managers as a part of a shared set 
of evaluations about other managers which enabled them to adjust their behaviour. 
This existing language community prized obeisance and prioritised the attainment of 
immediate, short-term targets. These managers lived for the moment and their 
success or failure was measured by the immediacy of their attainment and the related 
evaluation of their superiors, just as among Jackall’s firm’s managers: 
Managers think in the short run because they are evaluated by their 
superiors and peers in their short term results. Those who are not 
seen to be producing requisite short term gains come to be thought 
as embarrassing liabilities. Of course past work gets downgraded in 
this process. [Jackall, 1988: 84] 
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Line managers from the manufacturing and assembly areas – who might also be 
GEMBA Unit leaders or GULS, were often perceived by departmental heads – for 
example the Head of Material Planning, as not doing enough to achieve the various 
inventory targets identified in the roadmap or to eliminate blockages in WIP. As 
mentioned earlier, not meeting these targets and periodic failures to overcome the 
reduction of inventory of particular components in the GIRAP caused the plant to produce 
poor results in the inventory reduction initiative, so EWS lagged behind other plants in the 
group. Thus, in the meetings held at corporate headquarters in Nellore, which had been 
called by the corporate executive director for manufacturing and the COO Mr. VDS, EWS 
looked like the poor relation of the group. This in turn meant that with adverse statistical 
indicators, it was untenable for the GM, Mr. N, Mr. AB and Head of Material Planning to 
defend EWS. 
Certainly, the attempts of Mr. AB and the subordinate GEMBA team 
managers who assisted him, to keep track of the status of inventory for CompCo as a 
whole, and to force EWS middle managers to concentrate on inventory, were 
undermined by more urgent priorities thrust upon lower-level executives by their 
Section Heads, in particular the demand to meet production targets. The underlying 
reason for the conflict between departmental priorities and the inventory meetings was 
because of the more immediate compulsions of Section Heads that were grounded in a 
framework of ensuring that the assembly or machining areas they supervised met the 
production targets set for the day, rather than seeing the broader organisational 
perspective of following systematic and detailed lean steps to cut down inventory. 
Managing as seen by the Section Heads was an apparently never ending sea of 
contingencies and they could not see that attaining both their immediate priorities and 
the GEMBA norms were equally important. In their view a failure to achieve these 
immediate and pressing production number targets would get their Section Heads into 
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trouble and would rebound on them because trucks and engines would not be 
produced as they needed to be to keep the plant running and exhaust the sub-
assemblies and inventory. 
The argument of the Section Heads, as put to the DGM (Machining and 
Tooling) and the GM, was that if their middle managers were doing GIRAPs or 
taking time out of the line to discuss lean kaizening this meant that they did not have 
time to ensure that daily production targets were met, but such arguments were 
considered farcical by senior management. Hence there were two competing 
discourses, and the language of attaining targets and protecting positions was 
dominant, and through that an assertion of the primacy of the production lines over 
what the Section Heads of MDV assembly considered a tangential activity, namely 
GEMBA. 
In the face of such resistance a closer synchronisation of GEMBA, by 
systematically tracking and accounting for each anomaly, was sought through the 
GIRAP about which Mr. AB was so enthusiastic. Day-to-day inventory activities in, 
for instance, the production planning and control department were, however, very 
much controlled by the priorities decided by the Section Head, even though they 
sometimes appeared to be interrupted by GEMBA. This meant that the long-term 
developmental and integrative discourse of GEMBA sought by Mr. AB had to pass 
through and be made palatable to these managers and accommodate their perspective 
on how GEMBA and inventory should be managed. 
Attending the inventory meetings provided me with an opportunity to observe 
how arguments and counter-arguments on the GEMBA inventory initiatives were 
exchanged in the day to day activities of managers, how they stated their positions 
and how they defended their activities. That line managers regarded filling in the 
GIRAP as an additional and barely tolerable burden thrust upon them, and that many 
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did it only with the greatest reluctance, was reiterated in the immediate context of the 
inventory meetings. Section Heads wanted to shower their indignation upon line 
managers and appear highly critical, only to show that they were attentive and 
diligent in their own departmental roles. When gently reminded by Mr. AB of what 
they had to do, they would concede ground only after much argument and only after 
being advised by Mr. AB or someone equal to themselves in rank. 
The meetings also gave a chance for purchase managers and material 
planning managers to show that they were in total command and had a broad 
overview, but at the same time a detailed and almost microscopic vision of all 
activities and issues relevant to inventory in the manufacturing areas they 
monitored. In inventory meetings the Section Heads tried to counter the accusations 
levelled at them that positive WIP and, hence, inventory was accumulating, by 
attempting to disown any responsibility and instead they would attempt to direct 
the blame towards middle managers such as Mr. AK or Mr. SMU, who they felt 
were negligent in entering data and ensuring the effective monitoring of materials 
issue and usage. The above point also concealed what was in reality a subtle 
suggestion by the Section Heads that Mr. AB should first get his own house in 
order by rectifying known problems in inventory, rather than merely speaking the 
language of lean supply management and intruding into their domains.  
Meanwhile the Section Heads and the Head of Material Planning would be 
animated and exceptionally harsh in their criticism of middle managers, although 
behaving obsequiously to impress their seniors and the GEMBA Head Mr. N 
whenever he was present, giving detailed accounts based on their idea of what they 
thought was the right way to manage inventory. Mr. N would come to the meetings 
intermittently and ask a few very significant questions but often meetings would 
lose their focus, as they became opportunities to praise important individuals such as 
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Mr. N or the COO or degenerated into vehicles for individuals such as Mr. N to 
display the full force of their authority. 
Different middle managers across the hierarchy of EWS had developed 
different coping mechanisms against senior management’s criticisms of their work 
during the inventory meetings. In these meetings, some middle managers such as 
Mr. SMU could still manage to hold their own by deploying defensive strategies [cf. 
Argyris, 2007: 416] to help protect themselves from blame, and they occasionally 
succeeded in subverting the attacks against them. Being busily engaged in 
contingency management, rather than spending time implementing GEMBA 
mandated actions, their key priorities were making sure that materials reached the 
Medium Duty Vehicle (MDV) assembly line and ensuring that operators worked 
properly to meet the production targets for medium duty commercial vehicles. 
Failure to achieve these targets would have had a cascading effect on EWS’s 
manufacturing process and this contingency management implied doing whatever 
was necessary to keep the line moving, even if it meant disregarding requirements 
for paperwork and bypassing prescribed procedures. 
The line managers responsible for reconciling inventory had their own 
priorities, namely completing the tasks set by their departmental heads and 
supervising workers, and they tried hard to defend their inability to measure up to the 
periodic targets set by Mr. AB and the GEMBA measures. They wanted to defend 
themselves against the blame thrust upon them in these inventory meetings and in 
particular accusations that they had not absorbed the GEMBA message that they 
should proactively troubleshoot accumulating inventory. Line managers were meant 
to offer suggestions to reduce inventory by eliminating components through 
modifications in the manufacturing process, or aggressively tackle WIP errors by co-
ordinating with the systems department of EWS. Individuals such as Mr. AK were 
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consistently accused of failing to resolve issues through robust use of all the means 
identified in Mr. AB’s roadmap, and thus failing to produce innovative solutions. 
Section Heads were accused of failing to monitor regularly whether the GULS or 
middle managers were working with their operators as teams, to ensure that regular 
cyclic counting was going on instead of waiting for the cumbersome and tedious IOH 
option. 
The complex patterns of blame and excuses that resulted can be illustrated by 
an example. The GEMBA activities organised by the line managers in the MDV area 
(Mr. AK, the late Mr. SMU and Mr. ISC) fell short of targets in an area where they 
needed to pay particular attention to the details of the various parts, their features, 
their item numbers, their functions and their specifications, all of which consumed 
significant amounts of their time. By obliquely blaming the Section Head (Mercury) 
for not allowing them to prepare the GIRAPS or adopt a planned lean manufacturing 
style of inventory management, everyone present in the meeting attempted to put him 
at a disadvantage, then see how Mr. SMU, the line manager, would defend himself. 
In this context Mr. SMU knew that Mr. AB might urge the Section Head politely, 
whilst Mr. N would come down heavily on the lapses and failures to meet the 
GIRAPs targets, but the person who had the final authority to rebuke the Section 
Head was the DGM of his functional domain such as, for Mercury it would be the 
Deputy Head of Production Control or the DGM [Production Control].  
This illustrated another important aspect of the jockeying for position when 
GIRAPS were incomplete. Section Heads sometimes argued that they were merely 
awaiting transhipments from the adjacent GEMBA or some (such as Mercury) would 
quickly disown their own middle managers, their subordinates, for not doing enough 
to reduce inventory in their own GEMBAs, perhaps because they had failed to get 
right certain organisational pre-requisites, such as ensuring shop floor order and 
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operator discipline. Other line managers such as Mr. ISC were not so eloquent and 
did not seem to have the presence of mind in the meetings to turn the argument 
around, but instead would have to listen to the dressing down of his Section Head 
(again Mercury) by Mr. AB and Mr. N. The graduate engineering trainee in Mr. 
ABK’s office who at that point of time was helping Mr.AK in cataloguing 
components, specifications and their quantity both online and physical, summed up 
the plight of these managers: “They move from one meeting to another, scribbling in 
their notepads and often forgetting the crux of what was discussed in the preceding 
meeting.” [Mr. ABK, January 2009, Works Office]. 
6.4.2 Change manager efforts to implement policies within and 
beyond the meetings 
In this section I will review the attempts of change agents such as Mr. AB, 
faced with the reluctance of middle managers, to get their co-operation in the 
inventory meetings, and then address the differences in managerial styles between 
change agents tasked with implementing GEMBA based inventory measures and the 
responses of middle managers. 
On one hand the change agents sought to gain co-operation by seeking higher 
commitment through training and instituting a new discourse that promised rewards 
for active participation and self-initiative. On the other hand there was a willingness to 
punish middle managers who would often bear the brunt of different disciplining 
mechanisms designed to subjugate them to the GEMBA concept. As a usual first 
recourse the GEMBA team, headed by Mr. N and Mr. AB, would try subtly to mould 
managers into ‘self-starters’ and ‘problem solvers’, to enable the easier monitoring 
they desired. The other disciplining mechanism, which was more blunt, was the high 
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probability of a humiliating dressing down in full view of their colleagues, including 
their bosses and the Section Heads, who themselves bore enormous pressure to meet 
the immediate production targets or else face rebuke from their DGMs. 
First, then, I observed that at the inventory meetings Mr. AB tried to act as a 
mentor and coach to middle managers such as Mr. AK, asking them to take greater 
responsibility for their GEMBA and to take the initiative in fine tuning the inventory 
system. He wanted middle managers to ensure that everyone was gripped by the need 
to minimise wastage and could visualise inventory management holistically through 
aggressive root-cause analyses of increased inventory in their work areas. But when 
Section Heads stepped into the ring with their blunt ‘lion tamer’ managerial style that 
immediately tore into the arguments proffered by middle managers, Mr. AB had no 
other option but to change his own mentoring and coaching style of encouraging line 
managers to meet inventory deliverables without placing much emphasis on 
sanctions. Over time this changed the atmosphere in the GEMBA unit-based weekly 
inventory review meetings that I had a chance to observe, as frequently criticism was 
levelled at particular, failing departments by Mr. AB and also by Mr. N whenever he 
was present. 
The Departmental Heads of Production, both assembly and machining, and the 
DGMs, production control and DGM Material planning, started attending meetings 
sometime after they started, from January 2009 onwards, owing to pressure from Mr. 
AB. This reflected worry about growing inventory accumulation in CompCo and 
corporate management's concern about a rise in unproductive capital expenditure in 
the company. In many ways Mr. AB was junior to these new attendees but he had the 
mandate of implementing the GEMBA project and all its accompanying authority. 
But Mr. AB could only go so far in exercising his authority in the inventory meetings 
and had to bear in mind that the GM production and the Section Heads could also 
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make a valid case in prioritising the tasks he assigned, over and against GEMBA 
tasks such as tallying the WIP and proactive kaizening with regard to inventory. 
When the senior middle managers, such as the Section Heads, would not heed 
his calls to implement and follow up on the GIRAPs with a greater degree of 
urgency, he would turn to Mr. N, who was in the senior management stratum and had 
the ears of the COO. This forced attendance brought the senior middle managers into 
functional opposition to the GEMBA team and particularly Mr. AB (who, as I noted 
was much younger, and unlike the other senior and middle managers in the plant was 
not an EWS career man). I learnt from my observations at the inventory meetings that 
he could barely understand the local language (Tamil) and in the eyes of the Section 
Heads he was a junior who, as a lateral entrant, had overtaken them in the 
organisational hierarchy. As such he was seen to belong to a newer generation of 
managers who were highly qualified and hired with a specific purpose in mind. 
The Departmental heads were not only much older but had been a part of the 
CompCo system and culture for many years, and had weathered many a storm in the 
past. The Section Heads had their own ideas on efficiency and lean manufacturing 
which were often not as well informed as that of Mr. AB or Mr. N., but nevertheless 
sat there, effectively in opposition. Indeed in one of my meetings with him on 22 
November 2008, Mr. AB expressed the view that these Section Heads routinely 
refused to admit that they were wrong and they were prepared to accept only 
piecemeal adoption of a few measures of lean manufacturing if they saw them as 
being helpful in realising their sectional production targets, rather than viewing the 
whole plant as a totality, and seeing their parts as being subsets of the whole process. 
Though Mr. AB and Mr. N were both advocates of the GEMBA change 
programme, they had different approaches to orchestrating middle manager 
commitment and activity, rooted in their different power positions, career trajectories 
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and personalities. Mr. AB belonged to a newer generation of managers who could be 
designated as ‘shooting stars’ and was a staff-specialist who had made a lateral entry 
into the habitus of the careerist managers of CompCo. As mentioned earlier, he had 
invested an enormous amount of energy and time in GEMBA and preparing its 
graphical indicators. He tried his best to charm the Section Heads on the few 
occasions that they attended inventory meetings, but even then they would miss no 
opportunity to score points off the middle managers, ignoring his ‘problem-solving 
approach’ and exhortations to them to show ‘team spirit’. After the proceedings of an 
often rambunctious meeting, Mr. AB would speak with a calming voice, playing the 
role of a mentor and coach, emphasise the need for troubleshooting and teamwork, 
and talk encouragingly to any GUL whose GEMBA's GIRAP was wrong or whose 
figures were not very encouraging. 
But where he thought it necessary he would also accuse other GULS or line 
managers, such as Mr. AK (who compiled and ensured the implementation of a more 
logical and planned flow of inventory) of a lack of effort. To drive the point home he 
would use varied rhetoric, such as suggesting that the relevant managers were lazier 
than their children. In addition he would often rely on the material planning head Mr. 
TMS, for help in giving credence to his pleas that the attendees should address the 
parameters in the GIRAP in a particular GEMBA. On my bus rides and in subsequent 
meetings he expressed his inability to change the mind set of middle managers and 
Section Heads. When I suggested that he took them to examples of plants that 
represented the best of lean manufacturing, of which there were many notable 
exponents in India, he shrugged his shoulders and said that he and GEMBA could 
only take a horse to the water. 
Mr. N, on the other hand, was very self-assured in his demeanour, worried 
much less about GEMBA’s permeation across EWS and CompCo, and thought that 
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all that was required to produce a mind set change was the active rewarding of 
participants through the Empower and Passport schemes discussed in Chapter 5. The 
inventory meetings clearly brought home to me the point that the older generation of 
managers were more authoritarian and were resistant to being ‘talked around’ by a 
person who was much junior to them in age. But there were exceptions such as Mr. N 
who was around fifty-nine years of age and came from an older generation of 
managers whose careers had progressed within CompCo. He made every effort to 
adopt the empowerment vocabulary and constantly urged everyone to kaizen their 
way to success within and outside the inventory meetings and tried very hard to 
disguise his true emotions by playing the role of a team motivator or coach, using his 
temper only when everything else failed. Nevertheless Mr. N’s arrival in these 
inventory meetings would galvanise the meeting and he was all pomp and 
circumstance, lecturing attendees on the importance of being lean by asking a 
question that would flummox everyone, eventually training his guns on the Section 
Head and the middle managers. Sometimes it took the combined pressure of Mr. AB 
and Mr. N to get the Section Heads to move more rapidly over inventory by getting 
their DGMs to push the Section Heads hard in that direction. 
Mr. AB realised that there were limitations to his ability to get middle 
managers and Section Heads to implement his GIRAP and the Trackers and to take 
his roadmap and inventory targets seriously, and he would try to defend his inability 
to get across the GEMBA troubleshooting message. Bus rides with him illuminated 
for me the challenges he faced in implementing an efficient inventory management 
system, in particular his difficulty in aligning the world-views of the production 
DGMs, Section Heads, managers and more specifically middle managers (who in his 
view were the real cogs that ran EWS), more closely to the view he shared with 
CompCo’s corporate management. His expression that he could only take the horse 
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to the water, summed up his frustrations. However Mr. AB got along with younger 
graduate trainees and certain middle managers such as Mr. TJN, who administered 
the rewards system and decided the norms for engineering processes in the Industrial 
Engineering department, and this may reflect generational affinities. I presumed that 
being part of the younger generation of managers, he and his counterparts were more 
comfortable with the apparent atmosphere of informality that characterised some of 
the companies in the IT industry that were located further down the road from EWS 
near Bangalore. This contrasted with the measured strategy and vocabulary of words 
he had to deploy whilst talking to the older EWS hands such as the Section Heads 
and the Head of Material Planning Mr. TMS, which were characterised by an 
underlying generation gap and distinctive career pathways. 
Mr. N, on the other hand, would talk directly to these line managers and their 
Section Heads, and suggest that corporate management would not be pleased if they 
did not implement the Targeted Date of Completion System [TDC] or monitor the 
attainment of TDCs. Corporate management expected them to account for their 
successes and failures in their review meeting trips to corporate headquarters 
whenever they were called, and they wanted to be seen in a good light. Mr. N would 
also hint at proposed changes when appraising managers who were suspected of not 
having implemented GEMBA properly. Together with Mr. AB, Mr. N would meet the 
Head of Material Planning and the GM Production to ensure that they understood 
what needed to be done in relation to WIP. They would go to the Head of the Systems 
Department in EWS and conduct a detailed review of how the errors in the software 
could be resolved and, in Mr. N's words, implement the necessary 'course correction'. 
Mr. N epitomised flamboyance. He sensed the change in the wind from headquarters, 
with the dynamic Mr. VDS having a greater say in the company, and was eager to be 
in his good books. This was essential if, before hanging up his boots for good, he was 
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to be inducted into the Executive Board of the company, something which carried 
immense prestige and authority and which would be a fitting finale after all his years 
working in EWS. 
Mr. N was well on his way to thinking how to ‘engineer CompCo’s 
tomorrows’ in synchrony with the thoughts of Mr. VDS, the COO of CompCo to 
whom he was very attentive and with whom he made operose efforts to be friendly. 
He thought he shared Mr. VDS’s vision for the future, and I was able to pick up 
fragments of this as I listened to his summary of where he wanted to see CompCo go 
in future. Broadly he envisaged a ‘world class lean organisation’, operating state of 
the art technology and devoid of many of the departments such as Stores and 
Material planning that were viewed as costly drags on efficiency. On the one hand 
he argued that a ‘tipping point’ had been reached, but on the other he would often 
rehearse the popular aphorism that ‘Rome was not built in a day’. 
Mr. N, having served in CompCo over many years, also had direct access to 
the GM, Mr. SDN, and could talk to him in a more regular and frank manner 
whenever he wanted, in contrast to Mr. AB who was junior to him in the 
organisational hierarchy. Though both Mr. AB and Mr. N adopted the coach and 
mentor style of managing up to a point, it was not unusual for Mr. N to lose his temper 
and reprimand Section Heads and their middle managers for not having the 'lean mind 
set' and for the costs the company was incurring owing to quality lapses and 
accumulating inventory. Whilst Mr. AB used tact and diplomacy, albeit laced with 
threats that middle managers’ progress, promotion and bonuses would be impeded if 
their non-cooperation was made known during progress meetings at corporate 
headquarters, he could always rely on Mr. N whose intervention was more direct and 
brought immediate results because of his senior position in the management 
hierarchy. When AB felt that senior middle managers were not paying heed to his 
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calls to ask line managers to rectify the WIP errors, he would turn to Mr. N who 
would give the Section Heads a piece of his mind. 
The hierarchical organisation in the plant probably prevented the Production 
Control Department line managers and Section Heads from voicing what they really 
felt regarding poor performance from other departments, such as material planning. 
In this context the GIRAP, although intended to serve as an organisational tool, 
became a self-fulfilling statistical operation and an end in itself, because middle 
managers were prepared to dress up the data or even be ambivalent about it, either to 
get noticed when desired or to avoid rebuke by Section Heads or Mr. AB and Mr. N. 
The above discussion indicates the different strategies employed by managers to 
protect and defend their positions They would challenge the mentor coach discourse 
of Mr. AB, either by playing victim, or by justifying their failings by saying they 
were too busy for GEMBA. They could also emphasise that the Section Heads would 
run the shop floor the way they knew because that mode of management worked, or 
they would offer alternative views of what was going wrong. In short they would say 
and do anything rather than wholeheartedly absorb Mr. AB’s suggestions on 
GEMBA. On the basis of my observation in the inventory meetings, I feel that the 
meetings provided an opportunity more for individuals to project themselves 
favourably and assert their relevance and importance, rather than acting as a forum in 
which people would work coherently towards a plan of action based on the lean 
supply chain management advocated by Mr. AB. The efforts of Mr. AB and Mr. N 
had limited successes but were also mired by major limitations. 
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6.5 The Case Study of Inventory and Organisational Change 4: 
Explaining the Scope and Limitations of the GEMBA Inventory 
Innovations in EWS 
Having discussed the inventory meetings, different management pathways 
and the responses of middle management I will now examine the limited successes 
and failures of GEMBA with regard to inventory and how these successes were 
undermined by failures in recording inventory and other delimiting factors that 
inhibited the effective implementation of the GEMBA initiatives with regard to 
inventory. 
6.5.1 A limited measure of success in institutionalising a new 
vocabulary of lean manufacturing and tightening the leeway 
which line managers and operators had to manipulate the system 
GEMBA did achieve a considerable degree of success in establishing, for the 
first time, an understanding of the importance of the lean manufacturing concept of the 
internal customer. There was an increased awareness about pro-actively tackling 
accumulation of inventory and streamlining the supply chain. Notwithstanding WIP 
errors, and owing to tighter monitoring of inventory, there was some degree of 
reduction and this was partly because the recession exposed the buffers which, in the 
lean manufacturing literature, give a false sense of normalcy. 
The internal customer approach had its greatest success in some of the areas seen 
by plant management as being critical to the manufacturing process, such as the engine 
assembly area. The GM, Mr. SDN, explained that in an internal customer culture, the 
manufacturing department would be the internal customer of the stores and the servant 
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of each of his counterparts in the production process until the finished goods reached the 
external customer – the buyer of the truck – with everyone behaving with honesty and 
sensitivity to everyone else’s needs. The main objective of the internal customer ethos is 
the tighter coupling of sequential production processes to enable a continuous flow of 
processes in conjunction with JIT; however, perpetuations of errors and record keeping 
mistakes in inventory meant that the internal customer concept was not successful 
uniformly throughout the plant. Indeed, it had a long way to go before it could be said 
to have permeated the organisation on the part of workers that they had an obligation 
to help make the job of the next operator on the line quicker and easier. That said, the 
internal customer approach had its greatest success in some of the areas seen by plant 
management as being critical to the manufacturing process, such as the engine 
assembly area. 
6.5.2 Understanding the limitations of specific innovations 
I will not broaden the discussion beyond the inventory meetings to discuss the 
scope and limitations of parts and the physical stock taking of inventories such as 
IOH. I will begin by explaining what is meant by IOH and standardisation. Although 
specific measures outlined in the roadmap and the GEMBA innovations intended to 
intervene to reform inventory management were envisaged by Mr. AB, Mr. N and 
corporate headquarters, the effectiveness of these interventions was affected by 
limitations that were both internal and external to the company. Drawing upon the 
preceding discussion on the errors caused by WIP mismatches and the inventory 
meetings, I will discuss three important bottlenecks that undermined GEMBA 
innovations. 
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An important causal factor, that emerged in our discussion and which seemed to 
me to be likely to undermine Mr. AB’s baby, the GIRAP, and thereby render GEMBA 
impotent – was explained by Mr. Ar. He pointed out to me that when the purchase 
managers raised orders against which the suppliers delivered their products to the 
stores, they did so without checking their records to see whether the particulars were 
right and that material planning had properly tallied the WIP and specifications of the 
components. This often meant that surplus materials either spilled over into assembly 
areas where it was not meant to be or corrupted CompCo’s inventory management 
system with erroneous data. This in turn meant that any GIRAP that was being 
discussed was open to question as potentially inaccurate or even incomplete because 
tallied and recorded components that were not needed had managed to find their way 
into the system when they should never have been in the work area in the first place. 
The hand to mouth work routine, the manhunts launched for urgently required 
components and the chaotic manner in which components were arranged adjacent to 
the production site, violated the fundamental tenets of 5S and the core of GEMBA, 
which depended on organised and methodical inventory management. It was evident 
that GEMBA did not make much of an impact here and that the impact of the 
inventory innovations was at best piecemeal and uneven. I could not but empathise 
with the line manager Mr. AK who would have to call on operators to launch 
manhunts for the components and then find them bundled carelessly together in 
another corner of the plant. Components were often not put away in the right place and 
operators and their managers regularly had to search for them physically and bring 
them to the line. They would have to bring two-three lots at the same time to feed the 
MDV assembly line which made a mockery of GEMBA’s methodical proclamations 
of regular completions of the cycle count, sorting and categorising base-line inventory 
and adhering to 5S principles on the line. There were also situations where rejected C 
 317 
value materials got into the assembly process owing to poor sorting or overlapping of 
these items from adjacent lines. But the Section Heads like Mercury would listen to 
none of these reasons for failure and would turn the tables on Mr. AK and blame it on 
his lethargy. Thus, as mentioned earlier, the inventory meetings, especially when they 
were attended by Mr. N, would provide excellent opportunities for the breathing of 
fire on to Mr. AK. 
This left the only way out, the final terminal option to resolve long-standing 
inventory mismatch problems. His procedure was keenly awaited by middle managers 
as it provided them with a temporary refuge from Mr. AB, inventory meetings and the 
tirades of managers such as Mercury and GEMBA, by enabling them to insulate and 
protect themselves because it was all consuming, requiring them to work quietly and 
continuously so as to ensure that they managed to complete the operation. The 
necessity of IOH underlined the perpetuation of system errors and attested to the lack 
of coordination between various departments in making sure that physical inventory 
was managed and its flow monitored. 
Manufacturing and assembly processes ceased in the work area as these 
comprehensive, cyclic counts of physical inventory took place. This meant that some 
operators and line managers could get a break away from the assembly line and 
machining process while the counts were in progress. IOH was used mainly for A 
value items (C value items were often given step-motherly treatment if they had to 
pack up the IOH fast). The IOH ritual would usually be carried out over the weekends 
or when the plant was a little less busy. A manual inventory count was made, part-by-
part, of each individual item present in the area. Jumbled up items sitting in the wrong 
areas were identified and traced back to where they should have been. The physical 
inventory was tallied. By weeding out components of different specifications sitting in 
other areas, identifying missing components and house-keeping the storage areas, this 
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time-consuming process would eventually allow physical WIP to be balanced so it 
equalled the system’s negative WIP and therefore eliminate the source of the 
mismatch that lay in physical inventory or software bugs.  
In my interaction with Production Control, middle managers such as Mr. AK 
and Mr. SMU, I found their approach to the process of matching online and physical 
stock to be highly selective. This could be attributed to two factors: first that they 
were sometimes exhausted and on other occasions they could not make sense of the 
entry of items in CompCo’s inventory management database. Thus the need for IOH 
became inevitable in assembly areas of the plant such as the engine assembly Shop 
Three and engine dressing areas Shop Six because kanbans would be triggered by the 
depletion of the stock in the line and in turn would trigger the system to direct the 
vendor to replenish the system. If there were bugs in the system, as there often were in 
the case of C value items, which needed constant replenishment, it was certain that the 
kanbans would be triggered frequently. The outcome of this conundrum was the 
frayed nerves of both assembly line operators and their line managers. 
It was clear that line managers found the IOH rituals a crutch they could lean 
on instead of GEMBA. Line managers would tell their Section Heads that all other 
activities were feasible only after completion of an IOH count, without which they 
could not make much headway in production, and that in any event GEMBA would 
benefit from making a fresh start with corrected IOH data in the GIRAP. An 
indication of the limitation of the GEMBA project’s attempts to wean middle 
managers off their IOH habit by active co-ordination, team work, 5S and regular 
cyclic counting was the periodic necessity of IOH in areas such as the medium duty 
vehicle assembly area. Mr. AB was of the view that if line manager did their root 
cause analysis and followed 5S systematically and did not look for short cuts in their 
job cycle, there would be no need of this IOH ritual. 
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Mr. SMU complained that on top of this IOH and production, he had the 
headache of doing GEMBA and it was clear that for many of them GEMBA was an 
imposed burden amongst their many other burdens and they complained forever of 
being slaves of the plant, sitting from 0700 hours to 2100 hours Monday to Saturday 
and even Sundays if there was a production-related emergency in EWS such as the 
need for ramping up production at very short notice. I later learned during a 
subsequent visit to the plant in January 2010 that Mr. SMU had died on 13 February 
2009 at the threshold of his house after a long shift at EWS because of a massive 
cardiac arrest. This reminded me of Beynon and Nichols’ caricatures of line managers 
and the capitalistic labour in their chapter about the capitalistic labour process 
[Beynon and Nichols, 1977:56]. Another point with regard to the counting done in 
CompCo [as pointed out by the late Mr. SMU, 1 May 2009, whom I paraphrase] is 
that the cyclic counting methodology was less effective than the previous “great 
counts” carried out once every six months or so that middle managers like him who 
predated lean manufacturing had been used to. They took longer but were very 
thorough and he saw them as markedly superior to the cyclic counting strategy in 
which small subsets of inventory were counted every-day; furthermore, they need not 
allow mechanisms designed to streamline inventory to become an end in themselves 
and to eat into the busy schedule of line managers who were caught between 
satisfying their departmental heads and goading operators to work hard. It was clear 
that line managers found the IOH rituals a crutch they could lean on instead of 
GEMBA.  
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6.5.3 WIP mismatches and recording errors in the inventory 
software make a well-coordinated long term programme of 
standardisation difficult to contemplate 
There were a few considerations to attend to by line managers who had to first 
establish which were the components that could be standardised for any two given 
models of engines or vehicles, the elimination of the components from the inventory 
stock in EWS that would be rendered redundant by the standardised component, the 
specifications that had be arrived at for the standardised components and whether they 
were either similar or distinct but standardisable through engineering modification. 
The kaizening suggestions made by the line mangers or GUL's and operators were 
conveyed to the Section Head and getting sanction from the finance department of 
EWS to sanction funds to make a prototype and then once the prototype passed 
quality checks during production and eventually the standardised item replacing both 
components is put into mass production. Material planning which would in turn 
codify the specifications of the standardised component throughout CompCo and the 
design centre would incorporated the modification and try to improve on the 
standardised item further. Material planning would pass the specification item to the 
suppliers to follow the new specifications or making necessary modifications in the 
computerised inventory management system the plant. Standardisation was an active 
policy to be pursued simultaneously by line managers, operators and the CompCo's 
component and product design centre located in the outskirts of Nellore. 
The bottlenecks to the standardisation initiative were pointed out by Mr. 
RGPN [10 January 2009] who said that each part number is specific for a particular 
model and though there are similar parts for similar product families, it may not 
always be possible to have a common pool of parts for instance in the assembly and 
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fit-ment process of engine components. Mr. RGPN also explained that although 
management wanted a common pool of identical parts ready to use for as many 
different production models in order to save on the costs of procurement from the 
suppliers and save on the inventory it would have to keep, this was not always 
practicable. He illustrated this by giving the example of an abrupt model or design 
change where the Marketing Department at Corporate Headquarters told production 
head in EWS that they needed x quantities more of model type a as against model 
type b immediately, whereas they had originally asked for y quantities of b which 
now needed to be either scaled down or discontinued outright because the market 
seemed to be demanding product b right away. There were limitations, in 
standardising models a and b because they were in fact different vehicles, but to add a 
further twist market conditions could change rapidly again rendering the production 
of model b in its turn redundant and indicating a need to shift to a further new model, 
c. Much time and money would have gone into standardising models a and b or 
components relevant to a and b and that investment might now go waste because they 
may not be required in the immediate future. 
This did not however mean that models A and B were totally extinct and there 
were example of models being resuscitated some time later. So, all this uncertainty 
tended to lead to the piling up of inventory and a diminution in the attractiveness of 
standardisation and made corporate management and Mr. N appear in poor light in 
front of line managers, Section Heads and workers because of the exactly the opposite 
effort of reducing inventory. There were limitations, in standardising model a and 
model b because they were in the end different vehicles and there could only be some 
distance that could be traversed with regard to standardisation of C and B value 
components and some A value items, but the market conditions changed rapidly 
rendering the requirement of model b less urgent. The shift in demand of a particular 
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type of model c which though identical with model a and model b may affect the 
specifications that were kept in mind in standardising model a and b respectively 
because the time, investment and inventory accrued of the older components specific 
to a and b and the standardised components common to model a and model b might 
now go waste because they may not be required in the immediate future but sometime 
later. 
The drive for standardisation had another serious implication for the company, 
which could not be ignored. I was given to understand by Mr. RGPN [3 February 2009] 
that up until some time back product design had been carried out in its entirety by a 
single group of people in the CompCo's component and product design engineering 
centre. However, recently, with corporate management aiming for each engineer 
acquiring a core competency of specific engineering skills, each group of engineers 
(usually young graduates) worked in isolation on specific areas of a vehicle, such as the 
transmission and its associated products, without ever getting to know the vehicle's 
organic history or the relationship between the other components specific to that model. 
The above bird’s eye vision led to a loss of continuity. The problem this brought about 
in CompCo by way of uncertainty and frequent component specification errors in 
addition to the already prevalent WIP errors in EWS inventory management system was 
explicated to me by Mr. RGPN where he said the design engineers at the design centre 
to cut and paste specific component specifications sometimes operated blindly and 
made mistakes in inputting values which led to specification errors at the very source of 
the supply chain. Mr. RGPN explained that this bird’s eye vision lead to a loss of 
coordination and continuity in design, as disinterest stemming from a loss of job 
satisfaction caused frequent component specification errors at the very source of the 
supply chain. These faults compounded the inventory WIP software problems already 
described elsewhere in EWS. Mr. RGPN alleged that low morale and a fall-off in trust 
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in their seniors, led many young engineers to quit for pastures new as soon as they had 
finished their training in CompCo’s design department in Nellore. CompCo was 
reputed to be one of the best developers of talent in India and these young engineers 
simply moved on to CompCo’s competitors such as Daimler Benz, who were the 
main beneficiaries of the slump in morale and who were supposed to pay better 
salaries. 
As Mr. RGPN pointed out, their replacements had to be trained from scratch 
in product design and the assigning of specifications to products and because the new 
incumbents did not know components’ specifications or the exact manner in which 
these specifications had been arrived at, thereby aggravating the mistakes further 
down the line. To cap it all, corporate management’s relentless drive to cut costs 
wherever and whenever possible meant that the numbers of even experienced staff in 
that department had been trimmed down significantly, despite there being a 
substantially increased work load because of standardisation. 
6.5.4 Contract employees and attempts to trim the wages bill 
CompCo's management was always trying to trim its waistline and it believed 
that the wage bill was an unproductive component of its expenditure and needed to be 
minimised in an expedient manner. As seen before and as mentioned to me by Mr. N, 
ideally at some point in the future he would want to see a stage where departments such 
as material planning stores were rendered redundant because of suppliers taking an 
active role in the self-certification of tools and consumables and the excessive 
bureaucracy in all departments in all plants in EWS needed to be minimised. Senior 
plant management resorted to outsourcing measures as mentioned in the previous 
chapter. It also hired temporary workers and tried gradually to ease out regular workers 
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and middle managers. Though temporary workers might save the wage bill, it did not 
necessary coalesce with the GEMBA measures to manage inventory, facilitate self-
initiative and promote troubleshooting amongst line managers and contract workers. 
Contract workers typically worked for an external agency and were hired to 
supplement the regular operator force in EWS. Since their duration of work was 
uncertain, managers could not establish a working rapport with them because by the 
time they did they would move over to some other manufacturing establishment. By 
the time they learnt the skills required for their job they may have left their present job 
and this meant that the new incumbent had to be taught his work. 
Line managers like Mr. AK blamed CompCo’s short sighted policies of 
outsourcing and deploying contract labour and found it unconvincing that senior 
plant management at the same time expected line managers and operators actively to 
contribute to reducing waste and continually Kaizen to eliminate excessive processes 
and labour. For instance, Mr. AK cited the example of the stores of each 
manufacturing or assembly area in EWS which bothers to accurately count part by 
part actual floor level inventory in normal circumstances of full production was is in 
contrast done judiciously by the stores in recession bound times. [Mr. AK, 11 
February 2009]. Mr. AK alleges that store count is not taken regularly and in normal 
times it is never done. He alleges that stores calculate stock only once in two weeks. 
Stores may issue material, but may not keep track because when it is tight there is 
quite a lot of pressure to bypass procedures. Mr. AK blames the binners who empty 
and refill the components needed for production, for not doing work properly and not 
putting the material in its rightful place. The stores people, in his view, are equally 
culpable in not tagging material systematically resulting in a manhunt for material. 
To examine Mr. AK's view on the stores, I went and interacted with the stores clerk 
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[3rd January 2009] in assembly Shop Three  who alleged that the company has hired 
contract workers in place of regulars. These contract workers are not familiar with 
the work place and many have to be taught from scratch over and over again. The 
line manager in charge of that store told me that about two years back there were 
twenty permanent employees who knew exactly where each component lay, how to 
tag it and how to bin the material, and knew intuitively where each component was 
located, and mismatch and mixing up of inventory was rare. This function has been 
outsourced to contract workers who may not come to work everyday because of where 
they are dictated to head by their employers. Now there are only two line managers at 
most who supervise the contract workers and they are responsible for organisation of 
the components, tools, consumables and sub-assemblies, and they report to the stores 
manager. Contract workers drive the motorised vehicles that move material around to 
the line. In EWS much of the day-to-day store operations are done by contract workmen 
and some of the areas in the engine machining shop are done by contract workers. Even 
if there was a problem and plant management would want to listen to stores, the head of 
stores would in all probability give a version that shows many of the junior stores staff 
in poor light and that he was doing all that he could to keep the stores running in 
optimal condition. GEMBA unfortunately has not reached the store areas and for the 
contract employees it does not make any sense at all. 
6.5.5 Patterns of reluctance and self-justification among 
managers rooted in their daily management activities 
The discussion on inventory meetings demonstrated the persistence of the 
vocabularies of targets over the apparent dominant change vocabularies of GEMBA 
and kaizening. It also demonstrated the difficulty of getting Section Heads to 
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participate in illuminated competing priorities which also caused the recursive 
culture of blame game between managers and departments, with Section Heads 
trying to absolve responsibility and line managers blaming other managers or other 
departments. The low attendance of Section Heads and as a consequence their line 
managers at the inventory meetings amplified the lower priority given to GEMBA 
GIRAPS by Section Heads over their own departmental priorities. From November 
2008 to early January 2009, Mr. AB found it hard to ensure attendance at every 
inventory review meeting during the early phase of recession. Attendance was so 
meagre that the GEMBA correspondent who kept a record of whether the GULS were 
sending in their records and attending meetings and who was a middle manager in the 
purchase department, had to call out each department's name and get a head-count of 
the number of relevant people represented at the meetings. I observed on many 
occasions middle managers, such as Mr. AK, the manager of the Production Planning 
and control department whose functions included overseeing the software process for 
issuing materials, overseeing production and supervision of operators and issuing of 
materials in the MDV vehicle assembly area, having to be chased by Mr. AB who ran 
through a list of phone numbers in his notebook to reach managers on their mobile 
phones to require them to attend. Line managers, in turn, would complain to Mr. AB 
that their Section Heads had held them back and they had to manage problems arising 
in the line and supervise operators in whose abilities they did not have full 
confidence. 
GULS or middle managers were working with their operators as teams to 
ensure that regular cyclic counting was going on instead of waiting for the 
cumbersome and tedious IOH [Inventory on Hand] option. The Section Heads falling 
short of the day's mandated production target were worried about rebuke by their 
superiors such as the DGM engine assembly and this might in the long run affect their 
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appraisal by their superiors and promotion further upwards in the hierarchy of EWS. 
By prioritising targets they found a way of deflecting blame to their line managers 
belying their intention of not taking GEMBA wholeheartedly and instead 
implementing it selectively. These recursive features of blame and a lack of trust 
between line managers and senior managers and operators undermined GEMBA.  
There was a multiplicity of agencies trying to make up their minds as to who 
could best initiate measures to bell the proverbial cat. Amongst them, were there 
many departments in EWS who were engaged concurrently in calibrating inventory 
but amongst whom there was little co-ordination? Their indecision caused 
considerable confusion which none of the sections involved in the material flow 
process, such as material planning, was prepared to admit. Instead, they blamed the 
problems on one of the other departments, Production Control, who in turn blamed 
stores and when everyone had finished blaming each other, they finally pinned the 
blame on the Quality Control Department. This pervasive organisational blame 
culture prevalent in EWS undermined Mr. N’s and Mr. SDN’s aim of implementing 
an internal customer ethos, within which each department streamlined its activities 
and the reconciliation of inventory began at the level of the operator and in the words 
of Mr. SDN, entailed the line manager and the operator taking responsibility for their 
job-cycles, and thinking carefully about each stage and the nature of the components 
used, so as to achieve the predictability of component usage that lean manufacturing 
required. Operators and middle managers would not then be able to dodge the 
consequences of poor quality. 
From Mr. AK’s perspective as a line manager it was not the shortage of 
systems, but the lack of co-operation and trust he encountered that was the source of 
his biggest problems. He felt especially affected by the doubting mind-set of his bosses 
and the way that caused them to treat people like him. Mr. AK’s colleague, Mr. SMU 
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told me that he and his colleagues [the line managers in Production Control 
Department Mr. SMU, Mr. AK and other line managers in that department which had 
about 35 line managers in addition to line managers looking after MDV line and was 
headed by the Section Head Mercury] were the “leashed overworked Doberman dogs” 
of the plant ready to be beaten or exploited by everyone whenever they felt like it, 
whilst other managers took life easy and passed on the blame. He said that they could 
be kicked and none understood their plight. I later learned that Mr. SMU had died on 
13 February 2009 at the threshold of his house after a long shift at EWS because of a 
massive cardiac arrest. One of the other things that worried Mr. SMU was that after 
purchase orders had been raised by the purchasing department, any changes in 
specifications needed to be avoided. But the practice of bad items not being weeded 
out in areas like MDV continued and they became mixed up in the final assembly 
with an inevitable adverse impact on quality and creating enormous problems for 
tabulation and necessitating reworking. This complicated and delayed the other lean 
manufacturing measures such as kaizening and self-inspection. Defective 
components could be arrested easily at some stages, but when production pressures 
were high and defects remained invisible during the engine’s assembly process, 
nothing much could be done but to wait for the rework team to start from scratch at 
the end when the engine was found to have failed its tests. 
Mr. AK for instance tried to fend off the allegation from Mr. AR and his 
Section Head that careless storage, or in his terms “binning” of material in the stores 
pointed out in the discussion on the WIP, lead to material becoming untraceable 
when it was most needed and he had to jostle between the Section Head, who was his 
ring master, and the GEMBA team’s relentless pressure aimed at making sure that 
the right components reached their intended recipients on time. This pervasive blame 
culture in EWS, undermined Mr. N’s and the GM Mr. SDN’s aim of implementing 
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an internal customer ethos an important precept of GEMBA, within which each 
department streamlined its activities and the reconciling of inventory began at the 
level of the operator and in the words of Mr. SDN, entailed the line manager and the 
operator taking responsibility for their job-cycles, and thinking carefully about each 
stage and the nature of the components used to achieve the predictability of 
component usage that lean manufacturing required. Operators and middle managers 
would not then be able to dodge the consequences of poor quality of the product 
because of not checking the quality of the component they are using for 
manufacturing and making sure that it is of the right specification. Section Heads 
were accused by Mr. N of failing to regularly monitor whether their line managers 
were taking a pro-active approach in suggesting measures for reducing inventory and 
monitoring the implementation of the GEMBA projects in their assembly and 
manufacturing areas. GULs and line managers in charge of preparing the GIRAP for 
their work area, wanted to defend themselves against the blame thrust upon them in 
these inventory meetings: accusations that they had not absorbed the GEMBA 
message of troubleshooting. They were consistently accused by Mr. AB and Mr. N 
of failing in resolution of imbibing solutions to inventory problems through robust 
use of all the measures identified in Mr. AB’s roadmap which was comprised of 
regularly evaluating the progress of shops in implementing and improving the 
material flow, its exhaustion through continuous pull and the transparency of the 
process reflected in MIFA. As illustrated above line managers adopted defensive 
strategies during the inventory meetings to protect themselves from blame. Some 
line managers were more adept in defending themselves against accusations of 
carelessness being levelled against them by their superiors while others preferred to 
listen to the rebuke of Section Heads who were clearly trying to prove that they were 
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on top of their role, in silence which pointed towards a pervasive culture of blame 
game within and between departments and individuals.  
In addition to individuals and departments blaming each other there was a 
multiplicity of agencies trying to make up their mind as to who could best initiate 
measures to bell the proverbial cat. Amongst them, there were many departments in 
EWS who were engaged concurrently in calibrating inventory but with little co-
ordination between them. Their indecision caused considerable confusion which 
none of the sections involved in the material flow process, such as material planning, 
was prepared to admit.  
6.6 The Impact of the Wider Context on the Management Of 
Inventory: Evolving Sub-contract Relations and the Recession 
The practical difficulties faced by middle management in EWS arising out of 
WIP mismatches were aggravated by the global recession of 2008. This section will 
consider how internal inventory control processes in EWS were affected by factors in 
the external environment, such as suppliers, and the downswing phase of the economic 
cycles being experienced during the global economic recession. The last section 
explored how GEMBA was undermined in a number of areas, thus undermining 
corporate management's attempts to cut costs through improved inventory 
management in EWS. This section will help us understand how changes in the external 
environment can affect management as they become vulnerable to the pressures of 
more powerful suppliers and in the process are forced to relinquish some control. 
During the recessionary months from November 2009 Mr. AB tried to 
troubleshoot components by fastidiously identifying product families, classifying 
them, sitting with each GEMBA and working to agree remedies for software problems 
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with the Head of Systems. The advent of the recession provided an extra spur to plant 
management to reduce inventory using the best paradigm known to them, which was 
the technique of tightening material flow and reducing excessive buffer stocks. In this 
context erroneous recording of stocks added to wasteful expenditure at a time when 
reduced orders and sales meant there was little cash-inflow into the company. 
However, the company had also to scale down on production volumes and close 
production lines and the effect of reduced production undermined employee 
commitment and hindered management's efforts to implement GEMBA measures by 
eliciting their co-operation in pro-actively targeting inventory reduction. 
6.6.1 The recession and the aggravation of conflicting priorities 
and organisational failure 
The recessionary pressures CompCo faced translated into internal pressures 
that intensified the social divisions among managers in EWS and the resulting 
‘blame game’. The recession that started at the end of 2008 and continued well unto 
the middle of 2009 led to what were in effect contradictory policies: on one hand 
CompCo wanted to reduce its inventory holdings but on the other it needed to push 
trucks out onto the market to ease cash flow. It could only have achieved this with a 
highly efficient lean system, which it did not have, so that increased production 
inevitably meant higher inventory. Thus the recession highlighted both the 
weaknesses of inventory management in CompCo and the attempts of EWS’s top 
management to remedy the problems through the very elaborate edifice of GEMBA-
based attempts to reduce inventory, using junior managers and operators working 
together to carefully reconcile and monitor inventory through the MIFA, the GIRAP 
and the software system they had put in to place. Corporate management wanted 
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tighter coupling of production processes and continual improvement in each and 
every process. But lean manufacturing could not provide answers to the questions 
raised by a situation in which reduced demand compounded the problem of excess 
production contributing to higher inventory. 
Although lean manufacturing and JIT were always being talked about and were 
implemented with a greater degree of urgency in WAP4, the newer plant further down 
the road, the urgent need to achieve accurate and systematic inventory management, 
which involved the selective application of lean manufacturing precepts, became an 
urgent priority for senior EWS management during the recessionary phase. Later on, in 
an effort to produce a respectable balance sheet (the rationale and the means by which 
is explicated further below), corporate management in Nellore decided it was time to 
ramp up production at short notice. Thus, after stopping procurement of components 
and putting the brakes on all forms of inventory accumulating in the plant, middle 
managers had no other choice but to treat GEMBA as second fiddle to the achievement 
of more immediate production targets that they were expected to deliver. 
6.6.2 Changing management policy during the recessionary 
months 
The recessionary phase aggravated the flaws prevalent in the inventory 
recording process and managers found it difficult to reconcile an accumulating 
inventory of A, B and C value components and finished products with mismatched 
inventory and WIPs. This difficult environment contrasted very sharply with earlier 
periods, with brisk demand and production in full swing, when the demand for 
inventory was robust and components entering the plant would be used up without 
much delay. As both the ethnographic and managerial accounts of lean manufacturing 
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literature would illustrate, the inherent wastage prevalent in the plant in this period 
would not be immediately obvious because of relatively quick entry and absorption of 
inventories and sub-assemblies. During such normal times of brisk production Material 
Planning, who were responsible not just for establishing what materials were needed 
but also for ensuring that components received met the specifications given to 
suppliers, were busy ensuring that the components passed quality standards and that 
Production Control received the components as quickly as possible. Minor inventory 
inconsistencies or the mixing up of similar parts used in different engine models would 
not cause undue concern because these issues could be dealt with in the actual 
manufacturing stages and besides there was an after assembly quality check team 
working away to ensure final product quality. The net outcome of all this was that 
positive WIP would be at manageable levels and would be consumed quickly. Given 
the pace of manufacture, any anomalies in material categorisation and inflow would 
either be largely invisible or would tend to be ignored because the priority was to 
maintain the pace of production. EWS was achieving its targets and the engines and 
medium duty vehicles produced were meeting set quality guidelines, so there was no 
need to worry about WIP discrepancies partly because they were hidden and 
buttressed by the rapid entry and exhaustion of material or because at that point of 
time their financial implications had not been perceived. 
Senior EWS Plant management wanted to put an end to these recurrent 
recording errors that were pervasive in EWS and also to ensure that money was saved 
by keeping orders to suppliers as low as possible. GEMBA now had to determine 
accurately the existing inventory levels through the GIRAPs in each shop, including 
those where production had come to a standstill as opposed to those in which 
production was continuing and where kaizening could help eliminate excessive 
components throughout the production chain. A consequent embargo on the 
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procurement of A, B and C value items lead to stringent controls being introduced to 
regulate the flow of materials but this often caused acute shortages, even when the 
production of individual engines for each of the different vehicle models was spread 
over a few days and the plants were shut on several days of the week. During this time 
there were instances of lapses on the part of Material Planning, stemming either from 
the supplier concerned being one that CompCo could not control or from inaccurate 
ordering. The EWS plant was closed for an average of five days a week during 
November and December 2008 and for about four days a week during January 2009. 
Thus the recession complicated the already strained inventory management system and 
aggravated the errors in the system. An illustration of the spasmodic entry of 
components and the pressure intermittent entry of components into the plant during 
these recessionary months, while the plant was working for only a few days during the 
week was illustrated by inordinate delay in issuing passed cleared tags for some of the 
A value critical items, which required quality certification by quality control because 
EWS lacked the confidence to grant every critical component suppliers to self- certify 
the quality of what they produced. While self-certification was a long term aspiration it 
was not possible to allow defective components delivered intermittently without 
ascertaining their quality much as senior corporate management wished to scale down 
material planning to a few managers and leave the responsibility for quality to the 
suppliers. This inability to certify and tag A items as ready to be used, arose because 
material supply as this phase was spasmodic in nature and because it was not possible 
for EWS’S Material Planning department to certify inflows within a planned schedule 
periodically as it could have done under normal conditions. This caused blockages for 
line managers such as Mr. AK who even with reduced production volumes during the 
course of the scaled down working week had to contend with the sudden clamp down in 
component supply and acute component shortage. 
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The failure to record and reconcile WIP carefully during normal circumstances 
began to become evident during the recession when management wanted to save 
money by reducing the procurement of items it felt were not needed following 
production cuts. As noted above in section 3 regarding the complications brought out 
through WIP errors for middle managers, it became clear that there were serious 
misclassifications of identical material families used in different but similar models, 
mismatches between physical and online inventory, incorrect specification of items in 
the BOMs of different product processes and significant errors in the tagging of online 
inventory became evident when inventory which began to pile up during the recession 
months. This created considerable and burdensome statistical problems for Material 
Planning, Production Control and Stores, each of whom kept separate records and 
contributed to the problem by entering incorrect data in the Comp-Co inventory 
database system which had been upgraded in May 2009 to meet MIFA and lean 
supply chain management principles. As the recession made its impact felt through 
declining sales, the pressure to minimise procurement costs increased during the 
recession and senior plant management looked to standardisation as an attractive way 
to reduce procurement levels of less-used components and cut cash outflows to its 
suppliers. During the recession Mr. N exhorted middle managers and operators to 
standardise inventory ranging from C value parts, such as nuts and bolts, to more 
critical components known as A value items, in accordance with lean manufacturing 
principles. In his opinion standardisation was a key objective for EWS and Mr. AB 
and the manufacturing departments were asked to liaise with Material Planning to 
hasten the process of standardisation. However, as was seen in the earlier section, 
attempts to achieve standardisation were not without limitations and were met with 
limited success. Standardisation efforts were also hampered by suppliers who were 
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less prepared to attempt innovations when working capital was tight and when 
operating costs were high. 
As we have seen the recession created a double squeeze on positive WIP 
[work in process] and inventory control. On the one hand procurement managers 
sought to save money and reduce risks by cutting down on orders for components 
from suppliers. On the other hand, marketing managers, under pressure because the 
vehicles occupying the company premises were adding to inventory and upkeep costs 
owing to natural wear and tear, were trying hard to maximise revenue by pushing 
products onto the market. Together these pressures exposed the limitations of 
inventory systems much more clearly and gave a heightened sense of priority to Mr. 
AB’s initiatives to tighten inventory control. 
6.6.3 Balancing the account books 
The pressure to increase sales (or even reduce inventory by shipping the 
unsold vehicles that were occupying considerable space in the EWS plant and would 
have to be worked upon to retrieve its brand new condition) became particularly acute 
towards the end of the financial year, as it had a direct impact on the balance sheet 
because of declining cash inflows and liabilities to suppliers. The balance sheet 
deterioration was a potential threat to the company’s share price. 
Subsequently, during the financial year ending months of March-April 2009 
when the balance sheets of each of the plants had to be supplied to add up to make 
CompCo's balance sheet, senior management in EWS decided to relax its tight 
inventory procurement policy and step up production in light of the urgency to 
improve its balance sheet but this relaxation could not easily succeed within the 
relatively weak system of inventory control. This expansion in purchasing and 
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production would have to be achieved even though the suppliers had stopped 
delivering components for over four-and-a-half months and had, as a consequence, 
severely disrupted the supply chain. Corporate management's plans for reforming 
CompCo's inventory assumed a fully functional plant but it recognised that given the 
imperative of a more respectable balance sheet, appearing in the balance sheet, it 
would have to work within the context of an imperfect inventory management system 
that was still very much work in progress and compromise on not meeting its slated 
GEMBA roadmap goals. For instance, I observed that, just prior to 31 March 2009, the 
end of CompCo’s financial year; middle managers such as AK spent much of their 
time chasing components needed for production and there was little time for any other 
activities. When production became busy, it was back to the material chasing game 
with middle managers like AK running to the stores on some occasions because the 
components they needed were not immediately available and needed to be brought 
back to the line. In his many interactions with me AK said that communication 
reached everyone especially through the ever pervasive email, mobile telephone and 
numerous meetings but I still wondered how long it would take to stabilise an 
inbound supply chain system to deal with sudden surges. He felt that no superior, 
showed empathy, appreciation nor cared for his plight. But the chaos in the storage 
areas adjacent to the MDV line did not explain the arbitrariness with which suppliers 
pushed through materials and the lack of mechanisms to deal with immediate inbound 
requirements when demand was high and production had to be ramped up. Part of the 
answer lies, in the economies of scale of larger suppliers and the Hubli suppliers who 
were not pleased with the EWS finance department at not getting paid during the 
recession. Their influence on the supply chain and GEMBA is explained further 
below. This chaotic process of scouring components through the stores, getting 
components urgently from WAP4 if they had the specifications, went on in parallel 
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with Mr. AB’s attempts in conjunction with Material Planning to brainstorm, ways of 
streamlining inventory management. 
The contradictory policy of relaxing inventory control and suddenly ramping 
up production was explained to me by Mr. R, the retired GM in charge of exports at 
CompCo, emanated unsurprisingly from corporate management’s mortal fear of its 
own performance appearing poor and its concern that pressure on the company’s share 
price sliding would set in motion a self-fulfilling prophecy of negative sentiment 
amongst investors and lower sales to nervous customers. They decided therefore to 
produce more vehicles and dispatch them to their dealers, irrespective of whether they 
had orders, which meant that the inventory of finished vehicles and hence the number 
of engines held in the plant would come down. The dealer would invoice the vehicles 
as sold by CompCo and later send it back to the plant. It meant passing inventory from 
CompCo’s storage area to the seller’s storage area but gave the cosmetic appearance 
of the vehicle having been sold. 
The surging up of production during the year ending months brought about two 
important organisational failures. The first of these involved neglect of quality, and 
was an example of a contradiction in lean manufacturing based quality standards. On 
earlier occasions when demand for a particular type of vehicle model was urgent, 
materials had been requisitioned directly by the line as and when the supplier’s vehicle 
entered the premises, thus bypassing the quality control check and stores, which 
resulted in components of doubtful quality going onto the line. The urgent need to 
meet the impending year-end financial targets, exacerbated by the recession whose 
effects on demand had fed through and could be felt in terms of lower demand and 
production, meant the company needed to reduce its stockpile of finished inventory. 
The surge in production implied a bypassing of the detailed GR&D process which, as 
was pointed out earlier, was not defect free itself. This neglect of mandatory quality 
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checks in the in-warding process of GR&D carried out by the inspectors of the 
Material Planning department, was blamed on delays on the part of suppliers or sudden 
surges in production given that during the year ending period the pressure to dispatch 
vehicles was high. In the last week of February 2009 AK told to me that at the year-
end of 2009, EWS had struggled to ensure that a minimum of 95 vehicles left the 
company each week and got to the dealers. Accumulating vehicles parked all over 
EWS made for a sorry sight for senior level plant managers such as the GM Mr. SDN. 
For instance during the first week of Feburary 2009, there was pressure to get rid of 
finished inventory stock and the MDV area had to produce and check the quality of 
these vehicles in 3-4 days in order to get the vehicles to the dealer’s warehouse for the 
last week of March 2009. Normally that process would take a fortnight at least. The 
above drive for a year-end surge in production after a prolonged lull compelled the 
Section Heads and line managers to be complicit in compromising quality because 
there was only so much work the re-work teams could do on defective vehicles. 
A second problem involved the ad-hoc nature of EWS management policy 
which involved window dressing of data even if it meant compromising on ethical 
standards. CompCo had been one of the two prominent players in the commercial 
vehicle industry but senior managers such as the GM Mr. SDN were clearer in their 
view that the automotive industry in India and in the rest of the world was cyclical. 
Poor results in the record books would manifest themselves in negative stock market 
sentiment and pressure on their ability to raise capital, which was the last thing they 
wanted in difficult times. CompCo’s senior management took a gamble on increasing 
production volumes, hoping that market conditions would improve. Given the 
imperative to produce a good year-end they felt that they had to reverse their earlier 
decision to terminate all production and procurement and this meant that they would 
have engines and vehicles ready to enter the market as soon as the first signs of 
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improvement were perceptible. This was not however a longer-sighted strategic 
decision, taken free from pressure, but a consequence of the window dressing 
approach driven by contingency. 
The arrival to a semblance of normal market conditions in June 2009 saw a 
return in demand and relieved the pressure on accumulating inventory in EWS. The 
streamlining of inventory supply and identifying and mapping out the process and the 
steps taken to clamp down during the recession had indeed brought down inventory 
levels of components. With vehicles being pushed out, the finished inventory in EWS 
also came down. The urgency of imposing GEMBA and lean kaizening, 
brainstorming on line managers and middle managers came down because production 
pressures and the return to daily production and sales targets made managers get back 
to the routine. As long as the senior managers like the GM engine development 
implemented their innovations and came out with newer ideas to implement models 
and did their deep dives once in a while to fix an area or machine line, the sales 
targets were achieved, they assumed that as long as they did their deep dives and 
periodically came out with product and design innovations using lean manufacturing 
principles such as allowing for production of multiple models in the same platform 
without avoiding frequent dye changes and getting everyone to kaizen to deliver 
profitability and vehicles which the marketing department could sell at competitive 
prices their task was more than accomplished. 
6.6.5 Varying degrees of influence exerted by the external 
suppliers to CompCo 
Certain large domestic suppliers such as Bharat Forge and multinational 
suppliers such as Deckel Maho Gildemeister [GMBH] and Bosch dominated the 
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Indian market and CompCo depended upon them supplying critical components such 
as connecting rods, upkeep and critical parts of critical multi-axle CNC machines 
which as seen in the preceding chapter were indispensable to the engine machining 
and assembly process. CompCo did not have the same influence over these big 
players and could not dictate the terms of trade as it could with smaller players in 
Hubli who manufactured less important and more generic components. Significantly, 
these big players adopted lean manufacturing practices themselves and speeded up 
component delivery by circumventing the gate entry and dispatch process, so it was 
not always possible to ensure that deliveries of components adhered to EWS’s desired 
standards occasionally because EWS trusted these suppliers and believed them. That 
in turn meant that GEMBA goals of a totally streamlined and planned material inflow 
could never materialise.  
For instance, on the engine assembly line there was a two bin system with an 
in and out bin; Compco wanted suppliers to take on the job of replacing the depleted 
bins with full bins as and when necessary. CompCo operated some arrangements 
under which manufacturers of A value components [A, B and C value items were 
gradations given to materials depending on their descending value by cost and 
importance] self-certified the quality of the components they supplied which relieved 
some of the pressure on EWS's Material Planning managers. However, the quality of 
components varied from manufacturer to manufacturer and although some could be 
trusted to produce components to the specifications laid down, other could not. This 
meant that relying on B and C value suppliers to operate a resupply system without 
quality checks was very dangerous. 
Big suppliers, however cause other problems by choosing to sequence 
deliveries to suit themselves rather than CompCo to achieve economies of scale and 
delivering in one lot to different manufacturers in Hubli rather than delivering in bits 
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and pieces. Deliveries were made in much larger consignments than CompCo would 
have wanted and in consequence EWS found itself entering a lot of material which 
the company did not want and could not manage to store, but had to receive because 
it was dependant on the goodwill of these big suppliers. This demonstrated clearly 
the power some bigger, multi-national suppliers, had over automobile manufacturing 
companies. Some of them supplied most of the big players in the Indian automobile 
industry and were able to turn the notions of lean manufacturing upside down and in 
the process pass more of their costs on to their customers. 
This happened in January 2008 and February 2008 during my stay in EWS and 
during the inventory meetings the piling up of decision inventory inflated each 
GEMBA’s inventory figures in the GIRAP. This created a sense of helplessness on the 
part of middle managers from the Engine Stores and their GEMBA and the Section 
Heads of Production and Material Planning. I observed that on some occasions in the 
inventory review meetings, that Section Heads and middle managers were resigned 
to the fact that corporate management had decided to keep this ‘decision’ inventory 
for better times in spite of it being conspicuous in occupying space in the storage 
areas and the self-evident need for it to be reduced. Decision inventory was inventory 
kept for future use even when the immediate need was not warranted. 
Therefore I argue here that the need to reduce inventory existed with the 
contradiction of material shortages at the same time because of the rationing of 
materials to the line either because powerful suppliers were squeezing the company 
or because smaller suppliers were being paid late and deliveries were delayed. In the 
recession months from December 2008 to March 2009 the smaller suppliers based in 
and around Hubli for instance, found it very difficult to run their organisations, pay 
wages and manufacture their components, when payments from their main client 
CompCo were not made on time. They were reluctant to supply without being paid 
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on time and the larger suppliers were spasmodic in their supplies. Without sufficient 
capital these smaller suppliers who were finding it difficult to pay their workers or 
find sufficient work for them and run the factory without working capital, stopped 
supplying to EWS as a mark of protest for some time. component shortage of C and 
B value items would not have been such an issue under earlier conditions when the 
reduction of inventory was not considered a priority and large stocks were 
maintained and CompCo could always bully smaller suppliers to fall into line. What 
is apodictic here, that there were different rules for bigger players and smaller 
supplier owners whose livelihoods depended on companies such as CompCo. 
Smaller suppliers operating out of Hubli and industrial areas of Bangalore had no 
choice to implement lean manufacturing or whatever manufacturing innovation they 
were told to do so by large companies such as CompCo including laying off workers 
or else risk losing custom and their local entrepreneurs running into heavy debt 
thereby putting their families in financial difficulty. Larger suppliers could flex their 
muscles and if need be relax on the precepts of lean manufacturing occasionally and 
could have much better terms of trade and flexibility to deliver regularly but with due 
planning. 
6.7 Senior, Middle and Lower Management at CompCo: Patterns of 
Experience, Outlooks and Career Pathways Reconsidered 
Section 5 above focused primarily on differences between departments and 
differences between hierarchical positions even among middle managers and how 
corporate management and senior management responses to external stimuli such as 
the recession and internal managerial contradictions discussed in section 4 such as 
the blame game and competing priorities affected middle managers and impeded the 
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success of GEMBA. I will now address the understanding of the career pathways and 
individual goals of senior management and middle managers, which is an important 
consideration in order to illuminate lower and middle management’s response to 
managerial consultant led corporate management innovations such as lean 
manufacturing. 
The conflicts and tensions between middle managers were also due to factors 
that went beyond the everyday challenges of meeting targets. The process of 
communicating the precepts of GEMBA with regard to inventory was fraught with 
difficulty because the proclamations of GEMBA had to be communicated within and 
across different managerial constituencies of senior or line management, each of 
which had its own expectations of what should emerge from its strategic exchange 
with the organisation. The difficulty in getting managers to apply the GEMBA 
inventory measures uniformly and consistently was described in the previous 
sections and this was intensified by the blame game, prevalent between different 
managers and departments, and the recurrent WIP errors that further complicated the 
implementation of GEMBA. 
This difficulty in getting GEMBA accepted and the challenges faced by Mr. 
AB in his efforts to implement the roadmap and get managers to take the initiative in 
identifying the WIP errors, should be analysed beyond the immediately perceptible 
flaws in EWS’s inventory management system and the difficulties it caused to line 
managers. Hence this section will draw argumentative resources from Watson’s 
strategic exchange perspective and will widen the discussion to consider the manner 
in which the longer-term patterns of experience, outlooks and career pathways of the 
middle managers shaped their perspectives towards their roles and indeed towards 
change management. Using examples from CompCo and EWS managers I will show 
that there is substantial analytic purchase in combining Watson’s perspective of how 
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the world-views of different levels of managers interact and shape the direction of 
organisations coalesces with Beynon and Nichols’ explication of managers who, as 
constituents of the technical system [p33,1977], have no other choice but to survive 
and ensure its continuity. Cumulatively, they offer a new way of understanding the 
process of management and the management of the labour process the managers are 
all engaged in. 
Section 2 outlined the patterns of managerial recruitment and progression 
within CompCo and commented on how managers occupying discrete roles in the 
organisational structure had shaped management policy in EWS. To paraphrase 
Watson, individuals bring their own agendas, priorities and private long-term strategic 
goals into the organisation they work for and interact with the organisation, which has 
its own history, its own ways of doing things and its own organisational ethos. These 
priorities and long-term strategic goals provide the lenses through which individuals 
view their workplaces, a process which Watson [2002: 213] terms as work 
orientation.  
Work orientations are the meaning individuals attach to their work, which 
predispose them to think and act in particular ways with regard to that work. Watson 
advocates the need for understanding the general patterns of work orientation amongst 
groups of strategy makers in trying to grasp the shared meanings and approaches that 
exist among them, as well as considering each individual separately. Managers enter 
into an exchange relationship, which Watson calls a strategic exchange between the 
individual and the organisation where these priorities and their acquired worldview of 
people and management interact with managerial projects and organisational 
imperatives and there is a constant iterative exchange relationship between the 
individual and the organisation. The more senior the person in the hierarchy of the 
organisation, the greater will be the significance of their particular exchange 
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relationship with it. Within the work roles managers occupy, they constantly define 
and interpret the attitudes, work histories and distinctive life experiences that they 
bring into their practice of management. 
Considering this interpretative relationship in which individuals as 
hermeneutic agents create meanings to constitute managerial vocabularies and their 
representations constitute discursive practices, we see that these discursive practices 
compete with each other periodically trying to dislodge each other as the dominant 
representation of management policy, as espoused by senior managers, that is 
applicable to all subordinates. Within this interpretative framework of viewing 
organisations Watson [2002: 214] argues that: 
“An organisation is not an entity equivalent to a person. It is a 
pattern of activities and understandings involving a range of 
human constituencies all of whom have their own interests and 
strategic priorities.” 
Senior managers control middle managers and direct their activities and they 
operate under the framework and structure provided by the overall organisational system, 
the maintenance and continuity of which is the main objective of this supervision and 
power, ultimately to generate surplus value. The hermeneutic world of managers as agents 
is interconnected to the technical system they operate under and whose continuity and 
success is the main aim of all managerial activity. I concur with Nichols and Beynon, 
[1977: 38] who explicate the meaning of the system: 
“The system is a bureaucratic system – a system of control. It 
programmes, monitors and processes the 'performance' of labour, 
including that of the labour of superintendence, which itself is 
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concerned with programming monitoring and processing in order 
to control.” 
As Nichols and Beynon [1977: 38] point out, the production process creates 
pressures on managers and requires them to control each other. If managers did not control 
each other the system would collapse and it is in this space of control that beliefs and truth 
claims about what constitutes the best way of managing and different vocabularies of 
management, compete with each other. At CompCo the corporate management sought 
tighter coupling of the supply chain, elimination of waste through GEMBA and wanted to 
transform the system of supervision into more subtle, direct non-hierarchical mechanisms 
of supervision and appraisal of middle managers over each other. Within this vocabulary 
(in the sense of what Wittgenstein implied by the representative nature of language), it 
expected everyone to use frequently certain terms that represent a culture dominated by 
self-discipline, pro-active troubleshooting, participation and problem solving. This 
contrasted with the accustomed vocabulary of EWS's senior middle managers which 
emphasised control, jobs, production targets and costs.  
Watson identifies managerial vocabularies founded on tight supervision and 
careful monitoring of costs with a perceived need for an ability to make rapid 
savings if an organisation’s costs began to exceed the return obtained and with 
various measures such as cutting 'headcount' sitting within a ‘systems control’ 
organisational structure [Watson and Harris, 1994:116]. Thus the emphasis amongst 
the senior middle managers directing manufacturing operations, was on reaching 
targets and training and managing the managers under them to enable those 
subordinates to deliver what was expected of them on the assembly line. Indeed 
senior middle managers’ appraisals and future career prospects depended almost 
exclusively upon their achievement of targets. 
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Therefore, although corporate management might set strategic priorities and 
longer-term objectives for the company, the decisions of senior management within 
EWS had a greater impact on the actual evolution of corporate strategy. It was these 
local priorities, rather than GEMBA, that prevailed in individual plants on a day-to-
day basis and formed the core of the motivation of those line managers and senior 
middle managers who were responsible for keeping the plant running. I argue 
therefore that it becomes very important to understand how the recruitment and 
career pathways of managers nurtured different management cultures and the 
perspectives, which governed the way they approached inventory and change 
management. 
6.7.1 The heterogeneity of middle management: the 
importance of both departmental and hierarchical 
differentiation 
As I discuss the career pathways of middle managers I register how the 
appraisal mechanisms of middle managers moulded their attitudes towards discharging 
their responsibility. There are differences between (a) departments and (b) hierarchical 
positions even among middle managers, both senior and junior, who hierarchically 
belong to senior middle management and junior middle managers who are further 
subdivided by age and vary in what they aspire to get out of theirs job in CompCo. I 
will demonstrate the manner in which the individual career aspirations of senior and 
middle managers have defined the ways in which they constructed vocabularies of 
meaning and beliefs that conditioned their ‘truths’ about managing and management, 
which vied for dominance with GEMBA as vocabularies for managing individuals 
and worker-capital relations and which cumulatively affected the outcome of change 
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management in CompCo. For instance within CompCo, corporate management 
included managers, such as Mr. VDS, who typically had spent a number of years in the 
corporate managerial world and were recruited for their international expertise and their 
ability to provide the company with vision and leadership. They sat right at the top of 
the organisational hierarchy and the owners of the company expected them to be what 
Watson calls the carriers of ‘corporate focus and responsibility’ [Watson and Harris, 
1999: 70]. 
I am in agreement with his elaboration of the phrase ‘corporate responsibility’ 
which denotes the ability of management to prioritise the objectives of the company so it 
was able to deliver quality to its customers and ensure its success and indeed survival in 
the rapidly changing market conditions of the automotive Indian automotive industry, 
whose changing contours I have already addressed in the India section. 
Those immediately below the COO, such as the Executive Director 
Manufacturing, might be recruited from other manufacturing firms on the basis of 
having a reputation of delivering corporate goals or might be new entrants to corporate 
management who had spent a number of years or most of their working lives in 
CompCo. These managers have climbed their way up to corporate headquarters after 
having occupied senior plant management roles, through their hard work were 
recognised as having delivered CompCo's targets consistently and been at the 
forefront of technical innovation. The organisational ‘tree’ at Appendix 1 shows the 
structure of the senior corporate management cadre. 
The second rung of senior management sat below corporate management and 
was comprised mainly of career men who were on the verge of retirement and 
typically were senior plant management such as the GM Mr. SDN and Mr. N. 
Individuals like Mr. N had invested a lot of their effort and energy in change 
management such as GEMBA and seemed to aspire to jobs at corporate management 
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level before they retired. While they did visualise the big picture of CompCo in 
relation to the competition it faced and day-to-day business objectives and targets, they 
had to institute new visualisations of vocabularies of GEMBA and make managers 
forget the older vocabularies of contingency management. Therefore they had to 
concentrate their attention on instituting and managing change management programs 
within and across all the plants of EWS they oversaw, with each plant having its 
distinctive set of contextual problems. They needed to appear to be cheerful, strongly 
driven and young at heart in order to motivate the younger recruits into the 
management hierarchy and in this way hoped to impress individuals such as the COO. 
By creating a favourable impression they hoped to further their career aspirations. 
The third rung of senior plant management was comprised of specialised 
managers with specific responsibilities for critical domain functions within the 
organisation such as finance, purchase, material planning and production as the 
organisational chart at Appendix 2 shows and were in CompCo parlance known as the 
GM’s who were much lower in organizational rank and power compared to the GM 
Mr. SDN. They have to make sure that their departments meet their targets and have 
to supervise their deputies and Section Heads to deliver their domains’ targets. Again, 
they were usually career men who had occupied similar roles either in other 
organisations or in CompCo. They were known for their loyalty to CompCo and in 
most cases their long innings’ but occasionally one or other would leave EWS to join 
another engineering company if better terms and conditions presented themselves or 
if there had been some internecine warfare with their superiors. Holding independent 
charge and only third to Mr.SDN and Mr.N was Mr.TRN a very competent and 
experienced manager the overall production head of EWS. He ensured that the plant 
functioned properly. Their position in the hierarchy is illustrated in the organisational 
chart at Appendix 3. 
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The fourth rung of managers were the deputies of the technical managers 
known as DGMs on rung three. These were the Section Heads who held the plant 
together and can be seen as representing the production cost vocabularies. 
The fifth rung of managers such as Mr. AB could be described as staff 
specialist Managers [Refer Appendix 4] with the objectives of a specific project 
borne in mind. They were recruited from the top management or scientific institutes 
in India and were tasked with implementing specific, project based objectives such 
as GEMBA. Even though they belonged to middle level management they tended to 
identify themselves with the senior plant management, with whom they worked very 
closely and whose aspirations they tended to share. These managers had a circle to 
square. On one hand they had to lead the implementation of corporate management’s 
transformational agenda and thereby meeting its expectation and on the other, that 
had to negotiate the authorisation of senior plant management for their projects 
whilst persuading senior middle management and line managers at supervisory levels 
to implement their agenda. 
The lowest rung was composed mainly of line managers who had spent 
decades in CompCo and had to meet divergent expectations of their Section Heads, 
reconcile errors in CompCo's inventory managers and get operators to meet production 
targets. As the GM Mr. SDN said; they were the cleaners-up of the mess others made 
and were the wheels of the plant. The younger generation amongst this group was 
envied by the older cohort for the facilities provided to them and because their youth 
and qualifications gave them a mobility in the labour market that their older colleagues 
did not enjoy. They might leave on any day were job prospects to present themselves. 
They were not bound by notions of loyalty unlike the GM and believed that the ascent 
up the corporate ladder to senior management could be traversed faster by changing 
firms periodically. CompCo's corporate management had invested a lot of money in 
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training these recruits and saw them as the future managers who would “engineer the 
customer's tomorrows”, even though it knew it would be difficult to retain them. 
6.7.2 The heterogeneity of middle management: introducing 
the role of career pathways and orientations 
As I mentioned in the earlier paragraph, distinctive management cultures 
were also linked to different career pathways and career orientations among 
managers, illustrated in Appendix 11. I will introduce below the main types of career 
experience and orientation by making a distinction between insiders and outsiders and 
using Nichols and Beynon's useful typologies of managers in order to develop my 
own. This will help register how these career routes and strategies could either 
reinforce or cut across the departmental and hierarchical contrasts depicted above. 
Understanding these divergent career pathways is made easier by the following 
matrix. 
 
Insider career managers External recruits 
Senior middle managers More senior company men Outsider recruits into senior 
management 
Junior managers Junior company men Younger shooting star 
managers 
 
I will build on the matrix by using a typology that will explain the career 
routes and ndividual career strategies of managers as follows: Outsiders, Senior 
Career Men, Shooting stars, Survivors, Firefighters, Fading Away Types and 
Opportunists. I will next elaborate upon each of these typologies by using them to 
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illuminate the contrasting experiences and outlooks of the various groupings of 
managers. 
Managers such as the COO and those immediately below him were 
cross-overs into senior plant management in CompCo, having previously worked 
in corporate management at Nellore, and brought with them into the plant some 
distinctive orientations. They could draw upon vast experience of overseeing 
CompCo or other plants and organisational structures in other firms and had a 
clear vision of the change they wanted. This was the rung of management into 
which managers such as Mr. N wished to move. 
These managers’ decisions had a decisive impact on the career prospects 
of other groups of senior and middle managers because in conjunction with 
management consultants they created the company’s corporate strategy and key 
change management decisions, such as the move to introduce GEMBA. The 
outcomes of their policies could result in many middle managers losing their 
jobs. Even though they took advice from senior plant management they and, in 
the final step the COO, were the final arbiters of the direction and outcome of 
management policy. They supervised all the plants within CompCo and it may be 
recalled that Mr. AB, Mr. N and Mr. SDN had periodically to attend inventory 
review meetings with them to bring them up-to-date with the progress being 
made in inventory reduction. 
The COO, Mr. VDS, presided over the governance of CompCo and sat at 
the very summit of the hierarchy, having had previous experience in “world class 
firms”. He had been head-hunted directly into corporate management after an 
extensive search using personal contacts amongst senior corporate managers in 
the global automotive industry. Recruitment mechanisms at senior levels, as I 
inferred from a conversation with Mr.RC [3rd January 2009], ranged from a 
 354 
combination of discreet word of mouth identification of talent in the industry to 
the use of executive search consultants operating world wide to secure managers 
with global experience in the best companies in manufacturing such as Boeing, 
Pratt and Whitney. The individuals approached received lucrative job offers that 
would help prevent poaching by industry rivals because as Mr.RC would say, the 
automotive industry was a very small world in which word travelled very fast. 
These top managers brought with them distinctive features of cultural 
capital and had their own views on how companies should be managed that were 
immune to the existing senior and middle management organisational ethos of the 
organisation they were entering. They also brought with them reputations for 
‘turning things around’ in the companies they had worked for and for steering 
those companies through the tempestuous waters of market instability and 
corporate change. This vision which was derived from their intentional experience 
in a phenomenological sense, served as the basis for the change management 
strategies they advocated and was the basis for their criticism of existing 
workplace managers. There was a perceptible insensitivity to the culture of the 
organisation they had been brought in to manage. 
Their vision, though overarching and long-term sometimes, resembled 
Chris Smith's [Smith, 2003: 354] comments on corporate strategy in which 
enunciation was an end by itself and its incessant revision with constant redrafting 
towards perfection seen as an achievement. Yet this approach to strategy was 
often intensely academic but incongruent with the realities on the ground. There 
was a perception of strategy as an essentially linear process which, if done 
correctly would produce almost inevitable results, rather than as something which 
was essentially emergent and needed to adapt and emerge in the specific 
environment of CompCo. 
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Senior company men perceived these managers as a threat both to the 
company and their own career advancement because of the authority they 
exercised. This was illustrated by the obsequious manner in which managers such 
as Mr. N spoke to Mr. VDS but it was now much harder for senior managers who 
were long-serving CompCo men through and through and at the end of their 
careers, such as Mr. N, to hope against hope that they would break in the pinnacle 
of corporate management positions of CompCo at Nellore after becoming the 
GM of a plant. They realised that because they had to compete with outsiders 
whose CVs boasted experience of working in and ‘turning things’ around in 
companies around the world, their prospects were limited. The age cohort of 
these senior corporate managers such as Mr. VDS and the team he lead, in 
Nellore, ranged from 52-65 years. 
The social strata of these managers such as Mr. VDS could be inferred 
from interest in golf which is not played very widely in India, their patronage of 
classical music and art, their discussion of Western and Indian genres of music 
and painting and their frequent trips overseas, typified their exalted social habitus 
and the cultural capital they were at pains to deploy and demonstrate. These 
corporate meetings were held at places familiar to them such as London, where 
the proprietors of the company were based, and industrial centres in the sub-
continent, the Far East, China, Japan and the US. 
The strata of these outsider managers at Nellore could equally be 
inferred from the chauffeur driven limousines they travelled in and corporate 
headquarters in Nellore, about which I learnt from Mr. AB and the trainee Mr. 
ABK, had an opulent ambience akin to that of a five star hotel, which 
characterised and showcased the company to the world and projected its 
ambitions to become a leading player across all the segments in the commercial 
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goods and passenger vehicle industry globally. Its ambition to engineer its 
customers’ tomorrows from this corporate Valhalla was in stark contrast with the 
grease and grime of the MDV area of EWS. And it was in this environment that 
outsiders recruited into the company and immune to its culture and ethos and 
resistant to its organisational practices could be contrasted with the experienced 
managers who had spent their careers in CompCo and previously with very good 
track records could have expected to reach senior corporate managerial positions 
and perhaps head the whole company. 
The point I am trying to make is that the success of the firm and the 
realisation of its goals and the firms outward projection reinforced and sustained 
the cultural habitus of the COO. This was very much a tale of two firms: one 
glittering with strategy and vision and futuristic technologically and the other 
conscious of its limitations and operating contingently in the grease and grime of a 
truck plant to, as experienced CompCo hands saw it, protect the company and 
produce its profits. 
As the organisational chart in Appendix 1 illustrates, the COO Mr. 
VDS, was aided by the Head of CompCo’s HRM who oversaw personnel 
management in the firm and devised payment, recruitment and training 
strategies. Immediately below the COO was the Head of Corporate 
Communications, who was responsible for constructing the image of the 
company. This key position, concerned with presenting the company to its 
shareholders, customers and other stakeholders was filled by a woman, an 
exception in an otherwise male dominated manufacturing organisation like 
CompCo where the few women if any performed administrative roles and tended 
to work in departments such as finance and occasionally in product design on the 
outskirts of Nellore. 
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Senior Managers in EWS, such as Mr. SDN the GM, exemplified this 
typology. The GM had long experience in the same company and like his 
contemporaries had climbed the corporate ladder to senior middle management 
positions after having started as young management trainees, fresh from 
university, three decades back. They had chosen to ignore offers from other firms 
and believed that by dint of hard work which they believed would never go 
unnoticed they expect to climb through the CompCo hierarchy. The GM had 
extended his tenure because he had a son who was paralysed and wanted to make 
sure that he could construct a home for such a physically challenged child and 
had committed himself to charitable causes. Although he was looking towards 
retirement corporate management valued his long experience in various posts 
across many functions in CompCo and he was totally committed to the company 
and willing to make personal sacrifices to address the firm’s problems. The GM 
had been due to retire a few years back, but considering that he was indispensable 
at a time of transition in EWS, he had requested an extension of service. His view 
was shared by corporate management who could see that his experience of 
keeping EWS going was far too important for CompCo to lose at such a critical 
time. 
Managers such as him had their distinctive reasons for continuing in 
CompCo after retirement and did not necessarily aspire to make it to the Board, 
unlike his colleague Mr. N. In the case of the GM, he also hoped that the 
extension would allow him to raise funds for his dream project, a home for adults 
with reduced motor, language or self-help skills. 
The GM believed in pragmatic realism and this approach of being 
constantly aware of the limitations imposed by constraints external and internal to 
EWS demarcated him from Mr. N who was up to speed with the very latest 
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managerial recipes and guru texts and wanted to see their implementation in 
CompCo. The GM, Mr SDN believed that it was essential to put EWS in good 
order before any attempt was made to implement lean transformation in the 
manner envisaged by Mr. N and in accordance with his favourite book Lean 
Thinking [Womack, 2003]. The GM was also aware of the limitations posed by 
suppliers and also that while efficient manufacturing practices through lean 
manufacturing could be useful in producing greater efficiency, over production 
was not necessarily the answer at a time of recession when the company faced 
critical short-term challenges and a fight to survive in a highly competitive market 
with falling demand. 
He believed in getting things right which to him implied managing 
employees, material and machinery with common-sense and reaching out to 
suppliers in order to work with them, identifying their problems before 
implementing any overarching programme of change management. Equally 
subtly, the GM was a firm believer in having a quiet chat with other managers 
and operators when there were problems rather than making demonstrative 
gestures. He believed in keeping a low profile and being a very modest man and 
wanted to build consensus within the plant and to see that consensus reflected in 
positive outcomes. The GM's managerial approach is well represented by the 
following pre-requisites for a managerial role identified by Watson and Harris 
[1999:104] 
a) The importance of interpersonal relations in all business matters. 
b) The need to be liaising and persuading if you want anything to get done. 
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c) The importance of communications and having to build contacts with 
all the agencies you have to deal with. 
d) How you have to listen and always see things from the operator's point of 
view before you make a decision. 
e) Establishing networks and listening constantly. 
f) Building trusting relations with the people whose help you need in getting 
your job done. 
The GM, Mr. SDN, valued all these principles but establishing networks and 
listening constantly were at the very heart of his managerial project in EWS. His 
pragmatic realism was reflected in his belief that the company needed to monitor its 
markets incessantly and identify products the market needed to fill its order books 
rather than making over-engineered products that might sate corporate management’s 
obsessive desire for quality for its own sake, which he argued afflicted some of the 
proponents of lean manufacturing, but incurred delays to market and excessive costs 
with poor returns for the company. Mr. SDN believed that the road transport 
conditions in India and the almost certain inability of CompCo to force large suppliers 
to adhere to JIT would undermine lean manufacturing and its effectiveness in the 
context of the Indian automotive industry. He was also had a clear view of the coercive 
consequences of lean manufacturing regimes, as amplified by recurrent management 
labour tensions in nearby automotive plants made which made it clear to him that he 
could push work-intensification only to a certain point. What mattered to him was the 
ability of line managers and permanent CompCo workers to work together in order to 
secure gradual gains in efficiency without recourse to the overtime working that 
typified many lean operations. Instead, he believed, creating a camaraderie amongst 
 360 
employees would cause them to work a little longer of their own free will whenever 
the company needed their services. The GM felt that Mr. N, who prior to being 
appointed as the overall head of the GEMBA project of CompCo, had headed the 
overall end product quality assurance apparatus of EWS [Refer Appendix 3]ought to 
have known, the structural constraints EWS operated under better than anyone. 
Mr. SDN wanted Mr. N to be more selective and concentrate on getting 
people to actively imbibe GEMBA’s vocabularies more voluntarily instead of just 
expecting people to participate half-heartedly. He was clear that voluntarism and 
emotional commitment would allow the company to implement measures such as the 
GEMBA inventory roadmap, with everyone understanding what needed to be done, 
rather than acquiescing in a top-down initiative driven by senior management. His 
conclusion implied that the GM was aware of the inability of the GEMBA team to get 
operators and middle managers to adopt lean supply chain management practices 
wholeheartedly and inculcate the various guidelines which Mr. AB had proposed. 
On the other hand managers such as Mr. N were seen by many to be all pomp 
and flamboyance personified in his conduct described earlier in the inventory 
meetings section. Mr. N had sensed the change in the wind with the dynamic COO, 
Mr. VDS, having a greater say in the company and was desperate to be in his good 
books and, in my opinion, get promotion onto company’s board before hanging his 
boots for good. He saw board status and a role in corporate management after all 
these years of working in EWS as carrying the prestige and immense authority he 
deserved. Getting on the board was becoming increasingly difficult because of the 
limited number of spaces available and the possibility of lateral entrants from other 
companies competing with him for the post. If he wanted this preferment, Mr. N 
could never be perceived as accepting the current limitations in CompCo's production 
and managing within those limitations because that would mean that he would appear 
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unenthusiastic and unwilling to embrace change in the way personified by the COO 
Mr. VDS. 
As I have shown in the context of the inventory meetings and Mr. N's style of 
management, Mr. N tried to mask his authority by deploying a vocabulary that would 
make him appear to the attendees to be a nurturing coach and empowering agent 
mirroring the mentor style of management and ascribing towards being a facilitator of 
the attributes that characterised the learning organisation. [Senge, 2007] However, 
Mr. N would only go so far in having in countenancing an accommodation of the 
operator's perspective. He did not have the patience to build contacts and listen, two 
of Watson's pre-requisites for successful management: instead he expected operators 
and line managers to possess the right mind-set, as he saw it, and meet his 
expectations without effort or persuasion on his part. He wanted deliverables and 
would jettison his ‘coach’ demeanour and become blunt and direct with erring 
subordinates, such as Section Heads, without much provocation. Then the persona of 
coach and motivator in him would be replaced by a more direct authoritarian style that 
emphasised deliverables, with the aim primarily of instilling fear and respect amongst 
subordinate senior and junior middle managers alike to make it more likely that they 
would deliver the GEMBA project’s targets. 
Mr. N was constantly engaged in thinking how to engineer CompCo’s 
tomorrows in synchrony with the thoughts of Mr. VDS, with whom he made operose 
efforts to be friendly and attentive to everything that Mr. VDS spoke, never ever 
attempting to disagree with him. He thought that he identified himself with the COO’s 
vision for CompCo of which I got to know a few fragments, both from his phone calls 
to Mr. VDS and his chats with me during the ride back to Bangalore. During these 
journeys I listened to Mr. N’s vision for CompCo as a world class, lean and 
functionally contiguous organisation without many of the departments, such as stores 
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and material planning, that he viewed as drag coefficients on the company. He had 
direct access to Mr. VDS and in his capacity as the head of GEMBA spoke to him on a 
more regular basis than almost any other manager and had to concur with Mr. VDS’s 
future vision of a company incorporating the best practices of the global automotive 
industry. He said that although a ‘tipping point’ had been reached he would often point 
out to the popular aphorism that ‘Rome was not built in a day’ when the limitations of 
human and productive capital in CompCo were singled out. As I have pointed out 
above, this tenacious but optimistic perspective on managerial strategy contrasted with 
the more low-profile pragmatic realism of Mr. SDN the GM of EWS. 
Senior Middle Managers represented a bridge between corporate management 
and senior plant management and supervisory line management. They were the 
adhesive that held the plant together and ensured its uninterrupted day-to-day 
functioning. The implementation of long-term change management projects could not 
be guaranteed without the plant’s uninterrupted functioning so they occupied critical 
roles. Senior Middle Managers represent the segementalist tendency and for their own 
survival in the firm had no other choice other than to speak the language of numbers 
and targets. 
Section Heads such as Mercury commanded fear and respect amongst 
operators and line managers. In times of crisis such as industrial accidents and when it 
was time to ramp up production at very short notice, the long standing networks and 
personal rapport cultivated and enjoyed by senior middle managers such as Section 
Heads with senior operators, who in-turn influenced other operators and their hands 
on control over employees and line managers was undoubtedly of more immediate 
relevance to the company rather than the theoretical constructs of GEMBA. Both the 
survivors and the fire-fighters had spent virtually all their working lives in EWS and 
were fiercely loyal to the company. Managers such as Mercury, the boss of Mr. AK 
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and the late Mr. SMU, and who tended to be in their late forties or mid-fifties were 
willing to endure great problems to make sure that they were never ever late for 
production and so began their 2 hour commute to the plant at the crack of dawn and 
stayed late into the night if required. 
One of the outcomes of my feedback on the state of GEMBA, where I 
mentioned the continued presence of line managers in the same departments for many 
years giving rise to a dominant subculture and a segmental outlook, was the breakup 
of the group of a triumvirate of line managers Mr. AK, the late Mr. SMU and Mr. ISC 
who were all in their early fifties. In December 2009 the GM Mr. SDN transferred 
them and other entire blocks of line managers and operators from EWS to the other 
plant, WAP4, to disrupt their subculture. I became aware of this development, when I 
went to EWS to enquire about developments after my exit from the field.  
It was evident to the GM Mr. SDN [24 January 2011] that the company could 
go only get so far by belittling line managers such as Mr. AK and Mr. ISC who had to 
maintain inventory records, take the GEMBA message to the line and monitor 
operators. These managers would not rise much higher in the hierarchy and in the 
view of Mr. SDN were unemployable elsewhere but had skills specific to CompCo 
and could be called upon at any time of the day to meet any contingency. Though 
widely perceived as inefficient by the GM, he said that they were a necessary evil as 
these line managers cleaned up the mess other managers and operators had made and 
the reason for using the word ‘survivors’ is because that is the phrase the GM Mr. 
SDN used to best describe them. The plant’s running and orderly functioning relied 
upon such committed career-people who were tenacious survivors and had seen many 
a management buzzword come and go as their hair had become white in the many 
years they had spent in EWS, the GM, classified managers such as Mr. AK, Mr. ISC, 
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the late Mr. SMU and the disciplinarian Section Heads such as Mercury were the 
rivets that held EWS together. 
The GM Mr. SDN attributed this instinct to survive rebuke and continue 
working, as being attributable to the same qualities of tenacity and persistence these 
managers displayed to evade transfers and continue in the same departments. He 
described this as symptomatic of ‘the old man and the sea syndrome’ and saw them as 
possessing the attribute of timelessness. When pushed at an earlier point of time by 
the GM to comment on what I thought about the triumvirate of line managers whom I 
had spent considerable time with [April 2009, when I was following up Mr. AB’s 
inventory GIRAPs], I had in very vague terms indicated to Mr. SDN [April 2009] this 
tenacity and their ability survive their superior Mercury’s periodic humiliating 
dressing down sessions. They were comfortable with their colleagues whom they had 
known for many years and did not want to trade that accomplished sense of 
familiarity for any other job outside their immediate surroundings. The measures they 
adopted consisted of rectifying the flaws Mercury had pointed out in their work and 
doing everything to satisfy him combined with the deployment of an array of 
defensive mechanisms that ranged from impenitent silence to arguing incessantly 
about the definition of any given situations. They had developed tacit and non-verbal 
understandings and camaraderie had come to develop over the years by working on 
the same desks and assembly lines and these enabled them to handle managers such 
as Mercury, who they rightly predicted would eventually tire and climb down. The 
promotion prospects of these managers depended upon their appraisal reports 
prepared by their Section Heads such as Mercury but both the GM, Mr. SDN, and Mr. 
N ensured that reaching important GEMBA milestones such as those mentioned in the 
roadmap, which were broken down into weekly targets, now constituted an important 
consideration in the promotion prospects of these managers. 
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Mr. AK and others lived modestly and had managed to accumulate substantial 
savings because most of their day revolved around EWS and they rarely took 
holidays. Evidence of this emerged when he told me had managed to build his own 
house in a street in which other EWS line managers lived and let them rent it, which 
afforded him an additional income. Later in January 2011 when we met, I noticed that 
Mr. AK had managed to move from a two-wheeler to purchase a car which he would 
pool with other line managers when required to commute to work. 
There was another generational strand of lower middle managers, such as Mr. 
RGPN and Mr. SGM [now a manager overseeing the Pre Delivery Inspection Area, 
who had started his career in WDP4 as an operator but moved to the other end after 
passing the recruitment tests and had been in CompCo for nearly twenty five years], 
who did their work sincerely and quietly, meeting the company’s requirements 
without wanting to stick their necks out too far and getting blamed for what they saw 
was not their creation. They wanted nothing more than to finish serving their time 
after which they would fade away into retirement when they would concentrate on 
other priorities in their lives such as being indulgent grandfathers to their daughters’ 
children or, in Mr. RGPN’s case, look after the orphanage which he helped [Mr. 
SGM, 24 January 2011; Mr. RGPN, 26 January 2011]. 
In the face of GEMBA their coping strategy was to lie low. These managers 
were survivors who, like Nichols and Beynon’s line managers, could not find 
employment anywhere else because it was too late for them, as single company men, 
to learn new skills. As survivors, they would do what was needed to survive but not 
much more. 
Nevertheless, CompCo needed this organisational constituency, for its intimate 
knowledge of the plant and their ability to keep it running at times of stress but was not 
interested in furthering their careers anymore or investing resources in them. 
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Within EWS there were inter-generational tensions between insiders and 
shooting stars occupying different positions in the organisation that were accentuated 
by their different backgrounds. For example, the key GEMBA manager Mr. AB 
came from Northern India and could barely understand or manage to speak a few 
words of any of Tamil, Kannada or Telugu, the three southern languages spoken in 
Hubli. He tried to be Phil of Beynon and Nichols [1977:35] but failed eventually in 
spite of his genuine and sincere efforts to implement GEMBA and not to upset 
anybody particularly senior middle managers who resented his lateral intrusion into 
their organisational demesnes and saw him as a junior upstart and a threat to their 
authority. As a northerner who could not speak the same languages he was more 
easily distanced. 
Mr. AB belonged to a newer generation of managers who could be seen as a 
particular sub-type of ‘career-shooting star’ and as a specialist had made a dramatic 
entry into the habitus of the careerist managers of CompCo laterally, more or less as a 
gate crasher. His promotion over the heads of many managers meant that he carried 
the imprimatur of corporate management who for all practical purposes considered 
him at the threshold of senior management. The fact that he had direct access to 
corporate management in Nellore, a luxury not enjoyed by most middle managers 
who had to go through their departmental heads or go only when summoned, a 
prospect they dreaded because it would mean a dressing down or on rare occasions 
that they had to attend an award function for winning a GEMBA Empower festival 
prize or collect a souvenir just before retirement. Mr. AB was expected to be a very 
successful manager delivering results and was remunerated accordingly. 
The difference in styles of management were stark: in contrast to Mr. AB’s 
kaizening, troubleshooting and coaching vocabulary and wide management repertoire 
sat the vocabularies of targets and numbers deployed by fire-fighter senior middle 
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managers such as Mercury who was schooled in being blunt, hands-on and getting on 
with the job even if it meant shouting at subordinates. 
Mercury had little time for polite niceties in his dealings with Mr. AK, Mr. 
SMU and Mr. ISC. Underlying his management style was an implicit acceptance that 
whatever the company did was for the common good and should be complied with. 
He and his firefighter colleagues saw no reason to seek greater efficiency through the 
process of dialogue, persuasion and participation that was readily accepted by the 
newer generation of managers, whose entry cut right across the company’s hierarchy. 
In contrast the fire-fighters believed in ‘doing things on the spot right’ and 
were certain that through tight management they could manage to deliver the same 
outcomes promised by lean manufacturing in terms of cost, quality and quantity more 
easily. This contrasted with the more theoretical outlook espoused by the newer 
generation of managers such as Mr. AB who I noticed wanted to be up to speed 
reading the latest issue of the Harvard Business Review. 
As I have explained the mutual undercurrent of subtle antipathy was reinforced 
by cultural contrasts between Mr. AB and careerist senior plant managers and senior 
middle managers of CompCo. But he also faced difficulty in breaking down the 
distance between himself and the operators, who found him very theoretical and 
technical. Although they talked to him politely, they absorbed what he said only 
partially and occasionally with difficulty. Thus, if they met him at all they met him 
half-heartedly and could not concur with his world view, however hard he tried to 
convince them. 
The inventory meetings clearly brought home to me the fact that the older 
generation of managers were more authoritarian with regard to their subordinates, 
refused to admit they could be wrong and were resistant to being ‘talked around’ by a 
person who was much junior to them in age. In the inventory meetings some of the 
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middle managers would indulge in cross talk in Tamil, a language AB could scarcely 
understand as soon as the first opportunity presented itself, for example when he had to 
take a phone call from the Executive Director Manufacturing in Nellore or deal with an 
inventory management question from either the Northern or Central Indian plant. The 
younger Mr. AB who was in his late thirties, and his contemporaries were less inclined 
to loyally serve one employer until the end of their careers, quite unlike long 
established managers in EWS who had started as apprentices after their engineering 
degrees and risen up the career ladder in the same company, being rewarded for their 
loyalty and hard-work by promotion. As I have noted in the inventory meetings 
section, AB would try to get across his point in an English laden with technical 
vocabulary which was fine with senior managers such as Mr. N, the GM Mr. SDN, the 
widely travelled COO, Mr. VDS and the individual domain heads of functional 
departments and to a significant degree EWS DGMs, GM and Section Heads. 
However, this vocabulary was sometimes incomprehensible to lower level line 
managers and operators who preferred to speak Tamil mixed with some English. 
As mentioned earlier, Mr. AB had invested an enormous amount of energy 
and time in GEMBA preparing its roadmaps, doing the GIRAPs and trying to get 
veteran senior middle managers, who had seen many a management fad come and go, 
to cooperate and take the initiative in aggressively reducing inventory. His efforts to 
get them into developing a scientific methodology that pre-emptively would reduce 
waste and cut costs, measures that required additional diligence and time over and 
above the production activity on which all their efforts were concentrated, meant that 
often he had to stay in the factory very late or be away from his young family. 
As mentioned earlier the underlying generation gap between the shooting stars 
and the company men was illustrated by the way Mr. AB got along with younger 
graduate trainees and certain middle managers. I presumed that being the younger 
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generation of managers he and his contemporaries were more comfortable with the 
apparent atmosphere of informality that characterised some of the companies in the IT 
industry located, just down the road from EWS near Bangalore, rather than with the 
measured strategy and vocabulary of words he had to use whilst talking to old timers 
in EWS such as Section Heads and the Head of Material Planning, Mr. TMS. Thus 
the shooting stars developed a separate way of talking and behaving, very distinct 
from that of the company men. I learned later from managers such as Mr. RGPN and 
the trainee Mr. ABK, who has since left CompCo, that Mr. AB was disappointed with 
the way GEMBA was going and that differences had developed between himself and 
Mr. N who epitomised pomp and flamboyance. Managers such as Mr. AB were also 
constantly on the lookout to advance their careers, in other companies if necessary, 
and such differences and the inevitable frustrations could lead them easily to move on 
to pastures new. 
As young graduates or trainees these employees had limited experience and 
only tacit knowledge of CompCo’s organisational ethos, but they showed a 
willingness to adapt to new tasks. But the GM Mr. SDN admitted that in contrast to 
their older colleagues they wanted to try to avoid the ‘grime’ of the shop floor if at all 
possible [Mr. SDN, 27 January 2011]. They were also shooting stars and the senior 
management knew that they would not stay long within CompCo, even as it invested 
substantial resources in training. This was demonstrated earlier in the example cited 
by Mr. RGPN, where design engineers were leaving the firm. They were ambitious 
for advancement and more than ready to move firms to achieve it, resulting in a high 
turnover of junior managers. This generational group, along with the main body of 
shooting stars, believed it would rise higher in the managerial hierarchy by changing 
jobs frequently, with each job in the new firm offering higher pay and status. That 
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outlook contrasted with the older generation that cried out for job security and saw its 
future inextricably linked to a single company. 
On the other hand for the opportunists who were just starting their careers, the 
burgeoning IT industry and its attractive pay packages and perceived excitement 
compared favourably with the tedium of manufacturing jobs and meant that CompCo 
had to struggle hard to retain talent. The GM Mr. SDN opined that the notion of 
company loyalty had changed so that these people had to be paid the best salaries and 
given all reasonable amenities such as accelerated training and the latest notebook 
computers. These gate-crashers, as Mr. SK who held a clerical post in the financial 
audit section in the second floor of the EWS administration building [refer Appendix 
8], who had become a manager after starting out as an operator, liked to call them, 
were resented by the survivors, the line managers and senior line managers who had 
to ensure that the plant functioned. They believed that these younger managers would 
benefit from ‘seeing the real world of the line’ rather than sitting in air-conditioned 
cabins preparing drawings and graphs. This point was acknowledged later when 
trainees began to spend more time in the line but EWS management was reluctant to 
demotivate them at the beginning of their careers, not least because manufacturing 
paid lower rates of pay than the service sector to which they might otherwise be 
attracted. Yet, despite its concern to keep them and in spite of its expenditure on 
them, CompCo saw a high rate of turnover amongst the opportunists. 
I conclude by observing that the cohort visualised by me as a fieldworker in 
EWS would be the last the generation of career managers of CompCo and that 
eventually they would give way to managers who were given more stringent 
performance parameters to adhere and whose employment would be predicated on 
shorter employment contracts rather than employment for life. Hence I argue that, 
patterns of recruitment, commitment and career pathways affect the strategic 
 371 
exchange between managers and shape organisational structure as much as it shapes 
managerial policy. 
6.7.3 Resume: The interplay of departmental segmentation, 
hierarchical positions and career orientations in the experience 
and activity of CompCo managers 
Whilst career pathways and orientations to some extent cut across and 
complicate the effects of departmental and hierarchical differentiation, departmental 
divisions remain important while hierarchical relations remain pivotal. As soon as Mr. 
AB left the company in December 2009 after my fieldwork and Mr. N was promoted 
upwards to head WAP4, GEMBA lost its champion and its essential vigour. Even 
though its practices were followed, the grand vision of lean transformation lost some 
of its impetus and overriding pre-eminence within the company. Mr. AB was an 
important pivot in the GEMBA project and losing him meant the loss of the engine 
that drove lean manufacturing forward. 
6.8 Conclusions 
This chapter addresses two competing vocabularies: of the vocabulary of 
immediate targets and strong management with the vocabulary of persuasion, 
participation and the achievement of longer-term aspirations through lean 
manufacturing. 
The implementation of a new system of inventory control led by corporate and 
senior management sought to improve on the extant procedures by establishing a 
more tightly regulated and recorded flow of components which would allow savings 
through stock reductions, without jeopardising production schedules, provided the 
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new system was implemented in the methodical manner envisaged. However, the 
proposed procedures did not abolish persistent tensions between the competing 
objectives of immediate production and longer-term reduction in stock levels, and 
these tensions were manifested in the competing priorities of different mangers who 
gave foremost priority to the preservation of their own functional domains. 
Limitations of time, person power and competing vocabularies and imageries 
were particularly important in making it difficult to reconcile these competing 
priorities and so generated subterfuges and provoked disagreements between 
managers and across departments. These factors also had a broader temporality, as 
changing market conditions led to shifts in pressures within the company and 
different generations of managers, each with its own aspirations and expectations 
towards work, drew on their personal experiences and reflected its own interests. 
The pressure to reduce inventory brought out the tensions between the 
competing rhetoric of long-term change management and the rhetoric of the short-term 
meeting of targets to preserve the company’s bottom line. Importantly, this section also 
links the pressures of inventory management to the career pathways of managers by 
drawing conceptual resources from Nichols and Beynon and from Watson. 
And underlying these other factors were the effects of the recession and stock 
market pressures that forced corporate management to react focusing contingently on 
meeting the targets necessary to produce the presentable balance sheets that were 
immediately important for the company’s survival. Thus lean manufacturing had to be 
accommodated within an environment of complicated uncertainty and I therefore 
advocate a critical realist and pragmatic appraisal of regimes of production and their 
adoption in different economic and social contexts. 
The patterns of disagreement and subterfuge and conflict did not of course just 
run horizontally between departments or within project groups (and out beyond the 
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organisation into the network of suppliers) but were strongly linked by vertical 
relations both within the management hierarchy of senior, middle and junior 
managers but also between managers and shop floor workers. 
In this regard although the original exponents of change and the sponsors of 
new systems may have been specialist managers, the systems had to be implemented 
by designated middle managers whose compliance could not be taken for granted. 
Meanwhile, other middle managers, along with their subordinates, were likely to 
defend their departmental priorities and protect their functional domains, subverting 
the demands of these change agents. Finally, ordinary manual and white collar 
workers were likely to be sceptical of the claims and objectives of the innovators (not 
least because they involved tighter monitoring and control of the work processes) and 
would seek to avoid the demands placed on them. 
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Chapter 7 Workers’ Attitudes and Trade Union Responses 
to Change Management Initiatives 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter will analyse workers’ responses to the change management 
strategies introduced by corporate management and implemented by plant managers 
and middle managers, against the backdrop of changes in the nature of operators’ 
employment contracts over the years that were described in Chapter 6. In considering 
the responses of workers, I will argue that the deployment of the precepts of lean 
manufacturing and GEMBA did not find favour with a large majority of workers in 
EWS, and I will examine the reasons why managerial rhetoric and the rewards 
promised by GEMBA failed to secure the acquiescence of a large majority of 
workers. CompCo’s corporate management wanted operators to change their 
vocabulary from one doubting the intentions of management to one believing in its 
linguistic visualisation of participation and troubleshooting. They insisted that both 
operators (now called “associates”) and managers were important participants in 
“engineering the tomorrows of the customer”. EWS, rather than any of the other 
CompCo manufacturing units, will be the focal point of my attention in understanding 
trade unions and workers’ responses in this chapter. 
The overall analytic aim of this chapter is to: examine workers’ attitudes 
towards GEMBA in EWS; examine trade union reactions to workers’ attitudes to 
GEMBA; highlight the implications and experiences of managerial policies such as 
GEMBA for workers and the trade union responses to their grievances that shaped 
these attitudes; and finally, to consider trade union responses towards managerial 
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policies in what was an evolving pattern of IR in EWS. I will break the analytic aims 
of this chapter into three tasks. The first will be to gain an insight into the impact of 
GEMBA on workers’ attitudes and an understanding from their vantage position of 
the repercussions of management policies that contradicted and undermined the 
participatory rhetoric of GEMBA. Explicating on the above point, I have earlier 
demonstrated that a medley of dynamic internal and external vectors pierced 
CompCo as a company and threatened both its market position and its survival. The 
external vectors, some of which, are dealt at length with regard to the discussion on 
changing political economic context in India in chapter 4, such as recurring cycles of 
economic recession, the changing structure of the Indian commercial vehicle market 
and evolving and increasing customer expectations, raised questions for which there 
were no definitive answers. Instead, the company adopted strategies that it realised 
were both adaptive and emergent. The internal vectors had their origins in the 
inefficiencies of old plants with deeply embedded working practices and cultures 
with multiple textures of relationships, using machinery which impeded the sort of 
efficiency the company wanted. Reacting to these vectors, corporate management 
was determined to tailor and deploy GEMBA to bring about fundamental changes in 
the plant’s work culture and working practices. However, GEMBA was a long-term 
strategy whose success could not be guaranteed, and if it did succeed it would take 
time to ‘capture’ all the benefits. Thus, faced with immediate challenges, managers 
at corporate headquarters saw no alternative but to drive through episodic bursts of 
cost cutting that included substantial job cuts. Indeed, such were the issues facing 
the company that any other new idea that corporate management thought would 
deliver results and therefore secure CompCo’s future seemed fair game. In that way, 
EWS’ workers were the targeted recipients of management’s participatory GEMBA 
rhetoric, but at the same time were also the victims of corporate management’s 
 376 
plans and perambulations as it sought to define the best strategic pathway for the 
company. 
A second task of this chapter will be to trace the history of trade union 
mobilisation in EWS so as to deduce their responses over time, and then link these 
responses to an understanding of whether the trade unions were successful in 
reacting to the managerial strategies that they thought were fundamentally inimical 
to the interests of the plant’s workers. The trade union responses that had to be 
formulated in a modern India had come to differ, in many ways from the time of 
Ramaswamy’s The Worker and his Union [1977]. trade unions and Management 
now had to interact in an Indian economy that on one dimension embodied neo-
liberal capitalism – but in another dimensions typified crony capitalism, powerful 
hierarchical patron and hierarchical client relationships that perpetuated the 
pervasive denominators of social inequality such as caste and widespread economic 
disparities. In recent years, CompCo’s trade unions faced a considerable challenge in 
having to react successfully to the changing contours of corporate and plant 
management’s onslaught, and protect workers from its consequences, whilst at the 
same time maintaining their relevance for workers and bolstering their support in a 
competitive union environment. Because the issues EWS’ trade unions faced were in 
the midst of an ongoing transition in India’s social structure, they had to react to 
workers’ aspirations to upward social mobility on the one hand, whilst on the other 
assuage their deep-seated concerns regarding job security. The two did not always 
sit comfortably together, as some cohort of workers competed with each other for 
advancement whilst others wanted to preserve the status quo. 
A third task of this chapter will be to bring out the multiple textures of the 
interpersonal relationships that existed between individual workers, shop floor 
conveners and managers, and to unstring the dynamics of the contradictory nature 
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of their relationships. This will help in understanding the contingent forms and 
locations of the accommodations reached between workers themselves and between 
workers and their line managers, within and across various shop floors in EWS. 
This process of accommodation had co-existed with sudden flashpoints of worker 
opposition, which reinforced the history of animosity between management and 
labour that had begun in the 1980s. I will now outline the thematic content and 
layout of each section to explain how I have gone about achieving the three analytic 
tasks I have just outlined. 
Section 7.2 identifies how workers responded to GEMBA and the reservations 
to GEMBA that shaped their scepticism. Section 7.3 will try to bring out significant 
features of industrial relations in EWS by etching the plant’s industrial relations 
history. The historical account provided here serves as a bridge linking the previous 
section to Section 7.4, which understands workers’ attitudes, contemporary trade union 
aspirations, their mobilisation strategies and corresponding responses in EWS, and 
their responses to managerial prerogatives, which were irreconcilable. This section 
concentrates its attention on the evolving pattern of industrial relations during the 
period of fieldwork, which was one of declining militancy, punctuated by only 
occasional bursts of protest. It points towards a tapestry of relationships that existed 
within the shop floor between workers and management and within and across trade 
union management relationships in EWS. 
7.2 Workers Responses to GEMBA 
At the outset and before proceeding any further, I would like to point out that 
caste differences did not emerge as a major determinant in shaping the reactions of two 
age cohorts of EWS workers to management policies. Indeed, if the converse were 
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true, key informants among the older operators such as Mr. VDVN, Mr. TNS, Mr. 
KNM, the middle manager Mr. RGPN and other operators would have replied in the 
affirmative to my repeated probing on this topic and its effects on industrial relations 
and more restrictively GEMBA in EWS towards the end of our interaction. I attribute 
the non-emergence of caste as a clearly discernible determinant in workers’ reactions 
to management policies, to the constant pressure faced by managers and workers in 
EWS production process functioning in the manner described by Beynon and Nichols 
[1977: 76]. They demonstrate how different managers and workers in ChemCo 
collectively played their cumulative part in ensuring that the technical system 
survived, and how extraction of surplus value was integral to the continuity of the 
fragile technical system, which would have collapsed if each part had not played its 
functional role effectively. It may well be that the caste of particular workers might 
have shaped managerial attitudes subjectively in terms of their assumptions about the 
work ethics of their colleagues and plausibly could have coloured their assumptions 
about other workers and managers. However, based upon my observations and the 
empirical data, I believe that senior plant management in EWS did not have time for 
manipulating or blatantly discriminating based upon caste, because it needed all the 
human capital and machinery it possessed to work in optimal synchrony; 
consequently, it was pre-occupied in ensuring the functional contiguity and survival of 
technical system. 
Workers in EWS were not a single block, and different age cohorts of directly-
recruited workers brought with them different perspectives on work and work 
histories in the company. In addition to the directly-recruited workers who had been 
hired on the contracts which were usual before economic liberalisation, there was a 
class of contract workers hired via outside labour contracting agencies (who supplied 
labour to large industrial concerns in Hubli) with little job security who were viewed 
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as a threat by directly-recruited workers, the last of whom was recruited in the late 
1990s. In addition, there were some other workers within EWS who were, in effect, 
probationers who were taken on during a limited drive to recruit operators in 2005 
and who were waiting uncertainly for CompCo’s management to regularise their 
employment as permanent employees having a semblance of job security. Senior 
management had not made up its mind and was yet to regularise them. 
I begin in Section 7.2.1 by picking out the reactions of older workers, younger 
workers and contract workers in order to understand the manner in which GEMBA 
affected the different categories of workers. 
7.2.1 Generational differences in workers’ perceptions and 
their relationship to management appeals 
The two generations of workers in EWS tended to have different views about 
GEMBA and varied in their optimism with regard to managerial innovations. It is 
important to identify how their perspectives were shaped by the context of their 
employment. The older workers, whom I call ‘old veterans’, had been hired straight 
after matriculation and had gathered experience by ‘learning on the job’ and getting a 
feel for the machines they worked with. These older workers, hired by EWS in the late 
1970s just before it commenced manufacturing operations in 1980, were first 
generational migrants mostly from neighbouring areas in the states of Tamil Nadu, 
Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh. They were attracted by a reputable and large company 
like CompCo setting up a plant in Hubli, and were particularly drawn by the job 
security it offered them. At that point of time, the older operators had not had the 
luxury of undertaking higher education, beyond attendance at the technical trade 
training institutes, and had to learn elements of the job as they went along. Some of the 
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operators nevertheless managed to study further after joining EWS, even acquiring 
university degrees.. Union convenors such as Mr. VDVN with his long experience as a 
trade union activist, demonstrated a perceptive awareness with regard to the labour law 
and the limitations of its functioning in India. These operators, now into their late-
fifties, had been witness ess to a tumultuous and acrimonious phase of industrial 
relations in the company in the 1980s, which I will describe in the context of trade 
union and management relations in Section 7.3. This shaped their scepticism towards 
management and GEMBA, which they viewed as yet another passing fad. For 
instance, Mr. SMGN  (now a quality inspector attached to the mobile quality 
inspection team of the ‘End Product Quality Assurance Department’), previously a 
worker, observed that he had seen many a fad come and go, and that GEMBA might 
well be one more of them. It should be noted, however, that corporate and senior level 
plant management did not really tailor their appeals towards these veterans. It knew 
that it would be extremely difficult to secure the co-operation of the veterans and, 
though it would make an effort, believed it would be better to allow them to retire 
through voluntary redundancy schemes or early pension arrangements. Instead, as one 
of my management informants pointed out [Mr. RC, retired GM Exports, 27 
December 2009], managers concentrated on two categories: the cohort of younger 
operators hired at the end of the 1990s, who were regularised or permanent employees, 
and the group who had been hired in 2005 but yet to be confirmed and who were in 
their middle thirties or early forties in age. These workers had seen spasmodic bouts of 
industrial conflict, such as the strike of 1996, but were seen by the older 
workers/activists [such as Mr. VDVN] as lacking political consciousness and as caring 
first and foremost about their own interests. 
Management thought that the vocabularies and representative imageries of 
participation and teamwork they offered would be better appreciated by these 
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relatively younger, middle-aged workers. It wanted to believe and hope that GEMBA 
would appeal to these younger operators who had been recruited from the Industrial 
Training Institutes and therefore had a greater degree of formal training. They had 
made it to CompCo through a tougher selection process, which involved written tests, 
an interview, a probationary period and finally confirmation as permanent employees. 
I discerned that, although repetitive assembly line production was not their preferred 
employment option, their first priority lay in holding on to their jobs in a tight labour 
market. These younger workers, in the thirty-to-forty age band, had young families to 
support and had growing aspirations. Accordingly, they made up the target group that 
management wanted to convert to the GEMBA cause and saw as critical to the 
company’s future. It set out to nurture them. 
This group felt under pressure to earn more in order to fulfil their own and 
their families’ aspirations, which ranged from procuring the latest consumer durables 
to getting better life chances. Plant management tried to appeal to these motivations 
by terming them ‘associated’ and by urging them to take an active part in the 
‘GEMBA Empower’ festivals and reward programmes. These ‘associates’ would then 
be rewarded periodically for their achievements through ad-hoc cash hand-outs and 
coupons which they could exchange for consumer goods, the value of which were 
directly proportional to their hands-on participation in GEMBA, in troubleshooting 
and in submitting kaizening suggestions. 
However, plant management’s efforts to speak the new language of growth, 
self-initiative and participation with greater politeness and beneficence proved to be 
difficult to sustain all the time and could thus be seen to be patchy and piecemeal, 
especially because some Section Heads appeared habituated to managing in a 
commandeering manner. Furthermore, their anger, although directed at their 
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subordinate managers, was transmitted to other line managers and via them to the 
workers they supervised on the line. 
Yet both the younger and older operators, though varying in their response 
towards management policy, with one cohort being in the evening of their careers and 
the other being in the middle stages of their working lives and reluctant to fall off the 
boat on which they were sailing, did have similarities. Neither wanted their children 
or grandchildren to be operators, but instead hoped to see them employed, with better 
pay and comfortable desk jobs, as part of the burgeoning services sector, in areas such 
as IT enabled services and BPO, in cities like Bangalore rather than enduring the sort 
of repetitive manual job routines their fathers had come to expect week after week at 
the factory. Indeed, even a committed communist trade union convener like Mr. 
VDVN told me with some measure of satisfaction [Mr. VDVN, 28 January 2011] that 
he had managed to provide a good education for his son, who was now on his way to 
join the IT industry as a technical manager and who therefore would not have to 
follow his father’s footsteps. Mr. VDVN continued to toil in the fond hope of 
mobilising the working class against their oppressors, capitalistic management, but 
this aspiration for upward vocational mobility points to the emergence of a technical 
class of younger operators who identified themselves with the desk‐based office jobs 
of the service industry, rather than the grease and taxing physical labour of the shop 
floor. 
That said, this optimistic perspective on GEMBA amongst the younger 
workers was to prove ephemeral and the causes for its negation are explored 
below. 
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7.2.2 Worker responses over time: scepticism reinforced 
When first introduced, GEMBA managed to attract the attention of the cohort 
of operators recruited by EWS in the late 1990s, who saw good reasons to work with 
corporate management in building what the company called “a shared tomorrow for 
CompCo, its employees and its customers”. As well as aspiring to a higher standard 
of living, this cohort of workers hoped that the vocabulary of empowerment and the 
fulfilment of the easier job routines promised in the EEI initiatives, the training 
classes held periodically and the N7i objectives that delineated the company’s plan of 
action, would translate into their daily job cycles. They surmised that a more 
participative environment and complex job cycles would result in making their work 
more interesting and remove some of the repetition and tedium of their daily 
routines. That, together with monetary rewards earned quickly through the kaizening 
scheme, the Empower festivals and the GEMBA rewards scheme, made up an 
enticing prospect. Thus Mr.SGM [Mr. SGM, 13 December 2009] told me of an 
operator in the assembly area of EWS who wrote a poem about GEMBA in his 
enthusiasm, little realising that greater efficiency accompanied by empowerment 
would almost inevitably bring downsizing and more focused management. However, 
Mr. SGM felt that, over time, initial optimism had given way to scepticism and this 
scepticism continued to be fed by a feeling that operators were rarely given credit for 
the work done by them. He said that before, GEMBA workers had always been 
interested in the work they did and had routinely offered their suggestions through 
the channels of communication available to them. For instance, he said, although 
GEMBA had formalised and codified a large number of production practices in 
accordance with the precepts of lean manufacturing that emphasised continuous 
improvement of quality and cost reduction, workers felt that they had already been 
 384 
doing their bit by participating in pre-GEMBA improvement programmes and cost 
reduction initiatives. As Mr. VN, another operator (from engine stores), explained to 
me, prior to the introduction of GEMBA there were involvement mechanisms such as 
quality circles. He noted that: 
“GEMBA was brought in by a multinational consulting agency 
but we had an ad-hoc but functional participation mechanism 
already and in spite of workers’ grievances they actively took 
part in them. This mechanism was labelled as 5S and was really 
imported from Japan but the consultants gave proper structure to 
this import and had defined its scope.” [Mr. VN, 3 April 2009] 
Indeed, he emphasised the co-existence of participation and conflict in this earlier 
period. Workers had their grievances with management, but as employees of CompCo 
who made up networks of relationships with line managers and a sense of loyalty and 
duty, they did whatever they could to participate and better utilise their experience. This 
did not imply that they were not sceptical about management’s motives – and certainly, the 
underlying oppositional struggle culture was pervasive, as the next quotation from Mr. VN 
will illustrate – but it annuls the impression that after the advent of GEMBA, workers had 
a change of heart with regard to CompCo’s management: 
“In EWS we had quality circles before GEMBA and we used to 
participate there and give suggestions in spite of all the 
problems we have. But we have had to fight for everything and 
the union has moulded us in that culture.” [Mr. VN, 3 April 
2009] 
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In his opinion, workers understood that GEMBA was introduced because 
management wanted to codify, streamline and concentrate operators’ suggestions and use 
them as a basis for continuous improvement, and it was not that workers were always 
hostile to participation. To illustrate his point, he gave an example of an occasion when 
workers expressed their willingness to participate as intelligent stakeholders who were 
equally interested in the wellbeing of the company; but in this context he also highlighted 
the limits of management’s response: 
“A new Tata truck was bought and examined and workers gave 
far reaching suggestions on how to reduce wastage in assembly 
and cut down costs. These suggestions were not taken seriously 
by plant management. We got some compliments from the then 
GM, but nothing much after that and we got no recognition or 
appreciation of these efforts. Managers are rude and very 
discourteous towards workers and do not even acknowledge 
efforts of the workers. I won so many quality awards for 
Madras.” [Mr. VN, 3 April 2009] 
As a result he concluded that, even when workers made efforts that benefited the 
company (as he had done), they did not feel respected or recognised by management. 
Hence he lamented: 
“How does CompCo care for us? Workers are very sceptical and 
apprehensive about the possibilities of being rewarded for their 
efforts at any time by management, with or without GEMBA, and 
the denial of recognition makes them even more dubious of it.” 
[Mr. VN, 3 April 2009] 
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This lack of recognition accompanied a deeper underlying tension, which united 
older and younger workers: concerns about job security and suspicion of management’s 
latest tactics. Contract workers and probationary employees who had yet to be confirmed 
as permanent staff also came to realise that GEMBA’s participation and self-initiative 
rhetoric did not have much in it for them, as corporate management tried continually to 
fine tune its adaptation of lean manufacturing and trim down the lines. They eventually 
joined the liturgy of workers sceptical towards GEMBA. These two groups of workers 
soon came to believe that they were dispensable and were being manipulated by plant 
management to put pressure on permanent employees, but would be the first target of any 
bout of belt-tightening as soon as it suited the company to make them redundant. They had 
also no trade union shoulder to lean on in EWS. 
Another informant, a manager who was no longer an employee of CompCo, 
added the dimension of hindsight to this picture, which suggested a further basis for 
the growth in scepticism. He suggested that the negative attitudes were exacerbated by 
the trade unions cautioning operators participating in GEMBA by telling them of its 
pitfalls and refusing to be responsible if things went awry for any worker who stuck 
his neck out in embracing the troubleshooting and lean rhetoric chanted by senior 
plant management. [Mr. SGN, 12 April 2009, Pune]. 
Finally, while the manager quoted in the previous paragraph believed that 
the unions had responded to threats to job security by discouraging participation, 
some union activists believed that GEMBA involved a more insidious agenda. In 
particular, one of my main informants [Mr. VDVN] argued that GEMBA wanted to 
appropriate the only assets that the operator had: his tacit knowledge that he 
possessed over the production process, especially those skills that he had acquired 
through experience to get the most out of machinery and to manoeuvre around 
machinery he knew very well. He felt that GEMBA aimed to snatch away all his 
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assured incremental pay and seek to control him continually and predictably the 
way management wanted, so as to keep him permanently on edge. Indeed, many 
workers – including Mr. TNS, Mr. VN, Mr. SMGN, and not just union activists 
such as Mr. VDVN – believed that a core objective of GEMBA was to individualise 
workers and sever their association with the trade unions. Because management did 
not listen to individual workers, they needed a union to hammer home their case to 
management. 
The next section tries to understand the consequences and outcomes of 
EWS’s plant management trying to push through GEMBA. 
7.2.3 The repercussions of plant managers trying to 
impose GEMBA upon workers and expecting their 
participation 
As the previous chapter indicated, line managers such as Mr. AK were the 
wheels on which the chassis of corporate management’s plan for implementing 
GEMBA sat and were in the front line of persuading workers to embrace GEMBA. 
Here I will discuss the effects of their efforts and show how workers’ immediate 
resistance to GEMBA was aggravated by deep seated anxieties, described in detail in 
the next Section 7.2.4. In the following pages I explore several topics: pressures upon 
workers; limited and uneven participation of workers in projects; the inoperability of 
financial initiatives; plant management’s dubious relationship with statistics; and the 
scepticism reinforced and undermined in GEMBA training classes. 
First, pressures upon workers which were exerted through the management 
hierarchy – EWS’s senior managers such as Mr. N, Mr. AB, all Production Heads 
and their subordinates – meant that the workers had an obligation to satisfy an 
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impatient headquarters in trying actively to draw in more operators to participate in 
the GEMBA activities vortex. Indeed, the middle manager, Mr. RN – who worked 
under Mr. RGPN and who was in charge of an engine stores section which dealt with 
the dispatch of finished engines, reported that middle managers and Section Heads 
were actively pressurised by their superiors [Mr. RN, 14 January 2009]. The 
operator's reluctance with regard to participating in GEMBA was perceived as a 
failure by middle managers and Section Heads, whom people like Mr. AB accused of 
having a pre-programmed tendency not to look beyond the immediate target. They 
were accused of lacking vigour and enthusiasm, and Mr. AB thought they spent their 
time finding suitable persons to pin blame upon – a theme explored at length in the 
previous chapter. It was also alleged by the operator, Mr. TNS, that departmental 
views generally crushed any innovation, and that Section Heads and other managers 
were always concerned to protect their own interests before those of the operators. In 
this context many workers, like many middle managers, were hesitant to instigate 
initiatives themselves. Within this atmosphere of ‘blame culture’ of management, 
Mr. KGN [9 May 2009] wondered what the point of GEMBA was when the ‘charge 
sheet mentality directed towards workers’ was so ingrained in the psyche of senior 
plant management, whilst they sought to identify and punish the worker rather than 
first listening to his problems with empathy. 
In this scenario of multiple levels of organisational interaction, another 
experienced worker who had almost two decades of experience in CompCo, Mr. A an 
operator in the engine machining shop 5[23 April 2009] wondered: “What is the point 
of this GEMBA nonsense?” believing that the operators who had worked for the 
company for years were, after all, foes of management. I would like to note that Mr. 
A, with his considerable experience in EWS, appeared to me to have seen most of the 
senior managerial cadre and had formed definitive opinions about them and their 
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management style. Mr. A reminisced fondly about a GM he had known in the past. He 
recollected that his GM in engine manufacturing in the mid-1990s was very concerned 
about workmen’s well-being, but the depth of this now long-retired GM’s altruistic 
concern was not shared in equal measure by his managerial colleagues. Mr. A had 
worked and observed at close quarters many a manager and seen many a shooting star 
such as Mr. AB and their GEMBA-like projects come and go, as well as other line 
managers who were survivors and those who concentrated on weathering the storms 
of change and passing pressures to live to fight another day. Mr. A was strongly of the 
opinion that the company worked on a flawed premise, which was that it had too 
many workers and that the best way of promoting efficiency was to reduce their 
numbers. In the blame culture that existed, Mr. A felt that managers operating under 
conditions of competition from other managers had as their first priority the need to 
“keep the boss happy, serve him well and ensure their survival and protect themselves 
and their future rise in the hierarchy from the machinations of competitor managers.” 
He also said that the reality was that middle managers were under pressure to ensure 
that the balance sheet stood up to scrutiny because showing a profit was the primary 
motive of the company, and heads would start rolling through the hierarchy if it 
failed to do so. Under these circumstances, middle managers tried to play safe at all 
times and dared not risk the ire of their immediate superiors, and workers had to 
adjust their expectations and live with the results of these complex interactions 
between managers at various levels. 
GEMBA targets were set and GEMBA computation work was done by line 
managers, who were under pressure to deliver from Mr. AB and Mr. N, with some 
participation by a few young operators and some veterans. Operators were made to 
sit in front of the shop floor computer with middle managers and asked to suggest 
ways in which they could improve the efficiency of material management in 
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inventory and offer other suggestions to improve production. To date, however, 
operators like Mr. KNM [16 March 2009] from engine assembly who performed a 
repetitive task welding bolts to engine blocks, felt that GEMBA had only mixed 
results. Some acknowledged that the deep dive initiatives done by cross-functional 
teams of managers had a substantial effect in shops like engine assembly Shop Six, 
but in other areas overall there had been only marginal improvements in processes 
and some minor improvements in product quality. Moreover, some managers such as 
Mr. RGPN suggested that the real leap in product quality had occurred because of the 
success of the centralised Research and Innovation centre from product conception to 
prototype production in Nellore rather than the limited production related 
improvements work in the production areas. Meanwhile other middle managers 
believed that in most cases it was middle managers and Section Heads who had 
brought about real improvements in work processes, rather than operators. He 
believed that in these circumstances of suspicion of each other's motives, 
management were faced with a difficult task of coaxing and ensuring operator’s 
participation in GEMBA, because of the complete breakdown of trust between 
management and workers. His view was that, instead of starting out with GEMBA, 
the primary goal of management ought to have been to win the trust of operators and 
display sincerity in its interaction with workers before launching anything so 
ambitious. 
Having discussed the pressures that workers faced, I now discuss their limited 
and uneven participation in projects. Management and labour found it difficult to find 
a tractable modus vivendi and this was partly because different age cohorts of 
operators with varying personal aspirations and at different stages of their careers 
contributed their different cumulative perceptions and interests or disinterests in the 
GEMBA project. In this context, veteran operators like Mr. TNS reasoned that whilst 
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some workers took part in GEMBA, these predominantly younger workers simply 
wanted to impress and flatter the bosses, and he claimed that younger operators who 
had joined over the preceding ten or so years were searching for some sign that they 
were progressing towards more senior grades. Meanwhile older veterans, like Mr. 
TNS (who had once been a union activist) did not want to be conspicuous, but 
wanted to fade into the background, biding their time quietly as permanent operators 
and getting through their shifts without issues so they could ease their way out of 
EWS and get on with the things that really mattered in their lives – things which had 
nothing to do with EWS. Many older workers had set their eyes firmly on retirement. 
Mr. SMGN [April 15 2009] felt that where a worker was being asked to 
Kaizen within that which management had already decided from above in production 
processes, that was quite different to being consulted in the first place on matters 
relating to efficiency and production cycle times, and not surprisingly elicited a less 
favourable response. Furthermore, Mr. VDVN felt that corporate management was 
not in touch with ground realities of EWS, which middle managers and workers had 
to negotiate on a day-to-day basis, something which the discussion on inventory 
brought out clearly. 
With regard to the limited impact of financial initiatives, seven operators 
were introduced to me by Mr. VDVN in phase 3 of my fieldwork (as explained in the 
methodology chapter), and I was able to put some leading questions to them. In 
addition, I met about ten other operators including one in Nellore, with whom I had 
brief but quick interactions during my walks around the plant and who even went to 
the extent of claiming that they knew nothing of GEMBA. The seven operators said 
many of their colleagues shared that perception and neither they nor their colleagues 
wished to stick their necks out, in spite of the fact that corporate management was 
exerting pressure to get senior plant management to ensure the participation of the 
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maximum number of operators possible, and was trying to secure finally the 
voluntary participation of workers. In that context, there was widespread scepticism 
about the financial rewards that were promised for participation in GEMBA. Union 
activists – such as Mr. TNS, Mr. VDVN and older operators such as Mr. KNM – felt 
that deigning to trickle some rewards to the operators once in a while through the 
passport scheme was not enough to sustain workers’ commitment in the long run. 
Furthermore, the opinion of an operator in the engine stores captures his resignation 
and scepticism towards management. Mr. VN suggested to me that such rewards 
were often difficult to extract: 
‘Management would refuse to part with money even if it were a 
meagre sum of Rs.100 and if it comes eventually it’s always 
through layers and convoluted loops, so it would be too little too 
late. I had to coax and cajole managers to release payments to my 
other operator mates who participated in the quality improvement 
project who had dropped out. Whenever workers ask for money, 
management will always say it is a problem for them.’ [Mr. VN, 
10 December 2009]. 
Overall, then, such workers believed these incentives were unlikely to 
motivate operators to participate actively, especially as they felt they could see 
through the management’s game, and in any case none of their long-standing 
grievances had been resolved, an essential precursor to them believing that 
management had had a change of heart. 
When we look at plant management’s relationship with operator participation 
statistics, Mr. RGPN [Sunday June 26 2004] also alleged that middle managers had 
possibly inflated the participation figures of operators in terms of the occasions where 
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operators had come up with suggestions in the kaizening and troubleshooting process. 
Senior middle management, he said, submitted overly positive reports to plant 
management which were sent on to the review meetings in Nellore and suggested to 
corporate management that an exaggerated number of operators were actually taking 
part by showing increasing numbers of suggestions and modifying the records for 
attendance at the 0800 hours meetings which allowed operators to accrue GEMBA 
passport reward points. Corporate management seemed not to worry too much about 
checking the accuracy of these reports, ostensibly because they presented a picture of 
involvement and progress that pleased them and implied that GEMBA was working. 
But, Mr. RGPN said that corporate management knew the limitations with regard to 
participation and was unflappable for the moment regarding these putatively 
massaged figures, because they knew nothing much could be done immediately to 
resolve the situation. Mr. RGPN felt that workers’ reluctance to embrace GEMBA 
was best illustrated by the manner in which they resisted management rhetoric in the 
training classes, something the statistics did not reveal. 
With regard to the scepticism reinforced and undermined in GEMBA training 
classes, one form of resistance was the rather subtle disruption of GEMBA training 
classes in which attendees would constantly pose extraneous questions regarding the 
organisation of the plant, with which trainers from outside organisations could not 
cope. This undermined the courses and rendered them ineffective. The majority of 
operators I overheard speaking during my stay in the plant – including those I came 
across in the afternoon training classes conducted to instil the precepts of lean 
manufacturing and GEMBA – were apprehensive of management’s lean initiative 
and surmised that this was yet another ploy to squeeze more work out of them. It 
appeared to them that the trainers found them easy targets for all the faults prevalent 
in the company. Thus the operators undertaking the training programme said that the 
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trainers started with the assumption that workers needed to learn about the precepts 
of lean manufacturing in order to be productive, something they contested. Mr. KNM 
[16 March 2010], was very sceptical of management’s attempts to facilitate job 
enlargement and greater variety of tasks within an operator’s job routine, and its 
seeking to elicit more out of workers’ job cycles by introducing ‘takt’ time and 
kaizening. Furthermore, he pointed out that, having asked people like him to take 
part in GEMBA and do more work, CompCo’s management was now telling him 
that his task could be done by a machine . He also told me that in the new lean 
ecosystem there was no need for an extended role for the maintenance department 
since the operators should now learn to troubleshoot and carry out their own repairs, 
and identify the root of the problem themselves; failing that, they should seek the 
help of line managers and if that does not resolve it, they are urged to call the 
maintenance department. With heavy irony and a marked scepticism towards 
training, he said that management would, in his words, prefer to see the maintenance 
department on fire so that other staff were busy and constantly preoccupied doing 
maintenance rather than their staying idle! He argued that management, ever 
receptive to new cost-cutting ideas, wanted to emulate its neighbour in Hubli, the 
two-wheeler company TVS, where sixty per cent of employees were on short-term 
contracts, and only forty per cent were permanent employees. 
Operators were highly doubtful of the elaborate quality infrastructure of which 
they were supposed to be a part. While this was premised on supposedly 
sophisticated, statistical quality measures such as Six-Sigma, rudimentary stores 
management was not practiced; this was a failing, operators contended. For example, 
EWS’s management allowed surplus parts of the projects of the IVECO model (being 
phased out) to continue to occupy space and gather rust. Attendees at training courses 
were quick to point out such examples of what they saw as plant management's 
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negligence and its concentration on new theory-driven initiatives and grand 
stratagems, such as lean manufacturing, rather than relying on common sense, 
working effectively as individuals because none knew their machines as well as they 
did – a knowledge acquired through learning on the job and regular housekeeping, 
whose values were proven. They argued that plant management should sort out basic 
failings such as these before berating workers or adopting sophisticated tools and 
theoretical constructs of efficiency and quality optimisation initiatives, lean 
manufacturing and Six-Sigma. 
On other occasions trainees would talk amongst themselves whilst the trainers 
were struggling to retain control, and these discussions would draw in the entire 
class, normally on issues and job routines in which the operators specialised, but 
where trainers had limited knowledge. In this way trainers could lose control of the 
classes they were teaching and the attentions spans of attendees would be exhausted. 
In this way trainers, who might have been managers, consultants or experts on 
lean manufacturing brought in from some technical institute, engineering firm or 
consultancy in Bangalore, would lose control of their classes and would tire before the 
short classes ran out of time and workers had to return to their lines. Indeed, even 
training sessions on GEMBA seemed problematic because trainers would be asked 
questions about matters of detail to which they could not possibly respond because of 
their inexperience of the plant. Operators’ queries were often highly specific and bore 
little relevance to the specialised lean topic of the day, and operators working in the 
logic of reductio ad absurdum made the trainers look idiotic. These visible forms of 
passive resistance to senior plant management’s resolve to implement GEMBA were 
exacerbated by the training environment in which sessions were held, after lunch, in 
comfortable, air-conditioned rooms, whose effect was usually soporific. Even the 
efforts of Mr. N, who would try his best to speak courteously to associates in 
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accordance with his invigorating empowerment and troubleshooting rhetoric as he 
always did with workers, would prove in vain. This passive resistance and the 
scepticism to GEMBA had an underlying cause, which was related to loss of pay 
resulting from management’s attempts to link operators’ pay with GEMBA 
participation and active kaizening, in exchange for monetary increments. But, 
workers in EWS harboured other persistent anxieties in addition to their concerns 
about variable pay, which all formed part of the fabric of resistance: job mobility, 
medical insurance and security, health and safety and decreasing control over their 
shift and job routine, with management continually scaling up what it expected from 
them in a working shift. These various anxieties along with senior plant 
management’s confused attempts to impose GEMBA, described above, ensured that 
apprehension and doubt overwhelmed and tendency to acceptance. 
7.2.4 Worker cynicism coagulated – contextual anxieties 
There were four persistent contextual factors that underpinned workers’ 
anxieties and conditioned their sense of an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ environment in which 
they were pitched against EWS management. These anxieties were instrumental in 
maligning the chances of GEMBA winning over workers, and their wholehearted 
embrace of corporate management’s new found commitment to the rhetoric of 
empowerment and its stated perceptions that, as ‘associates’, workers were equal 
stakeholders in the company’s future. These anxieties shape the following 
discussions, and include: existential anxiety on losing assured incentive pay; 
unpalatable alternatives; the fear of a flippant attitude towards health and safety; and 
the tighter coupling of production processes and cycle times. 
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First, a crucial anxiety of EWS workers was their existential anxiety 
concerned with losing their assured incentive pay. This fuelled their reluctance to buy 
management’s GEMBA rhetoric, and the assertion that they would earn more 
through participation was the fear of a permanent loss of what, hitherto, had been 
more or less assured incentive payments based on productivity growth. These were a 
major source of income over and above what workers saw as their modest basic 
salaries. 
This dynamic incentive wage plan – as against the present piece rate system of 
a worker getting a definite increment provided he met his individually mandated quota 
of pieces working 430 minutes per shift over and above his base pay – was premised 
upon workers reaching the average day’s production targets, as defined in the earlier 
settlements arrived at with the unions. This would alter the existing norm whereby 
operators were paid a basic wage but could earn piecework bonuses on top depending 
on their output for the day. Provided the operators achieved pre-determined targets, 
that had been agreed through collective bargaining, the bonuses would be paid. 
Management wanted to increase the working day from 430 minutes to 480 minutes 
with no increase in basic pay and with the piecework bonus frozen.If plant 
management in CompCo had their way in getting trade unions in CompCo to agree to 
its terms. Corporate Management viewed this piece rate system as unscientific and 
wanted eventually to do away with the trilateral system at the time of the labour 
settlement, where trade unions of a particular plant [using the labour settlements 
arrived at other plants as a reference point], the industrial engineering department 
within each plant and plant management sat together and fixed the increment. 
Closely entwined with the increment was an argillaceous description of the 
job cycle and the time taken by each worker to complete the requisite operation, 
which varied greatly depending on the nature of the job routine within assembly 
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operations or machining operations. These negotiations also spelt out the number of 
breaks he could take from lunch and tea breaks Management wanted to do away with 
this piece time pay basis and link part of operators’ pay to a management-determined 
time system that could vary based on the exigencies of production. It would be far 
more flexible because it was not susceptible to labour settlements bought through 
collective bargaining. This means if there was less target to produce the workers 
could not demand the incremental pay that was guaranteed to them for reaching the 
target. Pay would now be variable through kaizening and group performance. 
Management promised that it would benefit each worker individually rather than a 
flat piece rate. 
Corporate management in Nellore wanted to push through these measures that 
ensured that operators’ job cycles could be subjected to constant revision and tight 
scrutiny, but at the same time gave it greater control over the variable component of 
workers’ pay. Performance based pay would be paid for reaching targets mandated by 
management, rather than by negotiation with the trade unions, not only in terms of 
volume, but also quality, thereby giving it almost complete control over the variable 
component of pay. It argued that workers could earn more by kaizening and rapidly 
accruing GEMBA passport points and reaching targets set by it, than they could under 
the present piece rate system which management feared carried a risk of workers 
overproducing (anathema under lean), so as to maximise their earnings. This pay 
system based on ‘takt’ time would simplify and automate payment systems and make 
it easier for the company to scale down production rapidly based on what it called 
dynamic market analysis, without any prior notification. 
Consequently operators would lose a major source of assured incremental pay 
arrived through trade unions, plant management and the industrial engineering 
department at the time of signing a wage settlement. This assured pay would be 
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replaced by performance pay based on management prerogative which would 
become uncertain and unpredictable. This flexible payment system, driven by the 
precepts of lean manufacturing, marked an intent of management to make a clear 
departure from the existing system of deciding cycle time through negotiation with 
the union and in conjunction with the industrial engineering department during the 
process of productivity bargaining. And as a by-product, piece rate system payments 
would gradually do away with the need for the industrial engineering department 
whose closure was a long cherished desire of Mr. N, and in time allow CompCo to 
end collective bargaining over pay. 
The anxiety generated amongst workers by the shift in the payment architecture 
was highlighted by the pamphlet issued by Mr. MCL [11 February 2008], who 
reported that in its ongoing discussions, the senior plant management of EWS ”wanted 
[Mr. KS’s] union to accept the result of the time study carried out by the industrial 
engineering department of EWS and therefore succumb to management’s demands”. In 
return for a base salary of Rs.5,250, management wanted agreement to a rate of 
working comparable to that agreed with the union at the WDP4 plant near Nellore, to 
accept working for 480 minutes continuously and produce more pieces (which varied 
from shop to shop across plants) in order to get incremental pay. This would alter the 
existing norm of an operator working continuously in one shift for 430 minutes of 
production per day on a piece time pay basis, and would link part of operators’ pay to a 
management-determined time system that could be varied based on the exigencies of 
production and was not susceptible to collective bargaining. This means that if there 
were lower targets to produce, the workers could not demand the incremental pay that 
was guaranteed to them for reaching the target. Pay would now be variable through 
kaizening and group performance, even though management promised that it would 
benefit each worker individually rather than a flat piece rate. Mr. MCL forewarned 
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workers of the possibility of Mr. KS’s union agreeing to senior plant management’s 
demands for this new system. 
When we look at unpalatable alternatives, it appears that workers felt trapped 
within their job roles as workers. They had only two alternatives: to cross over to the 
other side as management, when the opportunity presented itself, but in so doing risk 
the loss of trade union representation and the apparent job security they enjoyed as 
workers; or, to stay in their current jobs with no progression throughout their careers. 
For instance, Mr. KNM,[12 February 2009], pointed out to me that many workers 
preferred to remain as operators because it gave them a measure of job security that 
was supported, at least on paper, by the Industrial Disputes Act [1947] discussed in 
brief in chapter 4, even though that precluded any substantial increase in their incomes 
or changes in their social status. 
Workers can be defined as those who are directly or indirectly (such as store 
room housekeeping) connected with the manufacturing process. Workers who are 
termed as entry-level operators directly fall into two categories: those who are skilled 
and those who are semi-skilled. Skilled operators came into the company as graduates 
of industrial training institutes and remained on probation for three years, employed in 
the S1 Band. After that probation period they would then move into the S2 Band but 
could take a machining skills test which, if they passed it, would qualify them to move 
up to Band S3. Semi-skilled operators were employed in roles supporting production, 
such as driving pick-up, vehicles and performed technical operations on the margins 
of the line that were repetitive and did not involve any extensive background training 
or skill. The nontechnical workers in EWS were gardeners, janitors etc., and they 
also stood a good chance of getting confirmation of permanent employment after 
seven-and-a-half years. After reaching Band S2 operators could opt to move into 
junior management roles, provided they passed the relevant aptitude tests. 
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I will now explain the entry-level wages structure of operators in EWS, and 
how it compared to managers. Within EWS an operator received an entry -level 
cumulative wage of Rs.11,000 per month (correct at the time of fieldwork), whereas 
an entry level manager received Rs.20,000 per month. Below these two groups there 
were daily-paid workers who were handed a flat sum of money at the end of each 
completed shift; these were mostly cleaners and other employees carrying out simple 
tasks. There was a wide disparity between the pay of permanent operators of EWS 
who came under the ambit of the IDA Act 1947 and contract workers discussed 
below and those who were directly recruited by CompCo but on probation and not 
yet confirmed, doing which would bring them under the ambit of the IDA Act 1947. 
At this point, it is worth noting that current Indian labour laws make it 
difficult for management to dismiss a worker without a protracted judicial process, 
which costs management time and money. This apparent inflexibility and the lengthy 
legal procedure involved in dismissing a worker alone would have encouraged the 
move towards employing temporary workers who are not protected under the 
Industrial Disputes Act 1947, but who instead worked under the more lax Indian 
Contract Labour Act 1976, as discussed in chapter 4, which allows employers to pay 
contract employees lower wages for the same tasks performed by permanent workers 
and allowed the employers to hire and fire contract employees relatively easily. 
In contrast to contract employees – a large majority of whom were hired 
through labour contractors who were bound by relatively inflexible pay scales agreed 
through contractors or, for the rest of those who worked on probation from 2005 
onwards or were occasionally hired in very limited numbers on an ad hoc basis, 
whose pay scales were decided by EWS’s management-prevalent wage policy 
towards them, which varied from plant to plant – permanent operators in EWS were 
able to progress through fixed pay bands described above as they moved from first 
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being appointed as apprentices to being confirmed as permanent operators. After the 
freeze in recruitment instituted by senior plant management in 2005, which is 
discussed in greater detail below in Section 7.4, this represented the prevalent 
mobility pathway for operators. 
Yet, operators could hope to rise only a few rungs up the career ladder during 
their careers, whereas managers had access to much higher pay bands as they moved 
from junior jobs to higher executive positions. Even if EWS workers did opt to make 
the move into the management cadre, this transition was easier said than done, as was 
explained by Mr. SMGN [8 April 2009], an erstwhile trade union activist who was 
now a manager in the Quality Assurance Department. He explained that those on 
transition would be junior in rank and would occupy similar positions to those filled 
by direct entry management trainees. But to get to that point, they first had to pass a 
written test to confirm that they had the requisite technical and theoretical knowledge 
and, second, had to satisfy the Section Heads and senior managers involved in the 
selection process that they possessed adequate managerial acumen. These workers, 
who had bitten the bullet and opted to make the arduous climb up the organisational 
ladder, faced particular problems in competing for jobs with management trainees. 
These direct entry management trainees would have enhanced training and wider 
skill-sets which gave them an enormous head-start over the former operators. It was 
very difficult for people who, although they possessed practical skills that were very 
relevant to the line, had to compete with management trainees with a management 
and/or engineering degree from university and benefited from a detailed and 
formalised training programme through which they were being put in CompCo’s 
training institute. 
These probationary graduate engineering trainees had to pass internal exams 
with an average of a least fifty-five per cent in the subjects they studied in CompCo’s 
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training institute before they could be confirmed as managers in CompCo. But once 
the trainees were confirmed as executives, they could look forward to being given 
experience in various functional roles and could expect a relatively rapid rise to 
higher-middle management positions in the plant. With regular promotions and after 
two years in the company, a junior executive could expect to have the equivalent of 
five years seniority in position over a promoted operator, even though trainees tended 
to be much younger than their ex-worker counterparts. 
A fundamental part of corporate management’s GEMBA pitch was to instil in 
the minds of operators the idea that they had a fundamental part to play in 
“engineering the customer’s tomorrows”, and that GEMBA offered them exciting 
rewards and the real prospect of moving into management and becoming a part of the 
knowledge ecosystem CompCo wanted to create, instead of having to be satisfied 
with very limited progression they had available to them as operators. Unsurprisingly, 
this caused a proportion of operators to conclude that GEMBA, with the option of 
either promotion and lower job security or by continuing to remain in the category of 
workers stagnation in pay and prospects as operators but with a perception of job 
security, left them between a rock and a hard place. Mr. RGPN, the middle manager, 
pointed out an important difference between managers and operators, that managers 
could lose their jobs as a result of continued poor performance. Workers were 
assessed differently compared to managers. Managers’ promotions initially depended 
upon what their immediate superiors evaluated by of their performance in the Key 
Result Areas applicable to their departments, as they made up the performance 
appraisal report which was liable to change because corporate management wanted 
more objective assessment criteria based on GEMBA involvement and target 
delivery, rather than just being judged by an immediate superior’s performance 
appraisal reports. Workers did not have to undergo periodic assessment and were 
 404 
managed instead by wage settlements. They had limited upward mobility in their 
careers but greater job security. For them promotion and increase in pay was not 
contingent on meeting changing performance parameters. Although there were 
different payment arrangements for workers based in EWS and WAP4, WDP4, 
WDG3, WAM4 and WDM3A, in all cases their pay still depended on wage 
settlements agreed by their trade unions and management and not appraisal. 
This existential dilemma was pervasive amongst EWS workers who were 
convinced that in most cases it would amount to occupational suicide because a shift 
to the ‘other side’ might usher in a change in their social status, but it would certainly 
guarantee a loss of the support they enjoyed from their fellow workers and in some 
cases would cause them to suffer opprobrium in the eyes of their peers. This dilemma 
was accentuated, Mr. SMGN [8 April 2009] pointed out, by the risk that operators 
who joined the ranks of management were in danger of antagonising their union too. 
He said that trade unions might throw up their arms when ex-workers, now 
managers, needed representation after getting into trouble as junior managers. This 
fear simply increased the despondency workers felt and the perceptions of social 
distance between ‘us and them’: between the community of workers and 
management. 
There were also concerns – and the perception of workers – that workers’ 
health and safety was ignored by target-conscious EWS plant management. It was 
alleged by Mr. TNS that workers got injured in production especially while welding 
or using the lathe, and if the injuries were minor they had to ignore them and get on 
with their work or run the risk of their line managers ridiculing them for their lacking 
masculinity. Mr. TNS said that management was obsessed with targets and it was 
only as an afterthought that safety was added to the list of N7i initiatives [Mr. TNS, 
January 2009]. Whether the trade unions became involved in safety problems or an 
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accident involving a worker was contingent on the gravity of the accident and the 
views of the colleagues of the operator in question: if they felt that he was to blame, 
the weight of the group’s opinion would pressure him to shoulder the blame and 
accept management’s rebuke. The seriousness of accidents – or, for that matter, the 
implications of any acts of negligence for other operators in the area – depended on 
whether they were in the assembly or machining areas. Barring any individual 
rivalries, where an operator was indeed a victim of a defective machine or 
highhandedness by the management, the union in power would come into play. The 
accident might bring the line to a temporary halt (as observed by me in March 11 
2009) and cause heated arguments between workers and management. Management 
would then invite the union and set in train a joint review of the events, followed by a 
process of negotiation between the personnel department, and the union and 
conciliatory mechanisms, elaborated on in Section 7.4.5, would come into play to 
cool things down. Management’s priority was to reach a “compromise”, a word 
many middle managers despised with all their hearts, to avoid production problems. 
This contingent approach to safety was ingrained, and it took considerable 
pressure from workers on the shop floor on their middle managers and line 
disruptions, which cut across party lines, to make management include safety as an 
N7i objective. However, Mr. VDVN said that this apparent epiphany was produced 
not by a new-found paternalistic spirit, but to integrate safety into body movement in 
line with the company’s EEI initiatives mentioned in Chapter 5, added to the N7i 
initiatives (discussed in Chapter 6), in order to advise workers constantly on safe best 
practices, and to avoid the inconvenience and disruptions to production that accidents 
caused. Extrapolating Mr. VDVN’s argument from a trade union leader’s perspective, 
I argue that EWS’s senior plant management, answerable as they were to corporate 
headquarters, saw the protection of CompCo’s brand image as an imperative (as 
 406 
illustrated in Section 7.5) and wanted to be seen as a conscientious company engaged 
in best lean practices, and in that way to deflect any aspersion that it was not very 
concerned about safety. 
This implied an apparent shift from the quiet chat to a codified set of steps, 
delineated in the EEI, adding safety as an important item in the N7i initiatives which 
draw their contents from the lean manufacturing literature, where a worker could 
instead be said to be at fault for not obeying steps that were purportedly for his 
benefit. 
Another cause of increased anxiety was medical cover and medical insurance. 
The disparity in the protection the company offered to workers during illnesses 
cemented the perception that managers and workers occupied different social 
habituses. Operators including Mr. TNS and the ex-operator Mr. SMGN claimed that 
managers, their in-laws, wives, children and parents could avail themselves of free 
annual medical check-ups with the company footing the medical bills of employees 
and their immediate families. Middle managers and senior managers could also take 
advantage of a range of insurance and other financial products on very favourable 
terms because of linkages the company had with insurers. Furthermore, corporate 
management enjoyed unlimited and free medical care with treatment in top hospitals, 
Mr. TNS alleged. 
Workers, on the other hand, were not covered under a free medical insurance 
scheme and instead had collectively to fund a group insurance scheme run by TTK 
Health Insurance (a private limited company), so as to create a pot of money that 
could be used for an emergency. But the amounts available were limited and in 
March 2009 other workers donated money to a fellow operator to help him get his 
kidney transplant operation. The contrast between the treatment of management and 
the treatment of workers caused considerable anxiety amongst workers, and did 
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nothing to cause workers to believe in the self-initiative dimension of the GEMBA 
message that everyone working for the company should share a single set of aims. 
The final anxiety stemmed from the tighter coupling of production processes 
and cycle times. Senior plant management wanted to speed up the imposition of lean 
job cycles during production and claw back any free time workers had in the gaps 
between the end of one job cycle and the beginning of another. Workers were 
apprehensive of the minute scrutiny and surveillance they were suddenly being 
subjected to through the use of the Effective Ergonomics Initiative, which was part of 
the N7i measures and had the overall aim of disciplining their bodily movements 
after scientific study and careful measurement and timing of each action in every job 
routine to eliminate ‘muda’, in lean parlance wasteful movements, and promote 
efficient and optimal bodily movements which management claimed were safe and 
for the benefit of workers. 
Mr. VDVN alleged that senior plant managers wanted to eliminate what it 
perceived as loopholes in cycle times that provided operators and their work mates 
with the opportunity to pace their work or get momentary periods of rest after 
finishing assembly line tasks. They would do this by intensifying job routines by 
adding more tasks for each single operator so as to reduce idle time. [Mr. VDVN, 21 
May 2009]. For instance, the pamphlet issued by trade union leader Mr. RK’s group 
[20 February 2009] said that management was trying to scale down the time 
operators had for basic human needs such as lunch and tea breaks. As mentioned in 
Chapter 4, the first shift in EWS began at 8a.m. sharp and ended at 16.00hours, the 
second shift started at 16.00hours sharp and finished at 1.00 Hrs., and the third shift 
ran from 1.00 Hrs sharp to 8.00hrs. The pamphlet issued by Mr. MCL’s grouping 
[Mr. MCL, 16 February 2009] implored management to be sympathetic to workers’ 
human needs and argued that they needed one and a half an hours in each shift for 
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food and toilet breaks. It told workers to compare the implications of the working 
conditions under the present dispensation with the settlement arrived at with Mr. 
MCL before 2007. It also argued that management must give due consideration to the 
need for worker rest and recreation in concordance with the standards set by the ILO. 
Meanwhile, it was clear that managers such as Mr. N were keen to factor in as 
much of the required GEMBA activity as possible, including GEMBA meetings, 
outside and above the production shift. By doing this they could eat away at any 
limited spare time or breaks workers had during their shifts. This added further to the 
workers’ scepticism of GEMBA. 
Having dwelt on the causes and origins of workers’ opposition to GEMBA, in 
the next section I will broaden the analysis to locate workers’ hostility to GEMBA 
within the difficult industrial relations history of trade unions, workers and 
management in EWS. Subsequently I will examine the challenges faced by trade 
unions as they have sought to remain the main channels for communication of 
workers’ interests and their declining power in the face of management’s varied 
stratagems, including GEMBA. 
Section 7.3 Trade Union Militancy and Representation: the 
Industrial Relations Context of Worker Responses to GEMBA 
The discussion herewith will explore how operators’ resistance to GEMBA, 
documented in the previous section, was rooted in the wider context of difficult 
industrial relations in EWS and was conditioned by the patterns of trade union 
response and institutional regulation at various points of time. A historical account of 
the industrial relations trajectory and salient events such as the strike of the 1980s will 
show how this shaped the opinions of operators and led to persistent grievances, so 
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that GEMBA never managed to convince a significant majority of operators in the 
factory. 
In order to demonstrate how different trade unions reacted to GEMBA, I will 
first introduce the different trade unions that operated at the factory. I will then situate 
the company's industrial relations historically within different epochs of labour 
militancy, state and judicial intervention and corporate strategy. Thus an integral 
argument of this section is that an understanding of this historical context is important 
in comprehending the responses of workers to the change management initiatives 
pursued by CompCo's corporate management. 
7.3.1 Introducing the different unions in EWS 
There were four main trade union groupings in EWS, which together made up 
the CompCo Employees Union, and each had its different leaders, policies and 
political affiliations. The way the industrial relations system worked was that 
elections were held periodically in which all workers could vote, and the outcome 
determined which of the union groupings would act as their bargaining agent with the 
company. Usually this led to a clear cut result and the winner became the official 
voice of the majority of the workers of the plant in their negotiations with 
management for a designated number of years, until the next elections were held on a 
date agreed with plant management. At the same time the other unions also continued 
their activities in the workplace, and specific episodes of agitation and unrest 
influenced the outcome of the next elections. 
The oldest trade union grouping in EWS was the Communist union, which was 
affiliated to and drew ideological support from the Communist Party of India 
(Marxist). It must be noted that the Communists were the first recognised trade union 
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in EWS but had enjoyed diminished influence, not having achieved representational 
rights in elections since 1997. Unlike the other unions, they did not have a personality-
driven leadership, but instead depended on a group of conveners who met periodically 
in their office at Hubli to review the industrial relations situation and listen to specific 
problems workers brought to their notice. I was introduced to its activists by Mr. 
VDVN, who was one of several trade union conveners for the Communists and was a 
worker in EWS with over twenty-eight years of work experience and was witness to 
most of the important fissure points in the industrial relations of EWS. The second 
trade union grouping was led by Mr. KS, a senior operator who retired from 
employment in the mid 1990s and who drew ideological and political support from 
the major Dravidian party, the DMK. This union became the majority union after 
elections were held in 1997 and remained in power until 2001. Having lost its 
dominant position in 2001, it regained a majority in 2009 and retains this position 
currently. However, this was not the only union affiliated to a Dravidian party. The 
third grouping, led by Mr. RK, drew ideological and political support from another 
Dravidian party, the AIADMK, and this was the majority union from 2001-2004 and 
again from 2007-09. Mr. RK had been a Communist Party member, but had been 
suspended from the party in the 1980’s on charges of fraud, and there was no love lost 
between him and the communists. 
Finally, another external trade union leader, Mr. MCL, led the fourth union 
grouping, which saw itself as an independent union, and had enjoyed one period as 
the majority union, from 2004-2007. As will be seen, this union played a key role in 
the 1981 strike, which saw its leader establishing roots in the plant, and at the time of 
my fieldwork Mr. MCL was once again one of the most popular union leaders in 
EWS. At the time of my exit from fieldwork, and based on numerous varied 
interactions with workers and managers such as Mr. RGPN and deductions I made 
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from the pamphlets used by the different trade union groupings to run down 
management or each other, I estimated that out of a pool of 1100 workers in 2009, 
approximately thirty per cent owed allegiance to Mr. MCL, twenty-five per cent to 
Mr. KS, fifteen per cent to Mr. RK, and around twelve per cent to the communists, 
whilst about thirteen per cent of operators were either selective and calculative or 
undecided about trade union representation.  
As the above outline of trade unions and their leaders implies, the different 
unions possessed distinctive resources that they could bring to the table. The 
Communists in EWS relied on the mobilisation of larger ideals, whilst they appealed 
to workers not to cease in resisting management and hence capitalism. Mr. MCL, by 
comparison, promised his adherents that he had the capability to achieve the best 
material terms in contract settlements. The other two unions, led by Mr. KS and Mr. 
RK, played upon workers’ regional and linguistic Tamil sentiments, and promised 
them that they could exert a considerable amount of pressure through the Dravidian 
DMK and AIADMK political parties, from which they drew support and backing. 
These parties were presented as having political clout, which allowed them to 
pressurise management, and an ability to influence the institutional governance of 
agencies such as the Labour Commissioner (whether by legitimate or corrupt means). 
However, the other groupings argued that these parties had never been pro-labour, as 
they distinguished sharply between political action and industrial activism and so 
long as their political interests were protected, they were inclined to see industrial 
issues through management’s eyes, as a ‘law and order’ problem. 
As the periods of dominance of the different unions enjoying representational 
rights suggest, it was rare for any union leader to be elected as the sole representative 
voice of all the workers in this company twice in successive elections. Furthermore, this 
system was almost guaranteed to produce animosity and the four leaders could not 
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stand each other. For example, Mr. MCL would not even enter the factory when either 
Mr. KS or Mr. RK was there. A review of the important milestones of strikes and 
lockouts will bring out the underlying tensions, both between management and workers 
and between the different unions that helped to shape the industrial relations of the 
company. It will also illuminate the wider context in which these tensions were 
played out, especially in terms of the changing attitude of the judiciary towards 
unions and union activists. I will now trace the industrial relations history of EWS 
from the 1980s through the 1990s to the current day. 
7.3.2 The epochal 1980s decade revisited 
1981 witnessed the most violent strike in the annals of the Company’s history, 
which forced the management to declare a lockout as the workers resorted to arson and 
physical attacks on managers as a means of venting their anger against the policies of 
the company [Mr. RV, Senior middle manager Material Planning who coordinated 
supplier deliveries, their timeliness and ensured they stuck to their immediate planned 
delivery schedule], 8 January 2009]. This was a significant dispute during which 
seventy-eight workers were suspended, and the early 1980s also saw large-scale 
dismissals of workers and this was barely a year since this plant had begun its 
operations. 
There have been other strikes at the plant, in 1984 and also in the 1990s and 
2000s. But of all the disputes, the 1981 strike stands out as an important milestone in 
the history of EWS because it was marked by considerable violence and left an 
abiding memory amongst both managers and workers. This strike also led to the 
emergence of Mr. MCL as an important union leader in the factory. The events of the 
1981 strike led to the widespread impression in EWS that MCL was driven entirely 
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by shop-floor labour concerns and always bargained hard to extract the best deal he 
could for his members, and that it was time to try his services because the 
Communists had not gone far in getting better terms for workers.  
One vignette of the company's difficult industrial relations history in this 
period can be found in the records of the High Court of Tamil Nadu, which 
adjudicated on several cases that emerged from the strike because the verdict of lower 
level labour courts continued to be challenged by either aggrieved party in the next 
higher court.[High Court Judgement of Tamil Nadu, 7 December 1998, High Court 
Judgement of Tamil Nadu, 6th November, 2003]. I will use this material, together with 
evidence from relevant interviews, to: illuminate how these events shaped 
management behaviour over time and workers’ responses in EWS; demonstrate how 
these events provided the opportunity for MCL to make an entry into EWS; and 
explore how workers depended on important individuals such as Mr. MCL to 
represent them. The court documents offer not only reports of court judgments but 
also a summary of management’s view of the activities of Mr. MCL and other 
activists. Thus my piecing together of events is reliant on these documents together 
with the recollections of the manager Mr. RN, and senior operators Mr. TNS and Mr. 
VDVN. 
These accounts suggest that the 1981 crisis was sparked by the actions of an 
operator (‘Respondent Two’ in the court case) who, within two months of joining the 
company as a temporary employee, resorted to stoppage of work in a concerted 
manner on 29 August 1980. The same operator during that time also engaged in 
riotous and disorderly behaviour, for which he was given a charge sheet memo (a 
disciplinary sanction) by plant management dated 1 September 1980. Since the above 
operator expressed regret for his conduct and gave further assurances as to his future 
behaviour, he was penalised only with a few days’ suspension without pay. However, 
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following another similar incident on 19 November 1980, he was again awarded a 
punishment of suspension without wages between 20 November and 11 December 
1980; later, after misconduct which took place on 29 June 1981, he was again 
cautioned and let off after he gave further assurances. EWS’s plant management 
believed that this operator, who was recruited as an employee on probation previously 
in 1980, was proving to be a disruptive element on the shop floor and was slowing 
down production. 
This worker managed to galvanise support over grievances that were hitherto 
latent subsequent to the time period between his entry and eventual suspension. 
During his suspension this worker sought the help of Mr. MCL then an ambitious 
young trade union leader, who saw this as just the right opportunity to promote his 
image in EWS by exploiting the situation. Mr. MCL’s foray into EWS Trade 
Unionism and IR began with the worker and him indirectly mobilising support and a 
section of workers in the assembly area began a concerted but brief flash strike on 29 
August 1980. 
Yet, on 12 August 1981 the same worker, along with a group of employees 
incited by Mr. MCL (Respondent One in the court case), went to the canteen in the 
factory and in the resulting affray assaulted the contractor who ran the canteen. 
Following this incident, a group of workers began a series of violent acts of larceny 
and arson in which a number of executives and supervisory staff of the Company 
were assaulted. Mr. RN reminisced that this included an assault on the then 
Departmental Head, Mr. VS, who suffered serious injuries when he asked Respondent 
Two why he had incited others to stop work. EWS management now believed that it 
had given this worker a long rope and the time had come to act tough not only with 
this worker but with all other workers who wanted to become militant. 
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The above climactic events marked a shift in senior management’s industrial 
relations approach from that of finding a consensus to a more assertive perspective 
that has to this day persisted in the minds of EWS senior managers who believed that 
giving workers many chances or an opportunity to make amends was bound to have 
deleterious consequences. As a result, Respondent Two was charged by the police and 
after a full trial was convicted. In view of the grave situation, the Deputy 
Superintendent of Police in Hubli also promulgated an order under Section 30(2) of 
the Police Act to prevent any further escalation of the incidents. 
Mr. VDVN [25 April 2009] agreed that these events marked one of the most 
militant phases of trade unionism in the plant, because of the assault on a manager and 
the commencement of a perpetual undercurrent of labour-management distrust. Mr. 
VDVN contended, however, that operators had simply wanted better working 
conditions and a longer time to complete their job cycle. Management had refused to 
negotiate and the operator who raised this demand originally was effectively silenced 
by cloaked threats and periodic suspension and eventual dismissal. However, his 
protest articulated the grievances over working conditions and job routines that 
operators were feeling and proved simply to be a harbinger of the strike of 1981, which 
was strongly supported by the majority of workers. So, Mr. MCL was beginning to 
cement his credentials as trade union leader. 
Mr. MCL initially sought the support of the communists, who were the 
strongest union in EWS at that point in time since its inception in January 1980, but 
by 1988 he had formed his own union, which drew support from workers from EWS 
and a number of other companies’ plants in and around Bangalore. Mr. RN’s 
recollections and the court documents also revealed this chain of events.  
Again, the court documents can be paraphrased to summarise how the dispute 
developed. Having found Respondent Two guilty of violent acts he was summarily 
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dismissed on 18 August 1981. The court papers say that no enquiry could be 
conducted because of the tense situation prevailing in the Unit and its vicinity and the 
lockout declared by the Company. Second, the documents reveal that, in response to 
these developments, CompCo senior plant managers took the unprecedented step of 
declaring a lockout, which continued for nearly three months from 25 November 
1981, in the hope that this would put an end to what they perceived as worker 
indiscipline. Despite this, the deadlock in negotiation continued throughout this 
period. During that time, Mr. MCL provided legal support to those workers who were 
members of his trade union in the ‘petitioner establishment’, and with great tenacity 
raised an Industrial Dispute and fought a legal battle over the dismissal of Respondent 
Two and a few other workers. 
Following pressure from the Tamil Nadu Government, which was concerned 
by the tense situation prevalent in both the factory and the town, the Industrial 
Tribunal in Madras came to a decision on the industrial dispute and as a result the 
dispute was settled eventually under Section 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act 
1947. Thus the lockout ended and the plant went back to work, but the case of the 
dismissed workers continued in the Labour Arbitration Tribunal and management and 
labour continued to distrust each other. There were other intermittent strikes 
concerning working conditions, which lasted for two to three days in July 1984, and 
were a reaction to increasing management attempts to gain greater control over the 
ways in which operators worked. 
Eventually a settlement was arrived at and under the terms of this settlement it 
was agreed that the Union and management would discuss the dismissal issue 
bilaterally and settle it amicably. There was also a formal agreement that the industrial 
dispute, which had in any case been ended by the court, was truly settled and it was 
therefore treated as ‘dismissed as withdrawn’ by an Award of 21 December 1986. 
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Thereafter the individual case issues raised, including the dismissal of Respondent 
Two, who was charged with inciting violence, were discussed at great length and 
finally resolved in a settlement between management and the formally recognised 
union, dated 26 May 1987. Clause Four of this settlement provided that only twenty 
workers out of the seventy-eight that had been dismissed would be offered re-
employment as fresh entrants and senior management remained obdurate that under no 
circumstances would Respondent Two be re-employed. This was accepted under the 
agreement. Another seven workers whom senior management believed to have 
aggravated the strike and indulged in rampant indiscipline were also not accepted back 
into EWS. They were viewed as having aggravated the strike by using an opportune 
moment to indulge in rampant indiscipline. 
As will be evident, this case was fought in the courts over many years, and 
only a minority of reinstatements was secured. The above account and evidence from 
the court also suggests that Mr. MCL saw these events of the early 1980s as an 
appropriate moment to test his strength, and, ambitious as he was to expand his 
leadership base, he went on to lead a large number of industrial plant trade unions in 
and around Bangalore. In 1989 he broke his tactical alliance with the communists in 
EWS. 
The 1981 strike and the other brief flash points of industrial relations over the 
period after 1984 went on to determine the trajectory of industrial relations between 
senior plant management and operators. Even though after a long time the scars had 
receded somewhat clearly, the dispute was still not forgotten also because both the 
individual aggrieved worker or union and management in reaction to the former kept 
appealing against the verdict of the lower court in the next higher court. Indeed, in the 
summer of 1988 there was a further short dispute over allegations of indiscipline, 
which led to the suspension of a number of workers; plant management clearly 
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decided that workers needed to be put in their place. Data from my interviews with 
communist trade union activists in the WDG4 support the view that the 1980s were 
extremely difficult times for management labour relations overall in CompCo. An 
operator and activist who worked in the heat treatment plant of EWS [Mr. TNS, 16 
March 2009] reported that, after the 1981 strike, workers turned to Mr. MCL, who 
promised them greater democracy and a pragmatic approach to resolving their 
disputes, compared to the communists whose conveners had always had to adhere to 
the primary aim of their party. Thus for them, striving for the achievement of 
ideological goals as defined by their party superiors was of paramount importance, 
even though in the course of that process of class struggle they might also achieve the 
better material terms demanded by EWS workers. I will return to the above point in 
greater detail when discussing trade union strategies in EWS in Section 7.4.3. 
7.3.3 The difficult 1990s: labour-management antagonism and  
the beginning of the decline of organised labour’s voice 
While the conflicts of the 1980s were particularly sharp, disputes continued 
into the 1990s. Thus there was a strike in 1991 over wages, at a time when the 
company again faced a difficult market situation. In that dispute, management 
suspended 600 people for over six months, although most of them were taken back 
eventually. Then in another strike in 1997, Mr. TNS, the operator and activist cited 
earlier, who had been a member of the communist dispensation in the 1980s, was 
imprisoned in Hubli for fighting for better working conditions and facilities for 
workers. He challenged his sentence with the financial support of his fellow workers, 
who raised 700,000 rupees to pay his legal fees and look after his family, and, though 
the case prolonged until 2004, a High Court judgment of the state of Tamil Nadu 
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eventually reinstated him. Again these disputes were a springboard for another union 
leader to establish his credentials, and by 1997 Mr. RK, an operator who had taken an 
active part in the 1991 strike, had managed to establish a modest following amongst 
workers who pledged trust in his leadership, whilst he drew tactical and political 
support through an affiliation with the Dravidian party, AIADMK. According to 
Communist Party activists, this was despite his having been expelled from their union 
for committing fraud by appropriating subscription funds during the mid 1980s (and 
they continued to call him a “thug”, a “congenital liar and a habitual cheat”) [Mr. 
VDVN, 26 May 2010]. However, it was not until the new century that Mr. RK was 
able to mobilise majority electoral support for his union. 
Meanwhile, in the period immediately after the 1997 strike, it was a union 
affiliated to another Dravidian Party (the DMK), led by Mr. KS – a retired senior 
operator – that gained majority support. Since the communists retained the loyalty of a 
significant minority of union activists, and MCL’s ‘independent’ union also retained 
substantial support because of its leader’s strong efforts to build support at the 
grassroots, the 1990s were a period in which competition between the four rival unions 
intensified. 
7.4 Declining Pattern of Industrial Relations of EWS since 2000 
Continuing from the earlier pandect of trade union history in Section 7.3, data 
from informants indicate that there had been a perceptible decline in workplace 
militancy from 2000 compared to earlier periods. This section commences by 
registering declining militancy in EWS, and then lays out the immediate context of 
trade union marginalisation encompassing fears of job-insecurity, outsourcing and 
casualisation of labour, and the subcontracting of production facilities. It concatenates 
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trade union marginalisation within the wider political economic context of changes in 
regulation regimes controlled by the state and the judiciary, and indeed the regime of 
accumulation in post-liberalised India. Enunciating this context of trade union 
marginalisation will highlight evolving patterns of industrial relations in EWS that co-
existed with and perhaps reinforced certain features of shop-floor attitudes and 
responses, to understand the circumstances in which the trade unions in EWS 
operated. Understanding the evolution of trade union strategy and the character of 
workers’ attitudes and responses to management policies since 2000 will place the 
moribund trade union response in EWS in the context of the difficult environment 
they operated under, which was accentuated by a determined management out to 
impose lean manufacturing projects and other cost cutting stratagems. The trade 
unions’ inability to offer a coherent response was complicated by the fragmentation 
and internal divisions between themselves. 
There were notable strikes in 2001 and 2004 continuing into January 2005. 
These events seemed to reiterate the trend of the 1980s when union factions continued 
to compete for influence, and these strikes tended to mark moments when a different 
union became recognised and then challenged management’s prerogative. For 
instance, the 2005 strike was about productivity where management wanted to ramp-
up production, lay off workers and offer only marginal increases in pay [Mr. TNS, 15 
May 2009]. 
7.4.1 Changing worker attitudes towards trade unions and a 
changing external political economic context 
In the context of declining strikes and militancy, trade union leaders also had 
to bear in mind the expectations and anxieties of the veterans and middle-aged 
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workers considered in Section 7.2. trade unions had a difficult job keeping their 
power bases intact, and staying relevant to workers whilst responding to 
management’s multifaceted offensive, which they were ill-equipped to handle. Mr. 
VDVN told me that in this context being a trade union organiser, listening to workers’ 
problems while at work and taking up trade union functions after work, became a full-
time job, without any holiday. As a result, the shop-floor activist had to endure a lot 
of hardship and pain – for example as a result of conflict with hostile Section Heads, 
though he also saw this as an inevitable part of his bargain with the people he 
represented. Mr. VDVN contrasted his attitude to defend workers with that of the 
younger workers who would approach him only when they felt threatened personally 
by management’s initiatives and seemed to lack any collective consciousness. This 
tendency made trade union activity more difficult compared to the past and this was 
attested by some further reflections by Mr. VDVN [4 April 2009; 24 April 2011], my 
main informant from the communist union, on the difficulties faced by union 
activists. He believed that it was easy for many workers currently employed in the 
plant, who were inexperienced in shop-floor activism, to blame trade union activists 
for a failure to meet their expectations and expect them to deliver whilst sitting back 
and watching the action unfold without taking on any of the responsibility for 
expressing dissent themselves.  
However, the decline in militancy compared to the yardstick of the halcyon 
days of conflict in the 1980-90s should not be entirely overstated, since there had 
been brief flashpoints of unrest in more recent years. Significantly, in my 
conversations with union representatives such as Mr. VDVN and middle managers 
such as Mr. RGPN, I discovered that they rated various CompCo plants according to 
their potential for militancy. They concurred that WDP4 ranked first in militancy, 
being one of the oldest plants, followed in decreasing order by brown field sites such 
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as EWS. Militancy was much reduced in WAP4, which almost entirely employed 
casual workers, and in WDG3A and WAM4, which were green field sites where the 
company was starting de novo. The trend of declining militancy was seen increasingly 
as being attributable to this increasing degree of casualisation of labour, which was 
evident also in WDG3A in the North and WAM4 in Central India. 
But there were other causal factors in declining militancy related to the far-
reaching changes in the environmental context in which workers and trade unions 
operated. The current external, political and economic context in India is that 
provincial governments are in competition with each other in order to attract 
investment and to facilitate inflows of global capital as pointed out in Chapter 4. From 
the purview of labour arbitration and legal case precedent, the changing attitude of 
jurisprudence towards unions, across the world but particularly in the UK, has not 
gone unnoticed in the judgments of the Indian law courts which have, from the late 
1980s, begun to see trade unions and any expressions of dissent in an unfavourable 
light. They have been increasingly willing either to give managements injunctions to 
delay impending strikes or declare them as illegitimate, seeing them as being more 
about law and order issues rather than a legitimate form of protest. Furthermore, the 
litigation process in industrial disputes is quite often cumbersome and time 
consuming, because a verdict or arbitration award can be challenged at multiple 
levels: in the district level Labour Commission; in the High Court; and in cases where 
one party has identified a grave miscarriage of justice, a serious tort or a fundamental 
point of law, the final court of appeal is the Supreme Court of India. As in the UK, 
this process tends to work in favour of employers by delaying effective industrial 
action. 
Moreover, there have been repeated allegations by union activists of 
favouritism, bias or nepotism and corruption in the Labour Commissioner’s office 
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(influenced, it is said, by favours and bribes from large corporations with much 
deeper pockets than workers and their unions). This added to the perception on the 
part of the unions that only long, drawn-out agitation would produce results: just the 
sort of agitation that some of their younger members would be less likely to support. 
7.4.2 Specific managerial strategies that shaped worker attitudes 
towards management and affected EWS trade union responses 
In the prevailing political and economic context, corporate management 
continued to drive far-reaching changes to cut costs and jobs. With particular 
emphasis on the recessionary period between 2008-09 when I was pursuing my 
fieldwork, I will now explore in more detail how managerial stratagems to cut 
labour costs, increase outsourcing, and enhance automation, threatened job security, 
formed the core of workers’ concerns and moulded the variety of trade union 
responses towards management in EWS. 
In terms of reducing headcount and the loss of guaranteed employment to 
children, like the crew of a sinking ship, the operators were reluctant to abandon EWS 
and found themselves both needing to move higher and higher to avoid the rising 
water of job insecurity in the present as well as peering into a future that threatened to 
engulf them. Thus, Mr. VDVN [24 January 2009] reported that the total aggregate 
number of workers in EWS had fallen over the previous ten years from 2,300 directly 
employed operators to 1,100. He also said that despite this, the company considered 
that it still had 660 employees too many in the factory, and wanted to shed a further 
300 through outsourcing and its continually evolving ‘efficiency optimisation 
initiatives’. Further, the abolition of the Warrish (a Tamil word for ‘heir’) 
employment scheme and delays in settling their pay demands added to the already 
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considerable disillusionment and sense of impotence felt by a large proportion of the 
workers. Mr. VDVN pointed out that in the past, around 700 employees had been 
hired through a Warrish family recruitment system, but this had been discontinued 
and he questioned where his and other workers’ children would find jobs. This 
paternalistic arrangement, which mirrored a practice on the Indian Railways where 
widows were eligible for jobs, guaranteed all children of CompCo employees jobs if 
they were fit and able to work. This Warrish system had since been scrapped silently 
by management, and there seems to have been no return to it since the implementation 
of GEMBA. Warrish was in obvious conflict with the move of the corporate 
management’s all-round effort to make the employment contract more ‘flexible’ – i.e. 
to introduce less structured and secure employment policies and bring a ‘tightly 
structured hard HR’ focus to its employment policies. This scrapping of the Warrish 
system and management’s determination to gain control over the terms of 
employment was illustrated in its setting up the new greenfield commercial vehicle 
plant in Northern India to bring it closer to the northern markets of the country. The 
new plant had been very expensive and CompCo wanted to make terms under which 
it employed operators as flexible as possible to recoup its investment. For example, 
Mr. RGPN, the manager in engine stores, said that the total number of operators in 
WAP4 amounted to about 500, of whom forty per cent were contract employees. 
Additionally, company plans for automation and the movement towards the 
adoption of Euro4 and Euro5 emission norms exacerbated the prevalent fear of job 
cuts. Management’s decision progressively to outsource some component 
manufacture and allow suppliers to set up line side delivery, with the closure of entire 
machine shops and assembly areas, in conjunction with automation which we have 
discussed before, had left a large section of the operators apprehensive. The senior 
operators who had worked in a machine shop or assembly areas for many years were 
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particularly apprehensive about management’s policies, which they criticised as being 
shrouded in secrecy and lacking transparency. These moves contributed to worries 
about their future. With the movement towards Euro4 and Euro5, plant management 
would find it expensive to retrain many operators and replace or modify the existing 
machinery, and those factors meant that the future of many permanent operators could 
not be guaranteed. 
Management argued that since labour costs represented the largest single 
element in its total costs, any attempt to reduce overall costs to compete with other 
manufacturers was bound to have a significant effect on employment and employees. 
The older operators in EWS were given options to retire early through various 
voluntary retirement schemes and were rarely replaced by directly-employed 
operators. Moreover, as noted earlier, there had been no substantial new recruitment of 
directly-employed operators in any cadre for the past twelve years, other than a small 
cohort who were recruited in 2005 as probationers whose appointments were made 
permanent. In 1995 for instance, operator level Industrial Polytechnic trainees were 
hired in WAP4 but the company told them to leave after ten months, saying that it did 
not have sufficient money to keep them employed after management suddenly realised 
that they had over-recruited [Mr. VDVN, 20 February 2009]. Mr. RK [13 March 2009] 
in his pamphlet said that the decline in the number of permanent operators employed in 
one shop, from forty in 2004 to just five in 2009, with about fifteen contract workers, 
was illustrated in the discussion pertaining to inventory in Chapter 6. For instance, as 
was pointed out to me by workers during my conversations with them at various 
junctures, in 1997 CompCo employed about 15,000 workers in its plants and produced 
30,000 commercial vehicles. Now, in 2009, it employed some 8,000 workers but was 
making 60,000 vehicles. Workers’ nagging anxiety that they would lose their jobs and 
be unable to support their families was pointed out to me by Mr. SMGN [18 March 
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2009], who had been an operator for many years but crossed over to the other side to 
join management (with the permission of his union). Unemployment would also imply 
a loss of social standing and undermine the self-esteem of the workers. Whilst these 
threats grew, corporate and senior plant management saw trade unions as irritants 
rather than as serious players committed to the future of the company and were keen to 
reduce their influence further in the recessionary period. Faced with this new 
pugnacious approach of corporate management to employment, the union headed by 
Mr. KS, which at the time was the recognised union, sought to reach an 
accommodation with management, believing that it lacked sufficient industrial strength 
to win a confrontation. This moderate stance and the deadlock in negotiations are 
illustrated by the pamphlet issued by Mr. KS on 28 March 2009, which stated the 
following: 
‘Talks have been going on for over 17 months and approximately 
Rs.5,250 salary increase is warranted and this as per this union was 
agreed by the management. But they want 35.5 percent increase in 
productivity when things come back to normal. Workers have not 
been able to work for the last 4 months and due to the recession talks 
between management and union have also come to a standstill. 
Management on its part is still sitting on the agreement doing 
nothing. This is leaving the workers sullen and depressed.’ 
Another pamphlet, issued by Mr. KS’s union on 3 December 2008, surmised that 
management’s argument was that it was an economic reality and that neither the workers 
nor management had any choice but to adjust their expectations to suit the circumstances of 
the market. It claimed that no worker wanted to be removed from his job; no one wished a 
lockout and denied that there was any ill feeling amongst them. It claimed that in response 
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to its demand, management expressed its inability to pay the increased wages because of 
the recession and said that if it did so it would set a precedent that would have to be 
followed in all other plants. The total cost company-wide would amount to Rs.80 million, 
an additional cost that Compo could ill afford at that point in time. For its part management 
was insisting that the operators accepted frozen basic salaries. Thus a sense of 
precariousness confronted Mr. KS’s trade union in dealing with the problem of EWS 
workers, who probably felt at that time it was better to accept some cuts in real salaries 
instead of losing their jobs is illustrated by February 7th 2009 when the company was 
struggling faced with a global economic recession. Mr. KS tried to fend of allegations from 
other trade unions that it was siding with senior plant management in agreeing to pay cuts 
in order to protect jobs. He argued that the fact that the company was able to keep the 
factory during the recession was a big thing in itself, particularly since it had done so 
without large scale layoffs of workers. He was at pains to defend himself against the other 
trade union groupings and needed to do so because the Communist affiliate, Mr. MCL 
and Mr. RK’s grouping were certainly adamantly opposed to any pay cuts. Additionally, 
the pamphlets corroborate the discussion I had with Mr. VDVN at his trade union office 
in Hubli on the 28th February 2009 when he spoke of the anxiety of workers who seemed 
to be waiting indefinitely without work. Mr. VDVN told me that he resented 
management’s behaviour of giving the impression that there were no layoffs because 
workers were losing a major part of their pay because of closure of the plant and became 
aggressive when I quoted to him from the KS group pamphlets. Another example of Mr. 
KS’s limited manoeuvrability is reflected in the pamphlet dated 7 February 2009: 
‘The workers are aware of the recession. Operators are aware of the 
company’s precarious position. During the month of November and 
December there were 13000 chassis for sale but owing to the 
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recession there was a massive drop in sales. Fearing that this may 
continue, for instance in November 2009 as many as 18 days were 
declared as nonworking days. This drop in working days was agreed 
by the union representing the employees and the management. 
During the recessionary period the central finance minister also said 
that while pay cuts were inevitable owing to lower productivity and 
what ought to be avoided was job loss.’ 
Senior plant management was steadily but perceptibly chipping away at the 
foundations of workers’ job security by closing departments and machining shops. As 
pointed out by the middle manager Mr. RGPN [March 24 2010], a large number of 
machining operations which were hitherto done in-house, had been outsourced, 
forcing a large number of workers to be made redundant or be redeployed to other 
plants. The closure of production modules for instance was presented by the staff in 
the engine machining shop, where previously the entire grinding milling operations 
had been done in EWS. In another example, the gear manufacturing process had been 
outsourced to an external supplier’s factory outside EWS. This resentment against 
what he saw as managements’ mendacity in creating doubt and tenaciously sub-
contracting production came out strongly in union representatives, such as Mr. 
VDVN who made a counter case for keeping production in house, protecting jobs and 
countering management’s hiving-off of production by pointing out that the quality of 
outsourced production was abysmal. He said that this was a sentiment shared by 
many workers he knew. The brunt of carrying out of the necessary reworking of 
defective components fell on the remaining workers of the plant, who were 
themselves in line for the next round of redundancies. “And what is the quality of 
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outsourced components? It is a racket you know. We have to do the rework of sub-
contracted components.” [VDVN April 15 2009] 
Mr. VDVN also said many of the problems inherent in inventory management 
stemmed from outsourcing stores functions and the movement of sub-assemblies to 
contractors. This illustration is in consonance with his earlier point that permanent 
employees with their specialised skills, acquired through working in EWS over many 
years, were invaluable to the company. Mr. SMGN [March 18th 2009] had a dim 
opinion of contract employees and other temporary employees who he claimed, did 
not know their work and he also complained that as peripatetic workers they had no 
lasting interest in the specific jobs to which they were assigned. He alleged that 
despite knowing their clear skill limitations and their limited motivation, management 
had gone ahead in hiring contract workers purely to save money, when it must have 
foreseen the likely consequences. In fact any savings were dissipated by lower 
productivity and the end for corrections to their work. 
As demonstrated earlier workers felt that senior plant management was 
insensitive to their persistent anxieties and exercised carte blanche in outsourcing, 
which they believed contradicted its participatory GEMBA rhetoric. An indication of 
their views on job-reduction and outsourcing were writ large in the pamphlet issued 
by the MCL trade union grouping, which I gathered on May 24 2009: 
‘Management claims that the reason for 41 per cent increase in 
production in the last quarter was possible only through the help of 
outsourcing. The contribution of contract labour lay in increasing the 
overall plant production rate by 6.5 per cent. The regular worker’s 
contribution on the other hand was 35.5 per cent in increasing 
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productivity, with the remaining being in percentile points of 
managers and senior plant management.’ 
The pamphlet then turned its attention to its competitor union affiliated to the DMK 
and alleged that its leader Mr. KS had joined hands with the management to crush the 
workers and had acquiesced in management’s outsourcing plans. Mr. MCL’s union felt that 
the workers’ livelihood was being threatened and insisted that management must put an end 
to outsourcing immediately. In riposte, Mr. KS alleged that it was Mr. MCL who should 
reflect on his actions as it was he who had represented the workers in the last 
settlement which had prised open the floodgates by agreeing to the outsourcing of a 
small number of jobs, which management exploited and then extended considerably. 
EWS’s trade unions, divided as they were amongst themselves, were reluctant 
to weaken their positions amongst their constituents. They were opposed to providing 
representation for contract staff who they perceived as being in direct competition 
with their established members. The unions believed that if they did try to recruit and 
organise contract workers, the conflict of interests would come to the surface as their 
existing flocks deserted them. The indifference trade unions showed towards these 
outsourced or contract workers by permanent operators, concerned about their own 
jobs, surfaced when I discussed the issue with Mr. VDVN, who was otherwise a 
committed trade union activist, conscious of workers’ rights. [Mr. VDVN, January 
24th 2011]. 
Furthermore, inexperienced contract workers, such as those in the logistics 
department, who were turned over very regularly and had no time to develop 
expertise, bickered both amongst themselves and with the few remaining permanent 
employees coordinating logistics and poor relations between contract employees and 
regular EWS employees was a common theme. Attempts by these tenuously bound 
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employees hired through the labour contractors, to organise themselves would put 
their employment in jeopardy and the senior plant managers, already had more than 
their plate full in dealing with a regular trade union. The last thing they were likely to 
tolerate was to have to deal with yet another union. 
7.4.3 Distinctive resources brought in by each trade union to 
industrial relations in EWS 
All the circumstances mentioned above represented new challenges for 
unions and their struggle to mobilise worker support in EWS. Workers lacked the 
entire spectrum of information pertaining to technology, automation, job security, 
wages and immediate future plans which management possessed and therefore they 
and the trade union have to make reasoned judgments as to management’s intentions 
in seeking to bargain to secure the best settlements when negotiating with plant 
management. This placed them at a marked disadvantage but they negotiated 
incessantly utilising what strength they could muster to reach a state where 
management was prepared to reach an agreement. Yet when an agreement was 
reached that was seldom the end of the story and in EWS senior plant management 
continually tried to mitigate the effects of terms it viewed as unfavourable, forced on 
it by hard collective bargaining. Such was the balance of power in EWS. 
I will now turn my attention to the relative strategies deployed by each trade 
union grouping in EWS. In this I will utilise Batstone et al.’s [1979] archetypes of 
leaders and populists to demarcate the strategies of Mr. MCL and Mr. KS 
respectively and compare aspects of the capabilities of the communist and the 
Dravidian unions respectively. Batsone's ‘leader’ archetypes were said to frame 
grievances (and potentially mobilise workers) in terms of trade union principles and 
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then strike ‘strong bargains’ with management. Workers tended to follow these 
leaders and accept whatever they got from the settlements that were negotiated, but 
there was still scope for argument about the principles their leaders prioritised and 
whether the bargains they struck were adequate. Batstone et al.’s other archetype was 
the militant ‘populist.’ Populists were said to defer to members’ immediate concerns, 
but this meant they rarely articulated trade union principles as a means of mobilising 
workers, and thus had less leverage in bargaining with management so that their 
rhetoric and the outcomes they achieved differed widely [Batstone et al., 1979]. 
Batstone et al. [1979] also point out that a few epochal events are needed to 
form the collective memory and reputations of trade union leaders and for many 
workers the events of the 1980s established Mr. MCL as the leader who was most 
capable of wringing the best deals from plant management, particularly in negotiating 
wage agreements. His leadership was sufficient to cause workers to agree to 
otherwise unpalatable clauses and one pamphlet in January 2009 alleged that he was 
the first trade union leader to give the employers a concession on outsourcing, which 
they then exploited enthusiastically. MCL’s ‘leader’ reputation remained intact even 
after he lost an election, [Mr. KNM, 24 January 2011] and workers still seemed to 
believe that he was the best judge of management’s intentions and would bargain 
hardest to secure the maximum possible monetary gains from plant management. He 
was perceived by his followers as a steady pair of hands and it was widely 
perceptible to me that Mr. MCL would have stormed back to power had there not 
been an inordinate delay in holding the elections due in 2009. Another indication to 
me that he embodied the leader archetype of Batstone et al. is my observation that I 
do not recollect seeing Mr. MCL addressing a gathering of workers outside the 
gatehouse of EWS at any time during my fieldwork. He did not need to because 
within EWS he was able to rely on his followers to orchestrate trade union activity 
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and issue his pamphlets, and did not need to come and periodically attest his 
relevance and abilities, unlike single plant trade union leaders such as Mr. KS and 
Mr. RK who depended on external political support. This ability to rely on lay 
activists of course suited MCL’s circumstances because he was a busy trade union 
leader with a wider flock of workers in the Bangalore and Hubli to shepherd. 
CompCo was also selective in the information it disseminated to individual 
trade union leaders and preference was given to the person many workers in EWS 
widely perceived as senior plant management’s preferred trade union leader Mr. KS. 
In contrast to Mr. MCL, Mr. KS could embody Batstone et al.’s archetype of 
‘populist’. Mr. KS would first stoke the fires of expectations amongst his constituents 
by exaggerating his demands, which he knew would remain unmet by management. 
But by being very vocal and highly critical of CompCo’s management in his 
speeches outside the EWS gatehouse, he raised the expectations of his constituents, 
all the time with an eye on attracting the prospective new supporters to his union who 
had assembled outside. In his diatribes against management he continued to promise 
workers that, come what may, he would ensure that tomorrow for EWS’s workers 
would be better than today’s difficult deadlock. Thus, in a recessionary context more 
than ever, he typifies Batstone et al.’s archetype of a ‘populist’ trade union leader; 
however, in my view he did not have the sway with workers enjoyed by Mr. MCL 
who, from my piecing together of trade union leadership repertories emerged as a 
Richard the Lionheart leader figure in EWS. 
Mr. KS claimed repeatedly to have political clout and unique access to 
nuggets of advance information of management’s constantly changing plans, which 
other trade union leaders were not privy to. This was a persuasive line because 
information was what workers, who were desperate to protect their jobs in a 
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recession, desired most in an uncertain context in which they suspected management 
had many detailed plans that would have profound impacts on them and their 
families. 
His rival trade union leaders on the other hand, such as Mr. RK, alleged that 
having seen Mr. KS over the years in EWS, it was virtually certain that he would 
eventually scale down his demands in accordance with the demands of the emerging 
situation and agree to a compromise with management. This pattern of raising 
expectations unrealistically and then not managing to deliver upon them is a 
characteristic typical of Indian trade unions, and my perception corroborates 
Teitalbaum’s similar observation of trade union leadership strategies within Indian 
firms mentioned in Chapter 4 [Teitalbaum, 2010: 54]. 
However, both the Communists and Mr. RK could not be forcibly shoved into 
the two archetypes identified by Batstone et al. because at the point of time of my 
field-work they had a stagnant if not declining support base, and senior plant 
management did not consider their grouping as a whole as salient players, barring a 
few individuals such as Mr. VDVN whose words might have been listened to. The 
Communists in EWS relied on a different, less specific strategy of disturbing the 
worker’s state of equanimity and then fighting, not only for resolution of his 
grievances, but also for wider – and to them more important – ideological objectives. 
This strategy assumed that workers would have a long-term appetite to endure the 
negative consequences of a protracted strike against management. The wide-ranging 
strategy of the Communists thus stood in stark contrast to the tightly concentrated 
strategy of Mr. MCL who promised his adherents that he had the capability to achieve 
the best material terms and working conditions in the contract settlement he 
negotiated with management, and that their interests were his sole concern.  
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Outside work, Mr. VDVN worked for the party and the cadre based chain of 
command of the Communist trade union and he was tightly bound to the party’s 
ideology, which demanded unswerving loyalty. At decisive stages of any trade union 
action Mr. VDVN had always to consult and keep informed his superiors who had 
general oversight of Mr. VDVN’s trade union activities. These superiors reported to 
others above them in significant positions in the CITU union and in the party’s 
politburo. Although a very modest, quiet and affable man, he would be transformed 
when he met his comrades by first greeting them enthusiastically as fellow 
communists, and then using the word comrade frequently in his conversation. My 
surmising of his enthusiasm for the class struggle is drawn from the fact that I had to 
endure lengthy periods of waiting as he advised his party comrades and workers from 
Hubli, who came in and out of his office, to mobilise workers and organise protests 
against what he saw as oppressive capitalist factory managements in Hubli. 
However, these ideals appealed to a decreasing number of subscribers in 
EWS and as Mr. VDVN himself grudgingly acknowledged to me on 26 January 
2011, it was difficult to retain, let alone increase, his activists beyond the ten-fifteen 
committed, longtime comrades who would never leave the communist dispensation 
of EWS anyway. He attributed this inability of his trade union grouping to expand its 
membership to a combination of Mr. KS misleading the workers, Mr. MCL giving 
them false promises and the modern worker’s caprice for more money instead of 
struggling for the principles that separated his generation from theirs. 
Mr. RK’s trade union was affiliated to the other Dravidian party, the 
AIADMK, and played upon workers’ linguistic Tamil sentiments, promising them that 
he could exert enormous amounts of pressure and he used this platform to try to 
outdo his rival, Mr. KS, who was backed by the Dravidian DMK party and from 
whom he wanted to recoup lost support. Mr. RK’s party was not in power at that 
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moment and therefore his influence was much reduced and workers failed to see any 
tactical advantages in backing him. I conjectured after my exit from the field that his 
support base might have improved in EWS with the coming to power in Tamil Nadu 
of the AIADMK to which he was affiliated. 
This actual or perceived political clout was an important determinant in the 
survival and tactics of the Dravidian parties whose trade union strategies were very 
much dependent upon the pleasure of the political sponsors who subsidised the 
running costs of the trade unions and provided periodic support on political strategies 
within the unions. trade union support from the Dravidian political parties worked in 
two ways. In one scenario, pressure from the political party applied by management 
made it quite possible for them to accept whatever management offered them; 
conversely, the second scenario could be that when the management is not on good 
terms with the political party, the union could make its daily life excruciatingly 
difficult by instigating workers to disrupt work without any worry of pecuniary loss. 
The first scenario was rumoured by Mr. RK, who was Mr. KS’s Dravidian union 
competitor, to be the case with Mr. KS and senior plant management’s relationship. 
The communists for their part could not convert that perception of sympathy to 
enlarge their representational block, and even win when the next elections were held. 
These Dravidian political parties in EWS relied on the influence of their 
external backers to engineer results for them rather than on the individual leadership 
qualities of their officials and the internal mobilisation of workers. Their promise to 
workers uttered sotto voce was that they could influence the institutions of state such as 
the Labour Commissioner, whether by fair or underhand means, through blackmail, 
bribery, threats of transfer or some other unpleasant consequence for any honest 
government official who failed to comply with their wishes. Yet for all its influence, 
real or imagined, Mr. RK, the leader, was sandwiched in between the other unions 
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with limited industrial power and could only complain about management policy and 
the misdemeanours of Mr. MCL and Mr. KS without having an obvious sanction that 
he could bring to bear. 
I will now turn my attention to how persistent inter-union rivalries aggravated 
their weaknesses in negotiating with management. 
7.4.4 Persistent inter-union rivalries but agreement on issues 
challenging workers 
EWS’s trade unions had to exaggerate their condescending and unflattering 
representations of their rivals, with each trying to broaden its support base, all within 
the same pool of permanent EWS workers. This tactic was critical for the survival and 
continued relevance of EWS trade unions because it was important to appear strong in 
front of their supporters to retain their support base and attempt to bring in new 
recruits both from rival trade unions and from the small proportion of undecided 
workers in EWS who had no trade union affiliations. Inter-union rivalry was 
characterised by mutual recriminations and a continuing acrimony between Mr. MCL, 
Mr. KS, Mr. RK and the communists. As noted in Section 7.3, the succession of 
different unions gaining majority support at different times from the 1980s to the 
present, produced marked shifts in trade union leadership which were underscored by 
the persistent divisions between the groupings who saw the other leaders as the main 
obstacles to their establishing legitimacy amongst workers. The workers’ willingness 
to change constantly the people in power at each election for the recognised union and 
the arrangements for regular elections, sponsored by the employers, probably reflects 
an Indian democratic phenomenon but certainly was disruptive to the development of 
a countervailing bureaucracy to that of the employers. 
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This disunity between the trade unions worked to plant management’s 
advantage, so that whilst one constituency of workers perceived Mr. KS as 
management’s sidekick and stooge had enormous confidence in the leadership 
abilities of Mr. MCL, another might see Mr. KS. as a credible power-broker and Mr. 
MCL as someone who regularly made them promises he could never deliver. 
Nevertheless, as demonstrated earlier, trade union leadership personalities 
such as Mr. MCL have shaped worker opinion in EWS and, in the climate of mutual 
acrimony between the unions, Mr. MCL appeared to be the only individual who saw 
the need to unify workers around a finite number of well-defined grievances that they 
all shared and focused his demands on pay and working conditions, subjects that 
united them. He took these demands, interpreted them and then presented them first to 
the workers and thereafter to management thematically, in terms that all EWS workers 
could understand and support. Other trade unions were thus forced to follow his lead, 
including his bitter rival Mr. KS, a retired operator who had already had a represented 
majority from 1997 to 2001. 
But, in the early 2000s it was Mr. RK and then Mr. MCL who gained majority 
votes, and each new majority coincided with fresh disputes, so Mr. KS seems to have 
had less influence than he imagined, something alleged by Mr. VDVN who 
condemned Mr. KS as a despicable lackey of management. For example, Mr. VDVN 
[24 January 2001] accused management of doing everything to break workers’ unity 
in EWS, including forcing compromises on workers’ grievances through agreements 
with weak trade union leaders like Mr. KS and Mr. RK. In another conversation held 
in February 2009, an operator in the assembly area, who owed allegiance to Mr. 
MCL, expressed an abysmal estimation of what they thought of the capability of Mr. 
RK. Talks were ongoing between management and the recognised union, led by Mr. 
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KS and affiliated to the DMK, but the operators to whom I spoke alleged opaqueness 
in management's communication of the detail of the talks and questioned Mr. KS’s 
commitment to negotiating hard for a fair settlement. 
One cause of the escalation in bickering amongst all the trade union leaders 
was the delay in arriving at the labour settlement with senior plant management of 
EWS. This was corroborated by Mr. MCL’s union grouping, in the pamphlet dated 9 
October 2008, in which he complained that it had been seventeen months since the 
last labour settlement had been signed, and he suggested that the operators, 
irrespective of their union affiliation, were bitter that management was delaying the 
wage settlement and not paying them in a timely manner. Mr. MCL singled out Mr. 
KS as being in cahoots with management and not bargaining hard enough with 
CompCo to secure workers’ interests during a recession when they were feeling the 
effects of what amounted to a pay freeze very acutely. Another smaller section of 
workers who looked upon Mr. RK as their leader in March 2009, wanted Mr. KS to 
accelerate the long delayed settlement agreement with management or unequivocally 
accept failure and quit for having failed to get a reasonable settlement in good time.  
When the settlement was reached at the end of May 2009 there was 
widespread discontent amongst trade union conveners such as Mr. VDVN and 
workers such as Mr. TNS who viewed its unfavourable terms as yet another instance 
of Mr. KS being management’s poodle. 
This persistent competitive antipathy between different groupings of workers 
allied to the different unions was a consistent theme and consequently trade union 
resistance to the managerial onslaught remained piecemeal and disjointed as the 
internecine rivalry destroyed the ability of trade unions to speak with even a 
semblance of unity even though they were all aware of the substantive issues facing 
the workers. So, even though trade unions in EWS tended to agree on several basic 
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grievances against a senior plant management that was implementing edicts from 
above and against corporate management whom they perceived was steadily sawing 
away the very ground they stood upon, they were virtually powerless to resist. The 
only winner from the chaotic system of perpetually changing unions was CompCo’s 
management. 
7.4.5 Contradictory nature of workers’ attitudes and responses 
Having pointed out the inability of trade unions to form a substantial 
oppositional block because of their fragmented nature and their weakened power 
bases, I will explore certain aspects of the workers’ own attitudes and responses that 
appeared to be contradictory. 
The workers in EWS adopted different perspectives depending on their 
circumstances and I have already explored the differences between different groups 
based on age, job role and recruitment source. Thus older workers were opposed 
fundamentally to management who were disturbing the working conditions built up 
over many years whilst the cooperation of younger workers, who were more mobile 
within the job market was contingent upon their personal self-interests and likely to be 
transient. This older generation, like Mr. VN and the union activist Mr. VDVN who 
had worked in the heat treatment department in EWS, preferred not to be noticed and 
wanted to “fade” into the background. They were particularly opposed to attempts by 
plant management to relocate them from the area in which they worked, which would 
mean them leaving their work-mates, familiar machines and jobs with which they 
possessed a sense of accomplished familiarity. These older operators, such as Mr. 
VDVN, had come to constitute their emotional sense of being, or in relation to these 
machines and the job routines with which they were familiar and the interactions that 
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their day at work entailed; these formed their world view of work. This vocabulary, 
the familiar job routines and the relationship of their job routines with their fellow 
workers provided them with their ‘intentionality’, in the phenomenological sense of 
usage of the term, to a pre-aligned perspective on management paradigms. 
Corporate management’s GEMBA project, envisaging as it did greater 
flexibility for management when it came to modifying the job routines of workers 
through kaizening and job rotation, hoped to disrupt that pre-set sense of existential 
being through constant change and the displacement of the sense of accomplished 
familiarity that workers perceived and which constituted who they were emotionally. 
However, it is important to point out that although the fundamental positions 
of management and workers were largely irreconcilable, their relationships were 
much more complex than these fundamental positions would suggest. Despite their 
grievances and management continually sawing away their sense of certainty, older 
workers still felt compelled to maintain reasonable relationships with their Section 
Heads with whom they had in many cases grown up and worked for many years. 
Their younger counterparts did not generally have these entrenched emotional bonds 
but nevertheless saw good financial and career reasons why they should cooperate, at 
least on the surface level. This apparent willingness to break bread with middle 
managers reflected the contradiction in workers’ attitudes and responses which I will 
explore further below. 
Middle managers – especially line managers – and workers lived in a 
symbiotic relationship and each needed the other for their continued employment and 
survival. Both operators and trade union leaders could harbour grievances and defy 
management while (sometimes) still remaining on friendly terms with Section Heads. 
Friendships and banter between older, established workers and section managers co-
existed with continuing worker grievances. Against this contextual background, 
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different areas of the factory continued to be characterised by distinctive patterns of 
compromises and negotiated adjustments. Allan Fox [1966: 18-19] argues that the 
totality of the situation at a given moment of time in the work area and types of 
productive system have a bearing on the nature of interaction patterns between work 
groups. The nature of the labour process in EWS, as illustrated in Chapter 5, varied 
in the assembly and machining areas. Hence different areas of the factory were 
characterised by distinctive patterns of compromises and negotiated adjustments that 
had to be arrived at amongst operators and managers, involving such features as 
lapses in time-keeping, quality reductions under production pressures or workers 
covering for one another. Older workers and managers, maintained relationships 
underpinned by shared experiences, friendships, joking and mutual tolerance, even 
though worker grievances still remained very real.  
For instance, trade union leaders such as Mr. VDVN would be on friendly 
terms with their Section Heads or middle managers but these friendly terms would not 
impede them from defying management because their grievances centred on corporate 
management’s initiatives and not on the actions of the individual managers with 
whom they worked and who had little influence over company policies. The degree to 
which operators got along with different middle managers and Section Heads varied. 
There would be a lot of casual banter and joking amongst some operators and middle 
managers, and people like Mr. AK would ridicule and occasionally swear at an 
operator for being slow in the line, but it would be taken in good spirit even if there 
were grievances, because in order to work together there had to be mutual tolerance. 
In this way, whilst some operators took breaks, their colleagues would complete jobs 
and middle managers and inspectors would ‘look the other way’. Also, when work 
pressures were high senior production managers would overlook attendance or 
punctuality issues and quality defects because they had known the operators 
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concerned for many years and needed their cooperation to reach their production 
targets. Without that cooperation, middle managers would have found themselves 
behind target and in trouble, and so were ready to abide by the implicit contracts built 
up over time between themselves and the workers rather than the literal, express 
contracts that ostensibly governed their working conditions. 
These relationships benefited management importantly in another way. The 
younger workers, who usually did not have these deeper relationships with managers, 
and who may have been fundamentally less attracted to direct action, were 
nevertheless easily swayed once there was some disagreement and were then much 
more likely to react angrily in one form or another. In that context, their older 
colleagues often acted as mediators to resolve issues and douse the flames of 
discontent. In that way they lubricated the wheels of production, which made their 
lives and those of their line managers a lot easier. Concomitantly, even though there 
was some militancy, these individual networks of relationships were certainly 
influential and workers’ opposition to management manifested itself in more subtle 
ways than just high profile opposition, as I will explore in the ensuing section. 
7.4.6 Spectrum of formal and informal resistance considered 
Although militancy was declining and the trade union leadership was 
fragmented, this did not by extrapolation elide sporadic flash points of worker 
resistance. Worker resistance in some cases took less obvious forms as different 
workers adopted different strategies to express their objections to management policy 
and resisted it. These varied with the age of the workers concerned and the staged they 
had reached in their careers; I will bring out the spectrum of forms of resistance 
adopted by workers. 
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In Section 7.2 I have described the subtle opposition to GEMBA evident in 
training classes which represented one form of undermining management’s project 
and represented a stubborn obstacle against corporate management’s expectant 
bricolage of present and future managerial strategies. I will now explore other forms 
of resistance and opposition in EWS that were often independent of any trade union 
initiative: sit-ins, flash strikes, work to rule and coordinated sickness absences. 
The sit-in was where workers occupied the company’s premises in defiance 
of management orders. This was intended to create publicity for the conflict between 
employer and employees and embarrass the company within its industry, knowing 
very well that high profile visitors would receive a message that suggested the 
company was less in control of its destiny than it wished to portray. Sit-ins were one 
way of placing workers’ grievances in sharp focus in the automotive industry in India 
and striking at CompoCo’s soft underbelly, and therefore negating the very image it 
wanted to project. This is because these forms of protest highlighted a crucial 
characteristic of modern Indian companies and their paranoia of preserving what they 
saw as the right image for themselves even if their work areas, the attitudes of their 
workers and the problems they faced sat uncomfortably with the idealised image that 
they sought to project to shareholders, customers and the public. 
EWS wanted to project an image of a dynamic company always learning and 
one that was abreast of the latest idioms of management practice and was quite unlike 
the typical image of a manufacturing unit, with workers having their hands full of 
grease and work areas smelling of the industrial odour of oil and industrial lubricant 
spillage. Corporate management at Nellore tried to emulate the ‘campus image’ 
assumed by companies like Microsoft and Apple, to whom managers like Mr. VDS 
and Mr. N looked up approvingly. Its corporate headquarters building was said to be 
world-class in terms of the comforts, amenities and conference rooms it offered, and 
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these were thought sure to impress visitors. To complement this the corporate 
communications unit in Nellore was always careful to exude an image of a company 
full of cheerful young willing employees ever ready to “engineer the tomorrows” of 
CompCo’s customers and to depict clean, state-of-the-art, work areas in the 
advertisements it issued periodically in newspapers. Complementing this, Mr. N loved 
to say, in line with the precepts of GEMBA, that consulting workers and middle 
managers was integral to hands-on troubleshooting and fulfilling of the N7i goals. 
Thus the image CompCo sought to portray was of a forward-looking, twenty-first 
century company in which management and workers were one team with one vision. 
These idealised images were challenged one day in late October 2008, when 
activists of Mr. KS’s group washed their clothes and hung them in the GM’s office 
suite, and refused to leave until assurances were given that the pay talks were going to 
be hastened [Mr. RGPN, 28 December 2008]. This spectacle of workers washing and 
drying clothes whilst occupying the GM’s office was anathema to the company’s 
carefully built image of a progressive, modern company and as a fieldworker, one of 
the sure ways I could have ensured my immediate expulsion from the plant would 
have been by citing this example to Mr. N, who strove very hard to maintain his calm 
and “coach” like image. Yet he had been affected by the sit-in and he could not 
sometimes disguise his unflattering perceptions of the company’s operators. In a 
market in which new entrants such as Mercedes were seeking to build strong brands 
and take a market share, image would be all important to CompCo and its 
management knew that acutely. Visible acts of resistance undermined the company’s 
efforts to strengthen its own brand whilst the less visible forms of resistance would 
also be damaging if known to CompCo’s competitors. 
‘Flash strikes’ were not an uncommon response to specific grievances and 
often took the form of brief sit-in protests until the Section Head, the Personnel Head 
 446 
and a representative of the recognised majority union met and resolved the issue. 
More informal forms of resistance could be as simple as lounging around the lawns of 
the assembly area, not turning up for work even if it brought disciplinary 
consequences later, sleeping during the night shift or workers resting during the 
assembly process while one of their mates completed the job. To reinforce strike 
threats one form of protest was to organise union meetings in front of the main gate 
of the plant at the end of a shift, where the union leaders would (much to the chagrin 
of management) talk loudly about the workers’ grievances. As explained earlier, the 
trade unions would also distribute pamphlets about the contentious issues 
surrounding the company, and these would also be distributed outside the main gate, 
to the irritation of managers like Mr. N.  
Another, less dramatic but no less effective, response to management was the 
work to rule. Older operators sometimes orchestrated ‘working to rule’ and refused to 
talk to management during shifts. They would also ask questions that both line 
managers and they knew the answers all too very well or seek obvious instructions, 
and although the questions were inconsequential, the end result would be damaging 
delays in production. For example, I observed that operators would deliberately 
identify parts for particular jobs wrongly from the stocks held on the line and then 
ask line managers, such as Mr. AK, to confirm their selections before proceeding 
with their work. The line managers would then have to instruct them to find the 
correct parts causing exasperation, diverting the line managers from other tasks and 
slowing down the line. 
One other tactic for resisting management’s intent was the coordinated 
sickness absence where I saw that small groups of say five workers would go sick on 
the same night shift (‘throwing a sickie’) causing serious disruption. The absences 
would be arranged to cause the maximum effect with the least effort and workers 
 447 
would fail to turn up with no prior notice or turn up late so that no substitute staff 
could easily be found. I saw that the consequence was that management’s carefully 
structured production schedule for the night would have to be revised with a loss of 
output. 
A saying once attributed to Vic Feather, General Secretary of the TUC from 
1969 to 1973, was that management could make people work but could not make 
them work with enthusiasm. Operators were notably unenthusiastic about GEMBA 
unless they saw some immediate personal advantage in it and hence displayed the 
exact opposite of enthusiasm, infectious lethargy. This was yet another tactic 
designed to make the life of tired line managers excruciatingly difficult and was 
particularly effective when adopted by operators on the night shift in the MDV area. 
With fewer managers present on the night shift, it was a relatively easy option for 
resistance, and would further exasperate line managers who found the assembly line 
operators’ episodic pace of work difficult to combat. One worker, usually one of the 
veteran operators, would begin to work more slowly and then others, sensing safety 
in numbers, would follow suit, followed by one operator working rapidly to provide 
‘cover’ and the eventually everyone rising like the high note of a concerto piece to 
catch up at some point in the small hours of the morning, when the line managers 
were at their wits end. Corporate management’s urgent aim of instituting a roadmap 
and clamping down on opacity by instituting lean job cycles stemmed directly from 
the above style of opposition that was particular to EWS and WDP4.  
7.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter I have tried above all to be a witness to and visualise mentally 
the moving frames of events as I experienced them, in order to identify the causal 
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aspects that shaped workers’ attitudes toward GEMBA, management and their trade 
unions. I have also sought to give voice to the workers and construct an account of 
their experiences as they narrated them to me.  
Corporate management went ahead with its programme of automation, 
outsourcing and active consideration of new production sites where it expected 
easier labour relations. For workers continued job security and better wages were 
what mattered: for management the imperatives were profitability and corporate 
survival. These two aims were seldom coterminous and from the attitudes of senior 
managers of EWS and corporate management towards workers, I am led to conclude 
that mental conceptions and corresponding representations of change management 
amongst managers and different workers can never be congruent. This is because 
plant management are constantly revising how they represent change in response to 
the factual, material realities that emerge before them. 
Workers reacted to change management half-heartedly. The reasons why 
GEMBA was not successful in convincing a substantial majority of workers to 
embrace change were partly driven by the historical context of EWS, and partly by 
pressing, topical concerns such as job security. Whilst management appeared not to 
expect an overnight transformation in workers, it was nevertheless impatient to see 
the human aspects of GEMBA realised and needed co-operation and commitment 
from its workers, particularly older workers and those in its older plants. 
Corporate Management was, therefore, reacting to the emergent reality of a 
range of vectors, both external and internal, and in doing so tried a range of 
strategems which it hoped would bring success, but which were rarely in the obvious 
best interest of its workers. This emergent reality serves as the background against 
which senior managers and workers were conditioned in their responses and 
behaviour to one another even as they shaped the future course of GEMBA. 
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Trade union rivalries and their dependence on, external leaders and the 
charisma of individuals obscured a critical need to understand and produce a 
coordinated and effective response to the technical nuances of lean manufacturing 
and management’s multidimensional onslaught. Marginalised as they were in recent 
times as compared to the halcyon days of trade union militancy, they became more or 
less passive spectators to what transpired and could little more than plead with 
management to slow down, if not stop its attacks on the job security of their 
members. The trade unions deflected blame upon their collective and individual 
failings by blaming their rivals and trying to inflate an illusion of strength in front of 
their current and prospective members, whilst fighting for the support of an ever-
dwindling pool of workers. And the battleground between workers and workers, 
between unions and their competitors and between workers and management was 
underlain by a complex texture of relationships between the key-players which 
remained complex and was often contradictory. 
Finally, the individual experiences that shaped their identity of workers were 
equally complex and varied from one age cohort to another. An older trade union 
activist’s memories of strikes were comparable with an aged elephant’s memory of its 
mahout’s ill-treatment of it as a young elephant, and their attitudes contrasted sharply 
with those of the apolitical, younger workers, who were eager to impress management 
but still reluctant to lose trade union support and isolate themselves from their peers. 
Each of their individual experiences created visual representations of words and the 
linguistic vocabularies that workers used between themselves and in their interactions 
with managers created a linguistic community that operated within the context of their 
work place. Within this linguistic community corporate management wanted to 
introduce uncertainty and substitute extant images and older vocabularies, that were 
difficult to dislodge, with newer ones. The interaction of this linguistic community of 
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middle managers, workers and senior management each with its own norms and 
expectations created an evolving pattern of industrial relations in EWS. This pattern 
had developed and was continuing to develop in a context that seemed to bear out 
E.P. Thompson’s claim that a working class can never be a monolithic, empirical 
block of fixed attitudes and predictable behaviours, and was continually evolving and 
changing. Instead the working class, as demonstrated in EWS, is an evolving 
construct that is irreducible and indivisible to deterministic economic and linear 
historical categories and is constantly being made and unmade in the process of 
management’s attempts to extract surplus value from workers. Among EWS workers, 
consciousness of themselves as workers was continually forming and dissipating, 
influenced by a collage of internal and external factors; despite that it remained a 
critical obstacle to the success of GEMBA. 
Finally to conclude, I cite from E.P. Thompson’s [1968 cited in Thompson, 
2001] preface in The Making of the English Working Class: 
‘Class consciousness is the way in which these experiences are 
handled in cultural terms: embodied in traditions, value systems, 
ideas and institutional forms. If the experience appears as 
determined, class-consciousness does not. We can see a logic in the 
responses of similar occupational groups, undergoing similar 
experiences, but we cannot predicate any law. Consciousness of 
class arises in the same way in different times and places, but never 
in just the same way.’  
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Chapter 8 Conclusions  
8.0 Introduction 
The overarching aim of this thesis has been to understand the process of 
change management within an automotive firm, CompCo, what this reveals about the 
objectives of the senior managers who planned the strategy, its implications for the 
middle managers and workers who were responsible for implementing it, and what 
this tells us about how an old Indian firm like CompCo – and the people who work 
there – are responding to the opportunities and constraints that face them. Most of my 
data came through observing, interviewing about, and to a small extent participating 
in the GEMBA change management programme in CompCo’s EWS plant, located in 
Hubli, India, during ten months in 20082009, together with a further ten-day visit in 
January 2011. 
My overall conclusion supports the findings of other ethnographies, such as 
Milkman [1997] and Huxley et al. [1997], that the implementation and outcome of 
change programmes like GEMBA are often quite contrary to the early, prescriptive 
management literature extolling the virtues of lean manufacturing, such as Womack’s 
and Woos’ Lean Thinking [2003]. GEMBA followed a non-linear path and was 
influenced by a panoply of external vectors beyond the control of CompCo. The 
introduction of GEMBA was highly selective and piecemeal. GEMBA was never 
deeply instituted but rather remained an overlay over existing managerial structures 
and practices, and was never organically integrated into CompCo’s organisational 
structure or production areas. To some extent some senior managers, many middle 
managers and experienced plant operatives preferred the chaos and contingency to 
which they were used because it gave them greater flexibility to meet their targets at 
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the last minute when required. Moreover, there was a clear conflict between the 
ambition to introduce some measure of participatory responsibility among workers 
and the disparaging attitude of some managers to workers. Later the atmosphere in 
the plant was dominated by short-time working owing to the drop in demand 
following the recession from 2008 and the apprehension of labour force cuts. This 
exacerbated existing worries that were linked to the extent of contract-working in the 
plant, rather than direct employment. These difficulties at CompCo, whilst also found 
in studies elsewhere, were closely connected to the existence of diverse subjectivities 
among managers, which were related to their careers in the firm and the value of 
their long-term career capital in post-liberalisation India and to the history of trade 
union activity at EWS. 
In this chapter I will look in detail first at the limitations of the GEMBA 
strategy, then at how middle managers’ responses might contribute to our 
understanding of managerial roles in India. I then consider workers’ responses, and, 
finally, contextualise this analysis within changes in Indian political economy. 
Finally, I make some suggestions for future research. 
8.1 The Limitations of GEMBA 
My main questions concerned, first of all, the overall strategies adopted by 
senior managers and their relation to methods of worker management and how these 
strategies were communicated by corporate management to other managers and to 
workers. My review of the literature on change management and related issues 
suggests that the implementation of lean manufacturing has varied greatly within and 
across automotive plants because of their different market position, their ability to 
manipulate or even control the factors of production, the extent of trade union 
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organisation, and other factors. These shape the strategies adopted, the extent to 
which they are successfully implemented, and the effects for workers, and their 
relative acceptance or resistance, which in turn guides the manner in which corporate 
management designs its change-management strategy. 
I found that at CompCo’s EWS plant the difficulties of implementing a 
paradigm shift went much further than simply the inertia of settled ways of doing 
things in an old firm on a brownfield site. The inconsistent and piecemeal application 
of ‘change management’ can be seen in every area of corporate management’s 
strategy, which sought increased productivity, increased self-initiative among middle 
managers and workers, and continuous cost reduction. Corporate management wanted 
change but also wanted plant management to manage through sometimes chaotic 
production to get through the production schedule. This thesis highlights the tension 
that lies between corporate management’s plans and plant management’s limitations 
arising out of a number of contextual factors, in realising corporate management’s 
agenda. 
8.1.1 Increasing productivity 
Attempts to increase productivity, including measures associated with lean 
manufacturing, involve measures for managing what management theorist Michael 
Porter terms the “productivity frontier” by which he implies “the maximum value a 
company can deliver at a given cost, given the best available technology, skills, and 
management techniques – shifts outward, lowering costs and improving value at the 
same time” [Porter, 2011: 3]. 
Some of these measures and their consequences have often been studied in 
terms of the tension between ‘responsible autonomy’ and direct control [Friedman 
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1977]. The paradigm shift touted by GEMBA sought to increase workers’ sense of 
involvement and increase in self-initiative among middle managers and workers by 
moving from a bureaucratic style of management that was prevalent in Indian firms to 
a more informal style. This participative style of engaging managers and workers to 
facilitate greater productivity is purportedly well established in the IT industry, and 
many management consultancy firms in post-liberalisation India and, according to the 
GM Mr. SDN [24January 2011], many management consultants recommend its 
adoption to corporate managements across the automotive manufacturing industry. 
CompCo was no exception. 
The empowerment of workers to stimulate their self-initiative is often a 
cornerstone of lean management programmes, and as Chapter 5 demonstrates, 
GEMBA made much of its empowerment programme. As headed by Mr. N it sought 
to facilitate self-initiative among workers through the GEMBA rewards programme 
and Empower festivals. However, the impact of such programmes were partial in 
securing the whole-hearted participation and acceptance of middle managers and 
workers, and in the context of the worsening recession and workers’ feelings of job 
insecurity, came to have very little purchase on workers’ attitudes. 
The efforts to encourage participation did not go very deep. It was the senior 
managerial team that decided on the GEMBA project goals, and did the ‘deep dives’ 
which comprised senior production managers such as the R& D head of CompCo 
(Engines), with a cross functional team from either the same plant or in conjunction 
with other plants, of senior middle managers across departments. The objective of 
these deep dives was: to undertake a detailed study of production processes, to 
identify present plant layouts and reorganise them in line with lean manufacturing 
requirements, to recommend comprehensive major machinery changes and far 
reaching line reorganisation if required. These deep dives were held either in 
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response to a recurrent production related malaise, or comprehensive overhaul and 
redesigning of the shop floor. If required the services of external managerial 
consultants would be requested to help in this senior managerial effort. The results of 
this extensive study of production processes, job routines and machinery would be 
studied by corporate management and in turn implemented across CompCo’s plants. 
Higher-level managers who headed plants or departments in EWS could already 
consult line managers whenever they wanted their opinion in any case. Not only was 
GEMBA essentially a top-down project, senior management in actual fact did not 
think very highly of the abilities of line managers and workers. 
In fact the attempts at empowerment were so shallow that I came to see them 
as a ‘language game’ of the kind that Wittgenstein [Monk, 2005: 74] analyses. His 
insights can be used productively to highlight that a change programme like GEMBA 
has to be understood at least partly in terms of competing languages which are linked 
to power. CompCo’s GEMBA programme consisted not only of reorganisations of 
machinery and labour, but it also tried to institutionalize a new vocabulary whose 
rhetorical handmaidens were ‘participation’ and ‘self-initiative’ where all needed to 
work together to make CompCo compete and thrive in the automotive industry. This 
can be seen particularly in the ways that CompCo’s change management team tried 
to mimic the atmosphere of informality of the Indian IT industry, the centre of which 
is located not far from Hubli, but within a hierarchical organisation. Ironically, 
however, the operation of the participative vocabulary depended on the hierarchical 
organisation of the firm. The proponents of GEMBA used their senior positions to 
try to displace the older, more authoritarian and often derogatory language adopted 
by Section Heads and line managers, with words and slogans such as ‘team-work’, 
‘troubleshooting’, ‘Together We Can’, and ‘Engineering the Customer's Tomorrows’ 
being used with optimistic fervour. 
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However, acceptance of this vocabulary was rather superficial. When the 
pressure of production met up against managerial GEMBA activity it was GEMBA 
that lost out in the face of the immediate priorities of Section Heads and line 
managers, in terms of reaching their targets and protecting their sphere of influence. 
When this happened, an older but more rigid and blunt form of communication 
emerged, with its abrasive words, said and unsaid, well understood by line managers. 
Production managers had no other choice but to take the place of slave drivers to push 
production. Hence Mr. N’s and Mr. AB’s apparent informality was both supported by 
the bureaucratic organisational structure of EWS, which made it appear that a 
friendlier participative atmosphere was being created, but it was ignored whenever 
necessary, and supplanted by more obvious and direct forms of control. 
As Delbridge [1998] found, responsible autonomy programmes and other 
lean manufacturing measures also seek to reorganise production to make it possible 
to respond more flexibly to changes in production models. Success depends on the 
resources the firm has and its ability to control the factors of production. At CompCo 
the firm lacked the resources, or was unwilling to spend the money, to transform 
production at EWS in the way that lean manufacturing demands. As is discussed 
later, it also faced opposition from trades unionists and workers. 
CompCo wanted to be more flexible in getting value from the factors of 
production, but faced limitations owing to the ageing and unevenness of plant 
machinery and production methods between different sections. The full 
implementation of lean manufacturing across all the shops of EWS, other than the 
model areas, required comprehensive redesign of job routines and tightly timed 
production cycles integrated to suppliers JIT delivery to the lines, vendor 
supermarkets and rigorous fault analysis by workers themselves, instead of their 
waiting for others to it for them (some of these measures were already in place in 
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engine assembly areas such as Shop Five). These would have necessitated changes in 
plant layout and reorganisation of machinery that in turn called for massive 
investments. However, CompCo was unable to make the large financial investments 
at EWS that the ageing plant required. This was especially the case because CompCo 
was developing other, more modern plants elsewhere in India and, as I discovered in 
2011, had been undecided about the future of the EWS plant in its overall role in its 
future product portfolio and strategy. Getting Nissan in would accentuate the 
implementation or even improve upon GEMBA by getting first hand inputs from a 
leading Japanese exponent in engine assembly. As the commercial vehicle industry 
was moving towards Euro 5 emission norms, Euro 4 and 3 compliant engines may no 
longer be relevant to the commercial vehicles manufactured. Newer engines required 
comprehensive reorganisation and rationalisation of lines as opposed to duplication 
of products and greater investment in technology. Bringing in Nissan would enable 
certain lines to be amongst the best in CompCo and a testing board for the latest lean 
innovations, while it gave the rest of the plant a chance to catch up with these new 
lines. At the time of my visit reorganisation work of the engine, testing facility and 
Shop Five was in progress to enable them to match Nissan’s standards. However, the 
prevalence of older and less flexible production machinery at EWS meant that 
management was selective and pragmatic in its implementation of job redesign. 
CompCo mirrors Delbridge’s [1998] ValleyCo, where these changes envisaged by 
high-profile corporate managers, such as Mr. VDS, never really took hold, because, 
like ValleyCo, EWS had “different structures and systems being run concurrently on 
the shop floor” [Delbridge, 1998: 65]. This lack of integration across the plant meant 
that its attainment of tightly controlled production targets was only ever met through 
what Delbridge terms “negotiated order and preference for chaos” [Delbridge,1998: 
29]. Like ValleyCo, Section Heads’ and line managers’ production targets were met 
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in much of the plant only by workers pulling together, eventually getting to the 
production target which was based on the production schedule. This production 
schedule was given to line managers by their Section Head who, in turn, received it 
from the deputy heads and further above the Production Head who prepared the 
forecast based on quantity and product mix warranted by the marketing department 
in CompCo. 
However, EWS senior management in charge of GEMBA paid more attention 
to production areas, such as assembly shops, that were more amenable to the work 
organisation of lean manufacturing even while neglecting others, especially 
machining areas, where it was more expedient to continue with older machining and 
cheaper, labour-intensive processes. Hence the assembly areas, and in particular Shop 
Five, resembled Delbridge’s NipponCo, where job routines were tightly coupled, 
something which depended on minimising uncertainty in the supply of components. 
At EWS some areas, such as Shop Five, were at the frontline of implementing 
innovations such as kanban, cellular production and the core principles of lean 
manufacturing. However, these areas in EWS were still vulnerable to disruption of 
the tightly coupled production chain by a miscellany of factors, such as delays in 
supply of components by suppliers, which in turn had a knock-on effect on the 
kanban bins where stocks were replenished just in time. However, we can say that 
the GEMBA paradigm never really spread across EWS as a whole. It was cheaper 
for senior management to retain labour-intensive machinery in comparison to more 
expensive automation. 
Moreover, senior plant management developed cold feet about the application 
of the planned new procedural job routines in the slump and crisis that followed the 
recession of 2008, when supplies were in short supply and arrived spasmodically. 
They instead continued with tried and tested ways of responding to contingency 
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through organised chaos and the “milking” [Jackall, 1988] of old machining areas to 
the limit for maximum output through extraction of maximum effort from line 
managers and workers to meet production surges. This was especially apparent when 
the plant needed to meet surges that would come during year-end periods. 
Sometimes targets of the day’s production plan were met by transferring the 
reworking of items to the quality control section. 
8.1.3 Cost control and reduction 
As explained in Chapter 6, cost reductions through an improved and more 
precise and up to date system of inventory control and recording was a key 
component of the GEMBA programme. It sought to reduce accumulating inventory, 
especially in a recessionary context, because vehicles were accumulating in its 
production facility, parts were lying unused, there was an upper limit its dealers could 
hold and there were mounting supplier bills. Apart from acutely corporate image 
conscious managers such as Mr. N, this sight of heaps of unused machinery, groups 
of suppliers circling the work office to get paid and commercial chassis lying unsold 
was an eyesore and negated the carefully nurtured image of a company in tune with 
the latest production practices which they were carefully trying to nurture. It also 
wanted to match supplies more closely to new models; better inventory control also 
would have an impact on productivity. 
The attempt to revamp inventory exposed the vulnerability of buffers and 
brought out the tensions between different systems of inventory management 
prevalent in CompCo and the challenges and conflicts between senior and middle 
management. It proved impossible to insist on the system being followed. For 
instance, senior plant management turned a blind eye when middle managers 
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continued to adapt to contingencies through actions such as bypassing the steps in 
inventory flow, as described in Chapter 6, for instance by grabbing components as 
soon as they arrived from the supplier – outside the proper recording and distribution 
systems – or rummaging for them in the Medium Duty Vehicle store area. 
An important problem here, as in planned increases or scaling down in 
productivity, was CompCo’s lack of control over bigger suppliers because they 
preferred to deliver in lots rather than in batches in order to achieve economies of 
scale. They also had a monopoly over critical components of particular specifications 
wherein alternatives could not be thought for substitution. There were limits to 
CompCo’s efforts to antagonise such suppliers such as the German multinational firm 
Robert Bosch and ask them either to supply or to withdraw supply at the last minute, 
akin to the manner in which CompCo could do to the individually owned or smaller 
ancillary industries whose survival was critically dependent upon CompCo.. 
8.1.5 Inconsistency in support 
Perhaps the most striking aspect of GEMBA, and what I believe underwrote its 
very partial integration into EWS management style and operations, was the 
inconsistent support it received, even from managers. Although CompCo’s corporate 
management may have been motivated primarily by the need for CompCo to achieve 
efficiency and profitability, for managers below them the end was likely to be more 
important than the means. 
Their sceptical attitude had several roots: long experience of changing market 
conditions, fluctuating consumer demand from the provincial government transport 
corporations, individual truck owners of varying requirements ranging from heavy 
multi-axle vehicles to light commercial vehicles to private bus owners (whose 
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operations were increasingly becoming very competitive) who formed much of the 
customer base of CompCo. The other discernible reason for their sceptical attitude 
was the changing polices of their superiors made them cautious about innovative 
measures that they suspected might be short-lived fads. Their focus was on the here-
and-now and the commercial reality that products or services need to be produced and 
distributed. For them, the fact that production and distribution is going to be achieved 
is likely to be less important than how it was done. The CEO who led the initiative 
from corporate management and the GEMBA team failed to create a motivating 
atmosphere for middle managers and workers who remained sceptical about GEMBA 
and its potential to benefit them personally, and they came to see it as yet another 
burde to their existing workload. 
All the managers except the GEMBA team were always faced by competing 
priorities. In fact, the fulfilment of their obligations within EWS was often at the cost 
of GEMBA. The day-to-day survival of the plant managers, Section Heads and line 
managers or team leaders precluded their honouring the transformative evangelical 
agenda of GEMBA, pushed through by corporate management. This was partly 
because their promotion depended on a favourable review by their immediate superior, 
and he was always more concerned about their ability to meet production targets than 
GEMBA record keeping or monitoring. Corporate management, while demanding that 
plant managers achieved GEMBA targets, took them to task if they were failing in 
their production targets. Their saying that they were busy implementing lean 
initiatives – which took time to be perfected, learnt and synergised by operators and 
line managers – was not an acceptable excuse. 
It seems, therefore, that while corporate management perceived GEMBA as an 
integral transformational agenda, it did not integrate it into the mind-set of production 
managers and allow them to innovate and give them time to find their way around. 
 462 
GEMBA strategising and analysis was very much a senior management activity and 
middle managers were only consulted and not taken aboard when warranted. It was a 
side activity that was not fused into the production system, but superimposed and ran 
in parallel with the production of the plant where, as in Delbridge’s [1998] ValleyCo, 
the line managers such as Mr. AK, and others such as the senior engine stores 
managers Mr. RGPN, believed in the end everything will be fine. 
Ironically, even the GM of EWS seems to have been somewhat sceptical about 
GEMBA, at least in hindsight, which suggests that GEMBA had never had whole-
hearted support even among senior managers. When I interviewed the GM on my 
return to CompCo in 2011, he talked about the then recent outbreak of industrial 
militancy in the Korean-owned firm Hyundai, and argued that lean manufacturing is 
dependent upon local cultural contexts and needs to take them into account. He said 
that transplanting lean manufacturing to a labour-intensive market, such as India, 
whose factors of production were far from developed, was fraught with difficulties for 
Indian managers who tried to follow the edicts of their Korean superiors. He said that 
he himself advocated a pragmatic policy of crossing the bridges as they came and not 
relying on GEMBA as the only means of realising efficiency and reducing cost. In the 
context of the Hyundai industrial strife, this perhaps suggests that he recognises 
potential worker resistance as a key consideration.  
In sum, strong support for CompCo’s GEMBA initiative was confined to 
relatively few individuals, and their attempt to force through a new language game of 
lean manufacturing was not accepted by their subordinates. The position and outlook 
of senior management themselves contributed to the partial and unsuccessful nature of 
GEMBA because the interpretation of GEMBA’s objectives and implementation was 
reduced to the personalities and egos of a few individuals. 
 463 
The CEO of CompCo in Nellore, Mr. VDS’s transformational agenda of 
GEMBA, implemented by Mr. N and his deputy Mr. AB, was felt by line managers and 
workers and senior management within EWS as an imposition from above and 
corporate management implemented it without going out of the way to ensure its 
success. At EWS the head of GEMBA was Mr. N, who always thought he knew much 
about contemporary management practices. His strong personality and manner led 
middle managers to mime his lean vocabulary and try to produce an array of statistical 
data, minutely monitoring production parameters. However, they had no inclination to 
explain why GEMBA was having a limited impact in the manner in which they worked, 
preferring simply to ignore what they could. Mr. N’s deputy, Mr. AB, a highly-
qualified engineering professional was recruited to ensure that GEMBA was well co-
ordinated and implemented across the organisational hierarchy in order to facilitate 
what Mr. AB pointed out the much warranted “mind-set change”. 
8.2 Middle Managers’ Orientations and Strategies 
Although I had not originally planned to concentrate on the situations or 
motivations of middle managers, I was told by the GEMBA Head to help them better 
understand the implementation of GEMBA and suggest recommendations to facilitate 
course correction. Initially he put me into the CompCo Hubli plant further along the 
same road. Not long after, Mr. N relocated me to EWS because, as EWS was an older 
plant, my services would be of greater use to the change management team to enable 
what he called “course correction and learning by doing” by EWS managers and 
operators. He felt that the requirement to facilitate the right attitudes amongst front-
line managers in an older plant such as EWS, in order to permeate GEMBA 
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successfully across every manufacturing shop within the plant, was far more 
immediate compared to WAP4. 
Thus in the course of time I came to know the GEMBA team well and to sit in 
on their meetings with department heads and other line managers, so I was able to 
observe the interactions between middle managers at close quarters, and became 
aware of how much the change programme depended on obtaining their compliance. 
My question became how different categories of middle managers understood change 
management and how the ways they interpreted corporate management policies 
affected the process and outcome of GEMBA, and I began to explore some of the 
literature on middle management’s crosscutting interests [Nichols and Beynon, 1977] 
as between capital and labour and other interpretations of their roles. As a result, this 
thesis is one of the few ethnographic studies to contribute towards a sociological 
understanding of the relative importance of first-hand accounts of middle managers’ 
day-to-day decision-making in India, where the studies of manufacturing sector are 
generic and usually focus on workers and trade union patterns [Ramaswamy, 1977; 
Bhatacharjee and Ackers, 2010; Teiltelbaum, 2011; Hensman, 2011]. 
So far, I have concentrated on how the managers’ attitude to GEMBA goals 
and procedures stemmed from their role in the overall production process, especially 
the competing priorities of meeting production targets and engaging with GEMBA 
data recording and analysis. Middle managers in EWS were caught between 
demanding senior management above, and workers who they cannot buy off below. 
However, I gradually realised that managers’ relative interest in engaging with 
GEMBA also reflected underlying divisions among managers based on their age, 
experience and the upward mobility their career pathways could offer them. 
As this case study of CompCo suggests that organizations can be seen in 
reality as being comprised of multiple managerial constituencies, that will not 
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immediately be evident, and which bear little resemblance to the formal 
organizational charts that imply logical interactions and clear separations of 
responsibility and power. Whilst CompCo’s corporate management might commit 
itself to one strategy, it will be surrounded by other groups of managers and workers 
who themselves have their own expectations and experiences and who will pursue 
strategies that align with those interests and experiences and are inimical to the 
intentions of top management. Different layers of an organisation within CompCo 
pursued many, multiple organisational goals rather than one tightly-packed set of 
complementary objectives laid down by its leaders. As described in Chapter 6, at 
EWS there were two main groups of managers, who ranged from plant managers, 
managers in charge of particular functions – such as materials – and the middle 
managers who had more direct contact with operators. 
Across this large group, however, the key division when it came to GEMBA 
was less their positions in the firm’s formal managerial structure, than their age and 
generation. For both groups, self-preservation rather than the pursuit of the latest 
managerial theories, with which they may have only limited sympathy, is likely to be 
the imperative. However, both groups had no other choice than to undertake the 
verbal ‘performative acts’ of using identical ‘lean parlance’ to mirror Mr. N’s 
vocabulary as a way of acknowledging his power and showing deference. 
The larger group consisted of ‘survivors’ aged about forty to fifty-five who 
were mainly interested in practices and accustomed routines of the production line 
which they felt they could cope with until they retired; they feared their jobs were 
threatened by the new vocabularies and methods of control. These survivors within 
EWS craved limited stability that allowed their careers to progress whilst meeting 
short-term organisational objectives, such as production targets, and reaching 
accommodations with the policies of their superiors. They were used to the 
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management vocabulary and priorities which had developed in the more 
bureaucratised system that had prevailed, with its higher job security, and where 
competition with other firms was less of an issue. Some had also developed significant 
philanthropic interests outside the plant, such as Mr. RGPN’s involvement in a local 
orphanage and life in EWS was a component, not the raison d’être of their lives. They 
complained about GEMBA and avoided it when possible, partly based on their belief 
that making do through last minute alterations and chaos was in any case inevitable. 
However, EWS (and its senior management) were dependent on them to keep the plant 
running, irrespective of how much senior management complained about their 
hidebound ways. 
The other group was a much younger, aspiring cohort in their twenties and 
thirties, often recruited from engineering colleges, some of whom had business 
education degrees. These trainee managers were eager to progress their careers in the 
more competitive environment of post-liberalisation India that promises upward 
mobility to the talented, a development also pointed out by Gurucharan Das [2012]. 
The firm saw them as its future and invested considerable resources in their training, 
seeing them as its future. However, it knew very well that the continuance of these 
managers within the same firm was not guaranteed, and that there were better 
opportunities especially in a less physically taxing environment – such as the 
services sector – which presented them with higher positions and better pay. The 
survivors were insecure with this group and were worried that his group would 
threaten their career paths and eventually their jobs by rising much faster than them, 
in spite of having been there for the company when it needed them most, in rain or 
shine. 
These younger managers tried their best to adhere to the vocabulary and 
deadlines of GEMBA. However, they did not necessarily have the same attachment to 
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CompCo. The epitome of this group was Mr. AB, the GEMBA leader under Mr. N, 
who was more committed to GEMBA and the values it represented than to CompCo 
(in fact he left the firm some months after my field-work ended). 
The younger managers cohort in EWS were opportunistic and did not have 
the fealty or loyalty towards the company partly because they believed that they 
ought to change jobs if a better opportunity presented themselves as opposed to 
‘company men’ who believed in rising up the ladder and being rewarded for their 
services within the same firm. These younger managers’ opportunism for 
employment within other firms for career mobility and their consumption patterns, in 
cities such as Bangalore, were closely connected to shifts in the wider political 
economy, and the demands it makes of managers. I suspect that it is also connected 
to ongoing transformations in the class structure in India, especially the growth of a 
new middle class, including a new managerial class faction, with its interests in 
consumption and what is less talked about – its relative insecurity in employment 
[Fernandes, 2000]. However, owing to lack of further specific investigation on data 
on the class backgrounds of my informants, I am unable to develop this point further. 
My finding that attitudes to GEMBA and interpretations of their work more 
generally were underlain by differences in personal priorities, work histories, and 
career ambitions suggests that Watson’s [1994] emphasis on the importance of 
individual and variable subjectivities of managers as an explanation of their decisions 
and loyalties is as important to their interpretation of events and their actions as their 
structural position in the drama of capital-labour relations, as portrayed by Marxist 
analyses, nor are they trapped within a Foucualdian panopticon which gives them no 
room to manoeuvre. 
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8.3 Workers’ Responses to GEMBA 
As Chapter 7 documented, GEMBA did not appeal to workers and they did not 
react positively to the vocabulary of participation and troubleshooting. This was 
because they were much more apprehensive about losing job security and angry about 
the constraints on wage growth, because of both the long postponement of a new 
contract and later the cessations of production during the recession. However, owing 
to the antipathy to the trade unions of Nr. N, who nominated himself as my mentor, I 
was unable to have as much time with workers or trade union activists within EWS as 
I had hoped. 
Different groups of workers were affected by GEMBA quite differently. 
Permanent workers’ employment was relatively secure owing to the continued 
protection still offered by labour laws, but they still did not want to stick their neck 
out because of fears of going too far and showing management a way to reduce their 
headcount through kaizening. They were particularly worried by what they saw as 
management's systematic onslaught on the incremental component of their wages 
through scrapping the piece rate system and linking their incremental pay to kaizening 
and the attempt to tighten cycle times. Outsourcing and off-shoring and the steady 
increase of contract workers on site compounded their fears about job security and 
made them distrustful and even aggressive towards contract workers. 
Contract workers are especially vulnerable because they were itinerant 
employees and were under the mercy of the labour contractors and had no organised 
trade union support or representation. They bore the brunt of managerial ad-hocism 
especially when priorities of cost reduction overtook senior plant managers. One 
obvious area where plant management could show results to CompCo's finance 
department was to reduce the headcount of contract employees, and thereby save on 
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the wage bill. Even otherwise, contract workers were caught between the CompCo 
employees, who blamed contract workers for quality defects and lapses in the 
production and inventory management, and the ire of line managers who had to 
ensure shop-floor coordination to deliver production targets. 
Trade unions in CompCo failed to respond to a multi-levelled onslaught on 
their constituents’ job security and managerial intention of moving away from 
collective, bargaining-determined aspects of workers’ pay and job routines. Being 
affiliated and subsidised by political parties was a multiplier in their strength to 
negotiate with management as an added source of pressure (especially if the party by 
whom they were backed was in power) but was also their Achilles heel. Considering 
the party-led union organisational structure of Indian trade unions and within 
CompCo, party unions persuaded by management could force the local union 
conveners to cede to their demands. Moreover, both the plant level trade union leaders 
and external political leaders needed greater understanding of the finer technical 
details of lean manufacturing whose implementation was being progressively scaled 
up and multiple and often contradictory managerial strategies which CompCo 
management was pursuing which had direct implications for workers’ livelihoods. 
Bickering amongst each other, a large portion of trade union leaders’ time went into 
managing workers’ perceptions and expanding their support base, which meant that 
they could not mount a coherent response towards management. In summary, trade 
unions within CompCo were already operating in a context that those more 
favourable to management were unable to resist or mount a coherent response to 
managerial strategy. 
 470 
8.4 The Importance of the Wider Context 
As can already be seen in my discussion of middle managers and workers, 
the GEMBA programme and its limitations cannot be understood outside the wider, 
macro context of Indian manufacturing industry at the time of my fieldwork. There 
is a complicated historico-political and economic context under which managerial 
policy operated. I will briefly recollect changes and continuities regarding these 
macro variables and link them to changing Indian managerial policy which affected 
the outcome of change management in CompCo. 
Changes in the manufacturing environment include first the relation between 
manufacturing industry and the state. India had a licence permit economic system 
based on import substitution, in which the state in its various forms placed large 
orders with manufacturers and where consumers of all types had limited choice. Thus 
manufacturers enjoyed stability of demand and predictability of profit within a 
protected bubble that insulated management from the cold winds that were blowing 
through other economies. This was also true of CompCo, since at one time its buses 
would have been purchased by state-owned transportation corporations. Those 
employers were unable to impose the working systems that were regarded as best 
practice in other, more developed, economies. This environment was sustained by 
employment laws and political dynamics that emphasised the primacy of job security 
and encouraged labour market inflexibility by making litigation and prolonged legal 
complexity a norm, as explained in Chapter 7. The organisational structures of Indian 
manufacturers reflected this relative security, and emphasised the importance of 
time-serving over performance where promotion was concerned, which had produced 
strong company cultures and loyalties so that it was common for workers and 
managers to spend their entire lives with the same company. 
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Nowadays India is in the throes of transition from this economic system and 
the liberalisation that was taking place during my field-work (and since) has led to a 
harsher environment for firms like CompCo. What some call “crony capitalism” 
[Timmons, 2010] by which she implies “a small group of powerful conglomerates 
[which] scramble to fight for resources or project mining rights, land, infrastructure 
projects”. The dependence of economic life on close ties between corporate business 
and the state had been facilitated by state controls over the economy and has changed 
in character after liberalisation with increasing involvement of corporations, both 
Indian and overseas, in bribe-giving and fixing deals with bureaucrats and politicians 
– often to the detriment of the poor who are cheated [Sainath, 2011]. But it continues, 
co-existing with increased market competition from new market players, changing 
consumer demand and a globalised marketplace for goods and raw materials. This is 
also true in the bus and lorry market, where purchasers now are private companies 
with diverse demands. 
In this much more unstable environment, manufacturers like CompCo are 
forced to develop diversified product portfolios to meet changing consumer demands 
and competition from new multi-national players, who even at the time of my field-
work had already become acclimatised to more hostile market conditions and were 
clawing away market share. They had gone through the full, lean learning curve 
already, and were ready to compete in the most difficult of markets. 
Despite this, CompCo had some offsetting advantages in that it had a very 
strong market position and brand, and had become inured to local conditions and 
problems such as unreliable supply chains. CompCo also understood the domestic 
market better than most of its competitors. In short, it was astute and in every sense 
‘battle-hardened’. But these advantages also of course limited managers’ and 
workers’ incentives to accept and strengthen GEMBA. Economic liberalisation has 
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also meant change for workers. Competition has meant that workers at CompCo can 
no longer take their jobs for granted and could be, and were often, replaced by 
contract workers who enjoyed limited job security and less-eligible terms and 
conditions. 
In any case, however much circumstances may have changed many older 
conditions continued to shape managerial responses during my field-work. Much of 
India’s labour law structure remained essentially intact and intractable, as CompCo’s 
difficult industrial relations history testified. Moreover, the firm’s ability to create 
new, more flexible production systems is hampered by inefficient roads and 
transportation systems, supply chain weaknesses, aged machinery and low levels of 
capital investment encouraged by a large pool of relatively-low cost labour that 
provided an attractive alternative to automation. 
Moreover, the firm’s interaction with its workers and managers continued to 
be authoritarian and bureaucratic and, as Chapter 5 showed, relied upon long-
standing ‘survivors’ to keep the show running. So, the industrial ecosystem within 
CompCo, on to which lean manufacturing and GEMBA were superimposed, was 
complex and multi-textured and the organisational structure within CompCo had 
evolved, adapted and matured on its own terms over time and would not easily be 
changed. This did not augur well for GEMBA’s success. For instance, supply chains 
were unreliable because larger suppliers of critical components could dictate terms to 
CompCo, because other larger purchasers had greater sway with suppliers and 
because of inefficiencies on the part of suppliers who could not be relied upon to 
supply components as specified and on time. Additionally, limited competition meant 
that suppliers were under only limited pressure to innovate, meet customer demand 
and operate efficiently. 
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8.5 Impetus for Future Research 
In thinking about these findings, potential pathways for future study can be 
identified. First, it is important to undertake other case studies in Indian 
manufacturing firms of their attempts to institute or improve lean management 
programmes, to see what their priorities are, and how they are accepted by managers 
and workers, and why. In particular it would be interesting to see whether other firms 
too are characterised by such strong generational divisions among managers, or 
whether this is characteristic only of firms of a certain size and age. In a future study I 
would try to get more information from managers (and workers) about their social 
backgrounds and aspirations, to enable me to explore the relationship between 
internal company divisions and the wider class structure. It would of course also be 
useful to be able to return to CompCo and to see whether the older generation of 
managers has been eased out, or, as I suspect, it is the younger generation which is 
going elsewhere to meet its aspirations, as Mr. AB has done.  
It would also be useful, with this thesis in mind, to do further research on 
workers and trade union responses and strategies in the manufacturing industries at 
the present time, especially in the light of Bhattacharjee’s and Acker's [2010] 
landmark paper tracing the challenges and dominant features of trade union 
mobilisation and evolution of Indian industrial relations after 1947, and recently 
Teitelbaum's [2011] work on collective mobilisation. At the time of my fieldwork the 
trade unions active in EWS were relatively quiescent, and reduced to communicating 
with workers through pamphlets abhorred by management. In view of the recent 
upsurge in worker militancy elsewhere in India, for instance Suzuki and Maruti 
[Workers Education 2012], it would be interesting to see what is happening at EWS 
and CompCo. 
 474 
These are examples of what I see as the need for more ethnographic studies in 
Indian manufacturing firms. So much research on work and employment in India now 
focuses on call centres and the software industry, so that we know less about how 
manufacturing firms are adapting to liberalisation. In a study of change management, 
this thesis looks particularly at the role of different categorisations of middle managers 
and the way they mediate and stymie middle managers. It does it in the context of 
structuring and restructuring of management careers. How widespread are these 
conflicts in India? Sociological studies of these responses are potentially valuable for 
other plants as well because, more specifically, there is little if any sociological study 
on what guides corporate management and senior middle management's decision-
making within India. I also think that there has not been enough effort to investigate 
how the experiences of different categories of employees, and their reactions to 
employer policies, differ. I would also like to see sociological studies which first 
excavate different dimensions of labour process. Doing so will illuminate more fully 
its implications for all the actors involved and carefully specify the multiplicity of 
causal vectors that mould management strategies and industrial relations and integrate 
the analysis with the theoretical rigour with which writers like Durand go about their 
stand. Influenced by Critical Realism, I believe that within future studies the writer’s 
ideological proclivity can subsequently be brought to bear on the data, for instance 
drawing on the writings of Lenin, communism and Mao, or conversely whole-hearted 
subscription of mainstream management literature rhetoric, which has been more the 
trend in the past, after comprehensive description and analysis. 
As it is, an ethnographic study by a sociologist such as E. A. Ramaswamy's 
[1995] research on the dynamics of industrial relations in the Ryon Industry is now 
over eight years old and Holmstrom’s 1984 study of industrial workers in and around 
Bangalore is even older. It made tentative attempts to work on a ‘behavioural’ 
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understanding of trade union leadership and follower behaviour, but has not been 
subsequently followed up by ethnographic plant-level sociological studies. More 
recently Hensman's [2011] research has identified workers’ difficult prospects in an 
environment that has become more favourable to management under neo-liberal 
capitalism. But it is hard to get past her ideological commitments and attention on the 
Marxist luminaries of the past, such as Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg, towards a specific 
understanding of either changes in the labour process and how different categories of 
workers particularly industrial workers were affected by the continuing onslaught of 
capitalism. 
8.6 Conclusions 
In sum, this thesis has provided one of the few ethnographies of a modern 
production plant in India, one which shows managers grappling with ‘change 
management’, and workers’ reactions and resistance to lean manufacturing because 
of the pressure lean manufacturing puts on them by virtue of its fragile nature and 
potential labour reductions through kaizening. This thesis has also demonstrated that 
lean manufacturing takes place very unevenly, even within a single plant.  
As Hyman [1987] points out, managerial strategies are always inherently 
contradictory and are inevitable routes to partial failure. But the implementation 
of lean manufacturing’s precepts through GEMBA is also specific to its time and 
place. Here it could be seen to have taken place in an industrial context that was 
sub-optimal. As an old established plant, EWS was relatively successful by dint 
of a continual management of contingencies and related management and staff 
compromises. It was efficient enough to meet production demands and survive 
for the day and but was never good enough to benchmark itself against India’s 
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exemplars of lean techniques in manufacturing. It was its strengths, therefore, as 
well as its internal divisions, which inhibited the acceptance and embedding of 
the GEMBA programme. 
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Appendix 14 Glossary of Terms 
CompCo’s Plants Listed 
EWS: Pseudonym for CompCo's plant located in the town assigned the 
pseudonym Hubli (a: fictitious name) started operations in January 1980. It 
produces Engines and Medium Duty Vehicles. 
WAP4: Larger plant than Hubli producing light commercial vehicles, custom-made 
long haul buses, chassis and heavy tonnage trucks.. 
WDM3: Press Shop catering primarily for EWS and WAP4. 
WDP4: Pseudonym for CompCo's plant located assigned the pseudonym Nellore (a 
fictitious name) near Madras. Also shares some of the production schedule of EWS in 
making engines and produces an identical commercial vehicle range with WAP4. 
WDP1: Foundry unit specialising in manufacturing engine blocks, owned by CompCo 
situated in the peripheral industrial hub Nellore near Madras. 
Plants WAM4: CompCo plant located near Nagpur in central India, produces 
commercial vehicles for central India., 
WDG3: CompCo plant near Jaipur in North India to cater to the Northern Market, YDM4: 
Pseudonym for CompCo’s recent state of the art lean plant built to start operations in 2011. 
Glossary Of Abbreviations Used 
GUL: GEMBA Unit Leader 
GIL: GEMBA Initiative leader 
GCC: GEMBA Communication Centre 
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CMI: Cost Minimisation Iniative 
5S: Sort (Seiri in Japanese), Set in Order (Seiton), Store (Seasur), 
Standardise (Seiketsu), Sustain (shitsuki) 
HRD: Human Resource Department (formerly the Personnel Department of EWS) 
MDV: Medium Duty Vehicle Assembly Shops 
EEI: Efficiency Ergonomics Index. 
WIP: Work in Process 
KRA: Key Result Area 
BOM: Bill Of Materials 
IOH: Inventory On Hand 
PDI: Pre Delivery Inspection 
PTS: Passed to Sales 
Other Salient Terms 
CNC: Computer Numerically Controlled Machines-Multi-Axis, implying they can 
perform multiple operations in one job cycle. 
DMG: Gildemeister Deckel Maho – multinational firm which is occupies a niche 
position in the CNC machining market around the world. 
Bharat Forge: Engine Crank Shaft Manufacturer – Primary supplier to CompCo who 
sometimes manufacture them in their own shop. 
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Bosch: Robert Bosch GmbH – critical components, spark plug suppliers. 
Andon lights: Japanese signal board indicators that are used on assembly lines to alert 
a line that a problem has arisen. 
GEMBA: A Japanese terminology used to identify the root cause at their source and 
resolve problems proactively and preemptively at the point of their origin in the 
workplace. 
Kaizen: Japanese terms for small daily incremental improvements in production 
practices which accumulate daily and are implemented as participative activities at 
work sites of Japanese companies [Bird, 2002: 260].  
Kanban: Implies a card or written indicator to control production and inventory of 
components. Kanban cards on their returnable bins indicate information on parts, process 
and number of parts in the bin and are replenished as soon as they get over [Bird, 2002: 
261]. 
Just in Time (JIT): Production system seeking to eliminate excessive stocks and inventory 
required to all but what is absolutely necessary. It relies on the kanban system and advocate 
usage and storage of components that are only absolutely necessary and follows a pull 
system and uses kanban-marked bins which can be replenished only when they are fully 
empty [Bird, 2002: 259]. 
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Appendix 15 Glossary of Individuals’ Names Mentioned in the 
Thesis 
1. CompCo Corporate management in Nellore and EWS Senior 
management  
Mr. D: Executive Head Manufacturing CompCo, Nellore  
Mr. N: GEMBA Head CompCo who operated out of EWS  
Mr. SDN: General Manager and Overall Head Of EWS  
Mr. TRN: Production Head, EWS 
Mr. TMS: Head of Material Planning in EWS 
Mr. VDS: Chief Operating Officer (COO) of CompCo Nellore 
2.  Senior Level Middle Managers in EWS 
Mr. AB: The Staff Specialist and Deputy Head of GEMBA 
Mr. Akb: Head Personnel Management of EWS 
Mr. Ar: Head of End Product Quality Subassemblies  
Mr. Mercury: Section Head (Production Control Office)  
Mr. Mrl: Deputy of Mr. Akb. Personnel Manager of EWS  
Mr. RGN Head CompCo Quality Assurance 
Mr. RN: Senior Middle manager Manager-Supplier-Coordination and Delivery 
Material Planning. 
Mr. SVM: CTV engineering GEMBA 
Mr. T: Manager Engine Machining Quality 
Mr. V: Manager-Material procurement-Purchase department  
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Mr. VS: The injured Departmental Head in EWS in the 1980s 
3. Lower level and middle tier Middle Managers in EWS  
Mr. ABK: Graduate Engineering Trainee who was stationed then in Production 
Planning and Control  
Mr. AK: Line manager (Production Planning and Control) 
Mr. ISC: Line Manager (Production Planning and Control) 
Mr. RGPN: Engine Stores (Tools and Consumables) Shop 
Mr. RN: Deputy manager of the finished engines section stores of shop 
Mr. RV: Senior middle manager Material- Planning supplier delivery coordination 
Mr.SGM: Experienced Manager Pre Delivery Inspection, had begun his career as an 
operator 
Mr. SK: Clerical manager who had started out as a worker and worked in the 
Financial Audit Department 
Mr. SMU: Line Manager (Production) 
Mr. SMGN: Mobile End Product Quality Audit Inspector [who had moved over to 
the “other side” from the worker’s whose job role, was to inspect finished 
commercial vehicles and was on tour for over 25 days in the month all around 
CompCo’s plants in India 
Mr. TJN: Manager GEMBA rewards administration 
4. Workers' Mentioned in the Thesis 
Mr. A: An Experienced Operator in EWS (Engine Machining Shop 5) 
Mr. TNS: Operator Heat Treatment shop, Erstwhile Communist Trade Union 
Activist 
Mr. VN: Operator (Engine Stores)  
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Mr. KGN: Operator Engine, Assembly 
Mr. KNM: Operator (Engine assembly) who applies pneumatic torque to engine 
cylinder head-bolts 
Mr. VDVN: Operator and EWS Trade Union Convener CompCo EWS Employees 
Union (Communist) 
5. External Trade Unionists 
Mr. MCL: External Trade Unionist who had considerable Influence over EWS 
workers, Head of CompCo EWS Workers Union [MCL]  
Mr. RK: Trade Union Leader – Head of CompCo Workers Union (AIADMK) 
Mr. RS: Senior Operator Retired, Trade Union Leader (DMK Party) – Head 
of CompCo EWS Workers Union (DMK) 
6. Retired Managers and Outsiders from EWS who became 
key informants 
Mr.NNK: Manager Purchase and Supplier co-ordination WAP4 plant, Hubli 
Mr. RC: Retired GM [Exports] CompCo Corporate Headquarters Nellore, who helped 
me gain access into CompCo and also a key informant. 
Mr. SGN: Erstwhile colleague of Mr. SVM now works as a production manager in 
Cummins Pune India 
Mr. SRV: Automotive Industry Expert and the head of Cummins India Pune 
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